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
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DECLINE OF IDEOLOGY: A DISSENT AND AN INTERPRETATION*

JOSEPH LAPALOMBARA
Yale University

INTRODUCTION

With increasing frequency and self-assurance, the scientific objectivity of American social science is proclaimed by some of its prominent practitioners. Various explanations are offered for the onset of social science's Golden Age, but central to most of them is the claim that modern social science has managed to resolve Mannheim's Paradox,[1] namely, that in the pursuit of the truth the social scientist himself is handicapped by the narrow focus and distortions implicit in ideological thought. Presumably, the social scientist can now probe any aspect of human organization and behavior as dispassionately as physical scientists observe the structure of the atom or chemical reactions. For this reason, it is claimed by some that the ideologically liberated social scientists—at least in the United States—can expect to be co-opted into the Scientific Culture, or that segment of society that is presumably aloof from and disdainful toward the moralistic speculations and the tender-heartedness of the literary intellectuals.

The behaviorial "revolution" in political science may have run its course, but it has left in its wake both obscurantist criticisms of empiricism, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, an unquestioning belief in "science." Quite often the latter belief is not merely antihistorical and anti-philosophical but also uncritical about the extent to which empirical observations can be colored by the very orientation to values that one seeks to control in rigorous empirical research.

The claims of modern social scientists are greatly buttressed by the views of Talcott Parsons.[2] In response to criticisms of his work

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[1] This term is used by Clifford Geertz in "Ideology as a Cultural System," in D. E. Apter (ed.), *Ideology and Discontent* (London, 1964), pp. 48 ff. Although the present paper was prepared in draft before that volume appeared, I have benefitted immensely in its revision from Geertz's perceptive essay. I have also profited from suggestions offered by my colleagues, Wendell Bell, James Mau and Sidney Tarrow; and particularly from William Delany, whose analytical critique of papers on this subject delivered at the 1964 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association ("The Role of Ideology: A Summation") is itself a most insightful view of the problem.

[2] I do not mean to suggest that American sociology speaks with one voice on this subject. There is, on the one hand, the claim of scientific objectivity and objection to the intrusion of values into research. But, on the other hand, there is also growing concern with the "global" questions, a retreat from the scientism implicit in some functionalist formulations, and increased demands for the need to engage in ethically relevant social research. See, for example, Peter Berger, *Invitation to Sociology* (Garden City, N. Y. 1963); Maurice Stein and Arthur Vidich (eds.), *Sociology on Trial* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1963).

It is also worth recalling that Max Weber, himself, to whom many claimants of the "scientific objectivity" of social science often turn for support, would never, in my view, have gone as far as some of our contemporaries in his brief for empirical science. As I read him, he considers a *science* of culture to be both "meaningless" and "senseless." See Max Weber, *On the Methodology of the Social Sciences*. Translated and edited by E. A. Shils and offered by a group of scholars at Cornell University, Parsons asserts that the "breakthrough" in the behavioral sciences occurred in the United States in part because of that country's intellectual openness and receptivity. A critical cause of this latter quality, according to Parsons, is the American intellectual's " . . . relative immunity to the pressure to put problem in an ideological context," and thus his refusal to worry too much about "global" problems.[3] For Parsons, science and ideology are simply incompatible concepts.

This is not the place to explore the ideological underpinnings of Parsons' formulations, particularly since the reader can turn for this to Andrew Hacker's somewhat polemical but nevertheless extremely cogent analysis (which Parsons chooses essentially to evade).[4] It is worthwhile noting, however, that Parsons' refusal to be concerned with the "global" questions, and his claims for the scientific objectivity of his emerging general theory, underpin the claims of other social scientists who extol the "scientific" qualities of their disciplines.

One interesting extrapolation from these assumptions about social science objectivity, and of the essential incompatibility of social science and normative orientations, is found in the so-called "decline of ideology" literature. Presumably, social-scientific generalizations have been made about the waning of ideology. The irony attaching to arguments in and against these "findings" is that they have themselves taken on many of the undeniable earmarks of *ideological* conflict. Thus, I wish to acknowledge that my own effort in this paper may be in part—and quite properly—identified as ideological. Indeed, the underlying theme of my argument here is that we have not, in fact, resolved the Mannheim Paradox and that perhaps the future of social science will be better served if we acknowledge this fact and face up to its intellectual and theoretical implications.

More particularly, however, I wish to deal in this paper with these topics: 1) what it is that is meant when social scientists write about the "decline of ideology"; 2) an examination of some empirical evidence from the West that strongly challenges some of the "findings" of these writers; and 3) a somewhat tentative ideological-social scientific interpretation of what these writings may represent in contemporary American society.

THE MEANING OF IDEOLOGY

It is abundantly clear that those who write about ideology's decline, with few exceptions,[5] intend a pejorative denotation and connotation of the term. Taking their lead from Mannheim, these writers contend that ideological thought means at least that such ideas are "distorted," in the sense that they lack "congruence" with reality. Beyond this, however, they seem to support the Mannheim view that the lack of congruence may be either emotionally determined, and therefore the result of subconscious forces, or "conscious deception, where ideology is to be interpreted as a purposeful lie."[6]

H. A. Finch (Glencoe, Illinois, 1949), pp. 49–112, and esp. part III. It is also possible to read Weber on the use of values in teaching as simply a strategy to be followed by scholars on the left who, in an authoritarian Bismarckian society, would be permitted to voice in the classroom only the values of the "Establishment." See, *ibid.*, pp. 1–47.

[3] Talcott Parsons, "The Point of View of the Author," in Max Black, (ed.), *The Social Theories of Talcott Parsons* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J. 1962), pp. 313–315, 360–362.

[4] Andrew Hacker, "Sociology and Ideology," in *ibid.*, pp. 289–310. In my view, Hacker raises most of the relevant questions about Parsons' seeming political "conservatism," and he underscores as well the essentially ideological reactions of Parsons to the work of someone like C. Wright Mills. Parsons' response to Hacker is to acknowledge that he (Parsons) is an "egghead," and a "liberal" whose views of American society and the functioning of the American political system are normatively unacceptable to Hacker and to " . . . a good many other American intellectuals, especially those who think more or less in Marxist terms. . . . " *Ibid.*, p. 350.

[5] One exception would be Otto Kirchheimer, who was greatly concerned about the possible consequence of, say, the emergence of the "catch-all" political party in a country like the West German Republic. See his, "The Transformation of the European Party System," in Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner (eds.), *Political Parties and Political Development* (Princeton, 1966). Cf. his, "The Waning of Opposition in Parliamentary Regimes," *Social Research* 24 (1957), pp. 127–156. I am uncertain as to whether what Kirchheimer describes is a decline of ideology, but it is noteworthy that he was one of those who didn't think that what he saw was "good" for Western societies.

[6] Karl Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia* (London, 1936), pp. 175–176. Mannheim's second chapter in this volume, pp. 49–96, from which the volume's title is derived, is of course the classic statement of the origins of the term "ideology," its particular and general formulations, its relationship to Marxism and it catalytic impact on the sociology of knowledge.

It can be argued, of course, that one is free to define ideology as it happens to suit one's mood or purpose, and we have a vast literature demonstrating the considerable range of meaning that can be assigned to the concept.[7] But if one elects a definition that is based too heavily on the notion of wilful or unintended deception or distortion, much of what social scientists generally identify as ideological would simply have to be ignored, or called something else. Moreover, if the central purpose of the analysis is to demonstrate something as significant as ideology's decline, it seems to me to be the essence of intellectual legerdemain, or downright slovenliness, to leave the definition of ideology vague, or to confuse the demonstrable decline of something one finds objectionable with presumably empirical generalizations about the gradual disappearance of something which is much broader in meaning.

My usage of ideology is quite close to the definition suggested by L. H. Garstin, in that it involves a philosophy of history, a view of man's present place in it, some estimate of probable lines of future development, and a set of prescriptions regarding how to hasten, retard, and/or modify that developmental direction.[8] While the concept, ideology, is certainly one of the most elusive in our vocabulary, we can say about it that, beyond the above, it tends to specify a set of values that are more or less coherent and that it seeks to link given patterns of action to the achievement or maintenance of a future, or existing, state of affairs. What makes such formulations of particular interest to political scientists is that ideologies frequently insist that in order to achieve or maintain desired ends, deemed to be morally superior and therefore desirable for the entire collectivity, public authority is expected to intervene.

It is in this broad sense, then, that I am using the concept in this paper. This being the case, several caveats are in order. For example, an ideology may or may not be dogmatic; a relative lack of dogmatism does not necessarily make a given set of cognitions, preferences, expectations and prescriptions any the less ideological. An ideology may or may not be utopian. I assume that conservative movements of the last century or two, as well as the so-called Radical Right in the United States at present have strong ideological dimensions, notwithstanding their vociferous denials of utopias. Similarly, Catholicism is no less ideological in many of its political dimensions by reason of its rejection of the Enlightenment's assumptions concerning man's perfectibility. An ideology may or may not be attuned to the claimed rationality of modern science; the place of scientific thought in ideological formulations is an empirical question that should not be begged by the assumption that science and ideology are incompatible. Technocrats and others who enshrine the Managerial Society certainly engage in the most fundamental kind of ideological reasoning. Ideology may or may not emphasize rhetoric or flamboyant verbal formulations. The language of ideology is also an empirical question; it will surely be strongly influenced by the socio-historical context in which it evolves, and a decline or, better, change in rhetoric should not be confused with a decline in ideology itself.[9] Finally, an ideology may or may not be believed by those who articulate it. Whether an ideology is cynically used as a weapon or instrument of control; whether it emanates from subconscious needs or drives or is rationally formulated and incorporated into one's belief system; indeed, whether it is narrowly or widely, publicly or privately shared with third persons are also legitimate and fascinating questions that require careful investigation rather than *a priori* answers.

It seems to me that the "decline of ideology" writers[10] commit one or more of all of the errors implied above. For example, ideology is said to apply to passionately articulated prescriptions, evidently not to those which manifest calm rationality. As Daniel Bell puts it, "ideology is the conversion of ideas into social levers. . . . What gives ideology its force is its passion."[11] Lipset, in his personal postscript on ideology's passing, tells us that "Democracy in the Western world has been undergoing some important changes as serious intellectual conflicts among groups representing different values have declined sharply."[12] In the case of Aron, his passionate and intemperate attacks on the ideas of certain French intellectuals are so extreme as to represent not so much social science analysis as they do a fascinating example of the rhetorical aspect of ideological exchange.[13]

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[7] The best recent short review of the literature that I have seen is Joseph J. Spengler, "Theory, Ideology, Non-Economic Values, and Politico-Economic Development," in Ralph Braibanti and J. J. Spengler (eds.), *Tradition, Values and Socio-Economic Development* (Durham, 1961), pp. 3–56, and esp. Part V. Spengler himself opts for a somewhat pejorative definition which hinges on values that directly or indirectly impede a "rational" approach to the ends-means problem in economic development: see pp. 31–32.

[8] L. H. Garstin, *Each Age Is a Dream: A Study in Ideologies* (New York, 1954), p. 3. I recognize that my usage here is quite broad and that it may be typical of what my friend, Giovanni Sartori, scores as the American tendency to assign to the concept, ideology, a very wide meaning, "without limits." Sartori argues that such definitions are "heuristically sterile and operationally fruitless" (personal communication to the author, November 16, 1965). Sartori may or may not be right; my point here is simply to break away from the extremely narrow definition implied in the "decline of ideology" literature.

[9] Much of the burden of Geertz's essay, *op. cit.*, is to alert the social scientist to the great need for viewing ideology within a framework of "symbolic action." See pp. 57 *ff.*

It seems equally apparent that what these writers mean by ideology is not any given set of values, beliefs, preferences, expectations and prescriptions regarding society but that *particular* set that we may variously associate with Orthodox Marxism, "Scientific Socialism," Bolshevism, Maoism, or in any case with strongly held and dogmatically articulated ideas regarding class conflict and revolution. Thus, "the exhaustion of political ideas in the West" refers to that particular case involving the disillusionment experienced by Marxist intellectuals when it became apparent that many of Marx's predictions were simply not borne out, and when the outrages of the Stalinist regime were publicly revealed. We need not document the evidence for the widespread disillusionment, or for the agonizing ideological reappraisals to which it has led. But, as I shall briefly document below, to limit the meaning of ideology to absolute utopias, to concentrate one's analytical attention upon what some Marxian socialists may be up to, and to equate certain changes in rhetoric with ideological decline is to narrow the meaning of the central concept to the point where it has very limited utility for the social scientist.

The writers I have in mind also seem to see ideology as a dependent phenomenon, whose rise and fall is conditioned by a number of ecological factors, most of them economic. This curious determinism suggests that if there are marked differences in poverty and wealth—or in life styles—ideology emerges; if these differences are reduced, ideology (i.e., class-conflict ideology) declines. Thus, Lipset tells us that "Ideological passion may no longer be necessary to sustain the class struggle within stable and affluent democracies."[14] At another place he says, "As differences in style of life are reduced, so are the tensions of stratification. And increased education enhances the propensity of different groups to 'tolerate' each other, to accept the complex idea that truth and error are not necessarily on one side."[15]

These writers are far too sophisticated to suggest that there is a simple correlation between increases in economic productivity or distribution and decline of ideology. They recognize, for example, that religious and other cleavages may cut against tendencies toward ideological quiescence. Nevertheless, I came away from this literature with the uncomfortable impression that these writers claim that moral imperatives, differences of opinion regarding the "good life," and opposing formulations regarding public policy must necessarily give way before the avalanche of popular education, the mass media and greater and greater numbers of washing machines, automobiles and television sets. How else judge the assertion—as clearly debatable as it is subjective and ideological—that ideology is in decline because "the fundamental problems of the Industrial Revolution have been solved."[16]

There are certainly thousands of European intellectuals, as well as tens of millions of other Europeans, who would react to the last quoted statement sardonically, or in sheer disbelief.

Since the generalizations about ideology's alleged decline apply to the West, and therefore to Europe as well as the North American continent, it may be instructive to look at one of these countries, Italy, to see exactly how accurate these generalizations are. It should be noted that the time span I will consider are the years since World War II; my point will be that since generalizations for such a short period are so manifestly inaccurate, it is useless to lend any kind of serious attention to prognostications about where we will be a century or two from now. Keynes, I believe, authored the most appropriate aphorism about the "long run."

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[10] I refer here primarily to the following: Raymond Aron, "Fin de l'age ideologique?" in T. W. Adorno and W. Dirks (eds.), *Sociologica* (Frankfurt, 1955), pp. 219–233; R. Aron, *The Opium of the Intellectuals* (New York, 1962); Talcott Parsons, "An Approach to the Sociology of Knowledge," *Transactions of the Fourth World Congress of Sociology* (Milan and Stresa, 1959), pp. 25–49; Edward Shils, "The End of Ideology?" *Encounter* 5 (November, 1955), 52–58; S. M. Lipset, *Political Man* (Garden City, 1960), pp. 403–417; Daniel Bell; *The End of Ideology* (Glencoe, Ill., 1960), esp. pp. 369–375; and S. M. Lipset, "The Changing Class Structure and Contemporary European Politics," *Daedalus* 93 (Winter, 1964), 271–303.

[11] Bell, *op. cit.*, pp. 370, 371.

[12] Lipset, *Political Man*, *op. cit.*, p. 403.

[13] Aron, *The Opium of the Intellectuals*, *op. cit.*

[14] Lipset, *Political Man*, *op. cit.*, p. 407.

[15] Lipset, "The Changing Class Structure . . ." *op. cit.*, p. 272.

[16] Lipset, *Political Man*, *op. cit.*, p. 406.

IDEOLOGY IN ITALY

The points I wish to stress about Italy can be briefly stated, although their detailed documentation would require more space than is available here. First, notwithstanding the existence within the Italian Communist party of both a "crisis of intellectuals" and a "crisis of ideology," there has recently occurred within that party a new ferment of ideas which in a certain sense has actually enriched rather than diminished attention to ideology. Second, if one bothers to look away from the Communist party (P.C.I.) and toward Christian Democracy (D.C.), it is possible to conclude that ideology in the latter is actually on the upswing. Third, and following from these two observations, the so-called decline-of-ideology theory is simply not valid for the Italian case.[17]

The Italian Communist Party. The most frequent—and most wishful—interpretation of P.C.I. is that it is moving in a reformist direction that will eventuate in its accepting the existing system and limiting its demands to social, political and economic manipulations designed to effect needed, but not revolutionary, reforms from time to time. This view of the party is superficial in the sense that "reformism" dates back to 1944 when Palmiro Togliatti returned from Moscow articulating a moderate line which was as unnerving as it was unexpected. This line was carefully followed in the Constituent Assembly, which drafted the Italian Constitution, and in this broad sense the party has been "reformist" throughout the postwar years.

What has changed in recent years is neither the party's will to power nor its commitment to a basically socialist ideology. Rather, I would say that the changes include: 1) the party's use of extreme rhetoric; 2) its now openly expressed polycentrist view regarding the nature of the international socialist or communist movement; and 3) the party's notions regarding how the class struggle should be conducted in contemporary Italy. The debates and agonizing reappraisals that the party has experienced in recent years must be construed not as a sign of ideological decay but, rather, as a sign of ideological vigor which is largely responsible for the party's steady and increasing attraction at the polls.

The list of P.C.I. errors in prognosticating about Italian society is long and impressive; it led observers at Bologna not long ago to comment on what a "grotesque assumption" was the party's belief that only it possessed a scientifically infallible method for analyzing reality.[18] The errors included such things as predictions about the comparative rate of economic growth in Communist and free countries, expectations regarding the European Common Market, impending economic crises in capitalistic countries, etc. One observer of this pattern of inaccurate prognosticating notes that it was not until the middle of 1961 that the "Communists awoke from their dogmatic dream and almost in a flash learned that their judgments did not correspond to reality."[19]

The truth is that the alarm had sounded for P.C.I. several years before, and precisely at the VII Party Congress of 1956. It was here that the party's activities in the underdeveloped South first received a public airing. The critics of the party's "*Movimento di Rinascita*" in southern Italy openly noted that the movement was in crisis and that the crisis grew out of the party's failure to adapt ideology and consequently policy to the concrete conditions of Southern Italy. Members of the party itself scored it for its "sterile and negative" approach to national problems, for its rigid and doctrinaire adherence to fixed schemes, for its permitting the movement to lose whatever dynamism it may have had in earlier years.[20]

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[17] A number of colleagues who were good enough to read this manuscript urge that the empirical evidence challenging the "decline" thesis should not be limited to Italy. Roger Masters and Giovanni Sartori point out, for example, that the U. S. would provide additional supportive evidence. Nils Elvander notes that Tingsten himself, in his analyses of the Swedish Social Democratic Party, became "caught up in the intense struggle against the 'dead' ideology of the party, and when the battle was over he went on declaring ideology dead, not being able to see that it was revitalized again and again" (personal communication to the author, December 19, 1964). I am aware of this additional evidence and simply note that the Italian case is used here as an illustrative rather than exhaustive example.

[18] Paolo Covilla, Giorgio Galli, Luigi Pedrazzi, Alfonso Prandi and Franco Serra, "I Partiti Italiani tra il 1958 e il 1963." *Il Mulino*, 12 (April, 1963), p. 323.

[19] G. Tamburrano, "Lo Sviluppo del capitalismo e la crisi teorica dei comunisti italiani," *Tempi Moderni*, 5 (July–September, 1962), p. 22.

Both Togliatti and Giorgio Amendola (the latter considered the leader of the P.C.I.'s "reformist" wing) urged that the party must be flexible and overcome the inertia of pat formulations. They admitted that both the party and its trade union wing seemed to be unprepared to confront the great changes in local conditions that had occurred in the years since 1945.[21] It is possible that, within the party's secret confines, this kind of self-appraisal had begun before 1956, but in those earlier days one would not have expected Togliatti to say publicly that the party was not keeping up with basic social and economic transformations in Italy or that it was necessary for that organization to engage in the kind of total re-examination that will finally sweep away "ancient and recent moldiness that impede the action of P.C.I."[22]

To be sure, removing ideological mold is not easy for Communists, who tend to be ultra-intellectual in a society where intellectual elegance is highly prized. One can therefore note in the party's literature the care—and the web-like logic—with which recent changes are reconciled with Marx and Lenin, and particularly with the writings of Antonio Gramsci, the intellectual fountainhead of Italian Communism, and a formidable dialectician whose work is too little known in the English-speaking world.[23] Nevertheless, the party's public posture has changed radically. The most recent and important indication of this change is the party's decision to seek alliances with elements of the middle class—peasants, small landowners, artisans, small and medium industrialists and even with entrepreneurs who are not involved with industrial monopolies.[24] The importance of this change should be strongly emphasized; the P.C.I. has managed in one stroke to shift largely to monopoly capitalism all of the attacks that had previously been leveled against an allegedly retrograde, decadent bourgeoisie. The party's open strategy is to attract to its ranks the mushrooming members of the middle and tertiary strata that large-scale industrial development tends to proliferate. The fire of opposition is no longer directed against proprietors in general but against the monopolists who allegedly exploit all others in society, who are oppressive, and who increase the degree of imbalance or disequilibrium in the social system.

This, then, is not the party of the Stalin Era. Not many who followed the antics of P.C.I. up to the Hungarian Rebellion would have predicted changes in orientation such as the ones so briefly summarized. The fascinating question to pose here, however, is whether what has happened represents a *decline* in P.C.I. ideology, or something else. If by decline is meant the abandonment of some of the rhetoric, the verbal symbols, the predictions and expectations voiced until the late fifties, there seems little doubt about the validity of such a judgment, although the more appropriate word would be *change*. However, if by decline is meant that P.C.I. is becoming bourgeois or "social-democratized," or that it is abandoning any commitment to ideological formulations, I believe one should hesitate before leaping to such a conclusion. As Palmiro Togliatti significantly put it, "There is no experience regarding the way in which the battle for socialism can or must be waged in a regime of advanced monopolistic state capitalism . . . There do not even exist explicit prescriptions in the classics of our doctrine."[25]

Communist leaders who spearhead this reappraisal are not calling for ideological retreat but, rather, for a concerted search for new ideological underpinnings for party policies and actions. In noting that Marxism offers, at best, vague guides to party behavior in modern Italian society, these leaders seem to me to be a long way from abandoning such key concepts as class, dialectical conflict, the exploitative nature of monopoly capitalism, and the fundamental need for effecting structural—not mild, reformist—changes in the social system. They, and the millions of Italians who support them at the polls, are far from concluding, if this is the acid test for the inclination toward ideological decline, that the problems created by the Industrial Revolution have been largely solved.

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[20] See the editorial, "I Problemi del Mezzogiorno nei Congressi del PCI e del PSI," *Cronache Meridionali,* 4 (January–February, 1957), pp. 57–58. The struggle of the P. C. I. to make the necessary ideological, strategic and tactical changes in its approach to the Italian South is perceptively and exhaustively analyzed by Sidney Tarrow, *Peasant Communism in Southern Italy.* Ph.D. dissertation manuscript, Berkeley, University of California, 1965.

[21] "I Problemi del Mezzogiorno . . . ," *op. cit.,* p. 59. Cf. Giorgio Amendola, "I Comunisti per la rinascita del Mezzogiorno," *Cronache Meridionali* 4 (May, 1957), p. 279. See, also, P.C.I., *Tesi e documenti del Congresso del PCI,* (Rome, 1963), p. 138.

[22] Abdon Alinovi, "Problemi della politica comunista nel Mezzogiorno," *Critica Marxista,* 1 (July–August, 1963), 4–8.

[23] Palmiro Togliatti, *Il Partito Communista Italiano* (Rome, 1961), p. 55; Antonio Gramsci, "Alcuni temi della questione meridionale," in *Antologia degli scritti* (Rome, 1963), pp. 51, 69.

[24] Tamburrano, *op. cit.,* p. 23.

[25] *Ibid.,* p. 69. See the important statement by Bruno Tentin, one of the most important of the party's young leaders, intellectuals and ideological architects, "Tendenze attuali del capitalismo italiano," in *Tendenze del capitalismo italiano: Atti del convegno economico dell'Istituto Gramsci* (Rome, 1962) p. 43 ff.

The effort to attune the party's ideology to present Italian realities is a complementary side of the vigorous campaign for polycentrism which the party has been conducting within the international communist movement. Beginning in 1956, P.C.I. frankly asserted that the Soviet model could no longer be a specific guide to Communist parties in every country and that it would be necessary to find a "national path to socialism." Togliatti made this point forcefully in the last book he published before his death.[26] In November, 1961, the P.C.I. Secretariat formulated a resolution which said in part that "There do not exist and there cannot exist either a guiding party or state or one or more instances of centralized direction of the international Communist movement. Under existing conditions there must be and there must increasingly be a great articulation of the movement in a context of full independence of individual parties."[27]

These are brave words, and it is still much too early to conclude with any confidence what the result of the P.C.I.'s campaign will be.[28] What is important is the apparent P.C.I. conviction that it can come up with a new strategy—a new formula for achieving power—for Communist parties operating in Western European and other countries of advanced capitalism. It is important to bear in mind that, in doing this, the party purports to be able to provide an up-dated ideological rationale for action. Some of the "moldiness" of "Scientific Socialism" has certainly been scraped away. What remains, coupled with some of the newer ideas currently in ferment, amounts to much more ideology than one might detect from the simple notation that the language of the late forties and early fifties is no longer in vogue.

Italian Christian Democracy. The genius of Alcide DeGasperi is that for a decade following the birth of the Italian Republic he was able to hold together within the Christian Democratic party (D.C.) strongly opposed ideological factions that managed to play down ideology in the interest of holding on to power. This was no mean achievement. Although the popular image of the D.C. is that of an opportunistic, anti-ideological "brokerage" party, the truth is that, from the outset, strong factions that would have emphasized ideology, even at the risk of splitting the party, had to be suppressed or defeated. DeGasperi's hegemonic control of the organization was secured only after he had managed to beat down early competition for leadership emanating from such ideologues as Giuseppe Dossetti, Amintore Fanfani and Giovanni Gronchi. One might well conclude that, in an age of alleged ideological decline and after a decade of enjoying the many fruits of political power, ideology would have become a much less salient issue within the D.C.

Exactly the opposite tendency is apparent, however. Since the death of DeGasperi, and the advent of Fanfani as a major party leader in 1954, the ideological debate has not only intensified but has also broken into public view, revealing a party organization under deep internal stress. I believe that the facts will clearly demonstrate that since that date the role of ideology within the D.C. has actually increased rather than diminished, and a few central occurrences will serve to bear out this conclusion.

In September, 1961, the D.C. held at San Pellegrino the first of three annual "ideological" conventions. They represented a long and successful effort on the part of those in the party who had fought for making the party ideologically coherent, something more than the "brokerage" party the D.C. had been under DeGasperi's leadership. Looming over these proceedings were two of the party's perennial dilemmas: First, to what extent should the D.C., a party drawing much of its strength from the political right, articulate a left-wing ideology as a guide to policy? Second, how much ideological freedom could the party express *vis-à-vis* a Catholic Church to which it must necessarily remain fairly closely tied? Those who favored stronger articulation of a coherent left-wing ideology were strongly spurred by an undeniable gradual movement to the left by the Italian electorate, by the increasing willingness of the Italian Socialist party to consider active coalition with the D.C., and certainly not least by the kinds of ideological changes in the Vatican triggered by the innovating papacy of John XXIII.

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[26] Togliatti, *op. cit.*, p. 131.

[27] See "Problemi del dibattito tra partiti comunisti," *ibid.*, p. 16.

[28] The Italian Communists have pushed polycentrism very hard indeed, and do not react well to Soviet attempts to water it down. See, *L'Unità*, November 22, 1961, p. 11. On this general topic, see the excellent analysis by Donald L. M. Blackmer, "The P.C.I. and the International Communist Movement," Massachusetts Institute of Technology, mimeographed.

Speakers at the conferences reviewed the party's ideological history, noting that at war's end it appeared that the party would lead the country left and that, in those years, DeGasperi himself stated that the old order based on the domination of rural landowners and urban industrialists would not remain intact. But it was lamented that whenever the D.C. confronted issues concerning which the party's ideology seemingly required socialist solutions, ideology was arrested in favor of not pushing to the breaking point the ideological centrifugal tendencies within the organization. As Franco Malfatti, one of the followers of Giuseppe Dossetti and Amintore Fanfani, points out, the revolutionary tone of early D.C. pronouncements was gradually transformed into the muted notes of a purely formalistic democracy and of a great concentration of governmental power at Rome.[29]

As the D.C. moved self-consciously toward the "Opening to the Left" which would bring the Socialists into the government, the party's ideologues would no longer accept the DeGasperi formula whereby all concern about or dedication to ideology was to be obscured in favor of the overriding value of party unity. At San Pellegrino, Malfatti put the new posture of the ideologues pointedly. "The problem of [party] unity," he said, "is a great one of fundamental importance but it is also a problem that runs the risk of losing all its value if used as a sedative, or as the Hymn of Garibaldi, every time there is conflict between clerical and anti-clerical elements."[30] If the party wished to be free of all internal ideological conflict, nothing would remain of it except an agreement "to hold power for power's sake."[31]

According to Achille Ardigò, a sociologist and long-time member of the party's national executive committee, the major milestones in the D.C.'s ideological evolution are the following: First, the development of the concept of the political autonomy of Catholics, unconstrained by specific direction by clerical forces. Second, the growth of the idea of the autonomous function of intermediate groups (such as family, community and social class) against the excesses of the centralizing, modern liberal state. Third, the defense and consolidation of liberty, in a government of laws, through an alliance of the democratic forces of the nation against political and ideological extremes. Fourth, the materialization of the ideology of the "new party" led by Amintore Fanfani. Finally, the emergence of a new concept of the state as an artifice of harmonious and planned development—the idea of the state as an instrument of dynamic intervention in the economic sphere and of the modification of the rights of property in favor of the well-being of the collectivity. It is the evolution of this last, self-consciously ideological stage that permitted the party's recent shift to the left and the acceptance of coalition with the Socialists.[32]

One can identify many reasons for this shift to the left, including Italian voting patterns that have clearly led the D.C. in this direction. To the many social and economic pressures leading to the emergence of a Catholic Socialism, one would have to add the liberating impact of John XXIII's revolutionary encyclical, *Mater et Magistra.* In the light of this radical departure from the conservative, often reactionary, political utterances of Pius XII, it is easy to understand why the D.C. left should be spurred to a more purposeful and ideologically rationalized attack on Italian society's ills.

It is important to recognize that the San Pellegrino meetings mean not that the D.C. has moved left on a purely opportunistic basis, but, rather, on the basis of a "rediscovery" of the ideological formulations laid down by Dossetti and others in the late forties. To be sure the current ideology is not socialism and, indeed, leaders like Aldo Moro have been careful to distinguish D.C. ideology from socialism and communism. Nevertheless, the D.C. is today a dramatically less catch-all party than it was under DeGasperi. It now has a somewhat official and publicly articulated ideology. If ideology is in fact in significant decline elsewhere in Europe,[33] Italy will certainly have to be excepted from such easy generalizations. In the P.C.I., ideology has changed and appears to be vigorously reasserting itself; in the D.C. the era of suppressed ideology has passed, and ideological debate and commitment are clearly resurgent.

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[29] Franco M. Malfatti, "La Democrazia Cristiana nelle sue affermazioni programmatiche dalla sua ricostruzione ad oggi," in *Il Convegno di San Pellegrino: Atti del I Convegno di Studi della D. C.* (Rome, 1962), pp. 325–341. For examples of the early, postwar ideological statements of the party, see, for example, Alcide DeGasperi, "Le Lineo programmatiche della D. C., "in *I Congressi Nazionali della Democrazia Cristiana* (Rome, 1959), p. 23; Gianni Baget Bozzo, "Il Dilemma della D.C. e del suo prossimo Congresso," *Cronache Sociali* Vol. 3 (April 30, 1949), p. 17; Achille Ardigó, "Classi sociali e sintesi politica," in *Il Convegno di San Pellegrino . . .;" op. cit.*, pp. 135 ff. It should be noted that the periodical *Cronache Sociali*, cited above, was the most important publication for those in the D.C. who, in the early postwar years, attempted to give the party a clear-cut left-wing ideological cast. Until recently, full collections of the magazine were extremely rare. The major articles from it, however, are now available in a two-volume work, *Cronache Sociali* (Rome, 1961).

[30] Franco M. Malfatti, "L'Unità della D.C. e il problema delle tendenze," *Cronache Sociali*, 3 (February 15, 1949), p. 15.

[31] Ardigò, *op. cit.*, p. 145.

[32] *Ibid.*, pp. 155–165.

How, then, explain the imperfect, distorted and erroneous perceptions of the decline-of-ideology writers?

INTERPRETATIONS OF THE DECLINE-OF-IDEOLOGY LITERATURE

Several interpretations of the decline-of-ideology writings are possible, and I shall touch here on only two or three. First, one might simply dismiss this literature as reflecting a much too narrow focus on certain undeniable changes in the rhetoric, and even in the perceptions and prescriptions, of some contemporary Marxists. I say dismiss, rather then accord them serious intellectual attention, because: a) the narrow focus fails to include a broader conceptual framework that would permit comparative analytic attention to other aspects of Marxian and non-Marxian ideologies, and b) many of the observations limited to the crisis or travail experienced by Marxists since the Hungarian Rebellion and the XX Congress of the CPSU amount to nothing more than propaganda slogans.

Second, it is possible to sidestep the fascinating subject of broader comparative ideological analysis and concentrate instead on the central proposition that runs through much of this writing, namely, that ideology tends to wane as societies reach levels of social and economic modernization typified by several Western countries. It seems to me, however, that any attempt to assess these writings in such terms is fraught with a number of difficulties that can only be briefly mentioned here. For example, one will have to come to grips with Mannheim, who remains, after all, the first and most prominent scholar to touch on almost every aspect of the arguments mustered by comtemporary writers, including the proposition that the birth and death of ideology depends on certain social, economic and "ecological" factors.

But, Mannheim, as I have noted, intends a pejorative definition of ideology, thus greatly narrowing its application. For systems of ideas that are *not* incongruent with empirical realities, he uses the term "utopia." However, if I read him correctly, Mannheim's final test for deciding whether a system of ideas is ideological or utopian is almost invariably *post facto*—in the sense that what one identifies as yesterday's ideology becomes tomorrow's utopia when it can be shown that, somewhere in space and time, prescriptions or transcendent ideas turned out not to be incongruent with potential "social realities."[34] The pragmatic test is deceptively simple: If it works, it's utopian; if it doesn't, it's ideological. Outside of ascribing super-rational powers to the "omniscient observer," there is no readily apparent way of identifying the very thing one wishes to measure, except after the fact.

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[33] Exactly how much of the West is to be included in the generalizations about ideology's decline is never made too clear. Lipset, for example, is careful to hedge his European generalizations by frequently excepting Italy and France. My point would be that if these two countries are excepted, as they should be, one can scarcely pretend to speak with justification about *European* trends. See Lipset, "The Changing Class Structure . . . ," *op. cit.*, *passim.* Moreover, there is also rather persuasive evidence that Lipset's generalizations are not currently valid, if they ever were, for a country like West Germany. See H. P. Secher, "Current Ideological Emphasis in the Federal Republic of Germany," a paper delivered at the 1964 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, September 9–12, 1964. Note particularly the extensive, German-language bibliography on this subject contained in the footnotes of this paper. In any event, the burden of Secher's argument is that German ideology is on the upswing, both in the SPD and in the Catholic sectors of the CDU /CSU.

[34] See Mannheim, *op. cit.*, Ch. 4, "The Utopian Mentality." Mannheim notes that, "Ideologies are the situationally transcendent ideas which never succeed *de facto* in the realization of their projected content. . . . Utopias too transcend the social situation. . . . But they are not ideologies, i.e., they are not ideologies in the measure and in so far as they succeed through counteractivity in transforming the existing historical reality into one more in accord with their own conceptions" (pp. 176, 177). Mannheim later refines the definition of utopia, trying to tie it to the issue of incongruence from "the point of view of a given social order which is already in existence." Needless to add, it is ideology's decline that Mannheim applauds, and the decline of utopia that he greatly fears because the latter, he says, would make man

Beyond this conceptual problem, there are others implied by the "more modernization-less ideology" formulation. Such generalizations involve secular trends that span centuries. Thus, even if one can reach an acceptable working definition of ideology, the matter of measuring these trends—to say nothing of projecting them into the future—seems to me to involve a degree of precision in historical data gathering and measurement that is only a little better today (and in some ways much worse) than it was in Mannheim's time. My own impression about such long-range trends is that, despite some interesting changes in the symbology of ideology, we are far from seeing the end in Europe of ideology as I have defined it or, indeed, of ideology defined as dogmatic, inflexible, passionately articulated perceptions of reality and prescriptions for the future. Furthermore, since the long-term trend line is not unequivocally established, we cannot say whether short-term phenomena are part of a downward plunging graph line or merely a cyclical dip in a line which may be essentially flat or rising.

It also seems to me that the proposition we are discussing here suffers all of the limitations (which I have detailed elsewhere)[35] that one can identify with a good deal of the recent writing about political development. This formulation seems to rest on the assumption (or hope) that socio-economic-political development is moving in a deterministic, unilinear, culture-specific direction, whereby the future will consist of national histories that are monotonous repetitions of the "Anglo-American" story. In short, the decline-of-ideology writers seem to believe that "they" are becoming more and more like "us."

This leads to a possible third interpretation of the literature, namely, that most of this writing is not social science but, ironically, simply more ideology. The French scholar, Jean Meynaud, reacts in this summary way to the "decline" writers: "In reality, the deep intent of this theory is to establish that in wealthy societies socialism is definitely eclipsed. With many persons it [the theory of decline] is a rather banal aspect of anti-communism or, if one prefers, of a new version of conservative opportunism."[36] This view is strongly echoed by William Delany who says, "The end of ideology writers write not just as sociologists or social scientists but as journalists and an anti-totalitarian ideological cabal. Their work is ideology but, like almost all Western ideologies since the 18th Century, with a heavy 'scientific' component to give respectability and a sense of truth."[37]

These are admittedly harsh judgments. And yet, when one confronts the waning-ideology literature with actual developments in Western Europe, the gap between fact and "scientific" findings suggests exactly such evaluations. Indeed, it is entirely possible that, in the case of some of the decline writers, what they see may be little more than autobiographical projections, which may be fine for some novelists but is clearly quite sticky for social scientists. In any event, in so far as social science analysis of ideology is concerned, it is more than a little difficult to agree with an appraisal of the social sciences which begins by confiding that the American social scientist has been co-opted into something called the "establishment," and then goes on to say about "establishment" members:

> Theirs is an alienation brought about by 'superior wisdom,' that is, by the ability to penetrate the ideologies of others and thereby to emancipate themselves. In this group is the social scientist, who is the objective observer. He penetrates all of the disguises created by the untrained mind or the ideological mind and attaches himself to the image of the wise. He represents the 'establishment.' "[38]

I suppose that, if there is an American "establishment" and if the social scientist has come to play such a prominent role in it, one would expect that in the rationalization and defense of his well-ordered world the social scientist's words are likely to take on typically ideological overtones. In any event, it is difficult to imagine how the social scientist in the United States would now go about rebutting

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nothing more than a "thing" unable to shape or understand history: *ibid.*, p. 236.

[35] See my (ed.), *Bureaucracy and Political Development* (Princeton, 1963), Ch. 2; and my "Public Administration and Political Change: A Theoretical Overview," in Charles Press and Alan Arian (eds.), *Empathy and Ideology: Knowledges of Administrative Innovation* (forthcoming).

[36] Jean Meynaud, "Apatia e responsibilità dei cittadini," *Tempi Moderni*, 5 (April–June, 1962), p. 33.

[37] William Delany, "The End of Ideology: A Summation," *op. cit.*, p. 16.

[38] Apter, *op. cit.*, pp. 37–38.

the reiterated Russian claim that Western social science is not much more than thinly veiled bourgeois ideology.[39]

This leads to a few concluding remarks about the extent to which phenomena associated with the alleged decline of ideology reflect in great measure certain kinds of adaptations to the crisis confronting Western intellectuals. The Italian case will serve as one concrete illustration of this, although similar patterns can also be explicated for other Western countries.

At the end of World War II, Italian intellectuals—like their counterparts elsewhere in Western Europe—felt deeply involved in a concerted and apparently promising effort to transform Italian society. This was a period in which "The sacred texts were dusted off and the people were enlightened in order to create the maximum degree of consensus and to realize the maximum degree of support and conversions."[40] But romantic notions of socialist revolution—widely fostered by intellectuals—were of very short duration. Failure of Italian society to move directly toward socialism caught many intellectuals flat-footed. They remained tied to a permanent anti-Fascism which led them to ritualistic rhetorical statements about Italian society's ills and the paths to salvation.[41] For almost fifteen years, these intellectuals repeated with startling monotony themes and prescriptions which were simply out of joint as far as the changing conditions of Italian society were concerned. In this sense, certainly, Aron and others are right in scoring the stultifying consequences of doctrinaire ideological formulations.

These were years of demoralization for intellectuals who expected revolutionary change and were treated instead to a great deal of temporizing under DeGasperi; but the intellectuals were also blinded to certain social and economic changes that made the traditional rhetoric of Marxism alien to growing numbers of Italians. The irony in all of this is that the intellectuals were the last to appreciate the need for new rhetoric and, indeed, for new ideological formulations. They had been preceded by political leaders not only in the Communist party, but in the ranks of Christian Democracy as well. The politicians evidently quickly understood that no large-scale intervention of the public sector in any kind of development was likely to proceed for long without some kind of *ideological* justification.

To some extent, the isolation of intellectuals from social realities was encouraged by the P.C.I. In keeping the party's intellectuals organizationally separated from mass members, the P.C.I. was able to capitalize on a tendency which is deeply rooted in Italian culture. As Guiducci points out, Italian intellectuals were strongly influenced by the Crocian idea that they were a caste apart, superior to and removed from the masses, and thus failed to maintain an open and realistic contact with the broader population. Even in a context of deep ideological commitment, they managed to adhere to "a position which is traditional with the Italian man of culture, estranged as he is from reality, tied as he is to a culture which is literary and humanistic in the narrowest sense of the words."[42]

The striking thing about Italy in recent years is that the country's intellectuals (largely of the left, but also of the right) seem to be emerging from the kind of isolation Guiducci mentions. Their confrontation of the realities of Italian society has not led, however, to a decline of ideology. Rather, I would suggest that what has happened involves in part ideological clarification and in part the framing of new ideologies to which striking numbers of Italian and European intellectuals now adhere. These new ideologies in a profound sense involve substituting new myths for old. The new myths, which form the core of the ideological structure of many intellectuals, are those of the welfare state and of economic planning. As Henri Jarme rightly puts it, "The myth of planning is only the socialist variant of the myth of progress."[43] But such myths, if Italy is any test, attract more than segments of former orthodox Marxists; they are woven as well into the kind of new ideology that Christian Democrats create.

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[39] See A. A. Zvorykin, "The Social Sciences in the U.S.S.R.: Achievements and Trends," *International Social Science Journal*, 16 (No. 4, 1964), pp. 588–602. J. S. Roucek, "The Soviet Brand of Sociology," *International Journal of Comparative Sociology*, 1 (1961), pp. 211–219.

[40] Antonio Carbonaro and Luciano Gallino, "Sociologia e ideologie ufficiali," *Tempi Moderni*, 4 (January–March, 1961), p. 31.

[41] Nicola Matteucci, "Pensare in prospettiva," *Tempi Moderni*, 4 (April–June, 1961), p. 32. Cf. the important editorial, "Valori e miti della società italiana dell'ultimo ventennio, 1940–1960," *ibid.* (October–December, 1961), p. 22.

[42] Roberto Guiducci, *Socialismo e verità* (Turin, 1956), pp. 23 ff. Cf. Gaetano Arfè, "La Responsibilità degli intellettuali," *Tempi Moderni*, 4 (January–March, 1961), pp. 31–32; Paolo Prandstraller, *Intellettuali e democrazia* (Rome, 1963).

[43] Henri Jarme, "Le Mythe politique du socialisme democratique," *Cahiers Internationaux de Sociologie*, 33 (July–December, 1962), p. 29.

To be sure, the emergence of new myths creates new symbols and vocabulary. This sort of change should not be construed, however, as an end of ideology. As Giovanni Sartori notes, "Granted that in an affluent society the intensity of ideology will decrease, a lessening of its intensity should not be confused with a withering away of ideology itself. . . . The temperature of ideology may cool down but this fact does not imply that a society will lose the habit of perceiving political problems in an unrealistic or doctrinaire fashion; and it implies even less that a party system will turn to a pragmatic approach."[44]

Two points are relevant here. First, it is obvious that many Italian intellectuals seem to have rediscovered a valid—or at least personally satisfying—function in society, namely, providing an ideological rationale, as well as rational alternatives, for economic planning activity. Second, in achieving this redefinition of role, the intellectual seems to have reaffirmed his responsibility for creating the ideological system within which contemporary activity is justified. Needless to say, some of these intellectuals will phrase ideology in the language of science and rationality, whether they are in favor of radical change or of the preservation of the status quo. There is certainly little evidence in Italy, in any event, that, say, a commitment to social science miraculously resolves the nagging problem of Mannheim's Paradox, nor, indeed, that it should.

When we turn to the decline-of-ideology writers, it is possible to detect that they, too, are in search of a definable role in contemporary American society. Whether that role involves the use of social science to criticize America's failings or to extol its consensual or managerial character is a fascinating empirical question. But surely the exploration of this problem would require of a mature social science a certain amount of caution and humility regarding the danger of translating highly selective data gathering or personal predilections or ambitions into sweeping historical projections and "scientific" generalizations. Clifford Geertz, I believe, has put this most succinctly: "We may wait as long for the 'end of ideology' as the positivists have waited for the end of religion."[45]

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[44] Giovanni Sartori, "European Political Parties: The Case of Polarized Pluralism," in J. LaPalombara and M. Weiner, *op. cit.*

[45] Geertz, *op. cit.*, p. 51.

SOME FURTHER COMMENTS ON "THE END OF IDEOLOGY"

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I am somewhat puzzled by Professor LaPalombara's critique of the decline or end of ideology thesis which points out that deideologisation is itself ideological behavior in a pure sense. This is obvious to most of those who have written on the subject. In an article cited in other contexts by Professor La Palombara, I., for one, have written as follows:

> As a final comment, I would note that not only do class conflicts over issues related to division of the total economic pie, influence over various institutions, symbolic status and opportunity, continue in the absence of *weltanschauungen*, but that the decline of such total ideologies does not mean the end of ideology. Clearly, commitment to the politics of pragmatism, to the rules of the game of collective bargaining, to gradual change whether in the direction favored by the left or the right, to opposition both to an all powerful central state and to laissez-faire constitutes the component parts of an ideology. The "agreement on fundamentals," the political consensus of western society, now increasingly has come to include a position on matters which once sharply separated the left from the right. And this ideological agreement, which might best be described as "conservative socialism," has become the ideology of the major parties in the developed states of Europe and America. As such it leaves its advocates in sharp disagreement with the relatively small groups of radical rightists and leftists at home, and at a disadvantage in efforts to foster different variants of this doctrine in the less affluent parts of the world.[1]

It should be clear that if one says that he prefers a system with a low degree of ideologically intense political conflict rather than a high degree, he is making an ideological choice. However, as I read the rather lengthy literature by experts on various countries, e.g., political scientists, such as Herbert Tingsten, Otto Kirchheimer, Hans Daalder, Otto Brunner and Giovanni Sartori, journalists like James Reston or George Lichtheim, or sociologists like Raymond Aron, T. H. Marshall, or Stein Rokkan, they are concerned with one of three tasks, often with all three: 1) describing the decline in their own or various countries; 2) analyzing the social determinants of such changes; and 3) analyzing the presumed consequences of the changes. Thus, much of the literature involves stating specific testable propositions of the following sort:

a) Less intense conflict encourages greater respect for the rights of political minorities.
b) Intense ideologisation, sharp conflict, is characteristic of polities in which new emerging classes or strata denied political, social, or economic rights, are struggling to achieve these rights, but declines when these classes are admitted to full citizenship.

One may prefer sharp ideological conflict, yet recognize that the social conditions which foster it are weak under specified conditions. Curiously, many who argue that a prediction of the decline of ideological bitterness in industrially developed states reflects conservative political preferences do not also suggest that support of the thesis that stable western-type democratic constitutionalism is difficult, if not impossible, to sustain in impoverished "new states" or post-revolutionary societies bent on rapid industrialization means that one is opposed to political democracy. Some who make this latter argument are, in fact, opposed; others, however, are not. The propositions themselves must be testable if they are intended as scientific statements and not propaganda.

There are many researchable questions. Is it, or is it not, true that there has been a decline in the intensity of, in the depth of ideological cleavage in industrialized western society as compared to its industrializing past? Is it, or is it not, true that there is less bitter political cleavage in the wealthier as compared to the poorer democracies? Is it, or is is not, true that strata or ethnic groupings which have been admitted to citizenship in Marshall's sense are less likely to support intensive ideological politics than when they were denied citizenship?[2] Most recently, we have had implicit answers to these questions from a major spokesman from the Chinese Communist Party which reaches the same conclusions about comparative political behavior as have been posited by those who have written about "the end of ideology" in western society. Lin Piao, Vice-Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, and Vice-Premier, stated in a recent major policy speech:

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[1] S. M. Lipset, "The Changing Class Structure and Contemporary European Politics," *Daedalus*, 93 (1964), p. 296.

[2] *Class, Citizenship and Social Development* (Garden City: Doubleday, 1963).

> The countryside, and the countryside alone, can provide the revolutionary bases from which the revolutionaries can go forward to final victory. Precisely for this reason, Comrade Mao Tse-tung's theory of establishing revolutionary base areas in the rural districts and encircling the cities from the countryside is attracting more and more attention among the people in these regions.
>
> Taking the entire globe, if North America and Western Europe can be called "the cities of the world," then Asia, Africa and Latin America constitute "the rural areas of the world." Since World War II, the proletarian revolutionary movement has for various reasons been temporarily held back in the North American and West European capitalist countries, while the people's revolutionary movement in Asia, Africa, and Latin America has been growing vigorously. In a sense, the contemporary world revolution also presents a picture of the encirclement of cities by the rural areas. In the final analysis, the whole cause of world revolution hinges on the revolutionary struggles of the Asian, African and Latin American peoples. . . .[3]

The general question, whether the emphasis on systematic and integrated total ideologies has been experiencing a secular decline concomitant with social and economic development can not be resolved, of course, by reference to opinions, whether these be of scholars or revolutionaries. Neither can it be challenged by pointing to specific episodes which go in the opposite direction implied by the general thesis which refers to long-term historic trends. With this generalization as with all others, what is needed is hard research. And I would call attention to three studies which have attempted to systematically examine trends in the ideological behavior of political parties over time with the explicit purpose to test the "decline of ideology" thesis in Norway, Japan, and the Netherlands. Each concludes that it is valid for the politics of the country under investigation.[4]

I do not want to join issue with Professor LaPalombara on specific details of current Italian politics. I would only note a few facts. First with respect to the Christian Democrats, they are now sitting in a cabinet with Pietro Nenni's Italian Socialist Party. For the D.C. and the P.S.I. to join as coalition partners represents a considerable concession, a considerable moderation of historic ideological conflicts in Italian politics. Second, although the Italian Communists clearly remain committed to socialism, the party ideology is more moderate. Professor LaPalombara refers to a decline in "the party's use of extreme rhetoric," but he prefers to see this as a sign of "ideological vigor." The thesis that ideological tensions are moderating does not imply that class or party conflict is declining. Professor LaPalombara, here as elsewhere, is attacking a straw-man. No one has said the P.C.I. is "abandoning any commitment to ideological formulations."

Since he ends his article approvingly citing Giovanni Sartori that "Granted that in an affluent society the intensity of ideology will decrease," I simply do not know what he is trying to say, unless it is that political life is much too complex to be subsumed in a simple image like the "decline of ideology," that all political groups have ideologies and that over any given limited period of time the character of partisan ideologies will vary greatly. If this is what he means, then I am certain that almost everyone who has written about the end of, or decline of ideology will agree.

(Editor's Note: For further comments by Professor LaPalombara, see *Communications to the Editor*, pp. 110–111.)

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[3] Lin Piao, "Long Live the Victory of People's War," *Peking Review*, 8 (September 3, 1965), p. 24.

[4] See Ulf Torgersen, "The Trend Towards Political Consensus: the Case of Norway," *Acta Sociologica;* 6 (1962), 159–172; Masaaki Takane, "Eonomic Growth and the 'End of Ideology' in Japan," *Asian Survey,* 5 (1965), 295–304; A. Hoogerwerf, "Sociaal-Politieke Strijdpunten: Smeuland Vuur," *Sociolgische Gids,* 10 (1963), 249–263. I am indebted to Hans Daalder for calling my attention to the latter study, which, like the others, shows that the party programs of the different political parties have been converging since the last war.

SOME DYNAMIC ELEMENTS OF CONTESTS FOR THE PRESIDENCY

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University of Michigan

Despite the measured pace of American elections, there have now been a number of presidential campaigns since the advent of survey studies of voting. However sparingly, political history slowly has added to the set of distinct configurations of men and events which comprise a contest for the Presidency. The set is still small, whatever the impression created by massed thousands of interviews or by the accompanying files of election returns. Yet it is now large enough to be pressed hard for evidence about the sources of electoral change.

A primary virtue of measurements extended over a series of elections is that they can throw light on the problem of change. So long as the earliest voting studies were confined to cross-sectional relationships, they could deal only very inadequately with changes superimposed on these relationships or with changes in the relationships themselves. In the case of Lazarsfeld's enormously influential Erie County study in 1940, the natural limitations of a single-election study were compounded by the investigators' misfortune in choosing a campaign whose dominant personality and principal issues differed little from those of preceding elections. I have often wondered whether the static social determinism of *The People's Choice* would have emerged from a campaign in which the tides of short-term change were more nearly at flood.[1]

I shall examine here some sources of change which are richly evident in the presidential elections of the last two decades. In doing so I shall utilize several time series which can be extracted from the Survey Research Center's interview studies of the American electorate. The presidential contest of 1964 marked the fourth occasion on which the Center's national electoral studies have recorded the public's response to the issues and personalities of a presidential campaign.

This lengthening interval of electoral history contains material enough for the analyst of change. From the Eisenhower victories of the early 1950's, the high-point of presidential Republicanism since the Great Depression overwhelmed Hoover's party, the strength of Eisenhower's successors ebbed away in 1960 and sank in 1964 to a level which can only be regarded as one of the extreme lows of American national party competition. I shall examine some of the attitudinal factors in this extraordinary decline, focusing especially on the importance of changes in the issues and leaders which the electorate is asked to appraise. The relation of these "inputs" to the "output" of the presidential vote is exceedingly complex, but the moral of my piece is that this relationship introduces more dynamism into contests for the Presidency than the stability of party identification or of the social bases of party preference might lead us to expect.

In the course of the discussion I shall utilize a statistical model which has proved useful for measuring various attitudinal forces on the nation's vote. Dealing with a type of behavior which is notoriously subject to multiple influences, this model seeks to discern the relative importance of several dimensions of attitude both for individual choice and for the nation's collective decision.[2] The model treats the behavior of the individual voter as governed in an immediate sense by the direction and strength of his attitudes toward the several political objects he is asked to appraise, attitudes which we have probed in these presidential elections by asking a series of free-answer questions about the parties and presidential candidates. Since a presidential campaign confronts the voter with four main objects—the two parties and the two candidates—it is natural to place each respondent along four dimensions of attitude, and many of the findings reported below will rely on such a four-dimensional model. For other purposes, however, it is more revealing of the content of political attitude to place each respondent along six attitudinal dimensions: (1) attitude toward the Democratic candidate as a person; (2) attitude toward the Republican candidate as a person; (3) attitude toward the parties and candidates which relates to the benefit of various groups; (4) attitude toward the parties and candidates which relates to domestic policy; (5) attitude which relates to foreign policy; and (6) attitude which relates to the general performance of the parties in the nation's affairs. A detailed account of the procedure by which respondents are assimilated to these several dimensions appears in the appended note.

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[1] Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson, and Hazel Gaudet, *The People's Choice* (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1944). It is paradoxical that Lazarsfeld and his associates should have come to so static a view of party preference, since the desire to observe changes of preference was so central to their original intentions. Had they worked within the context of an election such as that of 1952 it is entirely unlikely that they could have ignored the presence of massive inter-election change, overlaid on the social bases of preference summarized in the Index of Political Predisposition.

[2] For a report of the application of this model to the Eisenhower elections see Donald E. Stokes, Angus Campbell, and Warren E. Miller, "Components of Electoral Decision," this REVIEW, 52 (June 1958), 367–387.

The appendix also describes the statistical operations by which we obtain definite estimates of each dimension's contribution to the winning majority—the means by which, in effect, the nation's collective decision is resolved into a set of attitudinal components. These methods must of course be regarded as approximate, for reasons of sampling if no other, and I advance no claim to exact measurement; none is really necessary to the central conclusion which I shall draw from the analysis. Nevertheless, the model's success in estimating the direction and size of the winning majority in each of a series of elections does increase our confidence that we have measured dimensions of popular feeling which are deeply involved in changes of party fortune.

The several dimensions of attitude, however, have by no means been equally involved in electoral change. Just as the various components of electoral decision can be very different in their direction and strength at a given point in time, they can exhibit a very different tendency to change over time. In the period of our research some have been relatively stable, others not. By examining the role of each attitude component over twelve years we form several time series which are extraordinarily suggestive of the sources of change during this interval of our national politics.

THE ATTITUDINAL COMPONENTS OVER TIME

The curves described by the components of the six-dimensional model arrange themselves into three interesting pairs. The first of these is a pair whose values have consistently favored the Democrats over the entire period. As shown by Figure 1, partisan evaluations relating to domestic issues and to group benefit have uniformly helped the Democrats more than the Republicans, although the extent of this aid has fluctuated from year to year.[3] To an unusual degree these elements of the party images have roots in the past, extending back at least to the Roosevelt New Deal. Indeed, the benefit to the Democrats from their party's sponsorship of disadvantaged elements of American society is an antique theme of our party politics. Even in the mid-1950's and the early 1960's the volume of comment approving the Democrats and disapproving the Republicans in terms of the interests of the common man was impressive. In the two most recent elections, however, these class-related comments were diminished somewhat and were accompanied by references to religious and racial groups in which the arithmetic of group size was less favorable to



FIG. 1. Continuing Democratic advantage: groups and domestic policy.

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[3] The vertical coordinate of Figure 1, as well as of Figures 2 and 3, gives the value of the quantity

$$b_i(\bar{X}_i - X_i^0)$$

defined in the appendix. As explained there, this quantity may be interpreted either at the individual level as the average amount by which a given dimension has increased (or lessened, in the case of negative values) the probability of the individual's voting Republican or at the level of the whole electorate as the proportion of the total two-party vote by which a given dimension has increased (or lessened) the Republican share.

the Democrats. For these reasons the group curve in Figure 1 shows the party's advantage to be somewhat less in 1960 and 1964.

It will be apparent that the concept of "group" is defined here in a very inclusive manner. Likewise, our net has been cast very widely in coding references relating to domestic issues. In particular, many of the comments giving substance to the domestic issue dimension are "valence" or "image" issues, in which the parties or candidates are linked with something which is uniformly approved or disapproved ("the Republicans are the party of depression") rather than "position" issues on which there are genuine differences of party policy. The leading image issue of domestic politics throughout this period was the association of the Democrats with good times, the Republicans with bad. This association, which probably had weakened steadily from the height of the Great Depression to the election of 1952, was further attenuated by the prosperity of Eisenhower's first term. But it revived again in the recession of 1958, before the Republican administration had left office, and it has been given fresh substance by the rising prosperity of the Kennedy and Johnson years.

The domestic issue dimension has not, however, been altogether lacking in genuine position issues. One of the peculiar qualities of the Goldwater candidacy is that it converted into position issues a number of image issues on which a broad consensus had hitherto existed between the parties. This fact was not lost upon the general public. Under the Goldwater challenge, the Democrats were rewarded more generously in 1964 than in any of the three prior elections for their sponsorship of social security and of the circle of other social and economic welfare policies which had wide popular approval. Primarily for this reason the domestic issue curve of Figure 1 shows a greater Democratic advantage in 1964 than in the years before.

A second pair of curves is traced by the movement of two components in which a strong initial Republican advantage is seen to have vanished over these four elections. As shown by Figure 2, the Republican party under Eisenhower enjoyed a substantial lead over the Democrats on foreign affairs—preeminently in terms of the great image issue of peace and war. This lead was not greatly lessened when Eisenhower's deputy sought the Presidency in 1960, but Nixon's legacy dissolved altogether in the contest of Goldwater and Johnson. It would be a misreading of the 1964 value, however, to suppose that widely-held foreign policy beliefs consistent with Goldwater's were nicely balanced by widely-held beliefs consistent with Johnson's. According to our evidence, foreign affairs did intrude on the public's consciousness in the 1964 campaign more than in any election since 1952, but popular references to foreign issues in 1964 still had only about a fourth the frequency of references to domestic issues. The loss of Republican advantage on this dimension was due to the final collapse of the belief that the party under Goldwater was more likely to bring peace than were the Democrats under Johnson.[4]



FIG. 2. Decaying Republican advantage: foreign policy and party performance.

The loss of Republican advantage in foreign affairs is paralleled by the decay of the party's advantage in popular assessments of party performance. The Republicans began this series of elections immensely aided by the mood for a change in 1952. There is no more striking element in all of our attitudinal materials than the public's anger and frustration with the outgoing Democratic administration in that year. Whatever the validity of the public's grievance, it was real enough in motivational terms and contributed handsomely to Eisenhower's first victory. The force of this feeling was easily spent, however, once the

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[4] For direct additional evidence on this point see Philip E. Converse, Aage R. Clausen, and Warren E. Miller, "Electoral Myth and Reality: The 1964 Election," this REVIEW, 59 (June 1965), p. 332.



FIG. 3. Greatest variation: appeal of candidates.

Democrats had been driven from office. Yet in 1956 and again in 1960 the Republicans still enjoyed an edge in terms of the electorate's general evaluations of current party performance, a fact which is the more remarkable in view of the stronger hold of the Democrats on the nation's underlying party identifications.[5] By 1964, however, this lingering advantage had been swept away, and the Democrats by a modest margin were now seen as the party better qualified to conduct the country's affairs.

The third pair of curves is traced by the components having to do with popular reactions to the personal attributes of the candidates. As shown in Figure 3, there has been remarkable variety in the appeal of the Republican candidates. The values of this component in 1952 and 1956 attest to General Eisenhower's personal hold on the electorate, an attraction which, if anything, was even more wholly personal after Eisenhower had served four years as President. Mr. Nixon's appeal in 1960 was somewhat less, although his personal appeal to the electorate, especially the sense of his broad experience, was marked. If the eventual account given by the political histories is that Nixon was a weak candidate in 1960, it will be largely myth.

The response to Goldwater, however, was something else again. Whereas Nixon's personal stature helped bring his party to the verge of a third presidential victory against a party enjoying a clear advantage in the country's partisan identifications, popular reaction to Goldwater contributed to his party's electoral ruin. The detailed references to Goldwater are an impressive amalgam of doubts—a wild and erratic campaigner, muddled and unclear, unstable, poorly educated, and so on—with these themes very little offset by references to the advertised qualities of integrity, sincerity, and decisiveness. If our estimates are right, the transition from Nixon to Goldwater cost the Republicans something like 7 percent of the total vote.

Despite immense differences of personal style, the appeal of three successive Democratic candidates was much more nearly equal. And except for Stevenson's second campaign, the response to each of these candidates added to his strength at the polls. Certainly the movement of the Democratic curve in Figure 3 shows Johnson to have been an asset to his own candidacy in 1964: the response to Johnson's attributes apparently did the Democrats about as much good as the response to Goldwater's did. The combined effect of both appears to have moved the two-party vote roughly 5 percentage points toward Johnson.

To emphasize the dynamic implications for party competition of pairing successive candidates for President, Figure 4 combines the effect of the personal appeals of the two men seeking the office in each of these elections.[6] The variation of this summary curve is impressive indeed. From a maximum Republican advantage of nearly 8 percent in the rematch of Eisenhower and Stevenson, the curve falls through more than 13 percentage points to a maximum Democratic advantage of more than 5 percent in the contest of Johnson and Goldwater. A more eloquent statistical comment on the personal contribution which candidates for President can make to electoral change could hardly be given.

It would be a mistake to read into these

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[5] For evidence on the distribution of party identification in this period see "The Concept of the 'Normal Vote'," in A. Campbell, P. Converse, W. Miller, and D. Stokes, *Elections and the Political Order* (New York, 1966), Ch. 1.

[6] The individual and aggregate interpretations of the quantity represented by the vertical coordinate of Figure 4 are the same as before, but the quantity itself is the sum of the components measuring the increment or decrement to Republican strength due to personal attributes of the Republican and Democratic candidates.



Fig. 4. Net impact of candidates.

figures too simple an explanation of the impact of candidate personality on the mass public. Certainly it would be grossly wrong to suppose that the properties of these "stimulus objects" are somehow immediately and directly impressed on the electorate's response. The relation of stimulus and response is remarkably complex, involving an interplay of several quite different factors. Before drawing some general conclusions about the problem of change, it would be well to consider the interaction of the "actual" properties of the stimuli to which the electorate responds, certain response dispositions which the electorate has already learned, and some properties of the communication processes by which the electorate is informed of the objects of presidential politics.

STIMULUS PROPERTIES AND RESPONSE DISPOSITIONS IN THE ATTITUDE COMPONENTS

Although the comments below extend to the full range of stimuli to which the public is exposed, some of the subtleties of electoral response can most readily be observed in connection with candidate effects. The men seeking the Presidency bring to a campaign certain "real" properties as stimulus objects. Some of these belong to the past—the candidate's role as war hero, his success as governor or senator, his marital difficulties, and so on—although the communication of these things to much of the public may lie ahead. Other properties have to do with appearance, behavior, and personal style—the candidate's smile, the timbre of his voice, his smoothness in dealing with the teleprompter, his willingness to suffer fools gladly—knowledge of which can reach the electorate in numberless ways.

Impressions of these things, however, do not fall on wholly unprepared ground. Voters display a variety of response dispositions as they form their evaluations of the candidates. One type of response disposition is so evident as to require little comment. A wealth of research evidence, as well as familiar observation, attests the profound influence which partisan loyalties may have on the voter's perceptions of the men seeking office. The stronger the voter's party bias, the more likely he is to see the candidate of his own party as hero, the candidate of the other party as villain. No one who has talked with a sample of voters during a presidential campaign can have failed to note at every hand the processes by which cognitive balance is achieved.[7]

The voter's perceptual predispositions are not, however, limited to party bias. We are confronted at times by striking evidence of other identifications exerting a like influence on candidate images. A vivid example of these is the influence of religion on perceptions of John F. Kennedy during the 1960 election campaign. Because Kennedy was the Democratic candidate, voters identifying with the Democratic party tended to view him more favorably than did voters identifying with the Republican party. But Kennedy was seen by the electorate not only as a Democrat; he was seen as a Catholic as well. As a result, at every point along the party identification continuum, Catholics tended to perceive Kennedy in a more favorable light than did Protestants.

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[7] Certainly evidence of it is plentiful enough in the Center's studies. See, for example, Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, *The American Voter* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1960), pp. 120–145. An excellent general review of the achievement of cognitive congruence in political attitudes is given by Robert E. Lane and David O. Sears in their *Public Opinion* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1964). An interesting application of these concepts to attitude change may be found in Denis G. Sullivan, "Psychological Balance and Reactions to the Presidential Nominations in 1960," in M. Kent Jennings and L. Harmon Zeigler, (eds.) *The Electoral Process* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1966), pp. 238–264.



FIG. 5. Influence of party and religious identifications on perceptions of Kennedy.

A demonstration of the joint biasing effects of religion and party in 1960 may be found in Figure 5. In that campaign we placed each of our sample respondents along a standard party identification scale, represented here by five ordered groups: Strong Republicans, Weak Republicans, Independents, Weak Democrats, and Strong Democrats. At the same time we placed each of our Protestant and Catholic respondents on a scale of religious identification defined here by four ordered groups: persons strongly identified with a Protestant Church, persons weakly identified with such a church, persons weakly identified with the Catholic Church, and persons strongly identified with the Catholic Church. These two forms of psychological identification are moderately correlated in American society (that is, Catholics are more likely than Protestants to be Democratic) but not more than moderately so. Crossing the two here yields twenty groups defined by religion and party at once in which we may examine the distribution of attitude toward Kennedy. Figure 5 displays the mean attitude toward Kennedy within each of these twenty groups.[8]

The means exhibit a remarkable pattern. The fact that the curve for each religious group slopes upward to the right shows that, whatever the voter's religious identification, he is more likely to have perceived Kennedy favorably the closer he was to the Democratic end of the party identification dimension. And the march of the four religious curves up the figure shows that, whatever the voter's party identification, he is more likely to have perceived Kennedy positively the closer he was to the Catholic end of the religious dimension. There is even a pattern to the partial discontinuities: the regularity of the curves for weak Protestants and weak Catholics suggests that the biasing tendencies of party identification were generally effective among the mildly religious while the irregularity of the curves for strong Protestants and strong Catholics suggests that party loyalty could have a marked impact on the strongly religious only if a party faith were itself strongly held.

Figure 5 is so rich in evidence of selective perception that we may easily miss what it has to say about the element of Kennedy's image which was not the result of response dispositions based on religion and party. The fact that this element was a favorable one ought not to be obscured by the strong pattern of the figure. Any reasonable operation by which we might seek to reconstruct a mean attitude among persons who are religiously and politically neutral would show that Kennedy was likely to be positively seen when his image did not fall prey to strong negative bias. For example, persons who were politically independent perceived Kennedy favorably even if they were weakly identified with a Protestant church.

We ought not to conclude from this that partisan and religious dispositions were the only response biases involved in the electorate's response to Kennedy or that, these dispositions aside, Kennedy was in some absolute sense an attractive candidate. In 1960, as any campaign year, many other kinds of response dispositions underlay the private impressions of the candidates formed by tens of millions of voters. We have identified two of the most important. It would not be difficult to suggest other factors which may have predisposed voters to react positively or negatively to something in the youthful, vigorous, Ivy-educated, Boston-accented stimulus which Kennedy presented.

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[8] In order to standardize the metric used in these comparisons, I have divided each of these means by the sample standard deviation of attitude toward Kennedy. Because the sample contained only seven Weak Catholic Weak Republicans and only seven Weak Catholic Independents the means for these two groups have been adjusted to reduce the probable effect of sampling error.

Perhaps this point can be stated even more forcefully in terms of popular reaction to General Eisenhower, the most attractive presidential candidate since Franklin Roosevelt. The point is simply that "attractive" implies more than something about the candidate himself; it also implies something about the response dispositions of the electorate. Given the dominant values of contemporary American society, Eisenhower was enormously appealing. But we can at least imagine his having done very badly before an electorate less resonant to the military conqueror and less susceptible to the charm of a supremely other-directed personality who nevertheless evoked many of the traditional virtues. We might suppose, for example, that Eisenhower would have done very badly indeed before an electorate whose dominant values are those of American university faculties of social science.

Attitudes already formed toward some political objects are of course among the dispositions which can influence response to others. This seems especially true in the case of attitudes toward the candidates. When one rival for the Presidency already is well known, as an incumbent President will always be, the public's attitude toward his opponent will inevitably be colored by its response to the established figure. Thus, in 1940, Roosevelt-haters were quick to discover the virtues of Wendell Willkie when he was thrust onto the presidential stage, as Roosevelt's partisans were quick to discern Willkie's vices. And in the early 1950's, Adlai Stevenson had the misfortune to be paired with a much better-established rival who already enjoyed the highest public regard.[9]

Of course the complex relation of candidate stimulus to the public's response also involves important communication factors. In a sense, the only real candidate stimuli are those which reach the voter via the mass media and interpersonal conversation, stimuli which only rarely are complemented by direct voter contact with the candidate. Therefore, the benefit or harm done to a candidate's cause by his actual personal attributes is mediated not only by the response dispositions of the electorate; it is mediated as well by the manner in which these attributes are communicated to the electorate. It is not hard to believe that some of the disarray of Goldwater's popular image was due to his extraordinarily bad press. The candidate properties communicated to the public are not a pure fiction of the media. But neither are they a pure reflection of the candidate himself, as he might have been seen at home in the desert.

What has been said of candidates can be said of any object which has electoral effects. Certainly the political role of domestic and foreign issues involves a similar interplay of stimulus properties, response tendencies, and communication processes. The Korean War's immense profit for the Republicans in 1952, for example, depended on much more than a set of objective events in the Far East and the parties' stand on those events. It depended too on a welter of response dispositions in the electorate—general isolationist or internationalist attitudes, hostility to communism, latent militarist tendencies, the anxieties of farmers over having sons away at harvest time, and the like—as well as the way in which the public was informed by the communications media of what was happening half a world away.

If the political effects of issues and personalities in the wider environment depend partly on what the electorate hears and how it is disposed to react to what it hears, it follows that changes in communication and response tendencies can at times alter the political effects of a stimulus which has not itself changed. A clear example of this is the rapid build-up of a candidate by the mass media when he steps into the charmed circle of leading contenders—or the opposite experience, which many potential candidates have had, of falling through the medias' trap door to oblivion. Instances of marked change of response dispositions while political objects remain unchanged are more difficult to discern, but they undoubtedly occur. Herbert Hoover's high starched collars, a symbol of middle class prosperity in the booming twenties, probably looked quite different from the bread-lines of 1932.

Although changes of communication and of response dispositions can alter the electorate's response to a given political object, it is nevertheless true that a turnover of objects—of the personalities, issues, and events of national politics—is the more important source of short-term electoral change. This is the more true since a stimulus object can affect communication and response dispositions themselves. For example, quite apart from the sort of man he "really" is, a candidate can have wide influence on his treatment by the mass media. If the newspapers gave Mr. Goldwater extraordinarily rough treatment for a Republican candidate, Goldwater's own posture toward the press was part of the reason. Similarly, different candidates engage different response dispositions in the mass public. Unlike any Democratic candidate since Al Smith, Kennedy activated response dispositions based on Catholic and Protestant religious identifications, as we have seen. And candidates can lead the electorate to learn new dispositions, as Kennedy helped make the country receptive to a whole new generation of youthful, vigorous candidates for national and state office.

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[9] The voter's attitude toward a given political object may be influenced by the presence of other objects in his perceptual field even when no question of order is involved in the formation of attitude. In such a case, however, it is more reasonable to think of these effects as belonging to the configuration of stimulus objects, rather than to the voter's response dispositions.

This type of change is vividly mirrored in the components of electoral decision given here for the past four presidential elections. The evidence of the changing personal impact of the candidates is especially impressive. Yet in a presidential system the turnover of candidates has implications reaching beyond sheer personal appeal. A candidate for the nation's great office is a focus for popular feeling about issues and questions of group benefit as well, and our measurements should be extended to take this fact into account.

RELATIVE CHANGE IN CANDIDATE AND PARTY ATTITUDE

It is hardly surprising that candidates for the Presidency should attract attitudes which are somewhat distinct from those attaching to the parties themselves. The platforms adopted by the nominating conventions are much less binding than the election manifestoes of a British party, for example, and a presidential candidate is notoriously at liberty to take his own stands on major issues and the problems of major social groupings. Equally, on matters requiring congressional action he is free to contradict positions taken by his party in the Senate and House. And on matters of foreign policy, the country is largely dependent on the candidate's record and views to know what his administration would be likely to do in the world. This is the stuff of which a presidential system is made.

Therefore, it is of interest to compare the variability of attitudes toward the parties and their presidential candidates. Neither has been constant over the period of our research, but the two have shown vastly different propensities to change. When we turn from a six- to a four-dimensional model, summarizing popular feeling according to the party or candidate toward which it is directed whether or not it concerns domestic or foreign issues, questions of group benefit, or other matters, the candidate components are found to have moved much more strongly from Republican to Democratic advantage.



Fig. 6. Variation of party and candidate components.

This contrast is shown by Figure 6, in which each pair of party and candidate components of the four-dimensional model is added together at each election. The combined party curve has not by any means stood still. The public's full assessment of the parties showed a marked Republican advantage in the mood of 1952. But by 1956 the comparison of parties had moved to the Democrats' benefit, and this trend continued over the later two elections.

The combined candidate curve, however, describes a very much greater change. The public's full assessment of Eisenhower and Stevenson, including issue and group perceptions as well as perceptions of personal qualities, was strongly Republican in 1952 and even more decisively so four years later. In the 1960 election, the comparison of candidates still favored the Republicans, although much more moderately. But between the Kennedy-Nixon campaign and the Johnson-Goldwater campaign the combined candidate component moved a most remarkable distance to the Democrats' advantage. In each contest the candidate curve was the farther removed from the zero-point: indeed, its average displacement from the neutral point has been more than 6 percent, whereas the average displacement of the party curve has been about 2 percent. But the really arresting comparison has to do with relative change: over these elections the variance of the candidate curve has exceeded that of the party curve by more than 10 to 1.

It is therefore evident that the dynamism of popular attitude is peculiarly tied to the emergence of new candidates for the Presidency. The attitudes toward the parties are not inert. The shift in the relative assessment of the parties over the period of this research has been enough to alter the parties' strength by something like six million votes on a turnout equal to that of 1964. But this change, impressive as it is, nevertheless is moderate by comparison with the change induced by succeeding pairs of candidates. The fluctuations of electoral attitudes over these elections have to a remarkable degree focused on the candidates themselves.

All of this is quite out of keeping with the static perspective of the earliest studies of voting. Even if our findings are no more than approximately true, they argue strongly the dynamic implications of changes of the stimulus objects of national politics. This source of change has in fact brought spectacular shifts of presidential voting despite the fact that over the same period there has been almost no perceptible shift in the single most important type of response disposition, the electorate's enduring party loyalties. It may also be noted that the variations of attitude recorded here have been largely independent of secular changes in the structure of American society, although, as we have seen, a turnover of stimulus objects can alter dramatically the facts of social structure which are relevant to political choice. Taken together, changes in the several stimulus objects of presidential politics in this span of years have been quite enough to bring a change of party control, indeed to have induced a drastic transformation of party fortune in the contest for the Presidency.

APPENDIX: A NOTE ON THE STATISTICAL MODEL

Since the number of positive and negative comments which a given voter makes about a given political object depends on the direction and strength of his feeling toward the object, we have placed a respondent on any given attitude dimension by forming the arithmetic difference of his pro-Republican and pro-Democratic responses whose content relates to the dimension. A pleasing variety of evidence can be marshaled to support the assumptions involved in this technique. That the resulting scales measure the intensity of attitude is borne out by the monotonic (indeed linear) relationships they exhibit with a host of other partisan variables, including the vote itself. That the neutral point is correctly located is indicated by the fact that a majority of those placed at the first scale position to the pro-Democratic side of the zero-point of each dimension do in fact vote Democratic; a majority of those at the first scale position to the pro-Republican side, Republican. The correct location of the neutral point is also attested by the model's success in estimating the direction and magnitude of the winning majority, as explained below. That the distances between scale positions are roughly equal (an assumption necessary to the further statistical operations) is also supported by the linearity of the relationship between the attitude scales and individual voting choice. Indeed, the proportion of the variance of the vote explained when individual choice is treated as a linear regression (as measured by the square of the product moment correlation) is almost identical with the proportion of the variance due to differences between the scale classes (as measured by the correlation ratio). That only a modest amount of error is involved in forming these relative-frequency measures of the direction and intensity of attitude is indicated by the success of the scales in accounting statistically for voting choice. Interestingly, the possibility that large errors have resulted from differences of verbal behavior can be partially discounted on the basis of experimental permutations of the order in which respondents were invited to comment on the two parties and the two candidates. Despite the reasonableness of the suspicion that either "warm-up" or "fatigue" effects might produce large differences in the volume of response according to the order in which the parties and candidates were presented, changes of order in fact seem not to make a particle of difference.

A linear probability model is used to describe the relation of these scales to voting choice, with a Republican vote scored 1 and a Democratic vote 0. If the probability of voting Republican, $\Pr(R)$, is expressed as a linear regression on the dimensions $X_1, \cdots, X_I$:

$$\Pr(R) = b_o + b_1X_1 + \cdots + b_Ix_I, \quad (1)$$

where I is either four or six according to the model used, the coefficients $b_1, \cdots, b_I$, of this linear combination measure the relative dependence of partisan choice on each of the dimensions. For some purposes it is useful to standardize these coefficients by measuring each attitude dimension in terms of sample standard deviations, yielding a new set of coefficients $b_1^*, \cdots, b_I^*$, as defined in a manner:

$$b_i^* = b_i s_i \qquad (i = 1, \cdots, I) \qquad (2)$$

which removes the effect of differences in the extent of variation along each of the dimensions. These standardized coefficients are not, however, the familiar beta coefficients of a regression equation in which both the dependent and independent variates are measured in sample standard deviations about their respective means. Scoring the dependent variable 0 and 1 is necessary to the probability interpretation of estimated scores. And each attitude scale is measured about its neutral point since this constitutes a theoretically meaningful origin.

The multiple correlation of the several predictors with partisan choice has varied in the range of .72 to .75 over the four presidential elections studied. There is reason to believe that most of the remaining "error" variance is due to the dichotomous nature of the dependent variate and that the multiple correlation of the attitude dimensions with some underlying *propensity* to vote Republican or Democratic would be substantially higher. Of the alternative ways of describing this relationship, I have given most attention to a multivariate probit model under which the probability of voting Republican varies according to the cumulative normal ogive. Such a model has aesthetically pleasing formal properties, especially the fact that it will never give probability estimates less than zero or exceeding unity. In practice, however, its performance differs little from that of the model used, since the relation of voting choice to the several dimensions is so nearly linear over the range of attitude actually found in our samples. The distribution of the electorate along an attitude dimension is much more easily summarized under the linear model, a fact which counts greatly in its favor.

To estimate the average amount by which a given dimension has increased (or lessened) the probability of the individual's voting Republican, we combine the information about its relation to voting choice, as measured by the multiple regression coefficient, with information about the mean location of voters on the dimension, as measured by the displacement of the observed mean from the theoretical neutral point, forming for each attitude dimension the product

$$b_i(\bar{X}_i - X_i^0) = b_i^* \frac{\bar{X}_i - X_i^0}{s_i} \qquad (3)$$

where b_i and b_i^* are as defined above and X_i^0 is the neutral point of the *i*th dimension. If the neutral point is taken as the origin, this product of course simplifies to

$$b_i\bar{X}_i = b_i^* \frac{\bar{X}_i}{s_i} . \qquad (4)$$

It is these quantities which I have called "attitudinal components" of the vote. The rationale for taking account of the mean's displacement from the neutral point is of course that a given dimension will benefit one party or the other only as its mean departs from the neutral point.

On the assumption that a dead heat would be the outcome of an election in which neither party was advantaged along any of the dimensions of attitude, the test of the model's ability to estimate the winning majority consists in seeing how well this relation is satisfied by the actual vote:

$$P_R - .5 = \sum_{i=1}^{I} b_i\bar{X}_i \qquad (5)$$

where P_R is the proportion of the two-party vote actually polled by the Republican candidate for President and each attitude factor X_i is measured about its theoretical neutral point. Over the four elections studied the maximum departure of this relation from equality has been about two percent, despite the fact that the Republican proportion of the two-party vote has varied over an interval from 58 percent to less than 40 percent. Indeed, the correlation of estimated and actual majorities over these four contests is .98, a figure which increases our confidence that we have faithfully measured many of the immediate attitudinal forces on the electorate's decision.

THE THEORY OF PARTY EQUILIBRIUM*

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Behind most political scientists' studies of nonvoting there is, implicitly at least, a theory of passive consent. This is particularly the case where nonvoting as a result of apathy is concerned. For, it is suggested, apathy tends to increase when citizens are satisfied that their interests will not be seriously harmed, regardless of which party wins. In other words: the very reasons which underlie apathetic nonvoters' failure to participate in an election testify that their inactivity is a form of passive consent to the election's outcome.[1]

Passive consent, however, cannot be equated to the "theory of consensus" which economists have recently contributed to political science. This "theory of consensus" deals with the "welfare economics" problem of aggregating individual citizens' preferences into a "true"—indeed, into a mathematically precise—schedule of social preferences.[2] Thus, while it is plausible that a citizen can, by nonvoting, tacitly consent to a given electoral outcome, it is also likely that the final social decision would change, however slightly, if in fact this citizen's true preferences had been admitted through voting into the social aggregation. In this case, the final choice would have popular consent without real popular consensus.

The converse can also be true. For example, while Duncan Black's *Theory of Committees and Elections* and Kenneth Arrow's *Social Choice and Individual Values* are characterized by a most impressive formal elegance, it is also true that neither makes provision for nonvoting. Indeed, in those relatively limited cases in which the Black and Arrow models lead to strictly determined outcomes in a majority rule election, they yield a theory of consensus without an explicit provision for majority consent!

The purposes of this paper follow accordingly. They are: (1) to incorporate provisions for nonvoting into some of the most simple existing models of consensus, and thereby (2) to reveal whether, with consent in the passive sense of the political scientist taken as given, nonvoting hurts consensus in the economists' sense. Hopefully, this paper will therefore (3) lay bare some new insights, and formally corroborate some old insights, regarding the impact of nonvoting on the functioning of two-party democracy.

I. ASSUMPTIONS OF THE MODEL

Application of mathematical-economic modes of reasoning to political problems promises some important advantages. Assumptions are necessarily made explicit. The reasoning is rigorously formalized and is all but proof against logical error. These tools frequently turn up nonobvious hypotheses for subsequent empirical testing. On the other hand, there is little likelihood that complex problems such as those involved in election analysis can be completely formalized, let alone completely "solved," through mathematics. The empirical data are too many, too varied. And the necessarily heroic assumptions of the economic or mathematical approach are too restrictive to permit any claim to great predictive potency.

The object of this model therefore is not primarily to give an accurate "fit" to reality. The object is rather to point up certain underlying, constantly-operating tendencies in the electoral process—tendencies which may or

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[1] The principal sources of this thesis are documented in Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man* (New York: Doubleday, 1960), pp. 216–219.

[2] See especially Duncan Black, *The Theory of Committees and Elections* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1958) and Kenneth Arrow, *Social Choice and Individual Values* (New York: Wiley, 1951). The other major contributors—all economists by training, as are Black and Arrow—are Anthony Downs, *An Economic Interpretation of Democracy* (New York: Harper Bros., 1957) and James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, *The Calculus of Consent* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1962). The appendices in the last-named volume contain further sources on the historical development of the theory of consensus; its bibliography is also comprehensive, as are those in Duncan Luce and Howard Raiffa, *Games and Decisions* (New York: Wiley, 1957) and William Riker, "Voting and the Summation of Preferences," this Review, LV (December, 1961), 900–911.

may not reveal themselves in practice, depending on whether or not short-term complicating factors appear in a given election, and depending on the degree to which the assumptions in this "ideal" system are realized in fact.

The assumptions are not, however, arbitrary. They are assumptions which are widely considered to be the prerequisites of a normatively "ideal" two-party democracy. They include, first, the Jeffersonian assumption of an interested and informed citizenry. Specifically, it is postulated that all citizens have complete information about the location of each party with respect to the spectrum of issues (though not necessarily information about other citizens' preferences). Moreover, this information is instantaneously communicated to the citizens if a party changes its location on the political spectrum.

Second, there is in this model perfect "factor mobility." By this assumption the representativeness of the system is putatively synchronized with the interest of the parties. That is to say, the parties are permitted to shift their platforms whenever such a shift will increase chances to gain a majority. Thus each party constantly "mobilizes" to represent the views of a larger portion of society.

The two final assumptions are designed to show that there is a *political problem* of consensus above and beyond the problems which have been revealed in the existing state of the *economists' theory* of consensus.

Black and Arrow have shown that majority rule can lead to inconsistency if no underlying harmony exists in the preference schedules of the electorate. The model in this paper will eliminate this problem by assuming, third, that a consistent and determinate social choice would obtain if all citizens voted. Put differently, it is assumed that the electoral system corresponds to the strongest form of Black's "single-peakedness" condition, in which each citizen has symmetrical preference profiles.[3]

But it will also be assumed, with the result of producing a different set of problems than have hitherto appeared in the theory of consensus, fourth, that electors have, in addition to the option of voting for one party rather than for the other, the third alternative of nonvoting. The passive consent notion will be preserved in this assumption by saying that the first cause of nonvoting, "apathy," is a function of how close the two parties' platforms are to each other. If they are very close to each other, more citizens will adopt an "I don't care" attitude as to which party wins; and this attitude will increase non-voting.

Yet it might be that a citizen will be more concerned over the fact that both parties have platforms which radically differ from his preferences than over the fact that the two parties are close together. Such a citizen—say, a "Left-Wing extremist" or a member of the "Radical Right"—would be likely not to vote as a means of registering his protest rather than his passive consent. Such possibilities will be admitted into this model (thus enriching it beyond the limits of the passive consent assumption) by postulating that "disaffection" is a second cause of nonvoting, along with apathy. Hence the likelihood that a given citizen will fail to vote will be a function of the combined magnitudes of his apathy and his disaffection.

II. THE CRITICAL-CONDITION EQUATION

Consider a system in which there are two parties, denominated "Conservative" and "Liberal." Each party can locate itself somewhere on a continuum, on a "conservative-liberal spectrum" of political issues.[4] The con-

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[3] Black, *op. cit.*, pp. 14–19. Summaries of the Black theory appear in Luce and Raiffa, *op. cit.*, pp. 353–56; in Riker, *loc. cit.*, pp. 906ff; and in Section VII below. By "the strongest form" of the condition it is meant that all preference profiles are single-peaked, symmetrically descending and without plateaus. To arrive at the true "equilibrium points" of Section V below while keeping some (however slight) differentiation of parties, it is also necessary that there be an even number of voters; the theory of party equilibrium will also hold for a system with an odd number of voters. But in this case party differentiation will completely disappear at the equilibrium.

[4] Continuity is a special, less restrictive case of the spectrum with which Black dealt in his *Theory of Committees and Elections*. Black's "spectrum" was composed of a limited number of discrete alternatives among which a relatively limited number of voters had to choose. Black's theory, developed for the harder "discrete issue" case,



FIG. A

sistency or single-peakedness assumption ensures that all issues can be aggregated into some order which runs from one extreme to the other, such that each citizen will prefer the party which is closer to his highest preference over a party which is farther away from his highest preference. And the significance of the assumption that the electorate is interested and informed comes into view. Given any positions assumed by the parties, every citizen would have some inclination, however slight, toward one party in preference to the other.

So if the entire electorate (E) voted, there would result an exhaustive division of E between the two parties. The share which would go, say, to the Conservatives is then the potentially Conservative vote. As will be clarified in the following sections, this can be expressed as some empirically determinable percent of the total electorate (K_C).

For simplicity, symbolic conventions are established as follows. As noted, E stands for the total electorate. K stands for a given percentage coefficient. Where they are needed, subscripts C and L will be used to stand for Conservative and Liberal. The following notations are also established.

N_T means "total nonvoting."
K_N means "percent of nonvoters *who would* have voted Conservative."
V_a means "*actual* number of votes cast for Conservatives."
V_r means "*required* number of Conservative votes for Conservative victory."

The actual Conservative vote return, however, must consider that not all Conservatives will vote. The actual Conservative vote then, can be described in the simple equation,

$$V_a = K_C E - K_N N_T,$$

which formalizes the truism that the votes actually won by Conservatives equals the number of votes which they would have won if all Conservatives voted, minus the votes of Conservatives who in fact do not vote.

Admission of nonvoting into the system affects V_r as well as V_a, because now the Conservatives, in a majority rule election, need gain only more than half the votes of that portion of the electorate which does cast ballots. Thus

$$V_r = \tfrac{1}{2}(E - N_T)$$

describes the "critical condition" for Conservative victory—the number of votes required to put the Conservatives just on the margin of victory.

One equation which will tell (when E and the K_C and K_N coefficients are known) what size N_T has to be in order to put Conservatives on the margin of victory can be derived by equating V_a to V_r and solving for N_T. This, the critical condition equation, is:

$$N_T = E\left(\frac{1 - 2K_C}{1 - 2K_N}\right)$$

The question next becomes: what factors determine the values of K_C and K_N? The simple location theory model from economics points to the type of framework that can be used to get an answer.[5]

III. VOTING AS A DETERMINATE FUNCTION OF PARTY LOCATION

Let the Conservatives start by announcing an extreme right-wing platform. The Liberals are, of course, at the extreme left. It follows that everyone to the right of dead center, *provided that voter distribution is symmetrical across the right-left spectrum*, will vote Conservative. Everyone left of center will vote Liberal. The two parties will halve the total vote exactly.

It will remain so unless, for example, the Conservative Party moves to the left—say, to position C_1 in Fig. A. Then everyone to the right of C_1 will vote Conservative. But so will everyone to the left of that position vote Conservative, out to the point where the segment between the Conservatives and the Liberals is bisected. Now the Conservative potential vote, $K_C E$, will equal the area under the curve out to line *a-b*. If everyone votes, it is obvious that, unless the Liberals counter the Conservative move to position C_1, the Conservatives will win.

But of course the Liberals will counter. They will move to the right, thus moving line *a-b* back to the right of dead center, and even beyond that. Indeed, because each party can strengthen its voting base by moving toward center, the process will end only when both

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thus applies to the model in these pages. Actually, therefore, continuity of the spectrum—which is a reasonable assumption when the electorate is very large, with many shades of differing opinions—is not necessary to the theory of party equilibrium that is herein broached. But it does simplify graphical representation of the argument.

[5] The remainder of this paper owes much to the pioneering work of Harold Hotelling, who first suggested the use of location theory to explain party characteristics in a two-party democracy. See his "Stability in Competition," 39 *The Economic Journal* (1929), pp. 41–57. Downs, *supra*, has made the most influential application of this mode of reasoning to election analysis.

parties have located themselves precisely at the mean of the spectrum, with Conservatives gaining all votes from citizens to the right of dead center, and with the Liberals gaining all leftist votes.

Now, what will occur when nonvoting is permitted in this symmetrical system? In such a system, wherein Conservatives and Liberals will have located themselves at dead center of the spectrum so as to yield 0.5 as the value alike for K_C and K_L, nonvoting will also be symmetrically distributed around the dead-center line so that K_N *also* equals 0.5. This can be seen as follows.



FIG. B

Apathy, the first cause of nonvoting, will be symmetrically distributed over the entire electorate because the cause of apathy (closeness of parties to each other) is the same for any citizen. If 40% of voters fail to vote through apathy, then the total "apathetic nonvote" will be built up by taking 40% of all voters at every point along the distribution in Fig. B. Since the distribution is symmetrical, so will the curve traced out by taking 40% of each ordinate value thereof be symmetrical.

Nor does the admission of disaffection affect this conclusion. By the definitions in Section I, disaffection will be proportional to the distance of a given citizen from the party which most closely represents his highest preference. In the symmetrical distribution, for every citizen who is at a given distance to the right of the dead-center location of the parties, there is a citizen an equal distance to the left. Unless some means of measuring interpersonal comparisons of intensity of disaffection is uncovered, it must therefore be assumed that the incidence of disaffection will be symmetrical about, and increasing as one moves out from, the dead-center line.

Disaffection will thus add to apathy as a cause of nonvoting as shown in the shaded portions of Fig. B. As a result, not only voting, but nonvoting as well, is determined in the symmetrical case by party location—determined such that both parties can and will achieve their critical condition. But what is the situation in the more realistic case, where voter distribution is not symmetrical?

IV. THE NON SYMMETRICAL CASE

The situation depicted in Fig. C—wherein there is a concentration of potential votes toward one extreme of the political spectrum—illustrates the general problem. The area under the curve equals E. Therefore both parties will move to a new position b where they halve the electorate. Point b must, in Fig. C, be to the right of dead center.



FIG. C

The Liberals' Problem. Since the Liberals are now farther from the left end of the spectrum than they were in Fig. B, they will lose more votes (and the Conservatives will lose fewer votes) through disaffection in direct proportion as point b is more or less far to the right of dead center.

Moreover, it would seem that the Liberals will also lose more votes through apathy near the mean of vote distribution (near line a-b) than will the Conservatives.

Let line a-b be equidistant from line c-d on the rightward segment and from line e-f on the leftward segment. As c-d and e-f get closer to the parties' positions, the impact of disaffection will get smaller. At some point, disaffection "close in" to the parties' positions will be small enough to be (but, incidentally, need *not* be in order to "save" the argument) disregarded. Apathy in this case will, however, count for much. Again, its incidence will be symmetrical about line a-b, even though voter distribution is not. This is, again, to be taken as meaning that a certain fraction of citizens whose top preferences lie at point d will fail to vote through apathy; and the same fraction will fail to vote at point f. But any given fraction of e-f is larger than the same proportional part of c-d. Thus the absolute number of votes lost to the Liberals through apathy will exceed the absolute numbers lost to the Conservatives. And, because the same holds for losses "at the extremes" because of disaffection, the Liberals would seem so far to be hurt by nonvoting more than their opponents. Yet this is not necessarily the case.

The Conservatives' Problem. Liberals have, in Fig. C, their comparative disadvantage at the extreme (through disaffection) and near the mean of voter distribution (through apathy). The Conservatives' problem, by contrast, occurs in the median ranges.

In Fig. C, let line *a-b* be equidistant from *i-j* in the leftward segment of the spectrum and from *g-h* at the right extreme. Again, apathy will operate with more or less constant effect on voters at all distances along the spectrum from *a-b*. This is because all voters, from the most moderate to the most extreme, perceive the similarity of the two parties in terms of outlook and program. If its impact at *c-d* and at *e-f* is to cause, say, 40% to refrain from casting a vote that is perceived to be meaningless, then the effect at *g-h* and at *i-j* and, for that matter, at every other "cut" of the electorate along the spectrum, might also be plausibly expected to be 40%.

As shown immediately above, this hurts the Liberals in Fig. C more than it hurts the Conservatives at all points equidistant from *a-b* where the ordinal values of the curve are higher to the left than they are to the right. But the reverse is also true!

In all regions where the ordinal value of the curve is lower (as, for instance, at point *i*) on the Liberals' than the corresponding point on the Conservatives' side (as at point *g*), apathy will cost the Conservatives more heavily in absolute numbers of nonvoters who would have voted Conservative. Hence if the curve slopes downward with sufficient steepness to the left of line *a-b* and the slope of voter distribution is sufficiently shallow on the Conservatives' side, that part of the Liberals' nonvoting problem which derives from apathy may be cancelled out.

Disaffection springs from, and is proportional to, the distance of a potential voter from the two parties at line *a-b*. Now it is possible to conceive a system in which the extreme right is so close to the extreme left that no one is disaffected. But as the extremes become more alienated from each other—as the spectrum "spreads out" in terms of the intensity of people's feelings on the issues at stake—disaffection will increasingly make itself felt. Obviously, it will tend to occur at the leftward end of the spectrum in Fig. C before it occurs at the right extreme.

Disaffection will thus represent a comparative disadvantage for Liberals unless it becomes so severe that its incidence affects Conservatives in the "median range" described above, where any fractional decreases in voting necessarily hurt Conservatives more than Liberals (as at *g-h* and *i-j*).

The essential points may be summarized as follows. While asymmetries in voter distribution do not prevent the parties from moving to positions where K_C and K_L equal 0.5, these very movements complicate the problem that one or the other of the parties has in getting the value of K_N in the critical condition equation which it needs to reach the margin of victory. In the example of Fig. C, it appears to be the Liberals who confront this problem; but, in fact, it could be the Conservatives who have, on balance, the comparative disadvantage at point *b*.

Now common sense would probably advise, first, that the party which has the greater problem should "back off" somewhat from position *b*, wherewith its loss of potential voters would be more than offset by a decrease in K_N. And common sense would probably compound what will be shown to be an error in this advice by arguing, second, that it is possible for voter distribution to be so skewed that one party—the party with the adverse value of K_N when both parties are located at *b*—might be able to find *no* position where it can get a majority of voters.

Actually, however, the first of the above suggestions is true only in one very special, albeit very important, case. (The implications of this case will be covered in Section VI.) And the second of the above suggestions, as will be demonstrated in the section to follow, is true only when the "factor mobility" assumption is not realized. Indeed, it is true except in the special case of Section VI that *wherever there is factor mobility, each party can find an equilibrium which guarantees that it will at least realize the critical condition—this regardless of the configuration of voter distribution!*

V. THE THEORY OF PARTY EQUILIBRIUM

The two-party system will be in equilibrium when each party has located itself on the right-left spectrum such that no further movement relative to the spectrum as a whole, or relative to the position of the opposing party in particular, will be able to gain for it a greater number of votes.

What dynamics underlie the parties' search for their equilibrium positions? We begin with the same sort of highly simplified electoral scheme that was outlined in Sections II and III. At the same time we realize that, whereas in the derivation of the critical condition equation



FIG. D

the percent of nonvoters who would have voted Conservative was assumed to be a constant and predictable figure, K_N must eventually be treated as a variable which is itself a function of N_T.

The interdependency between N_T and K_N can be established by referring to line *a-b* in Fig. D. This line divides the voter distribution into two areas such that all votes on either side of *a-b* will go, for reasons already broached, to the party on the corresponding side. (Again, line *a-b* is perpendicular to the point which falls just halfway between the two parties.) The resulting picture permits one to fill in the terms of the critical condition equation from Section II: the double-shaded area gives a value for K_N; the total area under the upper curve equals E; the total area under the upper curve and between the right extreme and line *a-b*, *divided by* E, gives the value for K_C; and the shaded areas on either side of *a-b* add up to the value of N_T.

But *a-b* is a variable—variable with the positions of the two parties. As *a-b* varies, the distribution of voter apathy, as well as the probability that disaffection will come into play, will also vary. This will normally change the configuration of the lower curve, with the corresponding effect of changing the sizes of the shaded areas.

The precise shapes of the curves in Fig. D must be determined empirically. Yet the fact that such empirical determination would be difficult need not, and should not, deter one from proceeding with an analysis of the theoretical problem. The key to this theoretical problem—a problem, by the way, whose general solution is unaffected by irregularities in the shapes of the curves in Fig. D—is as follows.

At any position of *a-b*, the number of votes lost to both parties through apathy and disaffection is, in principle, determinable. Also, the values of K_C and K_N are determinable. (For example, when the Conservatives and the Liberals locate themselves as in Fig. D, K_C equals 0.4 and K_N equals 0.3.) Other values will be similarly computable if, as in Fig. E, both parties move toward the "liberal" end of the spectrum. In such a case, the shape of the lower curve would change; but it would change in a predictable fashion with the repositioning of the parties—or, at least, would change in a manner that is empirically ascertainable. K_C would equal 0.8, and K_N would equal 0.9.



FIG. E

For every possible position of line *a-b*, then, N_T can be computed; as can K_C; and as can K_N too. Since E is constant, the "V_a equation" of Section II,

$$V_a = K_C E - K_N N_T,$$

is soluble for every position of *a-b*.

The problem is reduced to one of finding where the Conservatives must locate themselves relative to the Liberals such that (1) the value of V_a will equal or exceed one half of the actual vote turnout, and that (2) the Liberals will not be able to change their position in a manner which will reduce this value of V_a.

In order to locate the position in which Conservatives will enjoy this kind of equilibrium, we begin by plotting in Fig. F the values of K_N (on the ordinate) against the values assumed by K_C (along the abscissa) as *a-b* moves from one end of the spectrum to the other. From the resulting curve we can tell the value of K_N at every value of K_C. And we know, for reasons given above, where the line *a-b* must be located in order to have a given value of K_C.

Now, the $K_N - K_C$ curve in Fig. F gives no new information. It merely presents information that we assume has been empirically determined, but in a form which, it will now be shown, is more useable than otherwise.

New information—the information which we seek—will be forthcoming from Fig. F only if it can tell us the regions of the $K_N - K_C$ curve in which the Conservatives must locate themselves if they are to be in an equilibrium position. But in order to get such information out of the diagram, it must first be put *into* the diagram in some way. The critical condition equation indicates the way to do this.

The critical condition equation is, if N_T is for the moment held constant, a linear equation in the two variables: K_C and K_N. It can be re-



FIG. F

written:

$$K_C = K_N\left(\frac{N_T}{E}\right) - \left(\frac{N_T}{2E}\right) + \tfrac{1}{2},$$

which can be plotted as the straight line on the graph in Fig. F. (Section VI considers the case where N_T is permitted to vary.)

Inspection of Fig. F will show that any time the Conservatives have $K_N - K_C$ values which are *on* the straight line, the Conservatives have just reached the marginal or critical condition for victory; any time the Conservatives are *below* this straight line—in the shaded area of the figure—they have gone, so to speak, "supercritical," and have won the two-party election. The Conservatives, by locating themselves on the right-left spectrum such that *a-b* will produce a K_C which exceeds, in the example of Fig. F, a value of 0.4 will automatically guarantee themselves a K_N which is low enough to insure victory.

But once again this is a mirror image of the Liberals' problem. The Liberals need only locate themselves in the unshaded area *above* the critical condition equation line—need only insure that K_C is less than 0.4—in order to guarantee their own victory. And once again: the location of *a-b*, by which the whole two-party battle hangs, cannot be decided by the Conservatives alone. If, for instance, in Fig. D, the position of *a-b* insures the Conservatives a K_C greater than 0.4, and hence victory, and yet there is some distance between Conservatives and Liberals, then the Liberals will move closer to Conservatives. This will cause *a-b* to move closer to the actual position of the Conservative party, with the effect of gaining the votes of citizens who are now nearer to the Liberals for the Liberal party. The only way that the Conservatives can insure themselves at least half the votes that actually are cast, therefore, is by positioning themselves at the location of *a-b* which will give them the critical, but less than the "supercritical," value of K_C. And, of course, the Liberals' situation is identical.

Some preliminary conclusions can now be drawn. As *a-b* varies from the extreme right to the extreme left of the spectrum, the $K_N - K_C$ curve will *have* to trace out some curve between the coordinates (1, 1) and (0, 0). Moreover, the limits on the slope of the critical condition line in Fig. F insure that the $K_N - K_C$ curve cannot possibly be altogether above or below the line.[6] Now because the curve must somewhere intersect the critical condition line, and because this intersection determines the position which each party should take in order to achieve the critical condition, it follows that if the parties are free to take up any position on the spectrum, and are not "immobilized" by ideological commitments, then both parties have an equal chance for victory. *There is a strictly determined equilibrium in such a two-party system.*

To this extent, it can be stated that the chance for an equal two-party contest depends not in the least upon voter distribution over the right-left spectrum (as, for example, the familiar typology of "maintaining elections," "deviating elections" and "realigning elections"[7] seems to imply). It rather depends solely on the factors of mobility and, as is now to be shown, of nonvoting.

VI. DOES NONVOTING DESTABILIZE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM?

If N_T is permitted to vary, the system will not merely move to a new equilibrium. The system will, on the contrary, either keep the *same* equilibrium or else will be thrown into complete disequilibrium (and hence be "destabilized" in the sense that the parties can no longer insure themselves an optimum position),

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[6] By inspection, this equation must pass through coordinates: 0.5, 0.5. A further point can be established, thereby determining the line, by letting K_N go to zero, whereupon:

$$K_C = \frac{1}{2} - \left(\frac{N_T}{2E}\right).$$

This means that the K_C intercept of the line will vary between the limits:

$$\tfrac{1}{2} > K_C > 0.$$

[7] Angus Campbell and others, *The American Voter* (New York: Wiley, 1960), Chapter 19.

depending altogether on the rate at which nonvoting increases relative to the rate of a party's departure from the original equilibrium position.

Suppose that position *b* in Fig. D is thought to be an equilibrium point. Then, by Section V, the Liberals will be just to the left of that point and the Conservatives will be just to the right. Suppose further that these positions yield the values in Fig. F, where K_C equals 0.4 and K_N for the Conservatives equals 0.3.

Now, by definition, neither party can improve its chances of victory by moving from point *b*—*if indeed point b is an equilibrium position.* How can we get an answer to the question implied in that word "if"?

To test whether *b* is an equilibrium point when N_T varies, suppose still further that the Liberals move farther to the left of position *b*. Such a move would have the effect of shifting point *b* itself farther to the left—to a point midway between the original point *b* (where the Conservatives are still located) and the new position assumed by the Liberals. Such a movement would also have the effect of decreasing nonvoting on two accounts. First, because the Liberals would be closer to the left extreme of the spectrum, nonvoting through disaffection would decrease. And second, because the parties would now be farther apart, and hence present more of a real choice to the electorate, nonvoting through apathy would also decrease.

But as N_T decreases, the slope of the critical condition line in Fig. F gets steeper. Hence this line (which, at any value of N_T, will be found on an inspection of its equation to have to pass through the coordinates 0.5, 0.5) will intersect the $K_N - K_C$ curve at a higher value of K_C than in the original equilibrium case. Either of the following two results can occur.

The new position of *b* will produce a certain value on the $K_N - K_C$ curve. (Indeed, with N_T varying, it might even result in a slightly changed configuration in the $K_N - K_C$ curve.) Suppose the new point moves more rapidly in the "northeastern" direction that is indicated by the arrow in Fig. F than the intersection of the curve and the critical condition line (point *i*) which is caused by changes in N_T moves upward along $K_N - K_C$. Then the Liberal Party shift from the original point *b* will have insured values of K_N and K_C which fall in the shaded portion of the figure. In this case, the Liberal Party's movement will have guaranteed a Conservative victory. This means that the Liberals cannot afford to move from the original position *b*; and *this* in turn means that *b* indeed *is* an equilibrium point.

But an altogether opposite conclusion follows if—to invoke a well-known analogy from economics—there is a "high elasticity" between differentiation of the parties' platforms (indicated by their distance from each other on the left-right spectrum) and nonvoting. What if the Liberal movement away from point *b* effects an appreciable decrease in nonvoting? What if N_T decreases so rapidly that the intersection of the $K_N - K_C$ curve with the critical condition line travels "northeasterly" more quickly than the new point on the $K_N - K_C$ curve? In this case, "high elasticity" would exist between party differentiation and nonvoting.

If a slight *increase* in party differentiation causes a *more than proportional decrease* in N_T, the Liberal movement away from the original point *b* will, within the range where "high elasticity" exists, guarantee values of K_N and K_C that fall in the *un*shaded area of Fig. F. The Liberals therefore should consider moving away from point *b*. This indicates that *b* is not an equilibrium position when there is high elasticity between party differentiation and nonvoting.

The foregoing does not, however, say that the Liberals will insure themselves victory by moving. For now the Conservatives can "follow the Liberals" leftward from point *b*, such that *both* parties leave the original putative "equilibrium position." In this event, N_T would rise again. And inspection will reveal that it can rise in such a manner as now to guarantee that the Conservatives, by "following" the Liberals leftward, will win. This will hold true quite generally unless the Liberals "reverse field" and move to yet a newer position to the *right* of the leftward-moving Conservatives such that the split of both parties' votes is to the left of the original point *b*. The result here is Liberal victory once again.

What is essential to note is that neither Conservatives nor Liberals can strictly determine an equilibrium when there is "high elasticity." Rather, each must play a game of strategy. Each must decide to stick at its original position just left or right of point *b*, where votes will be evenly split (Strategy 1); to move away from the opponent's position, while staying within the limits of "high elasticity" (Strategy 2); or to move away from the original position and then to "reverse field" in an attempt to counter the opposing party's possible movement away from *its* original position (Strategy 3). Figure G shows a rough game matrix, with values of +1, 0 and −1 assigned to correspond to a winning, a tie vote, or a losing pay-off to Conservatives.

VII. INTERPRETATION OF THE MODEL

An assumption underlying the entire analysis (see Section I) has been that, in "mobilizing" to represent the views of a larger portion of society, parties integrate citizens' preferences; that, accordingly, the party which gains a majority represents a majority of society's views; and that as a result the two parties are prime instruments whereby consensus is translated into policy.

	LIBERALS		
CONSERVATIVES	1	2	3
1	0	-1	1
2	-1	-1	1, 0, -1*
3	0, -1*	1	-1

*can assume either value, depending on precise relative position of the parties.

Fig. G

It is now time to see if this assumption squares with the most thorough-going theory of consensus that has yet appeared—that of Duncan Black—and to interpret discrepancies or inconsistencies between this model and Black's "single-peakedness" model.

Black's *Theory of Committees and Elections* demonstrates that majority rule will produce a consistent social choice, provided that all citizens can arrange their preferences along a spectrum like the left-right spectrum in this model in such a manner that each citizen's preference profile is single-peaked. (In Fig. H, preference profile W is not single-peaked; but profiles X, Y and Z are single-peaked.) Then, if nonsingle-peaked profiles are eliminated, the voter with the median peak will be able to get a majority vote for his top preference over all others.

Black's theory can be translated without loss of generality into terms of the present model—so long as nonvoting is prohibited. What holds for the small majority rule committee of Fig. H holds equally well for the constituency represented in Figures A through E. Each party, in trying to get a majority of votes, is in actuality seeking out the median voter. *Indeed, the equilibrium point in all cases where nonvoting is not considered, as well as in all cases where there is perfect symmetry in distribution, will be the point at which the median citizen is located.* Hence the outcome determined by the electoral struggle is identical with the social choice prescribed by Black's theory of consensus.



Fig. H

Thus far, the theory of party equilibrium that is sketched in these pages supports and is supported by Black's *Theory of Committees and Elections.*

But now consider a system in which voter distribution is skewed, as in Section IV. It has been shown that asymmetries in voter distribution, even when such asymmetries are compounded by further irregularities in nonvoting distribution, will (except in the "high elasticity" case) not preclude parties from finding strictly-determined equilibrium positions. But now such equilibrium points—the points which determine the "decisions" that the electorate will make at the ballot box if parties and voters alike act "rationally"—will not produce a social choice that reflects the true democratic consensus.

In nonsymmetric cases, K_N for one party is higher than K_N for the other, and the equilibrium point is determined by the position on the left-right spectrum of the median voter. It is obvious, however, that the median *voter* can be the median *citizen* only if there are an equal number of nonvoters on either side of the equilibrium point—a situation which is not met when K_N is not the same for both parties. Therefore, in the nonsymmetrical case the party-equilibrium point is not the point which corresponds to the decision that would be produced by true majority rule consensus.

The situation is even less reassuring in the "high elasticity" case of Section VI. In this case, it will be recalled, there is no strictly-determined equilibrium position. This means that the system cannot even guarantee a final vote choice which represents the majority consensus of citizens who *do* vote, let alone of the franchise as a whole.

VIII. TOWARD A THEORY OF CONSENSUS

Nonvoting builds into the two-party system forces which systematically and documentably tend to preclude electoral decisions from reflecting true social consensus. This conclusion should be evaluated in light of the insights which have been provided by the empirical studies of Gosnell, Campbell, Converse, Miller, Stokes, Berelson, Lazarsfeld, McPhee, Lipset, and other survey researchers. For it adds a new dimension—one that seems *not* to have been adequately considered by survey researchers—to the difficulties in received theory. In point is the following passage from a volume by Professors Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee:

> *Individual voters* today seem unable to satisfy the requirements for a democratic system of government outlined by political theorists. But the *system of democracy* does meet certain requirements for a going political organization. The individual members may not meet all the standards, but the whole nevertheless survives and grows. This suggests that where the classical theory is defective is in its concentration on the *individual citizen.* What are undervalued are certain collective properties that reside in the electorate as a whole and in the political and social system in which it functions.[8]

This passage can only be viewed as a reaffirmation of the theory of passive consent. Insofar as it suggests the existence of some harmonizing mechanism in the "system of democracy," a mechanism which systematically discounts errors or apathy in "individual voters" and synchronizes the parties' drive toward victory with the system's rightful aim of revealing a true consensus, the above hypothesis is wrong.

The survey researchers, after having forced even the hardiest adherent of the "classical theory" into the conclusion that "individual voters" fall impossibly short of realizing the demands which democratic theory places upon them, cannot undo their damage by recourse to Victorian optimism about the system as a whole. What empirical study has done to our confidence in the individual voter, pure theory seems similarly to be doing to our confidence in the ability of the party process to produce true consensus.

In light of the conclusions in the foregoing section of this paper, is it to be admitted that consensus cannot even be hoped for in two-party elections, but that, at least, the decisions that are produced need not be expected to strain "passive consent" to the breaking point? The answer must be "no." For perhaps the most important conclusion in the theory of party equilibrium is that the tendency of two-party elections (with nonvoting) to frustrate consensus is a compounding tendency which threatens in the end to destroy consent as well.

As apathy in any nonsymmetrical system causes parties to locate themselves other than so as to represent the views of the median citizen, disaffection increases at one end of the spectrum. As voter Z in Fig. H, for example, decides not to vote because the parties are "too far away" from him on the spectrum, the parties have (at least, in other than the "high elasticity" case of Section VI) to move *still farther* away from Z to try to locate themselves at an equilibrium point— that is, at the median of those who do vote. But such a move away from Z also represents a move away from citizens in the area of Z, such as voter Y. This increases the likelihood that Y will become a new disaffected nonvoter, and hence that the parties will have to move again.

In other words, disaffection—which cannot be reconciled with "passive consent," as can apathetic nonvoting—tends to increase itself. Even apathy, if it is distributed across the electorate in an asymmetrical fashion, can, by leading to some initial disaffection at one extreme, ultimately cause breakdown of "passive consent" when disaffection has compounded itself up to sizable proportions.

This paper, however, is hopefully more than a destructive supplement to the work of Arrow and Black on the "pure theory" side of election inquiry. Hopefully, it is more than a destructive complement to the contributions of survey research. In pointing up some difficulties in received consensus theory, it also reveals some additional factors—such as the impact of nonvoting, the different implications of apathy and disaffection, the significance of "factor mobility," the relationship of two-party choice to Black's *Theory of Committees and Elections*, and the analytical potency of the equilibrium concept—which might be taken into account as pure theorists and survey researchers now turn cooperatively to the task of constructing a truly general theory of consensus.

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[8] Bernard R. Berelson, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, William N. McPhee, *Voting* (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1954), p. 312, emphasis in the original.

OBLIGATION AND CONSENT—II

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A reexamination of even the most venerable traditional problems of political theory can sometimes yield surprisingly new and relevant results.[1] The problem of political obligation, for example, and its most popular "solution,"based on consent, turn out on reexamination to be rather different from what we have come to assume about them. The problem of political obligation resolves itself into at least four mutually related but partially independent questions:

1. The limits of obligation ("*When* are you obligated to obey, and when not?")
2. The locus of sovereignty ("*Whom* are you obligated to obey?")
3. The difference between legitimate authority and mere coercion ("Is there *really* any difference; are you ever *really* obligated?")
4. The justification of obligation ("*Why* are you ever obligated to obey even a legitimate authority?")

And the consent theory of obligation, as exemplified in Locke's *Second Treatise* and Joseph Tussman's *Obligation and the Body Politic*, turns out to yield a new formulation—perhaps a new interpretation of consent theory, perhaps an alternative to it—that might be labelled either the doctrine of the "nature of the government" or the doctrine of "hypothetical consent."[2]

It teaches that your obligation depends not on any actual act of consenting, past or present, by yourself or your fellow-citizens, but on the character of the government. If it is a good, just government doing what a government should, then you must obey it; if it is a tyrannical, unjust government trying to do what no government may, then you have no such obligation. Or to put it another way, your obligation depends not on whether you have consented but on whether the government is such that you *ought* to consent to it, whether its actions are in accord with the authority a hypothetical group of rational men in a hypothetical state of nature would have (had) to give to any government they were founding. Having shown how this formulation emerges from Locke's and Tussman's ideas, I want now to defend it as a valid response to what troubles us about political obligation, and as a response more consonant than most with the moral realities of human decisions about obedience and resistance. At the same time the discussion should also demonstrate how many different or even conflicting things that one might want to call "consent" continue to be relevant—a fact which may help to explain the tenacity of traditional consent theory in the face of its manifest difficulties. Such a defense and demonstration, with detailed attention to such decisions, are difficult; the discussion from here on will be more speculative, and will raise more questions than it answers.

I. THE THEORY APPLIED

Our new doctrine seems most obviously satisfactory as a response to question three, concerning the difference between legitimate authority and mere coercion. For it teaches that legitimate authority is precisely that which *ought* to be obeyed, to which one ought to consent, which deserves obedience and consent, to which rational men considering all relevant facts and issues would consent, to which consent can be justified. Anything or anyone else who tries to command us is then merely coercing, and is not entitled to our obedience. This answer to the question is essentially what Wittgenstein calls a "point of grammar"; it reminds us of the way concepts like "authority," "legitimacy," "law" are related in our language (and therefore in our world) to concepts like "consent" and "obedience."[3] To call something a legitimate authority is normally to imply that it ought to be obeyed. You cannot, without further rather elaborate explanation, maintain simultaneously *both* that this government has legitimate authority over you *and* that you have no obligation to obey it. Thus if you say that you consent to it (recognize it as an authority), that statement itself is normally a recognition of the obligation to obey, at least at the moment it is uttered. Part of what "authority" means is that those subject to it are obligated to obey. As an answer to question three, then, this doctrine tells us (something about) what legitimate authority *is* by reminding us of something about what "legitimate authority" *means*. But of course that is not yet to provide criteria for telling apart the two species—legitimate authority and mere coercion—when you encounter them in reality.

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[1] This and part of the following paragraph are intended to summarize the argument of "Obligation and Consent—I," This REVIEW, 59 (December, 1965), pp. 990–999.

[2] John Locke, *Second Treatise of Civil Government*; Joseph Tussman, *Obligation and the Body Politic* (New York: Oxford, 1960).

[3] Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations* (New York: Macmillan, 1953). See also Stanley Louis Cavell, "The Claim to Rationality" (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1961), esp. Chapter I.

Thus, insofar as our *real* need is for a practical way of deciding whether to obey or resist this government right now, or which of two rival authorities to follow, our new theory seems less adequate. Its response to our question three does not seem immediately helpful with questions one and two; and surely those are of the most concern to real people confronted with decisions about action. It just does not seem very helpful to tell a man considering resistance to authority: you must obey if the government is such that you ought to obey. But neither is traditional consent theory very helpful to this man; indeed, one of its weaknesses has always been this matter of detailed application. Perhaps it is even a mistake to assume that a theory of political obligation is supposed to tell a man directly what to do in particular cases.[4]

One might argue, however, that such a theory should at least tell him what sorts of considerations are relevant to his decision, direct his attention and tell him where to look.[5] And in that regard, I suggest that traditional consent theory is defective, for it directs such a man's attention to the wrong place. It teaches him to look at himself (for his own consent) or at the people around him (for theirs), rather than at the merits of the government. Where it demands obedience, consent theory does so on the grounds that he or the majority have consented; where it justifies resistance, it does so on the grounds that consent was never given or has been exceeded. Thus the man who must choose is directed to the question: have I (we) consented to this? The new doctrine formulated in this essay seems at least to have the virtue of pointing such a man in the right direction. For it tells him: look to the nature of the government—its characteristics, structure, activities, functioning. This is not much of a guide, but it is a beginning much more usefully related to what men need to think about when they make such choices.

Let us consider seriously what sorts of things people really think about when they confront a genuine decision about obedience and resistance, and what sorts of things they ought to think about. But anyone who undertakes to do that is immediately overwhelmed by the complexity and multiplicity of what seems relevant, and by the many different imaginable cases. We need to consider a list of specific cases at least as diverse as these:

Socrates, as presented in the *Crito* and the *Apology*.
An ordinary criminal.
An American student engaging in civil disobedience.
A Mississippi Negro who decides to join a revolutionary group.
A South African Negro who decides to join a revolutionary group.
A minor official in Nazi Germany, who continues to carry out his functions.

Even a brief review of such cases teaches at least this much: the occasions for contemplating and possibly engaging in disobedience are extremely varied; and a great many kinds of non-obedience are available, from flight through crime to attempted revolution.[6] Some forms of non-obedience are violent, others not; some are personal and others organized; some are isolated actions and others a systematic program of action; some are directed against a particular law or decree and others against an entire system of government. To a person confronted with a real decision about resistance or obedience, it makes an enormous difference what kind of action is contemplated. Circumstances that may justify escape or isolated refusal to obey a particular law may not suffice to justify revolution; indeed, some forms of resistance (like civil disobedience) may even be provided for within a political system.

Next, we may notice that all of our examples are, or could reasonably be, people in conflict. Socrates may never have been in doubt as to what he would do, but his friends certainly disagreed with him at first; and he cast his own argument in the form of a confrontation between the desire "to play truant" and the admonitions of the laws. All of our examples (with the exception of the criminal?) might have good, serious reasons for resistance. None of them ought to feel entirely free to pursue those reasons without first weighing them against something else—his *prima facie* obligation to obey. One might say: all these men ought to feel a certain tie to their governments, their societies, in the sense in which Socrates feels such a tie, but some of them might nevertheless be justified in disobeying or resisting. That he does not sufficiently feel such a tie, that he has no (good) reason, no justification for disobedience, is precisely what makes the case of an "ordinary" criminal different from the rest. This is at least in accord with the formula offered by our new theory: normally law, authority, government are to be obeyed and resistance requires justification. You are not morally free to resist as a matter of whim.

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[4] See, for example, Margaret Macdonald, "The Language of Political Theory," in A. Flew, ed., *Logic and Language: First Series* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1960), pp. 167–186.

[5] This suggestion is advanced, against Miss Macdonald's argument, in S. I. Benn and R. S. Peters, *Social Principles and the Democratic State* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1959), pp. 299–301.

[6] Something like this point is suggested by Tussman, *op. cit.*, p. 43.

The real person confronted by a problematic situation about obedience needs to know that, but he obviously needs to know much more. He needs to know much more specifically when resistance is justified and what might count as a justification. Does he learn this by thinking about his own past consent or that of his fellow-citizens, as traditional consent theory would suggest? Or does he learn it by assessing the nature and quality of the government?

Our cases of potential disobedience show an interesting division in this respect. Three of them—the student and the two Negroes—seem quite unlikely to think much about their own past consent—when and whether they consented, how often and how seriously, expressly or tacitly, and so on. What they are likely to think about is the "outrageous" conduct and "oppressive, unjust" structure of the government, and of the possible consequences of resistance. The criminal (since we have defined him as "ordinary") is not likely to think about either obligations to obey or justifications for his action. The Nazi might well cite his consent to the Fuehrer, his oath of office, pledges of absolute obedience, and so on, as a justification for continued obedience despite "certain unpleasant government measures that perhaps ought not to have been taken." And Socrates is passionately aware of his ties to the Athenian laws, the gratitude he owes them for past favors, the power of his past consent to them.

Thus both Socrates and the Nazi do seem to look to past consent rather than to the nature of the government. But the significance of this fact has yet to be assessed; for on closer examination, each of their cases reveals an important weakness in traditional consent theory. From the case of the Nazi we can learn that even express consent may not be enough; and from that of Socrates, the difficulties of applying past consent as a guide to action.

It might be tempting to say that of our six cases, only Socrates is truly moral, for only he thinks about his obligations and commitments to the laws. But the example of the Nazi saves us from this simplistic response, by showing that sometimes past promises and oaths are not enough to determine present obligations. Sometimes a man who cites even an express oath to obedience, is being not admirable but hypocritical, refusing to recognize where his real duty lies. We would not want to say that past oaths and promises count for nothing, that they can be ignored at will. We all feel the power of the argument that you ought to be consistent, that it isn't fair to pick up your marbles and go home just because it's your turn to lose under the rules you have accepted so far. But that is partly because such a partisan assessment of the rules is likely to be biased. If you can in fact show that the rules are really unfair, then any time is a good time to change them. Again, normally rules and authorities are to be obeyed; when occasions for questioning this obligation arise, what is ultimately needed is an assessment of the rules or authorities. Mere reference to your "going along with them" in the past is not enough.

No doubt if a man had no political obligation he could acquire one by a promise or contract. But that by no means proves that political obligation can be acquired *only* by promise or contract; it may be that a quite independent political obligation is sometimes reinforced by an oath to obey, at other times (partly) countered by a promise to resist. A personal past commitment to obey need not settle the matter.

Indeed, the case of the Nazi calls attention to something traditional consent theory seems to have overlooked: the duty to resist. There are times in human history when men are not merely free(d) from an obligation to obey, but positively obligated to oppose the powers that be. The authors of the Declaration of Independence recognized this, despite their heavy reliance on Locke; for they saw resistance to tyranny not merely as man's right but as his duty. Locke, and traditional consent theory in general, make no provision for such a duty, nor can it be easily accommodated within their framework. There is provision in Locke's system for majority resistance to a tyrannical government, and a duty to follow such a majority. But *individual* resistance has a highly ambiguous status at best, and is certainly *not* a duty.[7] For if political obligation arises from contract, the violation or overstepping of this contract leaves each individual free to do as he likes with regard to the tyranny. True, the individual is still then bound by natural law; but natural law does not command the punishment of offenders, it only permits it. And amending the Lockeian system on this score would obviously require fundamental changes in its individualistic presuppositions.

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[7] Locke, *op. cit.*, pars. 121, 149, 168, 203–4, 208–9, 211–12, 220, 232, 240–3.

Similarly, traditional consent theory teaches that at times of civil war or successful revolution, when an old authority structure collapses, each individual is free to place his consent anew wherever he wishes and thinks best for himself. If he thinks fit to follow a highway robber then, he is free to do so. But when we contemplate real cases, would we not rather want to maintain that even in chaos there is responsibility, that even then the individual has some obligation to think of others as well as himself, the welfare of society or mankind as well as his own?

It seems that insufficient attention has been given to the failure of traditional consent theory to provide for any obligation to resist, or any obligation to choose responsibly when new authorities must be chosen. Indeed, divine right, prescription and utilitarianism can accommodate such obligations far more easily than a contract theory can. As for the "nature of the government" or "hypothetical consent" doctrine developed in this essay, it too would presumably require amendment on this score. An enlarged version might hold: your obligation is to obey what deserves obedience and consent, and to resist what deserves resistance and rejection (leaving the important possibility that many persons or agencies deserve neither obedience nor resistance). But it is not obvious to me whether the obligation to resist tyranny should be construed as a part of political obligation at all, or as an occasional alternative to it. The question seems related to that of whether revolution is a special part of political life or a breakdown of the political.

II. THE CASE OF SOCRATES

Though the Nazi may continue to obey on the grounds that he has sworn to do so, we may find that he thereby fails to perform his true obligations. Why, then, does Socrates' position—equally founded on past personal consent—strike us as so exemplary and moral? I would suggest that the distinguishing thing about Socrates' situation is this: he can find no fault with the Athenian laws, nor even with the Athenian way of administering them. Only his own particular conviction and sentence are (almost fortuitously) unjust. And his dialogue with the laws is essentially a way of expressing or establishing this fact. Socrates' past consent is not so much compelling in its own right, as it is a way of expressing and reinforcing his present judgment that there is nothing basically wrong with the system, no justification for resistance. What amazes us about him is not this judgment, nor the refusal to accept a single case of injustice as a justification for disobedience. These are relatively ordinary positions to take. What amazes us about him is that he construes disobedience so widely, to include even flight; and that he is willing to perform his obligation down to the minutest detail, even at the cost of his life.[8]

The suggestion is, then, that Socrates' focus on his past acceptance of the laws and his gratitude to them is in fact an evaluation of the Athenian government (or the expression of such an evaluation). We need to recall that this same moral Socrates refused to carry out an "authoritative" order given him in the time of the Thirty Tyrants, because it was unjust, and would apparently have refused to carry out injustice voted by a democratic majority as well.[9] In those earlier situations, one may suppose, what Socrates thought about was the injustice of what he had been ordered to do, and of those who issued the order, not his own (tacit?) consent to them.

To this line of argument a traditional consent theorist might respond: Socrates looks to his own past consent in order to find and determine its limits, in order to see whether this new governmental action does not exceed what he had consented to. But if we take that seriously as a model of what the moral man must do when he contemplates resistance, we set him an extremely difficult task. How is Socrates to know *to what* he has consented, particularly if his consent has been tacit? Surely it is not enough to say that he has consented only to those precise things the government did in the past, so that any new or unprecedented action is automatically *ultra vires*. But if not that, then to what does one give tacit consent? Is it to the particular people then in authority, or to the authority of the office they hold, or to the laws that define and limit that office, or to the body that makes those laws, or to the Constitution that lays down rules and procedures for the making of laws, or to the principles behind that Constitution, or to the fellow-members of the society, or even to all of mankind? In particular cases, these various foci of loyalty may come into conflict; then knowing that one has consented to them all at a time when they were in agreement is no help for deciding what to do.

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[8] Plato, *Crito* [50]: "are you not going by an act of yours to overturn us—the laws, and the whole state, as far as in you lies?" B. Jowett translation (New York: Random House, 1937).

[9] Plato, *Apology*, 32.

In short, though two of our examples do look to their own past consent in deciding what to do, one of them thereby fails to perform his true obligation, and the other seems to be using the language of consent to express a favorable assessment of the government. Furthermore, we have noted at least two disadvantages of personal consent as a criterion: the difficulty of knowing *to what* you have consented (especially if consent was tacit), and the fact that even an express oath to obey may sometimes be outweighed by an obligation to resist.

Besides an individual's personal consent, traditional consent theory offers as an alternative criterion the "consent of the governed," the consent of all, or a majority of one's fellow-citizens. Of such consent, too, we would have to say that it cannot simply be dismissed as irrelevant. Even our Negro in Mississippi or South Africa might think about how widely shared his grievances are. But again, the consent or dissent of the majority cannot by itself be decisive for defining your obligation. Majorities are sometimes wrong, and have been known to do evil. Resistance might be justified in Athens under the Thirty Tyrants or in Nazi Germany despite the majority.

But majority consent does enter the argument at another level, in a way quite different from the relevance of personal consent. Majority consent may be relevant as a *way* of assessing, as *evidence about* the nature of the government, given that the nature of the government bears on political obligation. In fact, a variety of considerations each of which we might want to call "consent of the governed" can be used in the process of evaluating a government. They may come into conflict with each other, and their relative weight and importance will be a matter of one's political values, of what kind of government he thinks desirable or even tolerable.

It is useful to distinguish here between the "procedural" criteria yielded by the consent of the governed for assessing a government, and the "substantive" ones. Procedural criteria are those which concern the institutional structure and political functioning of the government, the way in which it makes decisions and takes actions. To assess its nature, we want to know about the way a government functions in relation to the governed—whether it is responsive to them or forces its policies on them. Thus we look for machinery for the expression of popular desires; we look for the degree of popular participation in or control over decisions, for channels for the redress of grievances, for access to power. At the same time we look also for signs of repression, of propaganda, of coercion. We look, of course, not merely at the institutions defined on paper, but at their actual functioning in the largest social sense. Denial of suffrage to Negroes in South Africa is very different from denial of suffrage to women in Switzerland (and theorists would do well to think about why this is so). But roughly speaking, a government is likely to seem to us deserving if it is open to the governed, reprehensible if it rules them against their will. This general criterion may well be expressed by some formula like "the consent of the governed"; but that formula must not be taken too simply, and that criterion must not be regarded as our only one.

Besides this vague cluster of procedural criteria, we have in addition substantive ones. We may look also at the substance of what the government does—whether it pursues good, benevolent, justifiable policies. A government that systematically harms its subjects, whether out of misguided good intentions or simply for the selfish gain of the rulers, is to that extent illegitimate—even if the subjects do not know it, even if they "consent" to being abused. But even here "the consent of the governed" is *relevant* as important evidence, for one of the main ways we estimate whether people are being well treated is by whether they seem to like what they get. Only we may sometimes need to consider other evidence as well; the consent or dissent of the governed need not be decisive as to the goodness or justness of a government's policies.

It is the relationship between at least these two kinds of criteria that is likely to determine our assessment of a government, whether it deserves support or opposition. Thus we may all agree that a government pursuing very bad policies and forcing them on its subjects, so that it is obviously doing great harm to them and other countries, and doing so despite their attempts at protest and without their consent—such a government clearly is the occasion for resistance. Conversely, if we find a government that truly has the consent of its subjects although they have wide sources of information and true opportunities to dissent and criticize, and if that government pursues only the most praiseworthy policies, then few of us would urge revolution or resistance to it. The problematic cases are, of course, the ones in between, where procedure and substance are partly good, partly bad, and you need to make evaluations and decisions. Here it begins to be a matter of your metapolitics—how you think of men and societies, what positions you are willing to take and defend, and take responsibility for.

Suppose, for example, that a government is procedurally open, with genuine channels for controlling policy from below, but it engages in vicious policies. Then, one might want to say, the citizen is not free to engage in revolution; he has channels available and it is his duty to use them, to change the policy. But what if he tries to do so, and fails because the majority continues to approve of the wickedness? What if he is a member of a permanent minority group, being systematically abused and exploited by an eager, consenting majority? Then the seemingly open channels of consent are not truly open to him. Might there not come a point when violent minority resistance of some sort is justified?

Or suppose that a government is benevolent, so no one can criticize its actions, but in procedure it is simply autocratic and dictatorial. Is revolution justified against a benevolent dictatorship? This might be the case, for example, if men need political participation in order to be really well, in order to reach their full human potential. Then bad procedure would itself become a substantive grievance.

The theoretical complications possible here are legion, but at least this much seems clear: evaluating a government in order to decide whether it deserves obedience or resistance, requires attention both to the way it works and to what it does. In both cases something like consent is relevant; it may be a formula for expressing some rather complex requirements concerning opportunities for dissent and participation, or it may be evidence of good policies. Thus even if we adhere to the doctrine of hypothetical consent or the nature of government, majority consent may still be relevant in a subordinate capacity for assessing a government, for working out more detailed answers to our questions one and two about consent, the specific practical "when" and "whom" of obedience. But here "the consent of the governed" is not one simple thing, decisive for obligation; rather, it is relevant in a number of different, potentially conflicting ways.

And all of these ways put together differ, in turn, not merely from personal consent, but also from the doctrine of hypothetical consent developed in this essay.[10] That legitimate authority is such that one ought to consent to it, is a precept built into English grammar, into the meanings of these terms. That a legitimate government is one which has the consent of (a majority of) the governed—is procedurally responsive to them or looks after their interests, or both—is one particular position about what kind of government is desirable for men. More accurately, it is a cluster of positions, depending on the relative weight given to procedural and substantive criteria. Though these positions are very widely shared today, and though they were shared by almost all traditional consent theorists, they are not the only conceivable positions on this subject. Someone might undertake to argue, for example, that a government is legitimate only to the extent that it fosters high culture, or to the extent that it promotes the evolution of a master race. That would be to reject majority consent as any sort of criterion for assessing a government. But the doctrine of hypothetical consent holds even for someone taking such an unorthodox position; even for him, a legitimate government would be the one that deserves consent, to which everyone ought to consent. Both the philosophical weakness and the historical persistence and strength of traditional consent theory rest in its failure to distinguish these very different arguments.

Finally, even if we succeed in evaluating a government, that does not seem fully to settle how we must behave toward it. One final, important consideration seems relevant: the action taken must be appropriate. To the diversity of ways in which one can obey or support, resist or overthrow a government, there correspond a diversity of conditions when the various actions may be appropriate or justified. The fact that some action is justified, that some abuse has taken place, does not mean that just any action will do. A man mistreated by his superior may kick his dog. We can understand, and perhaps even sympathize, but surely the action is not justified. Not just any violation of law will qualify as civil disobedience or attempted revolution. This observation is presumably related to the traditional assertion of consent theorists, that it is necessary to "exhaust the remedies" available, to suffer "a long train of abuses" before violent resistance is justified. Where other actions are appropriate, revolution may not be called for.

Thus it begins to seem that a decision about obedience and resistance ought to be measured not merely against the character of the government, but against all the relevant social circumstances—what alternatives one can envision, and what consequences resistance is likely to have. Revolution would not seem justified, for example, if one had no hope of its being followed by an improvement in conditions. If it would simply substitute one tyranny for another, or if it would annihilate the human race through the resulting violence, then it does not seem justified.[11]

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[10] For the latter distinction, compare Benn and Peters, *op. cit.*, pp. 329–31.

But a doctrine that casts its net so wide, making all social circumstances at least potentially relevant, that sees both an obligation to obey and an obligation to resist, and that stresses so much the individual burden of decision, seems very close to the social utilitarianism examined in the first half of this essay. It seems to say, with the social utilitarian, you are obligated to obey when that is best on the whole for society (all of mankind?), and obligated to resist when *that* is best on the whole. But that formula, and social utilitarianism, seem to neglect again the obligatory nature of law and authority in normal circumstances, the *prima facie* obligation to obey. Being subject to law, government, authority means precisely an obligation (normally) to do what *they* say is best, rather than judge the welfare of society for yourself and act on your private judgment. Yet there are times when you must resist in the name of something very like the welfare of society. Whether these two positions are compatible remains somehow problematic; but before we can make a final stab at the matter, we must finish applying our new doctrine to our four questions about political obligation.

III. JUSTIFYING POLITICAL OBLIGATION

We come now to question four, the matter of justification: "why are you ever obligated to obey even legitimate authority?" Here again our "nature of the government" doctrine does not at first seem a very useful answer. For it can only say: because of the nature of the government, because the government is such that you ought to obey it and consent to it, because a rational man would do so. But that answer is not likely to still the question. For someone genuinely puzzled about obligation in this (philosophical) way is likely to persist: "how does that 'ought' bind me, *why* must I do what a rational man would do, what if I don't *want* to be rational?"

But the reader may have noticed by now that all of the theories and versions of theories we have considered are subject to this same difficulty to some extent. Some seem better designed to cope with it than others; yet we can always push the question further back: why must I do what God commands, why must I do what history teaches, why must I do what is best for me personally, why must I do what I have promised? Even traditional consent theory is liable to this difficulty; and it is remarkable that despite Hume's early criticism, we continue to believe in consent theory while ignoring this problem. For Hume had already told the consent theorist:

> You find yourself embarrassed when it is asked, *Why we are bound to keep our word?* Nor can you give any answer but what would, immediately, without any circuit, have accounted for our obligation to allegiance.[12]

The obligation to keep one's word is no more "natural" and self-evident and indubitable than political obligation itself; though either may sometimes reinforce the other, neither can give the other absolute justification. The two obligations are essentially separate and equal in status.[13] Why, then, does the traditional consent theorist, so doubtful about the validity of political obligation, take the obligation of keeping contracts as obvious? Why, if he imagines a state of nature, is it always stripped of political authority but inevitably equipped with a natural law that dictates the keeping of one's word? Hume uses these questions as a rhetorical device to attack consent theory, but they can also be taken seriously as a way of learning something more about the consent theorist.

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[11] One difficulty of this discussion is that it seems to make human decisions look excessively rational. Are any abstract principles of this kind really relevant to what real people think about when they must decide? Is a man on the point of rebellion or revolution not much more likely to be moved by strong emotion—by an overwhelming anger or sense of outrage?

But I would like to suggest that the human capacity for outrage is, as it were, the emotional correlate to rational moral principles. It is our inner, helpless response to a violation of principles of right and wrong, as we sense them, perhaps quite inarticulately. Outrage (unlike mere anger), is an emotion of principle. I take it that this is what Albert Camus means when he insists that "the act of rebellion is not, essentially, an egoistic act," even though it can, "of course" have "egoistic motives." *The Rebel* (New York: Vintage, 1956), p. 16. The rebel, the man who acts from a sense of outrage, says not merely "I don't want to put up with this," but "No man ought to have to put up with this." And by feeling "no man ought . . . " he acts, in a sense, on principle. Compare Tussman, *op. cit.*, pp. 78–79.

Of course a man's feeling that his situation is outrageous is one thing; whether the situation is in fact outrageous is another. A three-year-old may feel outraged at not being allowed to drink the detergent. We may sympathize with his feelings, but cannot condone the resulting violence. Not every feeling of outrage is a valid assessment of the world; but then, not every rational judgment that the limits of contractual obligation have been exceeded is valid either. No doubt rational judgments are more likely to be right; that is one advantage of rationality.

[12] David Hume, "Of the Original Contract," in Sir Ernest Barker, ed., *The Social Contract* (New York: Oxford, 1960), p. 161.

For a theorist does not choose his beliefs and his doubts. The traditional consent theorist simply finds himself in doubt about (the justification of, or limits of, or validity of) political obligation; it just seems obvious to him that there is a problem about it. And he simply is not in doubt about promises or contracts; it just seems obvious to him that they oblige.

At one level one can argue that both the consent theorist's doubt and his assumption spring from the peculiar picture of man and society he seems to hold. If your picture of man in the abstract is of a man fully grown, complete with his own private needs, interests, feelings, desires, beliefs and values, and if you therefore never think about how he grew up and became the particular person he became, then he may well seem to you an ineluctably *separate* unit, his ties to other individuals may seem mysterious or illusory and will require explanation. Given man as such a separate, self-contained unit, it does indeed seem strange that he might have obligations not of his own choosing, perhaps even without being aware of them, or even against his will. Furthermore, self-assumed obligations may then strike you as a way of overcoming this separateness. For it is easy to confuse the fact that promises and contracts are self-assumed, with the idea that the *obligation to keep* them is self-assumed as well. That is, the person who makes a promise seems to recognize and commit himself to the institution of promises; the person who makes a contract seems to acknowledge thereby the binding character of contracts, so that a later refusal to accept them as binding strikes one as a kind of self-contradiction. But of course this is a confusion. The making of particular promises or contracts presupposes the social institution of promising or contracts, and the obligation to keep promises cannot itself be founded on a promise.

In truth, there is something profoundly wrong with the consent theorist's picture of man. Every free, separate, adult, consenting individual was first shaped and molded by his parents and (as we say) society. It is only as a result of their influence that he becomes the particular person he does become, with his particular interests, values, desires, language and obligations. The only thing truly separate about us is our bodies; our selves are manifestly social. But surely even the consent theorist knows this, so the problem becomes why he nevertheless holds, or is held captive by, a different and peculiar picture. Could that picture be not so much the cause as the by-product of his philosophical doubt?

After all, consent theorists are not the only ones troubled about political obligation. Political theorists of other persuasions have also been led, or have led themselves sometimes to ask "why are you ever obligated to obey even legitimate authority?" But if none of the theories of political obligation is able to deal adequately with that question, it must be quite peculiar, not nearly as straightforward as it looks. Perhaps it is a question that cannot be fully answered in the ordinary way. But what sort of question is that; and if it cannot be answered, how should it be treated? Tussman rejects it as a symptom of "moral disorder"; I would suggest instead that it is a symptom of philosophical disorder, the product of a philosophical paradox. If so, it will not disappear—the theorist will not stop being bothered by it—unless we can show how and why it arises, why anyone should so much as suppose that political obligation in general needs (or can have) a general justification. But that would require a discussion of the nature of philosophical puzzlement far beyond the scope of this essay.

What can be done here is something much more limited and less effective. Having suggested that the status of political obligation and of the obligation to keep promises is essentially the same—that neither is more "natural" than or can serve as an absolute justification for the other—we can approach our question four about political obligation by first pursuing a parallel question about promises. For in the area of promises some extremely useful work has been done in philosophy in recent years—work which can be applied to the problem of political obligation.[14]

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[13] This assertion is not about the relative claims that the two obligations—political obedience and promise-keeping—have on us, where they come into conflict. It seems obvious to me that no single, binding principle could be found to govern such a question. There are occasions when a vitally important promise is clearly a more important obligation than obedience to some minor law; on the other hand, the keeping of a minor promise is no excuse whatsoever for treason. But the assertion that the two obligations are separate and equal is not meant to bear on this question. It is meant only to say: there is no reason to suppose that promising is more "natural" or basic than obeying authority, and hence no reason to derive the latter from the former.

Philosophers have sometimes asked a question like our question four about promises: "why are you (ever) obligated to keep (any of) your promises (whatsoever); why do promises oblige?" This question, too, can be answered in terms of divine commandment or utilitarian consequences, social or individual; and here, too, the answers are less than satisfactory. "God commands you to keep your word" is no answer to the nonbeliever, nor to someone heretical enough to demand proof of God's will. The utilitarian response tends to dissolve the obligation altogether, so that your duty is always to do what produces the best results, quite apart from whether you have made any promises on the subject. And, of course, a consent argument is out of the question here ("you have promised to keep your promises"?).

What has been suggested by philosophers is this: "promise" is not just a word. Promising is a social practice, something we *do*, something children have to learn *how* to do. It has rules, penalties, roles and moves almost in the way that games have them. Children do not learn what a promise is by having one pointed out to them; they learn gradually about what it means to "make a promise," "keep (or break) a promise," "be unable to promise but certainly intend to try," "have said something which, in the circumstances, amounted to a promise," and so on. Promising is not just producing certain sounds ("I promise"), for a phonograph might make those sounds, or a man rehearsing a play, or a philosopher explaining the practice, yet none of these would actually be promising. Promising, rather, is taking on an obligation. That is, "to promise" does not mean "to make certain sounds," but rather "to take on an obligation."

Now, of course, we do not always do what we have promised. Sometimes we act contrary to our obligations, and sometimes we are wholly or partly excused from performing what we had promised. If for example, keeping a promise would frustrate the purpose for which it was made, or would lead to great evil, or has become impossible, we may be excused from performing. So about any particular promise we have made it may sometimes be relevant to ask: am I still obligated to perform or not? That is, normally, in principle promises oblige; a promise is a certain kind of obligation. But sometimes, under certain circumstances, there is reason to question or withdraw or cancel that obligation in a particular case. In such circumstances we weigh the alternatives, the possible consequences of performance and failure to perform. But our obligations, including that of the promise, continue to be among the factors that must be weighed in the decision. The obligation of a promise does not simply disappear when there is occasion to question it; it only is sometimes outweighed.

But philosophers are sometimes led to wonder *categorically*, about *all* promises: do they oblige; what are the reasons pro and con; why am I ever obligated to keep any promise? And here, of course, there are no *particular* circumstances to weigh in the balance; the question is abstract and hypothetical. What sort of answer is possible to this question? First, that this is what a promise *is*, what "promise" means. A promise is a self-assumed obligation. If you *assume* an obligation and have not yet performed it, nor been excused from it, then you *have* an obligation; in much the same way as someone who puts on a coat, has a coat on.[15] To ask why promises oblige is to ask why (self-assumed) obligations oblige. And to the question why obligations oblige the only possible answer would seem to be that this is what the words mean.

Beyond this one can only paraphrase Wittgenstein: there are a hundred reasons; there is no reason. There is no absolute, deductive answer to the question "why does any promise ever oblige?" beyond calling attention to the meaning of the words. There is no absolute, indubitable principle from which the obligation can be deduced. It is, to be sure, related to any number of other principles, obligations and values; but the relationship is more like a network (or patchwork) than like a hierarchical pyramid. It is simply a mistake to suppose that there might be such an absolute principle, such a deductive proof. We have no right to expect one. (Why, then, does the philosopher expect one; why can we ourselves be led to share his expectation when we are in a "philosophical mood"?)

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[14] See particularly J. L. Austin, *Philosophical Papers* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1961), chs. 3, 6 and 10; John Rawls, "Two Concepts of Rules," *Philosophical Review*, LXIV (January, 1955), 3–32; and S. L. Cavell, "Must We Mean What We Say?" in V. C. Chappell, *Ordinary Language* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1964), esp. pp. 94–101.

[15] Compare Cavell, "Must We Mean What We Say?" *op. cit.*, pp. 96, 99.

John Rawls has pointed out that utilitarianism will not do as a criterion for the keeping of particular promises—as a standard for *when* promises oblige.[16] To say "keep your promises only when that maximizes pleasure and minimizes pain" is to miss precisely the *obligatory* nature of a promise; having once promised you are not free to decide what to do merely on utilitarian grounds. But, Rawls says, utilitarian considerations *are* relevant at a different level of argument, for assessing the social practice of promising. For we can ask "must we (should we) have an institution like promising and promise-keeping at all?" And here utilitarian reasons seem relevant; we may try to justify the social practice by its useful consequences.

Stanley Cavell has argued that this implies a degree of freedom of choice on our parts which we do not in fact have.[17] To evaluate the practice of promising pro and con, we would have to envision alternatives. And how shall we envision a society which knows no obligation to keep one's word? (For it is not, of course, the particular English locution "I promise" that is being assessed, but the practice of assuming obligations and holding people to their word.) We seem to have no choice about the pros and cons of such an institution. It is not socially useful; it is indispensable to the very concept of society and human life.

But even if we could and did evaluate as Rawls suggests, and "decide" that the institution of promising is on balance socially useful, even this would not provide an absolute justification for the keeping of particular promises. For what are we to answer the man who says: "granted that we must have the practice of promising, and granted promising means taking on an obligation; still, why am *I* obliged to keep my promise? Why can't *I* be an exception?" To him we can only say, that is how obligation and promises work. Of course you *can* refuse to keep your promise, but then you are failing to perform an obligation.

Now the same line of reasoning can be applied to the question "why does even a legitimate government, a valid law, a genuine authority ever obligate me to obey?" As with promises, and as our new doctrine about political obligation suggests, we may say that this is what "legitimate government," "valid law," "genuine authority" *mean*. It is part of the concept, the meaning of "authority" that those subject to it are required to obey, that it has a right to command. It is part of the concept, the meaning of "law," that those to whom it is applicable are obligated to obey it. As with promises, so with authority, government and law: there is a *prima facie* obligation involved in each, and normally you must perform it. Normally a man is not free to decide on utilitarian grounds whether or not he will do a certain thing, if that thing happens to be against the law or required by law; he is not free to make a decision on his own the way he would be free where the law is silent. The existence of the law on this subject normally constitutes an obligation, just as having promised normally constitutes an obligation, so that one is not free to decide what to do just as if no promise had been made. (This is not, of course, to say that everything claiming to be law is law, that everyone claiming to have authority has it, that every statement alleged to be a promise is in fact one. It says only: *if* something is a promise, law, obligation, *then* normally it obliges.) This kind of response to question four is obviously almost the same as the one our doctrine of hypothetical consent yielded to question three: government and authority are concepts grammatically related to obligation and obedience. A legitimate government is one that you ought to obey and ought to consent to because that is what the words mean. But as before, this answer is likely to seem purely formal, and empty. It will not satisfy someone genuinely puzzled about the justification of political obligation.

But as with promises, all that one can say beyond calling attention to the meanings of the words, is that no absolute, deductive justification exists or is necessary. There are no absolute first principles from which this obligation could be derived. It is related to all kinds of other obligations in all kinds of ways, to be sure, but the relationship is not hierarchical and deductive. In particular, as we have seen, the obligatory nature of promises is no more or no less absolute and indubitable than the obligation to obey laws. Again, following Rawls' suggestion, one might attempt a utilitarian assessment of such institutions or practices as law, government and authority. And here, I suppose, there may be somewhat more room for discussion than with promises. For it is not at all obvious that government and law are indispensable to human social life. But can we conceive society without any such thing as authority? One function of the idea of the state of nature in classical consent theories does seem to be a kind of indirect demonstration of the utilitarian advantages of having governments and laws. If such things did not exist, Locke seems to argue, we would have to invent them.[18]

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[16] *Op. cit.*, Part II.

[17] "The Claim to Rationality," Chapter VIII.

But as with promises, even a recognition of the necessity or utilitarian advantages of such things as authority, law and government is no absolute answer to the man who is questioning his particular obligation to obey, who wants to be an exception. There is no such absolute answer, and can be none. Nothing we say is absolutely beyond question. Again, you *can* disobey but in the absence of excuses or justifications you violate an obligation when you do so.

The parallel between promises and authority as obligations is not perfect. For one thing, promises are explicitly taken on oneself; political obligation (I have argued) need not be. Furthermore, promises are normally made to particular persons, whereas political obligation is sometimes confounded by our question two, by the problem of rival authorities. We have noted the difficulty of determining to whom or what consent is given: particular officials, their positions, the laws, the Constitution, the people of the society. This means, among other things, that political obligation is open to a kind of challenge not normally relevant to promises. We saw that, following Rawls, both promises and political obligation can be challenged at two very different levels: sometimes we may claim to be excused from performing in a particular case (for instance because of conflicting obligations or overwhelming difficulties). And sometimes we may want to challenge and assess the whole institution with the obligations it defines. But in addition, political obligation can be challenged also on a third level. Sometimes we may refuse to obey neither because our particular case is exceptional, nor because we question such obligation categorically, but because the one who is claiming authority over us does not in fact have it. We may resist a government that has become tyrannical not as a special, personal exception, and not because we are against government, but because *this* government no longer deserves obedience. Such a challenge is made on principle, *in accord* (as it were) with the "rules" of political obligation.

But the differences between promises and political obligation do not affect the point to be made here. That point concerns our question four, the search for a justification for having to obey (or having to keep a promise); and it is essentially twofold. First, we have said, "authority," "law," and "government" are grammatically, conceptually related to obligation, as is "promise." And beyond this, the quest for some "higher," absolute, deductive justification is misguided. Insofar, then, as the grammatical point does not seem to still the question, does not get at what someone philosophically puzzled wants to ask, what is needed is not a better justification, but an account of why the philosopher is driven to ask the question in the first place.

IV. THE DUALITY OF OBLIGATION

As Locke suggests in his preface, the consent theorist's purpose is a dual one. He wants both to show that men are sometimes justified in making revolutions, and to show that men are normally bound to obey governments and laws. And this is, indeed, what must be shown, since both these things are in fact true. The fact is that on one hand men are in some sense above or outside the institutions of their society, its laws, its government. They can measure and judge these institutions. Though they have not themselves made them they can change them; and sometimes even violent change may be justified. On the other hand, men are also part of and subject to their society, bound by its norms and authorities. Not every attempt at revolution is justified.

To say that men are both superior to their government and subject to it is to express a paradox. Because it seems so paradoxical, the traditional social contract theorists saw it instead as a temporal sequence: *first* men were free and could make a commonwealth, *then* they became bound by it (within the limits of a contract). We have seen some of the difficulties that result. Finding an accurate and unparadoxical way to express this paradoxical truth seems to me the most interesting problem connected with political obligation, but it is important to notice that this problem is not confined to political obligation. We are both superior to and subject to *all* our obligations, and *that* is what requires an accounting. Discussing it will reveal one final, rather subtle way in which obligation both is and is not a matter of consent—but all obligation, not just the obligation to obey.

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[18] It is significant, in this respect, that consent theorists so often speak of contracts or covenants, rather than simple promises or oaths. For of course the idea of a contract or covenant implies that you get something in return for the obligation you take on, and in a way at least suggests the informal additional ties of gratitude. But there are other differences as well, a contract being more formal and usually more explicit than a promise.

We are familiar enough from ethics with the view of a number of philosophers (notably Kant) that an action is not fully moral unless the actor knows what he is doing and does it for the right reasons. An action done for selfish motives but accidentally producing some charitable result is not (really, fully) a charitable action. A moral action is one taken *because* it is right, on principle. On analogy we might want to say that a man cannot (really, fully) obey an order unless he recognizes that it is an order, that the man issuing it has authority over him. He cannot (really, fully) obey a law or a government unless he recognizes it as valid law or legitimate government; only then will what he does (really, fully) *be* obeying. If I "order" a leaf to fall from a tree, and the leaf immediately does so, it is not obeying my order; if I silently and secretly "order" my neighbor to mow his lawn and he does so, he is not (really, fully) obeying my order. Even if he hears and understands what I am saying, he is not (really, fully) obeying me unless he recognizes what I say as an order, considers me as having authority to order him about, and mows the lawn *because* of my order.

Consequently, the capacity for this kind of awareness and intention is a precondition for being fully obligated. This is why leaves cannot be obligated (except in storybooks, where they are anthropomorphized), and children cannot fully do so. It may be right to punish or reward a child, but the child is not yet fully a moral agent capable of recognizing and therefore of having obligations.

It is not difficult to regard this kind of awareness and intention as a form of consenting to one's obligation. If (really, fully) obeying an order presupposes the recognition of it as an order and of the man who issues it as having authority, then surely that recognition resembles a kind of (perhaps tacit) consent to his authority. And then it becomes easy to take a final further step, and say you are not (really, fully) obligated unless you recognize, acknowledge, accept, acquiesce in, consent to that obligation. Such a line of reasoning undoubtedly has heightened the appeal of consent theory for a number of writers, and it clearly is the main basis for Tussman's stress on consent. He chooses agreement rather than force or habit as the nature of political association precisely because,

> 'I have a duty to . . . ' seems to follow from 'I have agreed to' in a way that it does not follow from 'I am forced to' or 'I am in the habit of.' This is sometimes expressed as the view that obligations are, or even must be voluntarily assumed.[19]

But even if one accepts these transitions and concludes that obligation in the full moral sense always requires consent, it by no means follows that obligation consists *only* of this inner awareness and intent. For that would imply that anyone failing or refusing to consent for any reason whatsoever is thereby excused from the obligation in question, does not have that obligation, cannot meaningfully be blamed or criticized for failing to perform it.[20] But no major ethical theorist, least of all Kant, would be willing to accept that consequence, any more than Tussman is willing to let the morally unaware clods in society disobey laws whenever they please.

It is necessary to recognize that obligation has not one, but two fundamental aspects—the inner, "awareness" aspect stressed by Tussman, and an outer aspect having to do with the way others see what we do, how it looks objectively. These two aspects of obligation may be seen as corresponding to two familiar strains in ethical theory: the teleological, concerned with the consequences of action, and the deontological, concerned with its motives.[21] The former deals primarily in the outer, shared world of facts and events, and takes as fundamental the concept of the *good:* the latter deals primarily in the inner, personal world of thoughts and feelings, and takes as fundamental the concept of *right.* I would suggest, following Cavell, that both are a necessary part of any valid account of morality and obligation, that neither can be ignored outright in assessing action.

Those moral philosophers who have stressed the deontological side of moral appraisal have been concerned particularly with the matter of giving praise: a person does not deserve full credit for an act of charity, of courage, of obedience, unless his intentions were charitable, courageous, obedient. He should not get full credit for an action that merely looks charitable "from the outside," if his own perception of what he was doing was quite otherwise. To a lesser extent this is also true of blame: you are responsible for the damage you do, no matter how good your intentions were, but good intentions may be a *partial* excuse. Those philosophers who have stressed the teleological orientation of moral appraisal have been more concerned with blame or responsibility, but most particularly with duty. Your duty is not merely to intend good behavior, but to behave well; the performance and its results are what define your duty.

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[19] *Op. cit.*, p. 8.

[20] Benn and Peters, *op. cit.*, p. 322.

[21] This and the next three paragraphs lean heavily on Cavell, "The Claim to Rationality," p. 323 and all of Part II.

But in a way this dichotomization—deontology for praise, teleology for duty—misses the point. For the real difficulty is in determining *what* action has been performed, what actually was done. It is naming the action (correctly) that is the problem: was it, should we call it, an act of charity, an act of obedience, considering what took place, considering his intentions? Having put it that way, one wants to say that the two modes of assessment are always both relevant, but not equally relevant to all actions. To the assessment of certain actions, inner intention is much more relevant; to the assessment of others, outer events will seem decisive. Lying is more a matter of inner intent, deceiving more a matter of outward results. Moreover it may be that, in a broader sense, whole categories of action vary in this respect. It may be, for example, that inner awareness is categorically more relevant in face-to-face, personal relationships than in public, political conduct. We do care more about motive and intention in assessing personal relationships and actions—love, anger and forgiveness—than in assessing political actions in the public realm.

If this is so, it deserves more attention than it has received from political theorists. No doubt it has something to do with the fact that in personal morality there is no umpire, no arbiter or judge; it is of the essence of morality that we confront each other directly. In the political, public realm, on the other hand, the normal situation is one where official "interpreters" are supplied by the society to tell the individual what the law or Constitution says, whether he has or has not committed grand larceny. But what happens at times of resistance or revolution is precisely that these normal official interpreters are themselves called into question. We are both bound by, and yet sometimes free to challenge or change all our obligations; but political obligation has an additional complexity, in that its *content* seems to be a subordination to the judgment of others.[22]

But if normally law and authority oblige and resistance requires justification, and if normally judgment is to some extent subordinated to that of the authorities, and if revolutionary situations are precisely the ones that are not normal in these respects, then the crucial question seems to be: *who is to say?*[23] Who is to say what times are normal and what times are not, when resistance is justified or even obligatory? If we say "each individual must decide for himself," we seem to deny the normally binding character of law and authority. If we say "society" or "the majority" or "the duly constituted authorities decide," then we seem to deny the right to resist, since it may be the majority or the authorities themselves that need to be challenged. Yet these seem to be the only two alternatives.

The matter is very difficult, though the question seems so simple. This essay will only briefly indicate a direction in which a solution might be sought. What needs to be said seems to be this: the decision both is and is not up to each individual. Each individual does and must ultimately decide for himself and is responsible for his decision; but he may make a wrong decision and thereby fail to perform his obligations. But then who is to say someone has made a wrong decision? Anyone can say, but not everyone who cares to say will judge correctly; he may be right or wrong. And who decides that?

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[22] Compare Tussman, *op. cit.*, pp. 86–95. It is tempting to construe the problem in relation to Hannah Arendt's discussion of action: *The Human Condition* (1958), Part V. The human situation is precarious, and human action fallible in unpredictable ways. Both privately as individuals, and collectively as a society, we try to some extent to overcome this uncertainty, this fallibility. We make commitments, tie ourselves down for the future. As individuals, for example, we make promises. As a society, for example, we try to act and plan beyond the lifetimes of individuals, through the education of our children, or through the establishment of laws and institutions. As we reduce the uncertainty of private future action by telling others what we will do so that they can count on it, so we reduce the uncertainty of public future action by telling others and ourselves what we will do and how, so that we all can count on it. Yet in both private and collective action, uncertainty remains and things go wrong. We do not always live up to our commitments, and promised actions do not always accomplish their intended purpose. Institutions do not always function as intended either; they produce quite different goals, pursue other principles than those they were supposed to embody. Thus sometimes we need to review, replace or reject commitments we have made; sometimes it must be right for us to do so.

And where do human beings get the standards by which on such occasions they assess their government and find it wanting? Well, surely from the very society which they criticize with these standards. That this is possible—that we learn both the existing rules and criteria for assessing rules *together*, and yet can use the latter on occasion to criticize the former—may well be the most important single fact about social life.

[23] Compare Tussman, *op. cit.*, pp. 44–6.

Each person decides for himself what to say and do; yet people sometimes speak and act in ways that are cowardly or cruel, thoughtless or irresponsible. And it is not merely up to the actor to assess his own action in this respect. Other people who want or need to assess the action may also do so; each of them will make a decision for which he bears responsibility, yet none of these decisions is absolutely definitive. The judge trying a would-be rebel makes a decision; the foreign onlooker asked to give money for a revolutionary cause makes a decision; the historian examining the record in a later generation makes a decision.[24] Each of us who talks or thinks or acts with regard to the situation assesses it, and no theory or God or Party can get us off that hook.

But that does not mean that all judgments are arbitrary or merely a matter of personal preference or whim. Some decisions are made arbitrarily or whimsically or selfishly or foolishly; others are made on principle, rationally, responsibly. These are ways or modes of deciding; none of them characterizes decision as such. And an individual's decision does not become rational, responsible or right merely because he thinks it is, merely because he urgently wants it to be. What is ultimately needed here is a better understanding of the role played in our language and our lives by assessments like "he was right," "he made a bad decision," "he betrayed the cause," and the like.

Who is to say? I want to answer, each person who cares to, will say—not merely the one who acts, not merely his associates, not merely those in authority over him, not merely the detached historian or observer. No one has the last word because there is no last word. But in order to make that clear, one would have to say a great deal more about how language functions, and why we are so persistently inclined to suppose that there must be a last word.

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[24] Thus not only citizens, but also bystanders and commentators may need to decide about a government. Their problems are not the same, to be sure. The citizen must decide whether to obey or resist; the bystander never had an obligation to obey, so he at most must decide whether or whom to assist; the commentator only makes a judgment. Therefore the evaluation of governments as to their legitimacy, their entitlement-to-be-obeyed-by-their-subjects, is a topic that ranges beyond problems of political obligation

TEACHING WITH INTER-NATION SIMULATION AND CASE STUDIES

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THE PROBLEM FOR RESEARCH

"Simulation" and "case studies" are supplementary teaching aids available for university courses in political science and international relations. The newer technique, simulation, has been used at several universities to augment instruction in international relations, foreign policy making, national security policy, urban politics, and political parties and elections.[1] In fields other than political science, similar techniques abound. The number of business games or simulations exceeds 100,[2] and less numerous games exist for educational administration, legislatures, career choices, and diplomacy, to name a few.[3] Case studies also supplement a wide range of politics courses, including introduction to American government, public administration, party organization, legislative processes, and public law.[4] The case method is the hallmark of schools of law and schools of business, and it is now emulated in teaching the history of science and in training in research methodology in sociology.[5]

Different types of simulations and cases and their uses have been described and discussed elsewhere.[6] Evaluation of games and cases as supplementary instructional aids has almost invariably been impressionistic. The consumers of these teaching methods have reported their personal experiences with them and have advanced claims for and criticisms of them, but they have undertaken little empirical research to determine whether the claims for particular simulations or cases are valid or to compare the actual effects of alternative methods. Moreover, the Ford Foundation expended thousands of dollars to induce business schools to try business games, but their investment in evaluating the success or failure of this innovation extended to convening a conference to discuss the subject, not to carrying out research on it.[7]

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[1] In addition to the use of Inter-Nation Simulation at Northwestern by Chadwick F. Alger, Raymond Tanter, and others, the same technique has been used at The Ohio State University in courses on national security policy and decision making and at the University of Michigan in an introductory course in international relations. Professors Lincoln Bloomfield and Norman Padelford of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology have a political-diplomatic game for use in foreign policy courses. Bernard Cohen introduced a similar game at the University of Wisconsin. Other forms of simulations or games include Robert C. Wood's local politics game designed for courses at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Smith College; James S. Coleman's election game used at The Johns Hopkins University and in Baltimore high schools; Dale Garvey's national political system game at Kansas State Teachers' College, Emporia; and Robert Alperin's American government game at the University of Maryland.

[2] Paul S. Greenlaw, Lowell W. Herron, and Richard H. Rawdon, *Business Simulation in Industrial and University Education* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1962). A useful directory of management games, including information about basic models, administration, and where further information can be found, is in Joel M. Kibbee, Clifford Craft, and Burt Nanus, *Management Games: A New Technique for Executive Development* (New York: Reinhold Publishing Corporation, 1961), pp. 315–336.

[3] For an introductory reader, see Harold Guetzkow, ed., *Simulation in Social Science: Readings* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1962.)

[4] Casebooks include Alan F. Westin, ed., *The Uses of Power: 7 Cases in American Politics* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1962); Harold Stein, ed., *Public Administration and Policy Development: A Casebook* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1952); and Paul Tillett, ed., *Cases on Party Organization* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1963).

[5] James B. Conant, ed., *Harvard Case Histories in Experimental Science* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957), 2 volumes. Matilda White Riley, *Sociological Research: A Case Approach* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1963), 2 volumes.

[6] See Guetzkow, ed., *op. cit.;* Stein, ed., *op. cit.*, pp. xx–xxiv; and Edwin A. Bock, ed., *Essays on the Case Method in Public Administration* (New York: Inter-University Case Program, 1962).

[7] See William R. Dill, James R. Jackson, and James W. Sweeney, *Proceedings of the Conference on Business Games* (New Orleans: Tulane Uni-

In international relations, simulation and cases have been introduced by empirically oriented scholars whose empirical investigations have rarely been applied to their teaching innovations.[8] Nor have educational psychologists added games and cases to the instructional methods they investigate.[9]

We believe that political scientists should undertake empirical studies of ways in which they communicate their subject-matter to students. Most political scientists are also university teachers of the liberal arts and sciences[10] and, as a practical matter, deserve the guidance of experiments to supplement their personal experience. Uncritical waves of enthusiasm or skepticism normally follow innovations such as games and cases. One way of counteracting excessive enthusiasm and answering skepticism is a "quasi-experimental" comparison of alternative methods.[11]

Additional reasons commend the investigation of different effects of teaching devices also. Since Plato, political analysts have been concerned with the impact of education on political interests, values, and activities; in modern parlance, this is the province of studies of "political socialization." Further, understanding decision-making practices of policy makers and designing proposals for altering such practices require knowledge of the training and preparation of decision makers. Many governmental and private organizations conduct special seminars and institutes to prepare their employees or to train them in mid-career. It is politically relevant to know whether alternative teaching devices differ in their usefulness to such programs.[12]

Experimental design

This essay reports results from a comparison between one kind of simulation and case studies in teaching three upper-division undergraduate courses (total enrollment, 134) at Northwestern University in 1962–63. The simulation was a modification of Inter-Nation Simulation, developed by Harold Guetzkow and his associates;[13] the case studies included individual cases written for either research or teaching and programmatic collections of cases, such as those prepared under the auspices of the Inter-University Case Program and the Eagleton Institute of Politics, Rutgers University. The three courses in which the comparisons were made were American Foreign Policy (enrollment, 57), International Relations (enrollment, 47), and Administrative Process (enrollment, 30).

Inter-Nation Simulation is readily adaptable for emphasis on either the external or inter-unit (nations) relations in the simulation or on the internal decision processes within the units. The course in American Foreign Policy, taught by Lee F. Anderson, emphasized intra-organizational factors that contribute to a nation's policy toward other nations. The International Relations course, offered by Harold Guetzkow, concentrated on interactions

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versity School of Business Administration, 1961). A critical appraisal of an elaborate innovation is Kalman J. Cohen, William R. Dill, Alfred A. Kuehn, and Peter R. Winters, *The Carnegie Tech Management Game: An Experiment in Business Education* (Homewood, Ill.: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1964).

[8] Exceptions include Albert Somit, Joseph Tannenhaus, Walter H. Wilke, and Rita W. Cooley, "The Effect of the Introductory Political Science Course on Student Attitudes Toward Personal Political Participation," this REVIEW, 52 (1958), 1129–1132; Sarane S. Boocock, *Effects of Election Campaign Game in Four High School Classes* (Baltimore: Department of Social Relations, The Johns Hopkins University, 1963, mimeo.).

[9] Reviews of the literature by Wilbert J. McKeachie have appeared periodically. See "Research on Teaching at the College and University Level," in N. L. Gage, ed., *Handbook of Research on Teaching* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963), pp. 1118–1172; "Impact of New Media on Higher Education," to be published in a volume of papers edited by Bruce Biddle and Peter H. Rossi.

[10] Systematic data on American political scientists have been collected through a mail questionnaire to a random sample of those listed in the Directory of the American Political Science Association. See Albert Somit and Joseph Tannenhaus, *American Political Science: A Profile of a Discipline* (New York: Atherton Press, 1964).

[11] Donald T. Campbell and Julian C. Stanley, "Experimental and Quasi-Experimental Designs for Research on Teaching," in Gage, *op. cit.*, pp. 171–246.

[12] For an effort to determine some effects of a training program on subsequent administrative performance, see Harold Guetzkow, Garlie A. Forehand, and Bernard J. James, "An Evaluation of Educational Influence on Administrative Judgment," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 6 (1962), 483–500.

[13] Harold Guetzkow, Chadwick F. Alger, Richard A. Brody, Robert C. Noel, and Richard C. Snyder, *Simulation in International Relations: Developments for Research and Teaching* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963), esp. chs. 2–3.

among nations rather than on intra-foreign-office activities. The Administrative Process course, given by James A. Robinson, stressed decision-making processes in organizations no matter what the content of the organization's decisions.

Numerous individual case studies of foreign policy decisions were available for the first course.[14] Although no casebook existed, we reproduced and distributed individual studies to students in the case section. The International Relations course benefited from a book of case-problems.[15] The Administrative Process course relied on ICP, Eagleton, and other cases.[16]

The same experimental procedure characterized each course. All students attended two one-hour lectures weekly. Half the students participated in a simulation section and the other half in a case section. The simulation group met one afternoon weekly for three hours to simulate decision situations and to discuss the relevance of the simulation for the course; the case section met another afternoon for approximately the same length of time to discuss cases and to relate them to other course materials. The instructor in each course excluded discussion of cases and simulation from his lectures, in order to avoid influencing either section with materials from the other. Efforts to relate laboratory activities to lectures, readings, and other materials common to both simulation and case sections were confined to discussions in the lab periods. The instructor who gave the lectures also conducted the labs.

These procedures permit a comparison of alternative supplementary activities. They do not, of course, allow one to determine whether a course with simulation is more effective than one without it. A quite different and much simpler design would have been required to assess the impact of a single supplementary technique than to compare effects of two auxiliary methods. We elected to compare the case method with simulation rather than study one of them alone because we believed that comparing cases with no-cases or comparing simulation with no-simulation would be comparing "something with nothing." We thought it more likely and more obvious that a "something against nothing" design would produce differences than that a "something against something" design would do so.

During the first week of each course we assigned students to sections on the basis of intelligence (as measured by scores on the Scholastic Aptitude Test), grade-point average, and certain personality data collected at an early class meeting (motivations toward achievement, affiliation, and power, and cognitive style).

Personal motivations toward or needs for achievement (*n ach*), affiliation (*n aff*), and power (*n power*) were measured by an adaptation of instruments developed by McClelland *et al.*, and by Atkinson of the Thematic Apperception Test.[17] Students were designated as high or low in need for achievement, high or low in need for affiliation, and high or low in need for power according to whether their scores fell above or below the class median.

Cognitive style refers to levels of complexity-and-abstractness and simplicity-and-concreteness in cognitive structure. Harvey, Hunt, and Schroder say that this level varies according to the "stimulus boundness of the individual."[18] The more concrete the person, the more bound to the stimulus he is; *i.e.*, the stimulus dictates his response. The more complex the person, the less bound to the stimulus he is; *i.e.*, the greater is his ability to abstract relations from experience and reorganize them. Cognitive style was measured by the Situational Interpretation Test, which ranks individuals by quartiles along a continuum from the most simple to the most complex. We refer to the four quartiles as concrete, moderately concrete, moderately complex, and complex.

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[14] Among the cases used in American foreign policy were the following: Chalmers Roberts, "The Day We Didn't Go To War," *Reporter*, September 14, 1954, pp. 31–35; Raymond H. Dawson, "Congressional Innovation and Intervention in Defense Policy: Legislative Authorizations of Weapons Systems," this REVIEW, 56 (1962), 42–57; Warner Schilling, "The H-Bomb Decision: How to Decide Without Actually Choosing," *Political Science Quarterly*, 76 (1961), 24–46; David S. McLellan and Charles E. Woodhouse, "The Business Elite and Foreign Policy," *Western Political Quarterly*, 13 (1960), 172–190.

[15] Andrew Gyorgy and Hubert S. Gibbs, *Problems in International Relations*, 2nd. ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1962).

[16] Among administrative cases were Richard M. Cyert, Herbert A. Simon, and Donald B. Trow, "Observation of a Business Decision," *Journal of Business*, 29 (1956), 237–248; Herbert A. Simon, "The Birth of an Organization: The Economic Cooperation Administration," *Public Administration Review*, 13 (1953), 227–236; Donald Herzberg and Paul Tillett, "A Budget for New York State, 1956–1957," Inter-University Case Program Case 69; Francis E. Rourke, "The Politics of Administrative Organization: A Case History," *Journal of Politics*, 19 (1957), 461–478.

[17] D. C. McClelland, J. W. Atkinson, R. A. Clark, and E. L. Lowell, *The Achievement Motive* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1953); J. W. Atkinson, ed., *Motives in Fantasy, Action and Society* (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1958). Scores on TAT are determined by content analysis of short essays written in response to the projection on a screen of several pencilled sketches. In this research the content analysis was done for each of the three courses by the same two scorers. The rank order correlations between their scores on a sample of essays (N = 57) were as follows: Men: *n ach*, .83; *n aff*, .83; *n power*, .66. Women: *n ach*, .84; *n aff*, .73; *n power*, .66.

We selected these personality variables for several reasons. First, other educational experiments testify to the importance of student motivations for achievement and affiliation in learning. Second, these motivations, along with motivations toward power, have a history of interest to political analysts, and in so far as was possible, we hoped that our teaching experiment might contribute to political theory. McClelland's study of the relation of *n ach*, *n aff*, and *n power* to economic growth constitutes an impressive demonstration of the relevance of these personality variables to political theory.[19] The theory and research on power and personality inspired by Lasswell is another theoretical interest of political analysts, to which we hoped our work might be related.[20] Third, Driver studied the influence of variations in simplicity-complexity of cognitive style on decision making in an earlier use of Inter-Nation Simulation.[21] If relations could be found between cognitive style and decision behavior in simulation, it seemed reasonable to investigate hypothetical relations between cognitive style and learning in simulation.

Criteria for comparison. A fundamental problem in teaching experiments is the "criterion problem"—that is, the selection of the dependent variables about which one tries to predict. If simulation and cases differ in their instructional effects, in what ways would we expect them to vary? In short, what differences do the differences make?

We conducted a three-fold search for hypothetical differences between simulation and cases. First, we recalled our personal experience with and observation of students and other participants in simulation and case discussions. In this respect, we were particularly influenced by an early paper of Chadwick F. Alger, who introduced his students of international organization to simulation.[22] Second, we drew upon the collective experience of teachers at several institutions who had supplemented their usual course materials with games or cases. Most of this experience was anecdotal, impressionistic, and relatively undiscriminating in its claims for either simulation or cases.[23] Finally, we took advantage of theoretically oriented, empirical research by educational psychologists.[24] Although many teaching experiments report negative results or no differences between and among methods, recent efforts have been more successful in discovering differences that are both statistically and theoretically significant. This has been true especially when account is taken of the interaction between method and student characteristics.

This search led to two kinds of variables about which predictions might be made. One was "long-run" and included effects on student career choices, reading interests, and political behavior. The other was "short-run" and included classroom behavior and course learning. The research setting, three relatively small classes, and the time limitations of an academic year of observation plus an additional period for data analysis made longitudinal research impracticable. It was more appropriate to concentrate on short-term differences in student performance.

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[18] O. J. Harvey, D. E. Hunt, and H. M. Schroder, *Conceptual Systems and Personality Organization* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1961).

[19] David C. McClelland, *The Achieving Society.* (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1961).

[20] Harold D. Lasswell, *Psychopathology and Politics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1930); *World Politics and Personal Insecurity* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934); *Power and Personality* (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., Inc., 1948); Arnold A. Rogow and Harold D. Lasswell, *Power, Corruption, and Rectitude* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963).

[21] Michael J. Driver, *Conceptual Structure and Group Processes in an Inter-Nation Simulation, Part One: The Perception of Simulated Nations* (Princeton: Educational Testing Service, 1962), sections 2, 3 and Appendix A.1.

[22] Guetzkow, Alger, Brody, Noel, and Snyder, *op. cit.*, pp. 150–189.

[23] We have sometimes been embarrassed by the advantages claimed for Inter-Nation Simulation by some of our friends and colleagues. For example, Ralph M. Goldman has remarked, "Admittedly primitive and oversimplified, these simulations are unquestionably successful in providing the students with insight into many of the decision-making realities with which policymakers must operate": "The Political Context of Arms Control: A Systems Approach," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 7 (1963), 618–646, at p. 639, fn. 9; *Journal of Arms Control*, 1 (1963), 712–740, at p. 733, fn. 9.

[24] For a review of the literature, see Wilbert J. McKeachie, "Procedures and Techniques of Teaching: A Survey of Experimental Studies," in Nevitt Sanford, ed., *The American College: A Psychological and Social Interpretation of the Higher Learning* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1962), pp. 312–334.

In this essay we compare simulation and cases as techniques for motivating student interest and relate method and motivation to differences in learning factual materials and principles.

INTEREST

Probably the most frequently cited claim for simulation asserts that it heightens student interest, which promotes learning. Whether in political science or business studies, games and simulation accord with C. P. Snow's recommendation to put the student in the position of the original discoverer as a way of exciting him about research and of enticing him to creative work.[25] Nevertheless, the reports on student interest are hardly uniform. At the Carnegie Institute of Technology, where a business management game extends throughout a semester and is the equivalent of one of five graduate courses, some students clearly dislike the game.[26] At the University of Wisconsin, boredom and absenteeism occurred among students who occupied less important roles in a foreign-policy game.[27]

We experimented with several measures of interest, on the assumption that interest is multidimensional and that findings supported by several measures deserve greater credibility than findings supported by single indicators.[28] We adopted ten measures of students' interest: (A) reports of the amount of their reading on the subject of the course; (B) comparison of their interest in the course with interest in other courses taken simultaneously; (C) perception of interest in this course; (D) perception of interest in political science; (E) preference for case or simulation; (F) use of special reading materials placed on reserve in the college library; (G) visits to the professor's office; (H) attendance in class; (I) descriptive evaluation of the course at the end of term; and (J) rate of participation in "lab" section.

Data on these ten indicators of interest were collected for 23 sets of participants in the three courses. These sets consisted of all students; all men; all women; men and women divided according to high and low achievement, high and low affiliation, high and low power; and men and women divided according to cognitive style (concrete, moderately concrete, moderately complex, and complex).

When one lists the findings, as in Table 1.1, they present no obvious pattern. Certainly, neither simulation nor case stimulates interest more effectively than the other. Surely the results do not fit our prediction that simulation would be uniformly superior to cases in exciting student interest and involvement. An unexpected pattern emerges, nevertheless: the case method succeeds more than simulation in eliciting student interest as measured by students' *perceptions*, but measures of student *behavior* indicate that simulation succeeds more than case in affecting student interest and involvement.

Perceptions of interest

To elicit perceptions of interest, we asked students to complete a "Course Evaluation" questionnaire at the end of term. We administered it at the last regular meeting of the course; the cover sheet instructed students to select one of their number to collect the questionnaires and deliver them to the office of the secretary of the Department of Political Science, where they would be held until the instructor filed his grades for the course. This assured students that their evaluations would not influence their grades. So far as we could tell, no students doubted the integrity of this procedure, and they cooperated with responsible delivery of the questionnaires.

As Table 1.1 (columns A through E) indicates, four of the five perceptual measures of interest obtained on this questionnaire did not discriminate between simulation and case sections. We found virtually no differences between students' perception of the amount of reading they did for the course (A), or in their interest in the course relative to other courses (B), or in their estimates of how much the course stimulated their interest in the subject

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[25] C. P. Snow, *The Search* (New York: The New American Library of World Literature, Inc., 1960), p. 23.

[26] William R. Dill, "The Educational Effects of Management Games," in Dill, Jackson, and Sweeney, *op. cit.*, pp. 61–72.

[27] Bernard C. Cohen, "Political Gaming in the Classroom," *Journal of Politics*, 24 (1962), 367–381.

[28] Donald T. Campbell and D. W. Fiske, "Convergent and Discriminant Validation by the Multi-trait-Multimethod Matrix," *Psychological Bulletin*, 56 (1959), 81–105.

TABLE 1.1. SUMMARY OF TEN INTEREST MEASURES FOR 23 SETS

Set	Perceptual Measures					Behavioral Measures				
	A*	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J
1. All students	—†	—	—	—	PC	—	—	PS	—	PS
2. All men	—	—	—	—	PC	—	PC	PS	—	PS
3. All women	—	—	—	—	PC	—	—	PS	—	PS
Men										
4. High *n ach*	—	—	—	—	PC	—	—	—	PS	PS
5. Low *n ach*	—	—	—	—	PC	—	PC	PS	PC	PS
6. High *n aff*	—	PS	—	—	PC	—	—	PS	PS	PS
7. Low *n aff*	—	—	—	—	PC	—	—	—	PS	PS
8. High *n power*	—	—	—	—	PC	—	—	PS	PS	PS
9. Low *n power*	—	—	—	—	PC	—	PC	PS	PS	PS
10. Concrete cognitive style	—	—	—	—	PS	PC	—	—	PS	PS
11. Moderately concrete cognitive style	—	—	—	—	PS	—	—	—	PS	PS
12. Moderately complex cognitive style	—	—	—	—	PC	—	—	—	—	—
13. Complex cognitive style	—	—	—	—	PC	—	—	PS	PS	PS
Women										
14. High *n ach*	—	—	—	—	PC	—	—	PS	PC	PS
15. Low *n ach*	—	—	—	—	PC	—	—	PS	PC	PS
16. High *n aff*	—	—	—	—	PC	—	—	—	PS	PS
17. Low *n aff*	—	—	—	—	PC	—	—	PS	PC	PS
18. High *n power*	—	—	PS	—	PC	PS	—	—	PS	PS
19. Low *n power*	—	—	—	—	PC	—	—	PS	PS	PS
20. Concrete cognitive style	—	—	—	—	PC	—	—	PS	—	PS
21. Moderately concrete cognitive style	—	—	PC	—	PC	—	PC	—	PC	PS
22. Moderately complex cognitive style	—	—	—	—	PC	—	—	—	PS	PS
23. Complex cognitive style	—	—	PS	—	PC	—	—	—	—	PS

* Columns correspond to the following variables:

A. Perception of amount of reading on subject (differences analyzed by chi-square test)
B. Perception of relative course interest (chi-square test)
C. Perception of interest in course (chi-square test)
D. Perception of interest in political science (chi-square test)
E. Perception of interest in lab section (no test of significance)
F. Behavioral interest expressed by reading (t-test)
G. Behavioral interest expressed by visiting professor (t-test)
H. Behavioral interest expressed through attendance (t-test)
I. Course evaluation essay (number of cases too small for test of significance on any groups except all students, all males, all females)
J. Behavioral interest expressed by rate of participation in lab section (t-test)

† A dash indicates no significant difference between case and simulation sections in amount of interest observed by indicators for this variable. PC (Pro-Case) indicates significantly more interest in case section, except in column E for which no test of significance was possible because the sets were too small. PS (Pro-Simulation) indicates significantly more interest in simulation section. The level of probability used to define significance was .05.

(C), or in how much the course contributed to their interest in political science (D).

Perception of interest in lab section (E). The one discriminating perceptual measure of interest asked the student to indicate, regardless of the lab section in which he participated, his preference between simulation and case studies. The Course Evaluation form asked:

15. Had you been able to choose the type of lab session to attend at the beginning of this quarter, which would you have preferred? Case Study Lab ______; Simula-

tion Lab ______. Would your preference be different now? Yes ______; No ______.

We calculated, for each set, the percent who preferred case and the percent who preferred simulation. The percent who preferred the section other than the one to which they had been assigned was subtracted from the percent who preferred the section in which they actually participated. This yielded a measure of perceived interest in or preference for one section over the other; those who voted for the section opposite theirs presumably showed less interest than those who voted for the section in which they had participated. Table 2.1 shows data for all students. Only two sets, men with greatest and men with moderate cognitive concreteness, preferred simulation to cases. The range of percentage differences in favor of the case method was from 1% to nearly 75%. To the extent that these data favor either case or simulation, they show that students prefer case to simulation.

Behaviors of interest

To the extent that students' perceptions of these two supplementary teaching methods vary, they favor the case method. It is striking, then, that observational data of their behavior, *i.e.*, participation, indicates just the reverse—that more interest is displayed by students in simulation than in cases.

Behavioral interest expressed by reading (F). Like most college libraries, Deering Library of Northwestern University maintains a reserve reading room, in which some books are on "closed reserve" and may be checked out overnight. Each instructor in the three courses placed on closed reserve a large number of journal articles, chapters, and books. The Reserve Room personnel preserved the call slips for closed reserve items, from which we culled evidence of students' use of materials for these courses.

TABLE 3.1. AMONG ALL STUDENTS NO DIFFERENCE APPEARS BETWEEN SECTIONS IN BEHAVIORAL INTEREST EXPRESSED BY USE OF CLOSED RESERVE READING

Section	Mean Use of Closed Reserve Materials per Student
Simulation	1.8
Case	4.3
Difference	2.5*

* Not significant at .05 level as determined by t-test.

This objective measure revealed no significant differences between sections for the aggregate of students, as is shown in Table 3.1. The average use seems relatively small—not quite two times for each simulation student and just more than four times for each case student.

For two of the 23 sets, men whose cognitive style was most concrete and women with high *n power* scores, significant differences occurred between simulation and case. Among the men, students in case studies used closed reserve reading materials significantly more than those in simulation, but the women with high *n power* scores in simulation used the library reading significantly more than those in case studies. Tables 3.2 and 3.3 report data for these two sets.

TABLE 3.2. MEN WITH CONCRETE COGNITIVE STYLE IN CASE USE CLOSED RESERVE READING MORE THAN IN SIMULATION

Section	Mean Use of Closed Reserve Materials Per Student
Simulation	.3
Case	2.5
Difference	2.2*

* Significant at .05 level as determined by t-test.

TABLE 2.1. MORE SIMULATION STUDENTS PREFER CASE THAN CASE STUDENTS PREFER SIMULATION

Section Preference:	Case		Simulation		No Response		Total	
Section:	*n*	%	*n*	%	*n*	%	*n*	%
Simulation	26	37	44	62	1	1	71	100
Case	46	73	15	24	2	3	63	100
Total	72		59		3		134	

TABLE 3.3. WOMEN WITH HIGH *N Power* SCORES IN SIMULATION USE CLOSED RESERVE READING MORE THAN IN CASE

Section	Mean Use of Closed Reserve Materials Per Student
Simulation	3.0
Case	1.6
Difference	1.4*

* Significant at .05 level as determined by t-test.

Behavior interest expressed by visiting the instructor (G). Each instructor maintained a record of the students who visited him during office hours. He attached an appointment sheet to his door and invited students to sign up for special times. Notes of unscheduled visits were also kept. Because the number of visits by a student rarely exceeded one, we dichotomized the data, separating students who made no visits from those who made one or more. Among all students, we observed no difference between sections in the frequency of office visits, as shown in Table 4.1. However, four of the 23 sets showed significant differences between case and simulation sections. In each set, more students in the case section visited the professor than did students in simulation.

TABLE 4.1. AMONG ALL STUDENTS NO DIFFERENCE APPEARS BETWEEN SECTIONS IN FREQUENCY OF VISITS TO PROFESSOR

Section	Number of Visits		
	None	One or More	Total
Simulation	46	25	71
Case	33	30	63
Total	79	55	134

$\chi^2=2.12$, not significant at .05 level.

The four sets in which case students visited the professor more than did simulation students consisted of all men, men with low *n ach*, men with low *n power*, and women with moderately concrete cognitive style. Table 4.2 reports the data for the largest of these sets—all men.

TABLE 4.2. MEN IN CASE VISITED PROFESSOR MORE THAN THOSE IN SIMULATION

Section	Number of Visits		
	None	One or More	Total
Simulation	32	15	47
Case	18	24	42
Total	50	39	89

$\chi^2=5.73$, significant at .05 level.

Behavioral interest expressed through attendance (H). The instructors did not keep attendance at lectures, but observers,[29] who were present at each section meeting, noted who attended, who remained after the formal close of the section meeting, who was tardy, and who left before the official termination hour. Each individual received an attendance score consisting of the number of times he attended his section plus the times he remained afterward minus the times he was tardy and departed before termination.

This objective measure of interest revealed that in 13 of the 23 sets the simulation section displayed more interest than the case section. This was true for the aggregate of all students, for all men, for all women, and for men with low *n ach*, men with high *n aff*, men with high *n power*, men with low *n power*, with the most complex cognitive style, women with high *n ach*, women with low *n ach*, women with low *n aff*, women with low *n power*, and women with most concrete cognitive style. Tables 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3 report data for all students, all males, and all females.

Behavioral interest expressed through Course Evaluation essay (I). The Course Evaluation form asked students open-end questions to

TABLE 5.1. AMONG ALL STUDENTS THOSE IN SIMULATION HAVE HIGHER ATTENDANCE SCORES THAN THOSE IN CASE

Section	Mean Attendance Score
Simulation	57.3
Case	48.7
Difference	8.6*

* Significant at .05 level as determined by t-test.

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[29] The presence of observers was explained to the sections at the first class meeting and was justified in terms of our desire to contribute to better undergraduate teaching on the basis of empirical research.

TABLE 5.2. MEN IN SIMULATION HAVE HIGHER ATTENDANCE SCORES THAN MEN IN CASE

Section	Mean Attendance Score
Simulation	58.6
Case	50.4
Difference	8.2*

* Significant at .05 level as determined by t-test.

which they could respond with comments about the course and the section in which they participated. In contrast to questions about perception of interest, there was no element of forced choice about these items; indeed, the questions invited rather than instructed students to answer. Thus, whether they commented may be interpreted as behavior rather than as perception. The questions read:

20. If you feel there are things about American Foreign Policy [or International Relations, or Administrative Process] which you had thought you'd like to get out of this course and didn't would you please list them in the following space.
21. The rest of this page is for any additional comments which you would care to make.

We analyzed these responses for the presence of favorable comment, unfavorable comment, or mixtures of both. For 12 of the sets, the students who were in simulation made more favorable comments than students in case, while in five of the groups the case section students offered more favorable comments. These data are not subject to tests of significance for all sets because of the reduced number for analysis, resulting from students' not being required to comment. We have reported the direction of their comments, either favorable or unfavorable, although for all students writing either strictly favorable or strictly unfavorable comments ($N=64$), the differences are not significant, as Table 6.1 shows.

TABLE 5.3. WOMEN IN SIMULATION HAVE HIGHER ATTENDANCE SCORES THAN IN CASE

Section	Mean Attendance Score
Simulation	54.8
Case	45.4
Difference	9.6*

* Significant at .05 level as determined by t-test.

TABLE 6.1. AMONG ALL STUDENTS COMMENTING EITHER FAVORABLY OR UNFAVORABLY NO DIFFERENCE APPEARS IN BEHAVIORAL INTEREST EXPRESSED THROUGH COURSE EVALUATION

Section	Comment		
	Favorable	Unfavorable	Total
Simulation	15	20	35
Case	11	18	29
Total	26	38	64

$\chi^2=.17$, not significant at .05 level.

Behavioral interest expressed by rate of participation in lab section (J). Rate of participation was calculated by counting the number of comments made by each student in the lab sections and dividing by the number of lab sessions he attended. The number of comments per session attended was overwhelmingly greater for simulation than for case students. In fact, the differences between the means for simulation and case for 22 of the 23 sets were statistically significant; only men with moderately complex cognitive styles did not have significantly higher rates of participation in simulation than the corresponding men in the case section.

In one sense, this finding is not surprising, because simulation sections include national conferences, bi-lateral and multi-lateral conferences, and other gatherings involving from two to five persons, in which the opportunities for student participation might be expected to be more numerous than in traditional discussion sections. It is not trivial, however, for as will be noted below, the promotion of activity may be one of the key ways of motivating students and affecting their learning.

Summary. The major conclusions from the indicators of interest are (1) that the behavioral measures are more effective than the perceptual in discriminating between simulation and case sections; (2) that three of the behavioral measures—attendance, course evaluation essay, and rate of participation—indicate greater interest among simulation sections; and (3) that these behavioral measures differ from the one perceptual measure in the direction of student interest.

LEARNING OUTCOMES

The fundamental reason for studying teaching methods is to determine what methods under what conditions favorably affect student learning. If different methods do not cause different effects, one can leave to taste and cost the selection of one method over another. However, if one method is more effective for learning, the presumption rests with that method, assuming costs and other factors to be relatively equal.

We measured student performance for two kinds of learning, mastery of facts and understanding of principles. For each course, we administered equivalent tests for "fact-mastery" and for principles at the beginning of the quarter and again at its end. The pretest-posttest design permits analysis to determine whether teaching method is related to changes in learning during the course.

Fact-mastery questions are instruments that may be scored objectively. For American Foreign Policy, the examination was constructed from items given to students ($N=22$) in the 1962 Northwestern Summer Session course following the completion of their classwork. Items were selected that differentiated between high and low performers. From these items equivalent pre- and post-course examinations for fact-mastery were constructed. For International Relations, the Cooperative Test on Foreign Affairs, developed by the Educational Testing Service, measured fact-mastery.[30] For Administrative Process, potential questions were written from the course materials and administered to more than 200 students at Washington University of St. Louis, Georgetown University, and Douglass College, Rutgers University.

Principles examinations were of two kinds. The first was an objective exam, consisting largely of multiple-choice questions but containing some true-false items, which was constructed for American Foreign Policy and International Relations. For the former, pretesting was carried out in the same summer course used for work on the fact-mastery questions; for the latter, items were submitted to a team of graduate students and faculty in International Relations and judged for appropriate difficulty. For Administrative Process, objectively scoreable principles questions were extracted from a test prepared by the Center for Programs in Government Administration of University College, University of Chicago. The items were designed and selected by a panel of five judges, instructors in administration, for a Summer Institute in Excutive Development for Federal Administrators.[31]

The second type of principles examination was an essay. Essays for each course were scored by at least two graders. Intercorrelations for American Foreign Policy were .78; for International Relations, .75; for Administrative Process, .72. These questions, unlike fact-mastery and the other principles items, were administered only at the end of the courses.

We predicted better performance on both fact-mastery and principles by simulation sections and expected that any exceptions to this generalization would occur among certain personality sets. Analysis of covariance, however, revealed no statistically significant differences between simulation and case for any of the 23 sets with respect to fact-mastery. The same was true of all sets on the objective part of the principles examination. That is, none of the sets evidenced a statistically significant difference in pre- and post-test performance. Virtually the same finding held for performance on the essay part of the examination; only one set, men with low *n aff*, performed significantly differently in simulation than in case, on the principles essay.

In short, simulation and case students scarcely differ in their performance on these two learning outcomes, fact-mastery and understanding of principles. If simulation and case students differ at all, assuming validity of our procedures, the differences are complex and indirect. No simple and direct associations between method and learning were found.

Interest and learning outcomes

To see whether interest intervenes between method and learning, we shall consider the four interest measures that discriminated between simulation and case (see Table 1.1, Columns E, H, I, and J). These are the perceptual measure of lab preference and the behavioral measures of attendance, Course Evaluation, and rate of participation.

Perception of interest in lab section (E). Table 7.1 displays the mean improvement on the two learning variables for men and women according to whether they preferred their own section or the opposite one. In all but one set, those who preferred the other lab section performed better on fact-mastery, *i.e.*, showed more mean improvement between the pre-

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[30] *Handbook: Cooperative Test on Foreign Affairs.* (Princeton, N. J.: Educational Testing Service, Cooperative Test Division, 1962).

[31] Garlie A. Forehand and Harold Guetzkow, "The Administrative Judgment Test as Related to Descriptions of Executive Judgment Behaviors," *Journal of Applied Psychology,* 45 (1961), 257–261.

and post-course scores, than did those who preferred their own lab. (The one exception was women in case sections, and for this set, those women did better who preferred their own lab; however, the *N* of those who preferred simulation was only 3.) The differences in mean improvements were not great between those who disliked and those who liked their own labs, except for women in simulation. In that set, the eleven who preferred case had a mean of 18.9 compared to a mean of 4.8 for the thirteen who preferred to stay in simulation.

In addition to revealing a difference in fact-mastery between students who preferred their own lab and those who preferred the other, Table 7.1 also indicates a difference between students preferring case and students preferring simulation regardless of the section they actually participated in. Taking each of the four sets (*i.e.*, men in simulation, women in simulation, men in case, and women in case), we observe that in three of the four the mean pre-post test improvement was greater for students who preferred case.

As for the relation of lab preference to principles learning, we see the same kind of relation as that noted between lab preference and fact-mastery. Except for one set, men in simulation, those who preferred the other lab showed more mean improvement between the pre- and post-course examinations.

TABLE 7.1. THOSE WHO PREFER OTHER LAB SECTION IMPROVE MORE

	Mean Pre-Post Improvement	
	Fact-Mastery	Principles
Preferred own lab		
Men in case preferring case	9.6	8.3
Women in case preferring case	11.3	9.6
Men in simulation preferring simulation	11.0	11.4
Women in simulation preferring simulation	4.8	7.2
Preferred other lab		
Men in case preferring simulation	9.7	14.6
Women in case preferring simulation	4.0	17.0
Men in simulation preferring case	13.6	7.1
Women in simulation preferring case	18.9	14.6

TABLE 7.2. CORRELATIONS BETWEEN ATTENDANCE AND FACT-MASTERY AND PRINCIPLES LEARNING FOR MEN AND WOMEN IN CASE AND SIMULATION

Set	Fact-Mastery	Principles
Case men	−.30	.12
Case women	−.36	.04
Simulation men	−.03	.16
Simulation women	.12	.24

However, the relation between object of preference and learning of principles is opposite to that between object of preference and fact-mastery. In three of four groups, students who preferred simulation did better.

Behavioral interest expressed through attendance (H). The first of three discriminating behavioral measures of interest was attendance, which related only partly to fact-mastery and principles learning. Table 7.2 reports the correlations between rate of attendance for men and women in case and simulation and fact-mastery and principles learning. Although none of the correlations is large, two observations seem indicated. First, for three of the sets there is a negative correlation between attendance and fact-mastery, but all the correlations between attendance and principles learning are positive. Second, the high positive correlations between attendance and learning are for simulation men and simulation women.

Behavioral interest expressed through course evaluation essay (I). A second discriminating behavioral measure was the course evaluation essay. Its findings are reminiscent of those on the perceptual measure of lab preference, in which those who preferred the opposite lab did better than those who preferred their own. Table 7.3 displays mean improvement scores for both men and women by section and according to whether they evaluated the course favorably or unfavorably. In all sets, those who evaluated the course unfavorably have higher mean improvement on fact-mastery than those who evaluated it favorably, although this is significant only for simulation males. Likewise, in all sets, "favorable evaluators" show a higher mean improvement on principles than do "unfavorable evaluators"; but none of these differences are significant.

Behavioral interest expressed by rate of participation in lab section (J). Rate of participation

TABLE 7.3. THOSE WHO EVALUATE THEIR SECTION UNFAVORABLY IMPROVE MORE

Sex	Mean Pre-Post Improvement	
	Fact-Mastery	Principles
Case men, favorable evaluation	7.0	5.3
Case men, unfavorable evaluation	10.0	9.9
Case women, favorable evaluation	11.2	0.0
Case women, unfavorable evaluation	15.8	14.1
Simulation men, favorable evaluation	4.7*	6.9
Simulation men, unfavorable evaluation	16.7*	13.9
Simulation women, favorable evaluation	1.4	9.8
Simulation women, unfavorable evaluation	4.1	13.5

* The differences between these means is significant at .05 level as determined by t-test.

as an interest measure intervening between method and learning was the third behavioral measure that showed some difference between simulation and case sections. Table 7.4 reports correlations between rate of participation for men and women in case and simulation and fact-mastery and principles. Note in these data the relatively low correlations: only two of the eight exceed .3. Moreover, five of the eight are negative, and simulation men are the only set with positive correlations between rate of participation and both fact-mastery and principles.

Summary

The relations between simulation and learning outcomes may be summarized as follows. (1) No direct and unmediated relation occurred between simulation and fact-mastery or principles learning, but a number of indirect, rather complex relations exist. (2) Those who preferred the other lab section did better on fact-mastery and principles, *i.e.*, they showed more mean improvement between pre- and post-course scores. (3) Those who preferred case, regardless of whether they were in case or simulation, did better on fact-mastery. (4) However, those who preferred simulation, regardless of section, seemed to do better on principles. (5) Attendance and fact-mastery correlated negatively, but attendance and principles learning correlated positively. (6) The higher positive correlations between attendance and principles occurred among simulation students rather than case. (7) Unfavorable evaluators had higher mean improvement on both fact-mastery and principles than favorable evaluators, especially among men in simulation for fact-mastery. (8) Participation and learning usually correlated negatively. (9) The strongest positive relation between participation and learning was among men in simulation.

TABLE 7.4. CORRELATIONS BETWEEN FACT-MASTERY AND PRINCIPLES LEARNING AND RATE OF PARTICIPATION FOR MEN AND WOMEN IN CASE AND SIMULATION

Set	Fact-Mastery	Principles
Case men	−.11	−.28
Case women	.05	−.02
Simulation men	.33	.23
Simulation women	−.19	−.48

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

The claims and expectations we had for simulation were not borne out. It is not uniformly superior to the case study as a supplementary teaching activity, nor are the exceptions to this generalization quite as we predicted them. We expected more differences between personality sets than we found. Nevertheless, these conclusions should not obscure the finding that behavioral measures of interest reveal simulation to be more involving and more interesting than case studies.

This observation is similar to findings from another recent experimental study of games.[32] (Because there is very little empirical evaluation of games and simulation, the research to which our results are relevant is sparse.) In four Baltimore high schools, James S. Coleman and Sarane S. Boocock studied the use of an election simulation (by computer) in two schools and the non-use in two others. They found, to a greater extent than we did, that the game stimulates and motivates students on virtually every measure of interest. Nothing comparable was found in the control schools without the game.

In spite of this claim for differences in simulation and cases or other materials, the "so what?" question remains: What differences do the differences make for learning? We have pointed out in the section on learning outcomes some differences, but they are usually small. Yet these differences are obtained from small differences in treatment. In so far as possible, we tried to make virtually everything in the courses the same for both groups, except for the three-hour laboratory periods held each week. And the "treatments" with case and simulation occurred only eight or nine times during an academic quarter.

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[32] Boocock, *op. cit.*

Moreover, the subjects in this experiment were college students, many of them already interested enough in politics to be political science majors and/or to enroll in these courses. It is important to bear this in mind in assessing the implications of the small differences obtained between the two techniques. Political interests and skills are often acquired early, by adolescence, and are not much altered except by dramatic public events or traumatic personal deprivations.[33] Thus, the presence of any differences at all may be regarded as socially and theoretically significant.

Our positive reading of these small differences is reinforced by comparing our findings with those of the San Francisco State College three-year program to develop and evaluate new and different ways of teaching international relations. Charles McClelland's summary of that experience indicates both the difficulty of making any noticeable impact on student learning and a likely explanation of that difficulty:

> The outcome that we have to report is that the course work did not affect the body of students in any significant way that the evaluations could take into account. That is, they did not, as a group, change their beliefs and attitudes perceptibly, they did not gain a greater mastery over the subject matter that was tested for, their understandings of various objects and conditions in the international environment remained very stable and unchanging, and they did not make measurable gains in critical abilities and techniques.
>
> Some tentative conclusions and hypotheses requiring further investigation have been reported earlier on the reasons for the failure of students to change very much. The most important of these is that these students kept firmly in their possession a frame of reference which will accept only a limited amount of information and meaning about international relations and which, also, causes the rejection of those things which did not fit readily into that frame of reference.[34]

The challenge to educators is to find ways to penetrate the firm "set" that college students bring to courses on politics and international relations. Students' perspectives and orientations toward public and world affairs ordinarily develop before they reach college and are largely beyond amendment, except for some unlikely confrontation with an irreversible learning experience.[35] It would be too much to claim at this point that simulation constitutes such an experience; but our data indicate the existence of small and important departures from the "set," beyond those obtainable by the case study method. We cannot yet recommend revision of instructional policies, but we do have grounds for recommending further research and replication to help decide whether our vision of an effective technique is a reality or a mirage.[36]

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[33] Fred Greenstein, *Children and Politics* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965); David Easton and Robert Hess, "The Child's Political World," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, 6 (1962), 229–246; Heinz Eulau, John Wahlke, LeRoy Ferguson, and William Buchanan, "The Political Socialization of American State Legislators," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, 3 (1959), 188–206.

[34] Charles A. McClelland, *College Teaching of International Relations* (San Francisco State College, multilithed, 1962), pp. 269–270.

[35] For examples recalled affectionately by a veteran and inspiring teacher, see Charles S. Hyneman, "Some Crucial Learning Experiences: A Personal View," in Robert H. Connery, (ed.), *Teaching Political Science: A Challenge to Higher Education* (Durham, N. C.: Duke University Press, 1965), pp. 217–237.

[36] This research was supported by the Cooperative Research Branch, U. S. Office of Education, and Northwestern University under Contract No. OE-2-10-122, Project 1568. We acknowledge also the assistance of the International Relations Program, Northwestern, through funds made available by the Carnegie Corporation of New York and the Illinois Center for Education in Politics.

THE LINKAGE BETWEEN CONSTITUENCY ATTITUDES AND CONGRESSIONAL VOTING BEHAVIOR: A CAUSAL MODEL

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Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes' publication in 1963 of a preliminary report on the Survey Research Center's representation study is an important landmark in the development of empirical political theory.[1] That report addressed itself to the crucial theoretical question of the linkage between mass political opinions and governmental policy-making.[2] More specifically, the report found considerable policy agreement between Congressional roll call votes and the attitudes of the individual Congressman's constituency.[3] This policy agreement was then interpreted through several causal paths and the Congressman's perception of his constituency's attitudes was found to be the main path by which the local district ultimately influenced Congressional outputs.

The main body of the report dealt with the broad civil rights issue dimension, and, by specifying the perceptual path by which constituency influence is brought to bear, documented the effect of political issues despite the generally low level of political information held at the mass level. Thus, the Congressmen, through their broad cognitive evaluations, were aware of how far they could proceed in determining their civil rights roll call votes on the basis of their own attitudes before risking the displeasure of their constituents.

Beyond such major substantive contributions the representation study introduced to political science a variance-apportioning technique similar to that developed by Sewall Wright, in 1921.[4] Through this variance-apportioning technique, the importance of the perceptual link was isolated and evaluated. This study, then, symbolizes the growing recognition in political science of the importance of more sophisticated methodological tools in the process of theory building.

I

This essay seeks to continue this trend toward empirical theory building in political science. A technique for making causal inferences is utilized to resolve two theoretically important problems left unresolved in the original constituency influence study.

In the representation study the authors report the following paradigm showing intercorrelations between constituency's attitude, representative's perception of constituency's attitude, representative's attitude, and representative's roll call behavior on the civil rights dimension. Each of these variables, which we shall call D, P, A, and R, respectively, was linked to every other variable through causal arrows. The inclusion of all possible causal arrows follows the authors' statement of the hypothetical conditions of constituency influence.

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* The authors wish to express their gratitude to Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes for providing the data upon which this analysis is based. We gratefully acknowledge the invaluable assistance of Hubert M. Blalock. Jr. and James W. Prothro. The authors, of course, are solely responsible for the analysis.

[1] Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, "Constituency Influence in Congress," this REVIEW, 57 (1963), 45–56.

[2] For other material on the linkage problem, see especially V. O. Key, Jr., *Public Opinion and American Democracy* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961), pp. 441–531.

[3] Briefly, the representation study interrelates three types of data collected in 1958. First, a mass survey was conducted according to probability sampling methods. From this survey central tendencies on attitudinal dimensions were computed for 116 congressional districts. Second, interviews were conducted with incumbent and non-incumbent candidates running for the House of Representatives from these constituencies. The third set of data consisted of Guttman scales of roll call votes taken in Congress on civil rights, social welfare and foreign policy. For a fuller description of the study, see Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, *Representation in the American Congress* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, in press).

[4] Sewall Wright, "Correlation and Causation," *Journal of Agricultural Research*, 20 (1921), 557–585.


Representative's Attitude (A)
.498
.721
.643
.649
Constituency's Attitude (D)
Representative's Roll Call Behavior (R)
.738
.823
Representative's Perception of Constituency's Attitude (P)

FIG. 1. Intercorrelations of variables pertaining to civil rights—whole district*

* The correlations used in this essay are not taken from Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, "Constituency Influence in Congress," this REVIEW, 57 (1963), p. 52. The original coefficients have been corrected to remove the attenuation of correlation due to the sampling variance of constituency measures based on limited samples of constituents. The basis of this correction is explained in Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, *Representation in the American Congress*, (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, in press).

Broadly speaking, the constituency can control the policy actions of the Representative in two alternative ways. The first of these is for the district to choose a Representative who so shares its views that in following his own convictions he does his constituents' will. . . . The second means of constituency control is for the Congressman to follow his (at least tolerably accurate) perceptions of district attitude in order to win re-election. . . . Out of respect for the processes by which the human actor achieves cognitive congruence we have also drawn arrows between the two intervening factors, since the Congressman probably tends to see his district as having the same opinion as his own and also tends, over time, to bring his own opinion into line with the district's.[5]

Figure 1, then, represents the model of constituency influence which the authors derive conceptually. This conceptual causal model is then evaluated empirically to determine how well it interprets constituency influence. Each conceptually possible path from D to R is assumed to be operative and the authors move directly to a test of how effective each is. Thus, each conceptually possible direct path is evaluated as an interpretation of the indirect relationship between constituency attitude and representative's roll call behavior through the computation of influence coefficients. The perceptual path, running from D to P to R, is found to be the major link accounting for the relationship between D and R. Nevertheless, the path from D to A to R is found to be of some consequence in interpreting the relationship, indicating that recruitment as such has a direct effect.[6]

The use of the variance-apportioning technique also means that the authors must leave the question of the direction of causation between the two intervening variables A and P unanswered, i.e., whether the Congressman's attitudes distort his perceptions, or his perception of district attitudes influences his own attitudes. The reported influence coefficients are computed with causation going from A to P. This is consistent with general psychological theory which holds that attitudes are firmer and more long-lasting than perceptions. This model is also the "least favorable" as far as the total contribution of the Congressman's perceptions to the original relationship is concerned.[7] However, the original study declared that either causal direction is possible.

The present analysis will apply two similar theory building techniques to the civil rights model. First, the Simon-Blalock causal model analysis is used to resolve the two questions: are all the possible causal paths operative? what is the direction of causation between the representative's perception and his attitude? The Simon-Blalock technique enables us

> to make causal *inferences* concerning the adequacy of causal models, at least in the sense that we can proceed by eliminating inadequate models that make predictions that are not consistent with the data.[8]

The logic of the Simon-Blalock technique, then, requires the consideration of various alternative causal models. The causal models are tested for adequacy by utilizing the empirically established intercorrelations. If the prediction equations for any given causal model do not conform to the actual relationships among the variables in the model, then it is rejected.[9] After testing each causal model, if only one fits the data, then we can infer from its adequacy that it is the causal model to adopt. If more than one model fits the data, it is necessary to resort to the use of regression coefficients to infer the most likely candidate.[10] Briefly, Blalock's additions to the Simon technique provide a basis for inferring causal relationships, not only through spurious correlations,[11] but also by establishing indirect and direct effects.

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[5] Miller and Stokes, "Constituency Influence in Congress," *op. cit.*, pp. 50–51.

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 53.

[7] *Loc. cit.*

[8] Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., *Causal Inferences in Nonexperimental Research* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1964), p. 62. Also see Herbert A. Simon, "Spurious Correlations: A Causal Interpretation," *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 49 (1954), 467–479.

[9] In the three-variable model, for example, if we predict that the relationship between B and C is spurious because they are both dependent variables of A, the Simon-Blalock method predicts that the product of the correlations between A and C, and A and B will equal the correlation between C and B. Thus: $rCB = rAC\, rAB$.

Second, Miller and Stokes' variance-apportioning technique is used to evaluate the effectiveness of various intervening variables in interpreting a relationship between independent and dependent variables.[12] This evaluation will proceed only after we have inferred the correct causal model by use of the Simon-Blalock method. The Simon-Blalock technique can also be used to evaluate intervening variables, but the value of the variance-apportioning technique is that it gives the proportion of the original relationship that the intervening paths explain.[13]

This analysis makes most of the causal assumptions made in the original study. On the theoretical level, the most important of these is that constituency attitude is the independent variable and the representative's roll call behavior is the dependent variable.

This paper also accepts the other assumptions necessary for the use of product-moment correlations in the original study: that departures from multivariate normality and normally distributed errors are not great, that relationships are additive and linear. It also assumes that the other causes of each variable are not correlated with the other variables in the system of relationships and causation is uni-directional.

II

Alternative Causal Models

The first test to be made of the constituency influence model involves whether, in fact, the direct link between *A* and *P* exists at all. If *A* and *P* are correlated only because they are both related to *D*, then there would not be a direct relationship between *A* and *P* and the question of causal direction would be superfluous. Model I shows graphically this possibility.



Model I. No direct link between *P* and *A*.

Restricting our attention to the first half of the model (the relationship between *D*, *A*, and *P*), we note that Model I predicts that *D* is an independent variable producing variation directly in the variables *A* and *P*. Neither *A* or *P* in that case would be producing variation in each other. If Model I is correct there would be no developmental sequence in either the direction of *D* to *A* to *P* or in the direction of *D* to *P* to *A*. The first equation in Table 1 shows the Simon-Blalock test of this model.

The very poor degree of fit between the actual correlation between *A* and *P* and the predicted correlation if there were no direct relationship between *A* and *P* indicates that Model I is incorrect empirically. The large difference between .643 and .368 indicates that at least to some degree there is a developmental sequence between *D*, *A*, and *P*. Once a direct relationship between *A* and P is found, the next step is to determine whether this relationship is entirely due to a developmental sequence. Model II predicts that the relationship between *A* and *P* is entirely a part of a developmental relationship from *D* to *A* to *P*.

If Model II is correct, then the causal direction of the relationship between *A* and *P*



Model II. Developmental Sequence from *D* to *A* to *P*.

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[10] At the very least, then, this method allows us to eliminate logically possible alternative models from our store of explanations. For the utility of regression coefficients, see Blalock, *op. cit.*, pp. 85–87.

[11] For a recent application of the Simon technique, see Thad L. Beyle, "Contested Elections and Voter Turnout in A Local Community: A Problem in Spurious Correlation," this Review, 59 (March, 1965), 111–117.

[12] Miller and Stokes, "Constituency Influence in Congress," *op. cit.*, pp. 52–53.

[13] If B is an intervening variable between *A* and *C*, then the product of the amount of variation *A* explains in *B*, and *B* explains in *C*, gives the proportion of the relationship between *A* and *C* that is accounted for by the path from *A* to *B* to *C*. Thus: the proportion of *A* to *C* explained by *A* to *B* to $C = (r^2AB \times r^2BC)/r^2AC$.

would go from *A* to *P*. This hypothesis is a necessary part of the developmental sequence which is predicted. This, incidentally, is also the causal direction included in the "least favorable" model of the Miller and Stokes study. Were this developmental sequence to fit the data, the inference would be that no direct relationship between *D* and *P* existed. Instead, the correlation between *D* and *P* would be accounted for by the relationship from $D \rightarrow A \rightarrow P$. The second equation of Table 1 shows the test of Model II.

The poor degree of fit between .738 and .320 indicates that *P* is not without some independent and direct effect from *D* and that therefore Model II is incorrect. If there is a developmental sequence from *D* to *A* to *P* it does not entirely account for the correlation between *D* and *P*. To some degree, then, *D* also has a direct effect upon *P*.

Thus far, this analysis indicates two findings:

1. To some extent there is a developmental sequence involving *D*, *A*, and *P*.
2. To some extent *D* has a direct effect upon *P*.

The direction of causation between *A* and *P* is still unknown, but these two findings lead logically to the next test. Thus, assuming *D* to be a truly independent variable in this system, the fact that *D* has a direct effect upon *P* and that there is some kind of developmental sequence in the system leads to the hypothesis that the sequence goes from *D* to *P* to *A*. Model III shows graphically this prediction.



MODEL III. Developmental Sequence from *D* to *P* to *A*.

In Model III the causal direction of the relationship between A and *P* is hypothesized to go from *P* to *A*. This sub-hypothesis is necessary to the total hypothesis of the predicted sequence. Also, if the correlation between *D* and *A* were found to be entirely due to the *D* to *P* to *A* sequence, then *D* would have no direct effect upon *A*. The third equation of Table 1 tests this model.

Unlike the two previous models, this model has an almost perfect fit to the data. The close correspondence between the actual .498 and the predicted .475 correlations provides a basis for inferring that the developmental sequence does indeed go from *D* to *P* to *A*. This test also enables us to infer that the direction of causation which was unresolved in the original study, goes from *P* to *A*. Moreover, the accuracy of the fit indicates that the developmental sequence accounts for the entire relationship between *D* and *A*. The lack of a direct relationship between *D* and *A* is, therefore, a modification of the model presented in the original study. Two points which have implications for empirical political theory can be derived from this new model.

Model III, by showing that constituency attitude and representative's attitude are not directly related on the civil rights dimension, has important consequences for the problem of linkage between mass attitudes and governmental policy-making in democratic societies. This analysis indicates that constituencies do not influence civil rights roll calls in the House of Representatives by selecting Congressmen whose attitudes mirror their own. Instead, Congressmen vote their constituencies' attitudes (as they perceive them) with a mind to the next election. Constituency influence is not provided by candidate recruitment but by elite cognitions.

Such cognitions, in this specialized population of political elites, do not operate as psychological theory would normally indicate. Rather than finding perceptions to be influenced by attitudes, this study shows that

TABLE 1. PREDICTION EQUATIONS AND DEGREES OF FIT FOR MODELS OF CONSTITUENCY INFLUENCE—FIRST HALF

Predictions		Degrees of Fit	
Models	Predicted	Actual	Difference
I. $rDA\ rDP = rAP$	(.498) (.738) = .368	.643	.275
II. $rDA\ rAP = rDP$	(.498) (.643) = .320	.738	.418
III. $rDP\ rPA = rDA$	(.738) (.643) = .475	.498	.023

TABLE 2. PREDICTION EQUATIONS AND DEGREES OF FIT FOR CONSTITUENCY INFLUENCE MODEL—SECOND HALF

Predictions		Degrees of Fit	
Models	Predicted	Actual	Difference
1. $rPA\ rAR = rPR$	$(.643)(.721) = .464$	.823	.359
2. $rPA\ rPR = rAR$	$(.643)(.823) = .529$	.721	.192

the reverse is true. In the area of civil rights especially, Congressmen are in a political situation in which significant rewards accrue to those who perceive their constituency's attitude correctly and vote on that basis. The deprivations are so severe that little room can be allowed for the Congressman's own attitudes to distort this perception. In fact, representatives are motivated to bring their own attitudes (or, at least, their public attitudes) into line with their perceptions of constituency attitude. In the case of Congressmen voting on civil rights the dynamics of the political situation strongly influence psychological processes.

The import of these theoretical statements is dramatized by the fact that both the Congressman's perceptions and his attitudes have direct effects on his roll call votes. Table 2, testing the second half of the constituency influence model (involving the interrelationships between A, P, and R), indicates that the causal arrows between A and R and P and R cannot be removed. In order for the constituency attitude to be translated into Congressional behavior, the Congressman must perceive his constituency's attitude and vote accordingly, or he must change his attitudes to meet his perception of his constituency's attitude and then vote according to his new attitude. Model III, then, is the new constituency influence model developed through an empirical test of the conceptually possible models presented in the Miller and Stokes study.

In the original analysis, the authors of the representation study concentrated upon both the Congressman's attitude and his perception of his constituency's attitude as interpretations of the link between his constituency's attitude and his roll call votes. The new paradigm presented in this analysis points out that only his perceptions can be thought of as providing this link, while his own attitudes are related to his constituency's attitudes through his perceptions. One question remains to be dealt with by this analysis: how well do the Congressman's perceptions interpret the link between constituency attitude and roll calls on civil rights?

The Congressman's perceptions were found to provide the major link between constituency and roll call in the original analysis. The present analysis clearly confirms this point. Miller and Stokes found that the three possible paths interpreting the root relationship explained nearly all of that relationship. Of these paths, that going from constituency attitude to perception to roll call by itself explained about two thirds of the relationship between constituency attitude and roll call.[14] Since the present analysis removes the weakest path, the two perceptual paths have to be reexamined as the sole possible interpreters of the constituency's influence on Congressional behavior. Table 3 shows the influence coefficients for these paths.

The influence coefficients for b, c, and d can be derived directly from the correlation coefficients involved, as illustrated in equations 1, 2, and 3. The influence coefficient for e can be derived from its correlation and from equations 2 and 3. Finally, the proportion of the root path (r^2DR) that each path explains can be calculated and added to give the proportion that they explain together.

Table 3 indicates that the paths from constituency attitude to representative's perception to roll call and from constituency to perception to representative's attitude to roll call account for an impressive 88% of the link

TABLE 3. EQUATIONS FOR INFLUENCE COEFFICIENTS FOR TWO PERCEPTUAL PATHS AS INTERPRETERS OF THE LINKAGE BETWEEN MASS ATTITUDES AND POLICY

1. $b = r^2DP = .5446$	
2. $c = r^2PA = .4134$	$be/r^2DR = .5978$
3. $d = r^2AR = .5198$	$bcd/r^2DR = .2778$
4. $e = r^2PR - cd = .4624$	———
5. $r^2DR = .4212$	Total $= .8756$

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[14] Miller and Stokes, "Constituency Influence in Congress," *op. cit*, p. 53.



FIG. 2. Intercorrelations of variables pertaining to civil rights—district majority.*

* Data provided by Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes to the authors.

between constituency attitude and roll call. The two paths go to this extent in solving the problem of linkage between mass attitudes and civil rights roll calls in Congress. The largest proportion of this linkage is provided by the path from constituency to perceptions to roll call. Nearly 60% of the relationship between constituency and roll call is explained by this path alone, while about 28% is explained by the path which contains the representative's attitudes. These proportions differ from the Miller-Stokes model because the direct link between constituency attitude and representative's attitude has been eliminated. Thus, these are the new weights assigned to the paths linking constituency and roll call after the model of constituency influence has been inferred by utilizing the Simon-Blalock technique.

III

Thus far, we have evaluated the alternative causal models derived from the constituency influence paradigm based on the attitudes of the whole district. In order to strengthen our confidence in the selected causal model, let us briefly evaluate the alternative causal models based on the attitudes, not of the whole district, but only of the majority within the district.

The three alternative causal models for the direction of causation between D, P, and A are evaluated in Table 4 in the same manner as before.[15] The very poor fit between the actual and predicted correlations for Models I and II indicate that they can still be rejected as the correct causal models. Once again, the fit between the data and the predictions from Model III provides a basis for inferring that this is indeed the correct causal model.

TABLE 5. EQUATIONS FOR INFLUENCE COEFFICIENTS FOR TWO PERCEPTUAL PATHS AS INTERPRETERS OF THE LINKAGE BETWEEN MASS ATTITUDES AND POLICY—DISTRICT MAJORITY

1. $b=r^2DP=.6162$	$be/r^2DR=.6161$
2. $c=r^2PA=.4134$	$bcd/r^2DR=.2863$
3. $d=r^2AR=.5198$	———
4. $e=r^2PR-cd=.4624$	Total $=.9024$
5. $r^2DR=.4624$	

In Table 5 variance-apportioning analysis of the two intervening paths from D to R also demonstrates that the relative weight between the two paths remains the same. The path from D to P to R still accounts for about twice as much of the variation as does D to P to A to R. One other encouraging aspect of the influence coefficients is the slight rise in the explanatory power of the two intervening paths.

IV

Substantively, on the civil rights dimension, several important findings emerge:

1. The lack of a direct link between Congressmen's attitudes and district attitudes indicates that elite recruitment is not the basis for constituency control.

2. Unlike the private citizen, the Congressman does not distort his perceptions to coin-

TABLE 4. PREDICTION EQUATIONS AND DEGREES OF FIT FOR MODELS OF CONSTITUENCY INFLUENCE—DISTRICT MAJORITY

Predictions		Degrees of Fit	
Models	Predicted	Actual	Difference
I. rDA $rDP=rAP$	(.469) (.785) = .368	.643	.275
II. rDA $rAP=rDP$	(.469) (.643) = .301	.785	.484
III. rDP $rPA=rDA$	(.785) (.642) = .505	.469	.036

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[15] It is not necessary to make prediction equations for the relationships between A, P, and R in the latter half of the model for their intercorrelations remain the same. Only the correlations between D and other variables are affected.

cide with his own attitudes. Because the costs of misperceiving are so high for an elected official, his perceptions are likely to cause him to modify his attitudes to fit his reasonably accurate perceptions.

3. The overwhelmingly important impact of Congressmen's perceptions in linking mass attitudes to policy-making, as indicated by Miller and Stokes, is reconfirmed.

4. The relative importance of the indirect impact of perception through congressional attitudes was underestimated in the original study.

5. Finally, the change in the independent variable from whole district to district majority attitudes reconfirms the inferred causal model and results in only a very slight increment in the explanatory power of the model.[16]

Methodologically, this study reconfirms the implication of the Miller and Stokes article that the use of sophisticated methodological tools is essential in the process of empirical theory building. In particular, it demonstrates the utility of the Simon-Blalock method of causal inference with nonexperimental data. It also highlights the rewards to be attained by the combination of techniques for causal inference and variance-apportioning in one study.

Finally, in regard to the subject of theory building in political science, the cumulative nature of empirical model building needs to be stressed. By explicit articulation of the model of constituency influence and emphasis on establishing empirical relationships, the Miller-Stokes study provides a basis for further development. The application of new techniques and the possible inclusion of new variables is thereby facilitated. This study has focused on the cumulative nature of this model by the adoption of the Simon-Blalock method to provide answers to undeveloped or unresolved questions stemming from the original model. The resolution of these questions also results in a more parsimonious causal model of constituency influence in Congress.

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[16] The degree to which these substantive findings (and many others) apply to other issue dimensions is the subject of Miller and Stokes' forthcoming book on representation. *Representation in the American Congress*, *op. cit.*

THE RELATION BETWEEN PUBLIC POLICY AND SOME STRUCTURAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL VARIABLES IN THE AMERICAN STATES*

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What is the relationship between certain major structural aspects of state governments and the content of policies adopted in the states? Do the socio-economic environments of the states relate significantly to political structures or the type of policies enacted?

The thesis advanced here is that differences in policy, at least in certain substantive areas, are more readily explained in terms of differences in the socio-economic environments of the states than by an examination of structural variables. It will also be maintained that, as policy is independent of structure, so structure is also largely independent of some major aspects of the environment. The specific structural variables to be examined are apportionment, party competitiveness, and divided party control between governors and their legislatures.

Six specific propositions will be examined:

Proposition 1. The more imbalance in a state's apportionment, the less likely the legislature is to pass "liberal" or welfare-oriented policies beneficial to urban groups.

Proposition 2. The more imbalance in a state's apportionment, the less financial aid large cities will receive directly from the state.

Proposition 3. The more imbalance in a state's apportionment, the less competitive will be its major parties.

  3a. the less competitive a state's two major parties, the less welfare-oriented will be the policies adopted by its legislature.

Proposition 4. The more imbalance in a state's apportionment, the more likely it is that control of the executive and legislative branches will be divided between parties.

  4a. The more frequently control of the legislature and executive are divided, the less likely a state will be to adopt welfare-oriented policies.

Proposition 5. The more industrialized a state, the more imbalance there will be in its apportionment system.

Proposition 6. The more industrialized a state, the higher will be its welfare-orientation.

The derivation of each of these propositions and the means used to test them will be discussed individually in the sections which follow.

I. APPORTIONMENT AND PUBLIC POLICY

The first two propositions suggest an inverse relationship between numerical equality of apportionment systems and the willingness of states to pass policies beneficial to urban groups and governmental units. Although this thesis is a common one,[1] it is increasingly under attack in reports of recent research.[2] Nevertheless, the propositions have sufficient acceptance to warrant their further investigation.

Apportionment and Welfare Orientation. The argument for Proposition 1 assumes that the claims and attitudes which inform the predominantly rural legislators and which define their conception of the public interest are substantially different from those of many urban groups. The need for an active role by the state demanded by urban-industrial groups is not recognized by malapportioned legislatures. And it is assumed that there are no alternative courses for the expression of urban influence

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* I am grateful to the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research for the use of their equipment and facilities while conducting this study.

[1] See, for example, William C. Havard and Loren P. Beth, *The Politics of Mis-Representation* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1962), p. 77; Charles W. Shull, "Political and Partisan Implications of State Legislative Apportionment," *Law and Contemporary Problems,* 17 (Spring, 1952), 417–439; Gordon E. Baker, *Rural versus Urban Political Power* (Garden City: Doubleday, 1955), p. 23; Malcolm Jewell, *The State Legislature: Politics and Practice* (New York: Random House, 1962), p. 24; William J. Keefe and Morris S. Ogul, *The American Legislative Process* (Englewood Cliffs; Prentice-Hall, 1964), p. 86; Duane Lockard, *New England State Politics* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1959), p. 275; Frank J. Sorauf, *Party and Representation* (New York: Atherton, 1962), pp. 22f.

[2] See, for example, Thomas R. Dye, "Malapportionment and Public Policy in the States," *Journal of Politics,* 27 (August, 1965), 586–601; Herbert Jacob, "The Consequences of Malapportionment: A Note of Caution," *Social Forces,* 43 (December, 1964), 256–261.

which might neutralize this obstacle, such as gubernatorial influence or direct legislation in one form or another.

In order to test this proposition, two measures or indices must be constructed: a measure of malapportionment and one of "liberalness" of policies. The latter is best achieved by a composite measure which accurately reflects the phenomenon or set of phenomena being studied and which allows for ordinal ranking of the states.

In a recent article in this REVIEW, Glendon Schubert and Charles Press carefully examine the various measures of malapportionment which have been used. Their objections and suggestions do not require restatement here.[3] Their proposal has also been examined and compared to available alternatives by Thomas R. Dye, in another recent publication.[4] It is enough here to note that, inasmuch as the Schubert-Press measure takes account of most of the major relevant variables, I have employed the apportionment ranking they propose.

For a measure of "liberalness" or what I will label "welfare orientation," guidance is taken from a study of inter-party competitiveness and welfare policies by Richard E. Dawson and James A. Robinson.[5] They employ a nine-policy test to measure a state's welfare orientation, including four revenue items and five expenditure items.[6] The specific policies were chosen largely on the basis of availability of data and interstate comparablity as well as to include policies both independent of federal programs and those encouraged by federal aid.

Dawson and Robinson utilize each item independently in their study of the impact of inter-party competitiveness on welfare orientation. However, for the sake of convenience, clarity of exposition, and reliability of the measures employed, I shall select from their list those items which demonstrate, by a high degree of covariation, a common policy orientation within the various states. These will then be combined into a single rank ordering. Where Dawson and Robinson select policies from a single year to test their propositions, I shall utilize ten-year means, calculated on the basis of biennial figures.[7]

Each particular policy yields a high average intercorrelation of ranks ($\bar{\rho}$ = around .90 in each case) from year to year, indicating that there is stability in the states' commitment to particular lines of policy. However, when the means for each item of expenditure and revenue were ranked and average inter-correlations of ranks calculated between items, only the five expenditure ranks correlated closely ($\bar{\rho}=.67$). This figure was the highest of any combination of five items on the scale. The assumption here is that anything less than five items would not be measuring a general policy orientation, but would be merely a reflection of particular issue-responses by the legislatures.

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[3] Glendon Schubert and Charles Press, "Measuring Malapportionment," this REVIEW, 58 (June, 1964), 302–327; see also "Communications," *ibid.*, pp. 966–970, for corrections to calculations in the original article. The measure they propose suffers somewhat from the shortcomings of any composite quantitative device, with the possible exception of unidimensional scale categories. For example, by combining house and senate scores, they derive a score which does not necessarily reflect any real situation but acts as an average and has all the potential pitfalls of an average. Also, it is unable to take account of the gerrymander (a point consciously noted by the authors). But, as a recent article by Thomas R. Dye indicates, when employed as an explanatory device, the Schubert-Press measure seems to be no less useful than other measures that have been proposed. (See Thomas R. Dye, *op. cit.*) And the disadvantages of the other measures, discussed by Schubert and Press as well as by Dye, would seem to tip the scales in favor of the Schubert-Press technique.

[4] Dye, *op. cit.*

[5] Richard E. Dawson and James A. Robinson, "Inter-party Competition, Economic Variables, and Welfare Policies in the American States," *Journal of Politics*, 25 (May, 1963), 265–289.

[6] The nine items are:

1. Per cent of revenue from death and gift taxes
2. Per cent of revenue from the federal government
3. Per capita amount of all revenue
4. State and local revenue according to personal income
5. Per pupil expenditure for elementary and secondary education
6. Per recipient monthly aid to the blind
7. Per family monthly aid to dependent children
8. Per recipient monthly old age assistance
9. Per recipient weekly unemployment compensation.

[7] Thus, I have 45 rankings for 48 states. Hawaii and Alaska are excluded as they have not been states throughout the period encompassed by the data. All of the data in the welfare-orientation index may be found in various volumes of the *Book of the States*, Council of State Governments, Chicago.

The final figure employed, therefore, to rank the states by welfare orientation is the sum of the individual ranks of mean expenditures for ten years on the following items: per-pupil expenditure for elementary and secondary education, per-recipient aid to the blind, per-family aid to dependent children, per-recipient old age assistance, and per-recipient weekly unemployment compensation. This ranking is the dependent variable related to the independent structural variable of Proposition 1, malapportionment. The results of this procedure are readily seen in Table I.

TABLE I. RANK ORDER CORRELATION BETWEEN APPORTIONMENT AND WELFARE ORIENTATION IN 48 STATES*

State	Apportionment Rank†	Welfare Orientation Rank‡
Alabama	44	47
Arizona	34	18
Arkansas	12	45
California	40	3
Colorado	21	11
Connecticut	37	2
Delaware	22	27
Florida	41	37
Georgia	48	38
Idaho	27	23
Illinois	23	10
Indiana	10	28
Iowa	42	16
Kansas	46	15
Kentucky	43	39
Louisiana	32	31
Maine	7	36
Maryland	36	29
Massachusetts	5	6
Michigan	28	13
Minnesota	47	8
Mississippi	30	48
Missouri	26	35
Montana	25	20
Nebraska	4	26
Nevada	38	12
New Hampshire	3	19
New Jersey	17	4
New Mexico	39	30
New York	11	1
North Carolina	19	44
North Dakota	35	17
Ohio	1	22
Oklahoma	45	25
Oregon	2	7
Pennsylvania	9	24
Rhode Island	31	14
South Carolina	20	46
South Dakota	14	33
Tennessee	8	43
Texas	33	32
Utah	6	21
Vermont	24	34
Virginia	29	41
Washington	15	42
West Virginia	13	40
Wisconsin	18	5
Wyoming	16	9

$\rho = .03$.

* Alaska and Hawaii excluded because they have not been states throughout the period covered by the data.

† See Schubert and Press, "Communications," *op. cit.*

‡ Based on mean per-recipient expenditure, 1952–1961, for aid to the blind, old age assistance, unemployment compensation, expenditure for elementary and secondary education, and aid to dependent children.

Even without the aid of sophisticated measures of covariation, it is clear from Table I that there is no obvious relationship between the numerical equality of a state's apportionment system and the legislative response to the type of proposals reflected in the welfare orientation measure. When $\rho = .03$, which is very nearly no relation at all, it does not provide any justification for accepting Proposition 1.[8]

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[8] The strength of this assertion would be substantially enhanced if it were possible to view the patterns of reapportionment and their impact upon policy developmentally within each state. This has been done in one state: see Gilbert Y. Steiner and Samuel R. Gove, *Legislative*

Apportionment and Aid to Large Cities. The data employed to calculate welfare orientation yield only crude outlines of the patterns of policy-making followed by the various states. It may be argued that gross figures on expenditure fail to reveal the manner in which funds are distributed within the states. Equally relevant, in other words, is the manner in which funds collected by state governments are distributed among the various governmental jurisdictions.

To test Proposition 2, which suggests a relationship between malapportionment and the amount of aid received by large cities from the states, a rank order correlation has been calculated between the apportionment rank and what may be called the "state aid index." The latter has been derived from the Census Bureau's *Compendium of City Government Finances* by calculating the percentage of "general revenue" in 1962 of each state's two largest cities which was supplied directly from the state government to these cities.[9]

The aim here has been to obtain a measure of state legislative receptiveness to the claims of the states' urban subdivisions. Given the wide variation in the pattern of state financial assistance to a host of intrastate political and functional entities, it is very difficult to obtain a measure that includes data from state to state on a truly comparable basis. For example, some states' welfare programs are largely or entirely administered by county governments, irrespective of the presence of a large city within the county. School aid is usually distributed on some basis of equalization, taking account of the ability of the school districts to support their own institutions. Also, peculiar historical factors sometimes affect the propensity of the state to monopolize revenue sources and thereby provide, via the legislature, seemingly larger amounts of aid to the cities.

The Census Bureau's definitions, however,

Politics in Illinois (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1960), p. 132. But it is difficult to make comparative statements due to the absence of any uniformity in the various reapportionment acts. I have examined one aspect of this by checking the rate of increase in spending for public welfare before and after reapportionment in every state which reapportioned between 1955 and 1962 (N = 22). No change could be detected; in fact, there was a slight drop in the mean rate of increase following reapportionment. The possibility of such investigation will be improved once the present stream of reapportionment suits is settled, assuming that the courts will be able to impose some standards of uniformity.

A conclusion similar to mine has been reached by Dye respecting the relationship between apportionment and policy. He employs a much larger number of policy variables individually and uses somewhat different statistical tests. He does not, however, employ an extended period of time to demonstrate policy orientations. This is probably a minor refinement, as my data show little overall change from year to year in the relative positions of the states on any of the items included in the welfare orientation index. See Dye, *op.cit.*, pp. 595 ff.

The findings on Proposition 1 and Dye's conclusions also relate to David R. Derge's study of roll-call voting in the Missouri and Illinois legislatures. Derge examines more than 19,000 roll call votes over a decade of legislative activity. He concludes that, at the voting stage in these two states, there is no evidence of urban-rural antagonism—that the urban legislators are able to obtain passage of their legislation whenever they can maintain internal unity. David R. Derge, "Metropolitan and Outstate Alignments in Illinois and Missouri Legislative Delegations," this REVIEW, 52 (December, 1958), p. 1065; see also a critique by Richard T. Frost, "On Derge's Metropolitan and Outstate Legislative Delegations," *ibid.*, 53 (September, 1959), 792–795, and Derge's reply, *ibid.*, 1097–1099. Derge's conclusions are supported in a survey of Ohio politics conducted by Thomas A. Flinn. One of Flinn's conclusions is that, "Urban-rural factionalism is unimportant in the Ohio General Assembly." "The Outline of Ohio Politics," *Western Political Quarterly*, 13 (September, 1960), 702–721.

[9] U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Compendium of City Government Finances in 1962* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963). This document lists only cities over 50,000 in population. In a few states, there is only one such city. In these cases, only the percentage of the one city's general revenue from the state was used to calculate the state aid index.

This particular source of city funds is listed in the *Compendium* under "General Revenue" and classified as "Intergovernmental Revenue, from state government only." The relevant definitions are:

General Revenue: "All city revenue except utility revenue, liquor stores revenue, and employees retirement or other insurance trust revenue. The basis for distinction is not the fund or administrative unit receiving particular amounts, but rather the nature of the revenue source concerned."

Intergovernmental Revenue: "Amounts received from other governments as fiscal aid or as reimbursement for performance of general governmental services for the paying government. Excludes any amounts received from other governments for sale of property, commodities, or utility services. All intergovernmental revenue is classified as general revenue."

would indicate that the measure here being employed comes about as close to a device having high interstate comparative value as anything else that could be achieved without a monumental research effort seeking a variety of other data directly from state and city officials. And I suspect that even such an effort would still leave considerable room for doubt as to the comparability of data from city to city and state to state.

Bearing in mind the possible shortcomings of the state-aid index, therefore, one still must come to the tentative conclusion that there is no significant relationship between apportionment, the structural variable, and the policy outcome. In this case, ρ is only .22.

The Impact of Southern States. With both Propositions 1 and 2, it might be contended that the presence of several southern states has distorted the outcome. It is widely recognized (and readily demonstrated by Table I) that the states south of the Mason-Dixon line are less disposed to pursue the type of welfare-oriented policies more characteristic of their northern counterparts. The eleven states of the old Confederacy have a mean rank of 41 on the welfare orientation scale. This may be attributed to a variety of factors. Chiefly, the exploitation of race as a major political concern, it might be contended, has set the politics of southern states apart from the rest of the country.[10] And, although not under the same sorts of pressures which conceivably lead to resistance to reapportionment elsewhere (particularly partisan pressures and rapid urbanization), these states may still pursue the same conservative policies of poorly apportioned, non-southern states but for different reasons. Thus, their presence in the foregoing calculations may cloud the relationship between welfare orientation or state aid and apportionment.

When these eleven states are removed from the calculations, however, the relationship is not strengthened. In fact, it is slightly weakened, as is demonstrated by a ρ of $-.005$ between welfare orientation and apportionment and $-.04$ between state aid to cities and apportionment in non-southern states.

II. APPORTIONMENT AND PARTY COMPETITION

The presumed direct effect upon public policy is but one class of results attributed to the lack of equity in the apportionment systems found in many states. This aspect of political structure is also presumed to affect—laterally, as it were—another variable which may be classified "structural" (if a little conceptual generosity is allowed), namely inter-party competition.

Malapportionment has been accused of being a major hindrance to responsible party government. It is maintained that this legislative inequity weakens the two-party system in a variety of ways. One most frequently suggested is that malapportionment denies legislative control to an occasionally successful aspirant for the governorship from a state's normal minority party. V. O. Key has stated, "By far the most important element producing [divided control] is the malapportionment of representation. . . ."[11]

A further obstacle to strong, responsible two-party competition is presumably created by malapportionment in that it encourages lassitude on the part of secure legislators, notably Republicans. Their personal success in retaining legislative positions makes them reluctant to approve programs that might encourage their parties' strength and growth, particularly in capturing and holding the governorship in highly industrial states.[12]

It may further be argued that, as party competition is weakened, the likelihood of governmental units responding to the needs of industrializing, urbanizing society is lessened. The problems of urban man are too complex for the governmental structures of an agrarian era. They require intelligent, resourceful leadership exercised through institutional channels which encourage rather than inhibit its development.

One would expect, from this reasoning, that any evidence of less than optimum operation of a responsible two-party system would be clearly reflected in the type of policies produced—or not produced, as maintained in Proposition 3a.

In order to test Propositions 3 and 3a, it is necessary to obtain a measure of inter-party competitiveness. There are a number of problems involved in this apparently simple concept. These have been reviewed by various writers and they have proposed several alternative methods. The technique to be employed here is one which I have proposed elsewhere.[13]

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[10] See V. O. Key, *Southern Politics* (New York; Alfred A. Knopf, 1949), Ch. 1.

[11] V. O. Key, *American State Politics: An Introduction* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956), p. 64; see also, Malcolm Jewell, *op. cit.*, p. 24; Keefe and Ogul, *op. cit.*, p. 92.

[12] See Jewell, *op. cit.*, p. 31.

[13] Richard I. Hofferbert, "Classification of American State Party Systems," *Journal of*

By utilizing contests for President, governor, and United States senator in each state and taking account of the percentage of the popular vote obtained by the majority party as well as the frequency of party turnover, a scale of inter-party competitiveness (IPC) has been obtained which ranks all the states but Alaska and Hawaii.

The results of a rank ordering of apportionment (again using the Schubert-Press schema) and competitiveness are seen in Table II.

TABLE II. RANK ORDER CORRELATION BETWEEN APPORTIONMENT AND INTER-PARTY COMPETITIVENESS IN 48 STATES

State	Apportionment Rank	IPC Rank
Alabama	44	45
Arizona	34	31
Arkansas	12	44
California	40	17
Colorado	21	4
Connecticut	37	6
Delaware	22	1
Florida	41	40
Georgia	48	47
Idaho	27	12
Illinois	23	5
Indiana	10	11
Iowa	42	14
Kansas	46	36
Kentucky	43	24
Louisiana	32	43
Maine	7	35
Maryland	36	13
Massachusetts	5	9
Michigan	28	10
Minnesota	47	16
Mississippi	30	48
Missouri	26	26
Montana	25	23
Nebraska	4	30
Nevada	38	25
New Hampshire	3	32
New Jersey	17	8
New Mexico	39	22
New York	11	15
North Carolina	19	42
North Dakota	35	29
Ohio	1	7
Oklahoma	45	34
Oregon	2	21
Pennsylvania	9	3
Rhode Island	31	33
South Carolina	20	46
South Dakota	14	28
Tennessee	8	37
Texas	33	38
Utah	6	20
Vermont	24	41
Virginia	29	39
Washington	15	19
West Virginia	13	27
Wisconsin	18	18
Wyoming	16	2

$\rho = .17$.

Again, the near absence of a relationship ($\rho = .17$) allows no basis for accepting the proposition.

Party Competition and Welfare Orientation. As for the minor proposition, 3a, assuming its continued relevance once the major proposition from which it derives has been challenged—this has been extensively examined by Dawson and Robinson using techniques similar to those being employed here.[14] A ρ of .67 between welfare orientation and inter-party competitiveness corroborates Dawson and Robinson's findings. However, they find that the relationship proves spurious when certain socio-economic variables are held constant. They conclude that *both* inter-party competitiveness and welfare orientation are likely to be products of particular basic social processes and characteristics, i.e., aspects of the political environment. The implications of this relationship will be explored further below.

Politics, 26 (August, 1964), 550–567; see also, Austin Ranney and Willmoore Kendall, "The American Party Systems," this REVIEW, 48 (June, 1954), 477–485; Joseph A. Schlesinger, "A Two-Dimensional Scheme for Classifying the States According to Degree of Inter-Party Competition," this REVIEW, 49 (December, 1955), 1120–1128.

[14] Dawson and Robinson, *op. cit.*, *passim*.

III. APPORTIONMENT AND DIVIDED CONTROL

The fourth proposition suggests a relationship between divided control and apportionment. Presumably a party whose strength stems from a distribution of population and resources no longer predominant in a given state can, by refusal to reapportion, maintain itself in the legislature despite popular acceptance of the opposition. This transferal of popular allegiance is manifested in the election of governors who face either one or both legislative houses containing a majority of their partisan opponents. It is on these grounds that the late V. O. Key was the most outspoken critic of the separation of powers at the state level.[15] The possibility and frequency of divided control is the main stimulus of his criticisms. And his argument credits malapportionment with causing the greatest number of partisan divisions between governors and their legislatures.

In order to test this proposition, each situation in which a governor confronted a newly constituted legislature was examined for the six bienniums included between 1952 and 1962. As all but three states elect at least some of their legislators every two years, by examining party control in these years, it is possible to calculate fairly accurately the total number of individual executive-legislative situations in all the states.

Table III divides these executive-legislative situations into those which saw a governor facing at least one house controlled by the opposition and those which saw both houses and the governorship controlled by the same party. As the table reveals, American governors, collectively, face at least one opposition controlled house about 35 per cent of the time.

In Table III, it is also seen, as with the previous propositions, that there is no particular relationship between the presumed dependent variable—divided control—and apportionment, the independent variable, the actual difference between the most and least equally apportioned groups being less than 2 per cent.

The Impact of Southern States. The question may be raised in this context, as it was regarding the presumed connection between welfare-orientation and apportionment, whether the presence of the southern states may not be suppressing an otherwise significant relationship. However, the fact that the non-southern states have no monopoly on malapportionment removes this as a relevant consideration. The percentages of divided control outside the eleven southern states are 41.7, 43.9, and 41.7 for the three apportionment groups shown in Table III (most to least equal apportionment, respectively). The larger figures for non-southern states compared to that for all states merely reflects the fact that division of control never occurred in the South during the period chosen for examination. But there is still no evident relationship between divided control and malapportionment.

TABLE III. APPORTIONMENT AND DIVIDED CONTROL IN 46 STATES,* 1952–1962

	Apportionment Rank		
	1–16 (Most nearly equal) $N=90$	17–31 $N=90$	32–48 (Most unequal) $N=96$
Unified Control	64.4%	66.7%	62.5%
Divided Control†	35.6	33.3	37.5
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

* Nebraska and Minnesota are eliminated due to the non-partisan election of their legislators. N, in each case, represents the total number of biennial legislatures. A total of 276 executive-legislative situations are, therefore, included in the calculations.

† The majority of the members of at least one legislative house are of the party opposite that of the governor.

Divided Control and Welfare Orientation. With respect to Proposition 4a, we are again in the anomalous position of considering a minor proposition which has been derived from a major proposition of dubious validity. However, although divided control cannot be related to malapportionment in any manner revealed by the data employed here, the impact on policy of party division between the branches of government is still interesting in its own right.

It is interesting precisely because the major concern here is not a particular variable, such as apportionment, but a mode of analysis. The separation of powers and the factors leading to party division between branches of government have come in for their own share of scorn on the basis of theoretical presuppositions which give high prominence to structure, including party, as a core determinant of the operation of democratic systems (or sub-systems, as we may be wont to classify the American states).

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[15] Key, *American State Politics*, Ch. 3.

Table IV, however, arranging welfare orientation against unity-division of control (in the same manner as Table III, but including only non-southern states), reveals no relationship between this type of policy and party control. This is demonstrated in more detail in Table V, which arrays each of the items in the welfare orientation measure against party control in the previous year, with respect to both the specific parties and the coincidence or differences of the partisan complexion of the legislatures and governors. Table V does bear out the frequently encountered contention that Democratic governors face opposition

TABLE IV. WELFARE ORIENTATION AND DIVIDED CONTROL IN 35 NON-SOUTHERN STATES, 1952–1962

	Welfare Orientation		
	High $N=66$	Medium $N=72$	Low $N=72$
Unified Control	56.1%	48.5%	68.1%
Divided Control	43.9	51.5	31.9
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

TABLE V. EXPENDITURE AND PARTY CONTROL: NON-SOUTHERN STATES, 1952–1962

Per Recipient Expenditure For Year Following Legislative Session	Democratic Governors $N=70$		Republican Governors $N=105$		All Governors $N=175$	
	At Least 1 House Rep.	Both Houses Dem.	At Least 1 House Dem.	Both Houses Rep.	Divided Control	Unified Control
Education:	%	%	%	%	%	%
High	25.7	7.1	14.3	21.9	18.9	16.0
Medium	20.0	15.8	11.4	21.9	14.9	19.4
Low	10.0	21.4	7.6	22.9	8.6	22.3
Total	55.7	44.3	33.3	66.7	42.4	57.7
ADC:						
High	20.0	8.6	8.6	33.3	13.1	23.4
Medium	21.4	12.8	10.5	19.1	14.9	16.6
Low	15.8	21.4	13.3	15.2	14.3	17.7
Total	57.2	42.8	34.7	65.6	42.8	57.2
Old Age Relief:						
High	21.4	11.4	7.1	26.6	12.0	21.2
Medium	22.9	7.1	10.5	23.8	15.4	17.1
Low	12.9	24.3	17.1	15.2	15.4	18.9
Total	57.2	42.8	34.7	65.6	42.8	57.2
Unemp. Comp.:						
High	28.6	7.1	12.4	20.0	18.9	14.9
Medium	17.1	12.9	13.3	26.7	14.9	21.1
Low	11.4	22.9	7.6	20.0	9.1	21.1
Total	57.1	42.9	33.3	66.7	42.9	57.1
Aid to Blind:						
High	20.0	12.9	6.7	23.8	12.0	19.5
Medium	22.8	7.1	14.3	21.0	17.7	15.4
Low	15.8	21.4	15.2	19.0	15.4	20.0
Total	58.6	41.4	36.2	63.8	45.1	54.8

controlled legislatures with greater frequency than their Republican counterparts.[16] However, the table fails to show a relationship either between unity of control and higher expenditure for individual citizens' benefit or between control by one party or the other and such policies. Those seeking state assistance, as reflected by the few policies examined here, may neither blame their misfortune on one or the other party nor upon any particular constellation of partisan control of the branches of government.

IV. INDUSTRIALIZATION AND APPORTIONMENT

Thus far, the limited evidence presented indicates there is no significant relationship between apportionment and public policy, apportionment and partisan competition, apportionment and divided control, divided control and public policy, or between the party in power and public policy. It may be, however, that, as studies by both Golembiewski[17] and by Dawson and Robinson indicate, there is some relationship between certain structural and environmental characteristics. These two studies find a strong relationship between inter-party competitiveness and such environmental factors as urbanism, per capita income, non-agricultural employment, and per cent white population. Although inter-party competitiveness is, admittedly, "structural" only by a very broad usage of the term, these studies might lead one to expect a covariance between similar environmental factors and a structural variable such as apportionment. This is the implication of Proposition 5.

Although several complex demographic factors are involved, one of the most commonly encountered explanations of the unequal conditions of apportionment in many states is that, as the states have industrialized, their populations have shifted to the urban areas. In the absence of a re-drawing of district lines, the relative population of districts not sharing in this increase, i.e., those in rural areas, declines, thereby leading to urban-rural imbalance.

Following the suggestions of Dawson and Robinson, an index of industrialization may be constructed. This index is based upon the items in Table VI, which also shows the rank order correlations of the individual components. The individual ranks of each state for mean per capita income (1952–1961), per cent urban, and per cent in non-agricultural employment were summed and the rank of these totals comprise the industrialization rank. That these items may justifiably be combined, from a statistical point of view, is demonstrated by a $\bar{\rho}$ of .79. Furthermore, they each measure a facet of the process commonly called "industrialization." Styles of life and occupational pursuits are reflected in the urbanization and employment figures. In addition, the expected fruits of industrialization (at least as conceived in western society) are measured by the income figures.

TABLE VI. INDEX OF INDUSTRIALIZATION: RANK ORDER CORRELATION (ρ) OF COMPONENTS

	Mean Per Capita Income (1952–1961)*	% Urban (1960)†	% Non-Agricultural Employment (1963)‡
Mean Per Capita Income (1952–1961)	×	.76	.87
% Urban 1960	.76	×	.74
% Non-Agricultural Employment (1963)	.87	.74	×

* U. S. Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Abstract of the United States*, (1953 to 1963 editions) Washington, D. C.

† U. S. Bureau of the Census, *U. S. Census of Population*, 1960, Vol. I.

‡ U. S. Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Abstract of the United States*, 1964, p. 224.

Apparently, apportionment systems and the willingness or reluctance of legislators to restructure their own electoral bases are largely idiosyncratic. Or, at least, they are independent of the type of environmental factors examined here, as is demonstrated by the fact that $\rho = .20$ between apportionment and industrialization.

V. INDUSTRIALIZATION AND WELFARE ORIENTATION

Proposition 6 posits a direct relationship between the level of economic development in a state and the proclivity of its policy-makers to enact welfare-oriented or "liberal" policies.

The reasoning behind this assertion might suggest that, as a state becomes industrialized, the life styles of its inhabitants no longer rest upon an agrarian, modified kinship basis stressing the values of individual self-sufficiency and the mutual obligations of members of small communities.[18] Rather, the complexities of existence, the massiveness of mutual needs, and the difficulties of communicating these needs through small, private organizations creates a set of claims which are reflected in governmental activity. Whereas in a less industrialized society there may be other systems (themselves only a remote part of the *political* environment) which meet the individual needs of the society's members, as the style of life of the members reaches a certain level of interdependence (reflected in industrialization) there are claims for action (and the mechanisms for the statement of these claims) which are reflected in what has here been labelled the "welfare orientation" of governmental organs.

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[16] See *ibid.*, p. 57.

[17] Robert T. Golembiewski, "A Taxonomic Approach to State Political Party Strength," *Western Political Quarterly*, 11 (September, 1958), 494–513.

Insofar as this line of reasoning is the basis for Proposition 6, it finds fairly strong support in the data, as $\rho = .70$ between industrialization and welfare orientation.

VI. CONCLUSION

The line of investigation suggested here seems to justify the recent concentration of scholarly efforts seeking to discover the impact of environmental factors on the shape and operation of state politics. Structural characteristics and, if one prefers to give partisan variables a separate berth, the nature of the party system and its operation do not seem to go very far toward explaining the kind of policies produced in the states.

Environment probably affects structure indirectly. And, in studies comparing national systems, such might be a fruitful avenue of inquiry. But in the American states, environmental forces do not seem to be differentiated enough to account for major differences in structure, with the possible exception of party competition. We might conclude that there is a nation-wide "structural tradition" in the United States, seen in the impact of pre-independence and British experience on the federal Constitution, and in turn inherited by the states.

We see by the data presented here and elsewhere, however, clear indication that there is a relationship between environment and policy. Remaining to be studied is the specific manner in which environmental forces are translated into policy. To investigate this will require a more intensive examination than has so far been conducted into political interest formulation (or evolution) and aggregation. It will also be necesssary to conduct careful studies of political communication and leadership processes.

In summary, the chief challenge for inquiry is to specify the factors which link environment and public policy in the American states.

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[18] An appreciation of this contrast may be gained from Arthur Vidich and Joseph Bensman's *Small Town in Mass Society* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1958). They describe in considerable detail the variations of life style contained within a small, rural community and the manner in which these modes of existence are affected by and respond to the changing external world. One of the striking implications, often not recognized by the authors themselves, is that politics are not relevant to many aspects of life in "Springdale"—aspects long ago made political by urban man.

CAUCUS AND COHESION IN CANADIAN PARLIAMENTARY PARTIES

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In a recent article[1] Leon D. Epstein sets out to analyze Canadian parliamentary parties, particularly the reasons for their cohesiveness, so as to better understand American parties. In some respects, this is an extension of his earlier study of British parliamentary parties.[2] An analysis of Canadian parties is particularly appropriate, he feels, because the Canadian party system has so often been described as an Anglo-American hybrid. As he succinctly points out:

> If a nation's size and diversity, social and structural federalism, or socio-economic class structure were to have anything to do with the achievement of cohesive legislative parties as is often argued, then the Canadian result should resemble the American. The fact that instead, Canadian legislative parties resemble the British in their crucial cohesion can only, in the present analysis, be attributed to the presence in Canada of a British parliamentary system.[3]

Professor Epstein argues that cohesion is maintained by Canadian Members of Parliament because: (1) they perceive it is to their personal advantage to act cohesively; (2) it is mutually advantageous to their parties and themselves; and (3) although not specifically stated, he strongly implies that the maintenance of their parties as viable, organized and effective groups requires such behavior on their part.

He also states that the transcending of intraparty policy differences may be facilitated by the party legislative caucus.

> The process by which it transcends may well include caucus compromise rather than crude leadership or majority imposition of a policy on dissenting M.P.'s.[4]

Implied here is the notion that if the party caucus does perform such a consensus-building function, then this may be yet another reason why Canadian parliamentary parties act cohesively. However, he is aware that the little evidence available suggests that in at least one of Canada's major parties legislative policies, rather than being the product of a caucus consensus, were imposed upon the member by the party leaders.[5] He also is aware that his observations concerning the legislators' motives for maintaining cohesion are based upon a review of an extensive body of largely impressionistic literature rather than upon empirical evidence and admits that it would be comforting to have a quantitative study confirming his assumptions.[6]

The purpose of this paper is to present some empirical evidence which largely supports Epstein's views regarding legislators' motives for maintaining cohesion. We shall also present data which suggest that the party caucus plays a limited role in facilitating cohesive action. These data were obtained from interviews carried out in 1962 with a stratified[7] random sample of 165 Canadian Members of Parliament.

To ascertain the legislators' motives for maintaining party cohesion, they were asked the following open-ended question:

> What are the advantages of going along with your party?

To help delineate the functions performed by party legislative caucuses[8] the respondents were asked:

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[1] Leon D. Epstein, "A Comparative study of Canadian Parties, this Review, 58 (March, 1964), 46–60. I am grateful to Professor Epstein for reading and commenting upon an earlier draft of this article. Although I have benefited greatly from his suggestions, I naturally absolve him of responsibility for any shortcoming herein.

[2] Leon D. Epstein, "Cohesion of British Parliamentary Parties," *ibid.*, 50 (June, 1956), 360–377.

[3] *Op. cit.*, p. 54.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 56.

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 52.

[6] *Idem*, and private communication from Leon D. Epstein.

[7] The legislative constituences were stratified in terms of region (i.e., Quebec, Ontario, and the residual area) and urban-rural characteristics. I am indebted to Philip E. Converse of the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan for his assistance in selecting the sample.

[8] Normally, each party caucuses once a week, generally on a Tuesday, Wednesday, or Thursday morning. The length of the agenda and the importance of the topics to be discussed determine the duration of the meeting. Usually, a caucus lasts approximately one and one half hours.

> In general, what do you discuss in caucus?

FINDINGS

The responses to the first question provide striking support for Epstein's assumptions regarding the legislators' motives for maintaining party cohesion. They reveal it is possible to array the respondents along an underlying dimension ranging from those who said without qualification there are no advantages and presumably did not maintain cohesion (11%) to those who were motivated by a desire to maintain the viability of the Canadian parliamentary system (14%). There were three intermediary positions: legislators who maintained cohesion for reasons of self-interest (13%); those who felt supporting their party is advantageous both to the party and themselves (14%); and those legislators who were solely party-oriented, that is, they maintained party unity so that the party could remain viable and/or attain its goals (48%).

Typical responses from legislators along this continuum were:

> None that I can see. In fact, it can be a positive disadvantage.

> I haven't been here long enough to see any advantages yet.

> If one has political ambitions, then there certainly are advantages.

> Unless you want to be a permanent backbencher, you support your party. You don't want to risk your personal future by becoming known as a malcontent and disturber of the peace.

> You're actually helping yourself when you go along with your party. You want to buttress the position of the party because basically you agree with the party's policies or you wouldn't be in it in the first place.

> The advantage is that we maintain our tenure in office. We keep on being the Government. You see, it's different from your [American] system.

> In our party it isn't a question of there being any personal advantages. You do it for the sake of the party. In the Government, it's a question of keeping themselves in power.

> It's imperative if the party is to be successful that you have complete party solidarity.

> It's a matter of efficiency and survival. It's like fighting a war, you can't function as a party in this system without being united.

> Because it strengthens the image of the party in the eyes of the public. I believe in what the Liberal party stands for. I wouldn't have joined or stayed in the party if I didn't believe in it.

> It comes down to the whole system of party government in Canada. There are none of the personal advantages your question implies. The system being a party system simply does not tolerate M.P.s who disagree publicly with their party.

The responses to the second question suggest that although the caucus may facilitate cohesive party action by enabling the members to attain a consensus on party policies, it performs other functions as well.

Again, there was an underlying continuum ranging from those who suggested that the caucus performs no real function (3%) to those who a perceived it as a mechanism for achieving united action on party programs and organization (20%).

There were two intermediary positions: a large group (64%) who saw the caucus as an opportunity to devise *ad hoc* strategies for impending House business (i.e., who speaks on what bill, when and for how long); and those who viewed the caucus as a mechanism for facilitating a catharsis of legislators' grievances by providing a forum for their expression (13%).[9]

When these interviews were taken, the minority Conservative Government was in danger of being overthrown. Consequently, there were sometimes two or even three caucuses during a week in which crucial votes were scheduled. Probably the most frequent use of the caucus was made by the Social Credit party, whose support on a number of occasions enabled the Conservative Government to survive.

[9] To help ensure that we were actually delineating caucus functions with the question on caucus discussions, respondents also were asked later: "What do you think are the two or three most important functions a caucus performs?" Unfortunately, we have been unable to use these data. First, we were able to code only a single function because well over half of the respondents did not articulate more than one. More important, virtually all the legislators structured their responses in terms of "caucus ought" rather than "does." It is interesting to note, however, that there were substantial similarities in their responses to this and the first question. For example, 11% of the M.P.s said a caucus ought to serve as a clearinghouse for information (i.e., when reports of committees could be read

Responses typical of legislators were:

> We don't *discuss* anything. We sit and are told.
>
> Our current strategy, our position on the current flow of affairs. We have an opportunity to discuss current legislation and plan accordingly.
>
> Legislation that is pending and how we will vote on it. Generally, we decide on strategy on forthcoming legislation.
>
> We decide what our stand will be on pending legislation—which of us will speak on what bills and in what order they will speak.
>
> Gripes! It's a gripe session, an opportunity to air our complaints, to get off our chest anything that's bothering us.
>
> It's a free and open discussion of anything on our minds that's troubling us, any complaints a person has regarding the conduct of the party and other members.
>
> Long range major party policies. We try to hammer out some consensus on future party programs and organization.
>
> Generally party policies. We try to get agreement on the direction of party policies and program. Sometimes, matters pertaining to the good and welfare of the party.

Although there were no specific references in the legislators' responses linking the two factors together, it seems reasonable to assume that in providing an opportunity for the venting of grievances and the release of built-up tensions, the caucus makes it easier for the members to achieve a consensus on policy issues and to take united action on these issues. It is felt, therefore, that the proportion of "cathartic" responses can be legitimately grouped with the "consensus" responses.

It might also be argued that in the very process of devising *ad hoc* strategy and tactics, the caucus facilitates cohesion in that party members are more likely to support policies and actions which in a sense are their own creations. However, certain accounts of how the Liberal party caucus was used by party leaders suggest that the task of planning strategy and tactics is more administrative than creative. According to J. W. Pickersgill, Prime Minister Mackenzie King used the caucus to explain "the whys and wherefores of Government action and suggested lines on which the Government could be supported most effectively."[10]

Political scientist John Meisel is of the opinion that Liberal party programs and policies were the product of close collaboration between party legislative leaders and trusted senior civil service advisors during their "salad days" in office (1935–1957):

> There seems to have been a tendency for the Liberal party, so long in power, to leave much of the formulating of policy to the leaders who could utilize the skill and knowledge of the civil service. Much of what had, in the years immediately before the election, been called Liberal policies or the Liberal programme was actually the product of intimate co-operation of leading civil servants and their ministers.[11]

That the policies of the Liberal and the other left-of-center party, the New Democrats,[12] may have been a product of something

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and other interesting or useful information exchanged). The largest single group (37%) said the caucus ought to enable the members to plan strategy and devise tactics for impending debate. A third group (27%) said the caucus ought to enable the members to air their grievances and complaints (cathartic), while the remainder (25%) said the caucus should permit participants to hammer out a consensus on party program. In other words, 52% of the respondents felt the caucus *ought* to perform what we will term consensus-building functions, while 33% indicated in their responses to the first question that the caucus *does* do this.

[10] J. W. Pickersgill, *The Mackenzie King Record* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1960), p. 9, quoted in Epstein, *op. cit.*, p. 52. Mr. Pickersgill was for years secretary to the Cabinet and the man sometimes considered closest to both King and his successor as Prime Minister, Mr. Louis St. Laurent. He later stood for Parliament and joined the Cabinet as Minister of Citizenship and Immigration. He fell within the sample for this study and provided us with a fascinating interview which lasted almost three hours.

[11] John Meisel, "The Formulation of Liberal and Conservative Programmes in the 1957 Canadian General Election," *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*, 26 (Nov., 1960), p. 565. Apparently the Liberal leaders were particularly swayed by their economic advisors. Meisel says they appeared "mesmerized by the cult of the Gross National Product," *ibid.*, p. 571. For another discussion of the relationship between Liberal party leaders and their administrative advisors in the formulation of party policies, see J. E. Hodgetts, "The Liberal and the Bureaucrat," *Queen's Quarterly*, 62, 176–83.

[12] At the time these interviews were taken the four parties in the Canadian House of Commons

TABLE 1. PERCEPTIONS OF CAUCUS BY PARTY AFFILIATION

Perceptions of Caucus	Right-Wing Parties	Left-Wing Parties
Nothing discussed	2%	3%
Strategy	52	79
Catharsis	19	5
Consensus	27	13
Total	100% (N=89)	100% (N=76)

TABLE 2. PERCEPTIONS OF CAUCUS BY POSITION ON FRENCH-CANADIAN CULTURAL INDEX

Perceptions of Caucus	Position A	Position B	Position C	Position D
Cathartic-Consensus	43%	41%	30%	13%
Others	57	59	70	87
Total	100% (N=42)	100% (N=44)	100% (N=35)	100% (N=44)
		Gamma.=43.		

other than a consensus arrived at in caucus is indicated by our data. (See Table 1.)

If we group the "catharsis" and "consensus" proportions together, we find that there is a correlation of .58 (Gamma)[13] between perceptions of the caucus and left-right party affiliation. In other words, the functions apparently performed by the caucus varied quite strongly with party affiliation. The legislators' perceptions of such functions also varied with two other variables, the regions they represented and their position on what we have termed a "French Canadian Cultural Index." The latter encapsulates those characteristics which distinguish English and English-oriented Canadians from their French countrymen and which presumably help explain the generic differences in their attitudes and behavior.[14] The data show that legislators who had few French Canadian characteristics were more prone to see the caucus as performing a cathartic-consensus function (see Table 2).

Since almost all of the legislators in positions A and B represented constituencies outside the province of Quebec, the relationship between regionalism and the perception of caucus functions (see Table 3) in part probably was

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fell quite naturally along the traditional left-right political continuum. The New Democrats, the party of the left, had a House membership of 19 and the Liberals, the part of the left-center, had elected 100 members. The right-center Progressive Conservatives numbered 119 and formed the minority Government for this Parliament while the right-wing Social Credit party had 30 members. For purposes of analysis, we have grouped the Liberals (N-63) and the New Democrats (N-13) together under "Left-Wing Parties" and the Conservatives (N-66) and Social Creditors (N-23) together under "Right-Wing Parties."

[13] This is a statistic proposed by Leo A. Goodman and William H. Kruskal in "Measure of Association for Cross Classifications," *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 44 (Dec., 1954). The magnitude of the correlations are somewhat greater than equivalent and more frequently used Tau Betas. However, unlike the latter statistic, they are not limited by a "square table" requirement (i.e., that tables be 2×2 and 3×3, etc.).

[14] Good examples of the literature which deal with these latter differences are Pierre Elliot Trudeau, "Some Obstacles to Democracy in Quebec," *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*, 24 (1955), 297–314; and Arthur Maheux, "Democracy and the French Canadian," in Grant Douglas (ed.), *Quebec Today* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1958), pp. 341–362. For purposes of analysis we combined the following variables in our index: ethnicity; religion; born Quebec; parochial education; educated in Quebec; and frequent (at least once a week) church attender. A legislator's position on the index was determined by coding him "2" for each "French" characteristic he possessed (i.e., Catholic, parochial education, etc.) and "0" if he did not possess a trait. In the few instances where the information had not been ascertained, the respondent was coded "1," on the assumption that it was equally probable he did or did not possess a particular characteristic. Then his responses were summed and cutting points arbitrarily established in the scores. Since excessively high variance together with low correlations to other items was not a factor for any of the variables, no special weighting system was employed. Thus, legislators were arrayed along a continuum ranging from those who possessed none of these characteristics (Position "A") to those who possessed them all (Position "D"). Those legislators in the "B" category had virtually none of the characteristics while those in "C" had virtually all.

TABLE 3. PERCEPTIONS OF CAUCUS BY REGIONAL BACKGROUND

	Residual[a]	Ontario	Quebec
Cathartic-Consensus	43%	36%	14%
Others	57	64	86
Total	100% ($N=63$)	100% ($N=50$)	100% ($N=52$)

[a] The residual regions include the eight provinces outside of Quebec and Ontario. Of Canada's 5,123,151 French-Canadians, 81.2% live in Quebec. A further 6.8%, by far the largest single group, reside in Ontario with the remaining 12% distributed among eight other provinces. (Source: 1961 *Census of Canada*, Vol. I, part 3, *Population*.)

spurious, reflecting the strong correlation (Gamma = .77) between the legislators' regional and cultural backgrounds.[15]

At any rate, when first the cultural and then the regional backgrounds of the respondents were controlled, the direction of party differences remained the same. There were consistently high correlations between the legislators' perceptions of caucus functions and their left or right party affiliations, regardless of position on the French Canadian Cultural Index or the region in which their constituencies were situated (see Table 4).

To what can we attribute these variations between left and right wing legislators?

It is suggested that the perception of the left-wingers (the majority of whom were Liberals) may well be related to the aforementioned accounts of how the Liberal party leaders use the caucus.[16] If these accounts are accurate and the caucus is largely used to decide how "ready-made" policies can best be implemented, then it is not surprising that such a small proportion of the left-wing M.P.s structured their responses in consensual terms. On the other hand, the fact that 46% of the right-wingers did perceive their caucus performing a cathartic-consensus function in part may be a function of the Canadian right's frequent intraparty conflicts.

The tendency of the Conservative party to devour their party leaders in this century is a well established fact. At the time these interviews were taken there were persistent rumors that a substantial proportion of Mr. Diefenbaker's followers, including a number of his Cabinet Ministers, were ready to "dump" him. Although these rumors were consistently denied, eventually three of his Ministers resigned, presumably over the issue of Canadian acquisition of nuclear warheads. Shortly after, Mr. Diefenbaker's Government was defeated in a House vote and resigned. The party was still deeply divided over Mr. Diefenbaker's leadership during the 26th Parliament, as witness the recurring demands made by ex-Transport Minister Leon Balcer and others that Mr. Diefenbaker give up the leadership of the party. Despite these cries, Mr. Diefenbaker was able to thwart a determined effort to strip him of his position at the national party convention in 1964.

TABLE 4. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PERCEPTIONS OF CAUCUS AND LEFT-RIGHT PARTY AFFILIATION WITH LEGISLATORS' CULTURAL AND REGIONAL BACKGROUNDS CONTROLLED

For	Relation between Caucus and Party	For	Relation between Caucus and Party
Position A Legislators	1.00	Residual Legislators	.76
Position B Legislators	.76	Ontario Legislators	.47
Position C Legislators	.60	Quebec Legislators	.68
Position D Legislators	.50		

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[15] There was also a correlation of .22 between the dependent variable and metropolitan-non-metropolitan constituency differences as well as a correlation of .20 between length of parliamentary experience and perceptions of caucus. However, these correlations undoubtedly reflect the fact that the parties of the right and left were disproportionately distributed in terms of these two variables. For example, fully 60% of the right-wingers had between 1–6 years of parliamentary experience while only 19% of the left-wingers enjoyed equivalent tenure. In addition, 40% of the left-wing legislators represented constituencies situated wholly within metropolitan regions while only 10% of the right-wing legislators represented such constituencies.

[16] *Supra*, pp. 85–86.

Similarly, the Social Credit party was rocked periodically by public statements made by the deputy-leader, Mr. Réal Caouette—statements which were diametrically opposed to the official party line laid down by party leader Robert Thompson. Eventually this struggle culminated in 1963 during the 26th parliament, with Mr. Caouette and eleven other Members of Parliament from Quebec leaving the parent organization and establishing a new *Ralliement des Creditistes* party. Immediately before that session convened, six Social Credit M.P.s presented a signed statement to the Governor-General promising to support a minority Liberal Government. After a series of caucuses the six withdrew their statement. Not long after this, two other Social Credit M.P.s announced they were leaving their party and joining the Conservative party.

Since intra-party conflicts have been salient for the right-wing parties, it may well be that the caucus is one of the means used to settle intraparty differences. On the other hand, the left-wingers, untroubled by such cleavages, may not have to make use of the caucus in this way and are thus left relatively free to use it for plotting strategy and tactics.

To recapitulate, in the legislature we studied, the respondents said that, first, the caucus is most often put to "tactical" uses. Second, it also serves as a forum for venting individual grievances and dissipating tensions. Third, it provides an opportunity for the members to reach agreement on party programs and policies. It seems likely that the latter two functions, and perhaps even the first, facilitated party cohesion both in this and in other Parliaments as well. However, the data suggest that the extent to which a caucus can contribute to cohesive party action is affected by the differing party uses of it.

Since the legislators' perceptions of the functions performed by the caucus varied strongly with their left-right party affiliation, it is particularly interesting to note that a similarly strong relationship did not exist (Gamma = .07) between this variable and their expressed motives for maintaining party cohesion. Nor were these motives strongly related, as will be shown, to other variables. It is to this problem that we now direct our attention.

Epstein has argued (correctly, we believe) that the reason the Canadian parliamentary parties are cohesive like the British, despite the fact that they operate in a social system which is far more similar to the American, is that legislators in the Canadian system are not only encouraged but compelled to support their parties because over and above any benefits that may accrue from the possible attainment of executive office, they realize their own political fortunes are inextricably linked with those of the party. Unlike their counterparts in Congress, then, Canadian Members of Parliament are continuously and powerfully motivated to support their parties. Also implied but not specifically stated by Epstein is the proposition that the maintenance of their parties as viable and effective organized groups requires cohesive party action. The data certainly support this implication in that the largest group of M.P.s (48%) structured their response in these terms. A further 14% indicated that they were motivated by system considerations. It is in the responses of these two groups that we find what might be termed a "generic" difference between members of the British-model Canadian legislative parties and the American—a difference which best explains why the Canadian parties are more cohesive. This is not to deny the Canadian legislator feels more keenly than does his congressional counterpart that personal interest requires cohesive action on his part. What we do suggest is that if our cohesion question had been put to a sample of American Congressmen, there would have been a far smaller proportion who would have felt that the effectiveness and continued viability of their party and even the system itself required them to maintain party cohesion.[17] There are two reasons why this should be the case.

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[17] Although, to the best of our knowledge, there are no empirical data which delineate Congressional responses to such a cohesion question, a number of studies strongly support our assumption, albeit indirectly. For example, in *U.S. Senators and Their World*, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1960), Donald R. Matthews demonstrated the importance of constituency, interest groups and other Senators upon Senatorial attitudes and behavior. Lewis Froman's study, *Congressmen and Their Constituencies* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963) illustrated the importance of selected constituency characteristics upon Congressional voting behavior. An important multivariate analysis of the relationship between Congressional voting and independent variables such as region and constituency was made by Duncan MacRae, *The Dimensions of Congressional Voting* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1958). Perhaps the most sophisticated attempt to illustrate the relative salience of party, constituency, individual predispositions and administrative cues

First, the content of Canadian politics (and here we part company temporarily with Epstein)[18] has been somewhat more ideological and the party struggles consistently more acrimonious[19] than has been the case in the United States. Even before the arrival of the two "extremist" minor parties in the thirties, party lines between Liberals and Conservatives were consistently and sharply drawn over such issues as tariff rates, relations with Great Britain and the United States, welfare statism, the scope of governmental activity and French Canada. In general, the Liberals have tended to be for lower tariffs, close relations with the United States, in favor of welfare issues but at the same time the defenders of provincial autonomy. The party has continually advocated a "partnership of the races" while the Conservatives have usually taken the opposite positions. Since the formation of the C.C.F. (now the New Democratic Party) the Liberals have been particularly active in introducing and extending welfare measures such as unemployment insurance, family allowances and so forth. In fact, the remark frequently attributed to former Liberal Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent that "they (the New Democrats) are nothing but Liberals in a hurry" would seem to indicate that there are few meaningful ideological differences between the two left-wing parties. The Social Credit party, on the other hand, apart from paying ever-decreasing lip-service to their "funny-money" financial panaceas, are basically a conservative, strongly individualistic, free-enterprise party.

Certain data we have tend to support these opinions. For example, 84% of our respondents replied "yes" to the question: "Do you think there are *fundamental* differences among Canadian parties?" When asked to articulate these differences, some proceeded to cite "stylistic" differences (i.e., Social Credit nihilism, Conservative hypocrisy, Liberal arrogance, New Democratic dogmatism). However, 65% of the references to the Social Credit party, 60% to the Conservative, 45% to the Liberal, and 75% of the citations referring to the New Democrats did describe the parties in many of the same terms mentioned above.

The respondents were also asked specific policy questions which were intended to delineate their ideological positions on these issues. Included were questions which tapped attitudes toward the use of Federal public works programs to combat unemployment, a national hospital and medical care program financed by the Federal government, and more extensive use generally of Federal money and power to help solve national problems like unemployment. Their responses have been encapsulated in what we have termed a "Welfare State Index." There were three positions on the index: strongly favor; moderately favor; and strongly oppose. When these attitudes were cross-tabulated with left-right party affiliations, there was a strong correlation (Gamma = .84) between the two variables. As one would expect, the largest proportion of the left-wing and the smallest group of right-wing M.P.s were in the "Strongly Favor" position of this index.

An attempt was also made to determine which of seven independent variables was the best predictor of the legislators' positions on the index by the use of a computer program titled *The Multiple Classification Analysis.*[20] The program enables the user to assess the net effect of each of a number of predictor variables (with the others controlled) on the dependent phenomenon after an adjustment for interaction effects. Analysis indicated that a left or right party affiliation was by far the best predictor (Beta = .53) of attitudes toward "Welfare Statism."

Thus it can be maintained that Canadian Members of Parliament in part are loathe to publicly vote against their party on a given issue because of deep seated party loyalties stemming from an attachment to the party's programs—regardless of where these programs

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upon congressional attitudes and behavior was the research carried out by Warren Miller and Donald Stokes and reported in "Constituency Influence in Congress," this REVIEW, 57 (1963), 45–57.

[18] For his views, see *op. cit.*, p. 56. In a recent article, Howard Scarrow lists the arguments usually given by those who feel Canadian parties and politics are more programmatic and ideological than American and those who do not. See Scarrow, "Distinguishing Between Political Parties—The Case of Canada," *Midwest Journal of Poltiical Science*, 9 (Feb., 1965), 61–76.

[19] See, for example, the Hansard reports on the debates over the pensions legislation, the new flag, or the alleged immorality of the Liberal Cabinet in the 26th Parliament.

[20] Also known as the *Lippit Iterative Program.* For a description of the program, see Donald E. Pelz and Frank Andrews, *The S.R.C. Computer Program for Multivariate Analysis: Some Uses and Limitations* (Ann Arbor: Survey Research Center, 1961).

originate. Certainly the responses of many of the party-oriented legislators suggest that partisan feelings and the attainment of party policy goals (even if transitory) are important considerations in acting cohesively. Also attesting to the attraction of party policies are data which suggest the legislators generally tend to identify their own policy preferences with those of their party. Respondents were asked: "Would you say that the way an M.P. votes is:

(1) Always a true indication of his own policy feelings on an issue?
(2) Almost always a true indication?
(3) Seldom an indicator?

Although only 11% said their votes *always* indicated their own policy preferences, fully 84% said they *almost* always were an indication, with only 4% claiming they seldom indicated their true feelings.

A second reason why such a large proportion of Canadian M.P.'s are party- and system-oriented stems, as Epstein has indicated, from the presence of a deeply rooted British-model parliamentary system. It is commonly assumed that an institution, once established, develops its own support mechanisms within a society. These often take the form of certain norms and values which are held up as virtues and are transmitted to succeeding generations by the process of socialization. In a society with a British-type parliamentary system, undoubtedly such norms include the belief that legislative actors ought to act "responsibly" and in unison with their parties because the continued effectiveness and viability of the system require it.

Since the position of national legislator in Canada is a highly visible one, the way an incumbent ought to behave is generally well known. Thus, long before he actually takes his seat in the House, the Canadian Member of Parliament is both cognizant of and has internalized certain beliefs about how he will act—to the extent that these beliefs largely constitute his expectations for the role of legislator.

In contrast, an American Congressman expects and knows others also expect that he will *not* be just a party hack,[21] that he will act independently, or else in the interest of his constituency when such a course of action is required. That these norms are part of the folklore of American politics requires no elucidation.

At first blush, it may seem that we have shifted ground somewhat and are now arguing that a social rather than political variable largely explains the cohesiveness of Canadian parties. This is not our intention. Our point, both obvious and unoriginal,[22] is that a political institution, in this case British-model parliamentary government, does not stand in splendid isolation from the social system of which it is a part. Consequently, we cannot explain an integral part of the former without reference to the latter.

Indicative of how widely and relatively

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[21] Ralph K. Huitt's study, "The Morse Committee Assignment Controversy: A Study on Senate Norms," this REVIEW, 51, (1957), 313–330 affords an excellent illustration of how difficult it has been to curb the "maverick" tendencies in American Congressmen and how infrequently sanctions have been invoked by the parties to punish deviant behavior. Lewis Froman, in "The Importance of Individuality in Voting in Congress," *Journal of Politics*, 35 (1963), 324–32, argues that we must be cognizant of the importance of individual predispositions if we are to understand Congressional voting behavior. Another report by Huitt, "Democratic Party Leadership in the Senate," this REVIEW, 55 (1961), 333–45, as well as Lewis Froman and Randall Ripley's "Conditions for Party Leadership: The Case of the House Democrats," *ibid.*, 59 (1965), 52–63 also illustrate the difficulties entailed in obtaining cohesive action from a Congressional party. Further, a basic criticism of American parties made by responsible-party theorists such as E. E. Schattschneider and James M. Burns is that American Congressional parties do not really behave like parties—at least on the British model.

[22] Epstein quotes the late H. McD. Clokie, an expert on Canadian politics, who in an insightful essay, "The Machinery of Government," contended that the unity of Canadian parties was expected by the public as the *very condition* of party government of the Cabinet variety. See Epstein, *op. cit.*, p. 52. That this particular group of legislators may have been aware of constituency expectations is suggested by the fact that 59% of them said most of the time they knew how rank-and-file constituents felt about the major issues coming before parliament. An additional 24% said they were sometimes aware, while only 17% said they were seldom aware of constituency opinions. Furthermore, 42% said they visited and talked with their constituents every week; 44% said they communicated with their constituency once a month and only 14% said they did not visit their constituency at least once a month.

evenly diffused were the attitudes toward party and system was the aforementioned lack of any strong relationship between motives for maintaining cohesion and left-right party affiliations (see Table 5).

TABLE 5. MOTIVATIONS FOR MAINTAINING PARTY COHESION BY PARTY AFFILIATION

Motivations for Maintaining Party-Cohesion	Right-Wing Legislators	Left-Wing Legislators
No Cohesion	11%	10%
Personal Interest	12	14
Mutual Interest	14	15
Party Oriented	47	50
System Oriented	16	11
Total	100% (*N*=89)	100% (*N*=76)

If we combine the party and system-oriented responses, the correlation with party affiliation is even smaller (i.e., Gamma=.05). Again, unlike their perceptions of caucus functions, variations in motives for maintaining cohesion were also weakly related to the respondents positions on the French-Canadian cultural index (see Table 6). In fact, the dependent variable was weakly correlated[23] with all but one independent variable—regional background (see Table 7). As was the case with perceptions of the functions performed by caucus, legislators representing Quebec constituencies differed somewhat from their colleagues. Primarily, this was due to the fact that only 6% of the Quebec representatives were motivated by system considerations as compared to 14% of the Ontario group and 19% of the residual regions legislators. As previously mentioned, however, when cross-tabulated with other independent variables, there were few appreciable differences in the proportions of party- and system-oriented legislators.[24]

TABLE 6. MOTIVATIONS FOR MAINTAINING PARTY COHESION BY POSITION ON FRENCH-CANADIAN CULTURAL INDEX

Motivations for Maintaining Party Cohesion	Position A	Position B	Position C	Position D
Maintaining party and system	57%	75%	56%	54%
Others	43	25	44	46
Total	100% (*N*=42)	100% (*N*=44)	100% (*N*=35)	100% (*N*=44)

Gamma =.09.

TABLE 7. MOTIVATIONS FOR MAINTAINING PARTY COHESION BY REGIONAL BACKGROUND

Motivations for Maintaining Party Cohesion	Residual	Ontario	Quebec
Maintaining Party and system	67%	64%	52%
Others	33	36	48
Total	100% (*N*=63)	100% (*N*=50)	100% (*N*=52)

Gamma=.22.

SUMMARY

Data have been presented which largely support Leon Epstein's thesis that the presence of a British Parliamentary system is of crucial importance in making Canadian parliamentary parties more cohesive than American Congressional parties. The cohesion exists despite the fact that in most important aspects Canadian society is similar to American rather than British. As Epstein specifically predicted, we found that a substantial proportion (27%) of the Canadian Members of Parliament interviewed in 1962 maintain party unity because it is in their interest to do so. Again, as Epstein strongly implied, an additional 48% are motivated to act cohesively because the maintenance of their parties as effective and viable groups requires it. A further 14% structured their responses in terms of the requirements of the continued viability of the parliamentary system while only 11% contended or implied that they did *not* maintain party unity.

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[23] For example, there was a correlation of .04 between such motives and length of parliamentary experience; one of .09 between motives and legislators' perception of political competition in their constituencies; a correlation of .11 with variations in respondents' educational backgrounds; and one of .15 with metropolitan-nonmetropolitan constituency differences.

[24] For the strongest relationship other than regional background, 43% of the legislators representing metropolitan constituencies were party- and 13% system-oriented. The equivalent proportions for those representing nonmetropolitan constituencies were 49% and 15% respectively.

There was also some empirical support for Epstein's assumption that the party caucuses may help facilitate party cohesion by enabling the members to transcend their internal differences—what we have termed the consensus-building function of the caucus. The data show that perceptions of the functions performed by their caucus varied strongly with the respondents' left-right party affiliation and to a lesser extent with certain aspects of their cultural and regional backgrounds.

The finding that the majority of the respondents were motivated to maintain cohesion because they felt the continued effectiveness of their parties and the parliamentary system itself required such behavior (together with the fact that the legislators' motives did not vary strongly with their party affiliation or other independent variables) probably best explains why Canadian legislative parties are more cohesive than their American counterparts.

The party and system orientations of the legislators were attributed to the more programmatic and ideological content of Canadian party politics. It was also suggested the British model parliamentary system is so deeply rooted in the Canadian social system that it is maintained in part by social norms which prescribe how actors in the system will behave.

SOCIAL SCIENCE DATA ARCHIVES: A REVIEW OF DEVELOPMENTS*

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This paper describes the rationale, progress, and prospects of a growing movement within the social sciences: the establishment of repositories of social science data. Social science data archives have developed in recent years because of the increasing need of many social scientists to have access to the growing body of quantitative data (1, 9, 11, 15) produced by research organizations all over the world.

The word "archive" and such phrases as "data bank" or "data repository" have come to be applied to organizations developed to serve such demands, probably because they were naively viewed in the beginning simply as warehouses of information that should be preserved. However, data archives in the modern mode are viable only because computers provide ultimately inexpensive and powerful means for processing, storing, maintaining, and analyzing large amounts of data. It is reasonably well known, in turn, that computers are technically intricate mechanisms requiring special human skills to exploit them effectively, and to maintain currency with the rapid changes that have characterized their use. Inasmuch as they depend on computers, data archives necessarily must become complex organizations, with staffs that include specialists in computer operations, programming, and data processing techniques, as well as administrators and professional research personnel.

TECHNICAL PROBLEMS ARCHIVES ATTEMPT TO SOLVE

The computer-based archive of social science data is such a new organizational phenomenon in the academic world that some general comments about the problems archives attempt to solve are warranted. First, it is important to recognize that each data collection added to an archive typically was designed in the first place for the specific use of a particular analyst or research group. A study involving the collection of data is hardly ever carried out so that the data and ancillary documentation are left in the form necessary for subsequent widespread dissemination to other scholars who would put the data to other uses. For example, many data have been and continue to be prepared for analysis using so-called unit record equipment (sorters, reproducers, tabulating machines, etc.) rather than computers. Consequently, it is necessary for the archive staff to re-format and recode data in such a way that computer processing and analysis is possible, and also, more economical, efficient, and easy than other means (6).

Second, once a number of data collections or data sets are brought together in an archive, there inevitably come demands to organize the data so that one may combine individual data sets for concerted use. For example, an archive may have information on the attitudes, behavior, and social or economic characteristics of Congressmen and their constituents from several sets of survey data. The archive may also include environmental data, election statistics, and economic and demographic characteristics for political units, such as congressional districts and counties. For a particular analysis, a research scholar may need to combine the survey data on constituents and Congressmen with roll call voting information, census data and other information from federal agencies, and county and district election statistics. The data required may originally have come from five or more different sources.

The integration, for analysis purposes, of such a data base, consisting of many individual data sets, has important implications for the processing of data and documentation for inclusion in an archive. For instance, standard codes are needed for identification information so that various data sets can be linked or merged, and standard codes are also needed for similar variables in order that combinations of data sets or comparisons between information files can be easily made.

Third, data and documentation come to an archive in varying degrees of "cleanness." Archive staffs ordinarily check information they acquire to determine whether data, codebooks, and ancillary information agree. The

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* The author is deeply indebted to the many persons, some of whom are named in the text, who supplied information regarding their archival activities.

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reason is simple self-protection: to prepare in advance, and one time only, answers to questions that users inevitably raise about discrepancies. When an archive staff has access to original source records, it may examine data for codes not described in codebooks and inconsistencies and illogical relationships among variables. Errors in the data and codebooks are then corrected before the information is released to users. Again, the reason is self-protection: to eliminate the need for certain kinds of user inquiries.

Fourth, the users of an archive may differ widely in the computer and data processing resources available to them, in their training in the use of quantitative data and data processing facilities, and in their analysis requirements. Some users have the use of only unit record equipment. Some have access to appropriate data processing equipment and computers, but the data processing and computer installations are not properly staffed or are insensitive to the needs of social scientists. Many users will need only a specified subset of variables from a single data set, while others will require that selected variables from several data sets be combined in a special format for a single analysis. Some researchers can take advantage of the data base provided by an archive only if the archive itself can provide analysis output, such as frequency tables, correlation matrices, regression equations, and factor scores. In each case there are implications for the staff specialization an archive may need to maintain. Specialists in mathematics, programming, statistics, and social research methodology may be required to handle the diverse demands for services.

Fifth, archives may have unique capabilities to collect and convert to a machine-readable form certain kinds of data, particularly published aggregative information such as election statistics and census data, not easily assembled by the individual scholar. This is most likely to be the case if an archive has a large clientele of potential users so that capitalization costs can be justified. In addition, the extent of the other parts of the data base may have already required the kinds of staff and computer facilities necessary to manage and service such collections. If so, only a relatively small, incremental addition to the staff and equipment facilities may be needed to support the acquisition of large amounts of other kinds of data.

Sixth, there are the mundane, but large, problems of data maintenance: insuring that data and documentation are kept in a complete and current form. Data in machine-readable form are highly perishable—cards can be lost or destroyed; tapes can be damaged by high temperatures, improper humidity conditions, exposure to certain electro-magnetic phenomena, and frequent use; cards can warp, and tapes can be stretched or broken during those infrequent times when machines malfunction; disks have unique vulnerabilities. Consequently, specialists are required simply to maintain data in an accurate and usable form: time and resources must be devoted to providing "back-up" reserves of data, and otherwise insuring against irretrievable losses of information.

Over time, a data base is also subject to dynamic change as errors are discovered or more accurate sources of basic information are located or defined. For example, a particular frequency table may generate questions about a data set: a search of original sources, such as interview protocols, may reveal errors in coding or keypunching. Another example: a more accurate and valid set of election statistics for a particular state and time may turn up in some obscure place in a state's archives. In such cases, a data archive will ordinarily want to update its files to include the best source of information.

The size of modern archives creates still more problems. Until recently, archives were small enough that traditional methods of information retrieval appeared adequate. Currently, a number of archives are approaching dimensions such that traditional methods are no longer adequate. The information retrieval problem is accentuated by the increasing complexity of data sets themselves, and by the increasing complexity of research needs. Before a scholar can exploit a given archive, he must know in great detail what data are available. The servicing facilities of the archive can be brought into play only if the researcher can match his needs against the store of data.

These problems lead to the use of computers to automate the documentation of data bases, and to provide for complex retrievals of information from large and complex data bases. Some experimental retrieval systems are under development, but there is no computerized system in operation today which meets the varied needs of the new social science archives. The result is that archives must train and employ specialists who can keep up with developments in the field of information retrieval, who can undertake the design and development of information retrieval systems, experiment with promising systems, and eventually maintain operational systems and keep the systems current as the data base expands.

FUNCTIONS OF DATA ARCHIVES

The above commentary can be reorganized as a functional description of data archives.

The initial function of a social science data archive is *information acquisition*. This includes locating relevant data and ancillary information, and arranging for their acquisition, duplication, and subsequent diffusion.

A second function is *processing information* in preparation for distribution and analysis—the creation of the data base. The information processing phase includes eliminating multiple punches and performing other transformations that facilitate computer analyses, conversion of data to standard coding schemes that permit easy comparisons and concerted analyses, and locating and correcting errors in both data and documentation.

A third important activity is *information maintenance*, insuring that data are current and accurate, and providing "back-up" copies of machine-readable data and documentation in order to prevent irreparable losses of information.

An archive must remain sensitive to the wide range of *services* required by its users. Services include preparing duplicates of and subsets from data sets on demand, supplying analysis output from computers, and providing consultation in mathematics, statistics, methodology, programming, and social research.

The above functions imply *development activities for computers*. Computer programs are needed to process data into an archive, to provide services requested by users, and to maintain data and documentation. Development activities include the design and programming of systems to handle a complex of related data processing and analysis functions in an integrated way, and to provide information retrieval capabilities.

As archives become larger and more complex, they must provide *training programs and research seminars* so that potential users can develop needed skills and the data base can be fully exploited (19).

In summary, archives are complex social organizations with specialists in statistics and mathematics, computer technology and programming, data processing, systems analysis, information retrieval, social science research and methodology, language translation, teaching, and administration. The required complex of specialists must be adequately housed, and provided with access to modern and appropriate data processing and computer facilities. Each archive must provide efficient and effective capabilities and procedures for communication with individual users and with other archives. The staff of each must keep reasonably current with developments in a number of specialized areas.

GENERAL PURPOSE SERVICE ARCHIVES

It would be useful if this section could include certain data base development activities which may ultimately lead to the establishment of archives in the formal sense, and which, in some ways, confront the many problems formal archives face. However, space limitations prevent the inclusion of comprehensive information about research organizations such as the National Opinion Research Center of the University of Chicago, and the Bureau of Applied Social Research of Columbia University. Such organizations maintain large data bases, are primary suppliers of data to archives, and supply, at cost, duplicates of data they have collected, but which are not included in the data bases of archives. They may become archives or establish data repositories as ancillary operations, and are playing important roles in archive development activities. However, they are not now archives in the formal sense.

Only passing mention can be made of the large social science data base development activities of regional and metropolitan study groups. Supported by the Bureau of Public Roads and the Housing and Home Finance Agency of the United States federal government, by grants from private foundations, and by national, state, and local governments around the world, these research groups systematically collect attitudinal, behavioral, demographic, ecological, and other kinds of data for studies of land use and transportation problems. Panel and time series analyses are becoming common, and considerable attention is being given to the development of complex models of socioeconomic phenomena. Such studies are being undertaken for most of the major cities and metropolitan areas in the United States and many abroad, and should become, in the near future, important sources of both data and new analysis methods for social scientists in general, and for students of state and local government in particular.

It is important to note that archives of information that is not intended to be put into machine-readable form in the near future, and repositories of machine-readable information developed solely for the use of an individual scholar or a specific research project or group, are not discussed in this paper. Space limitations prevent the inclusion of information on archival developments which may be of interest to social scientists in fields such as medicine and education.

Our attention can now be turned to operating individual social science data repositories. It is convenient to have two classifications of archives: 1) general purpose service archives, those whose data are routinely available to the academic community as a whole, and 2) local service archives, those which acquire data and provide services only for a geographically limited group of users.

The Roper Public Opinion Research Center, Williams College, Williamstown, Massachusetts

The Roper Public Opinion Research Center (16, 17) is the oldest and largest general purpose social science archive of machine-readable data in the United States, and, perhaps, in the world. It was first organized and began acquiring and storing machine-readable data and supporting documentation in 1946. In 1957 it formally became a general purpose archive to serve universities, industry, governments, other organizations, and individual scholars. In 1964, the International Survey Library Association, an institutional membership organization, was established by the Center to encourage the development of specialized archives of survey data at educational and other non-profit organizations, and to provide training programs for the staffs of member organizations and other interested persons.

Organizationally, the Roper Center has an Excutive Director, Dr. Philip K. Hastings, Williams College; a Board of Directors, whose twenty-one members represent business, government, non-profit research organizations, and university and commercial survey organizations; a six-member Professional Advisory Council; regional representatives who maintain contact with data suppliers around the world; and a staff of specialists in language translation, user and data services, data processing, and administration.

Although the Roper Center restricts its holdings to survey and poll data, there are no content proscriptions. The Center desires to have in its files as much of the survey and poll data collected by commercial, academic, and governmental organizations throughout the world as possible.

Presently, Roper Center holdings include the equivalent of more than eight million IBM cards of information: raw data from over four thousand studies from twenty-two American suppliers and seventy-one other organizations located in forty-one countries abroad.

Access to the materials located at the Center is granted to accredited scholars, and to other individuals or research organizations who seek to use the data in the public interest. Scholars have access to the data in a variety of ways: they can go to Williamstown and directly use the facilities and data of the Center; they can borrow duplicate sets of punched card decks and data documentation for a period of time, the length of which is tailored to needs of the individual scholar; or they can ask the Center staff to provide frequency tables, marginal distributions, and similar analysis output. Charges for these services are made on a cost basis to Associates in the Center's International Survey Library Association program, and on a cost-plus-overhead basis to all others.

The International Survey Library Association, mentioned above, especially provides for groups needing continuing access to data from the Roper Center. For $1,000 the first year, and $500 each succeeding year, a member organization receives an index to data holdings and other descriptive materials. The index is updated on an annual basis. Each member is permitted to have on his home premises, and permanently, data for which suppliers have placed no restrictions or for which they have made special exceptions for members.

The Roper Center maintains on its own premises a complete array of unit record equipment for card handling and tabulations. It has access to the computing facilities of the nearby Sprague Electric Company, and is currently using this equipment to move to magnetic tape as the primary storage and processing medium.

The Roper Center has a cooperative arrangement with the Center for International Studies at M.I.T. The need to use information from more than one Roper Center study at the same time has led the M.I.T. group to recode and reprocess much Roper Center data for use in concerted analyses. The International Studies Center is making the recoded and reformatted data available to the Roper Center for diffusion to its users. A principal benefit is that data reprocessed by the M.I.T. Center are more amenable to computer analysis than is the original information.

The cooperative arrangement with M.I.T. also involves computer program development activities. Techniques and computer routines developed by the M.I.T. Center are made available to the Roper Center staff for in-house use and for rediffusion to users of the Roper Center.

The Roper Center is supported by grants from data suppliers, interested business organizations, and the National Science Foundation; by fees charged to users and to members of the International Survey Library Association; and by direct and indirect support from Williams College.

A schedule of charges for services and other additional information are available upon request to the Executive Director. The archive publishes a newsletter which is free to members of the International Library Association; a subscription fee of $3.50 per year is charged to non-members.

International Data Library and Reference Service, Survey Research Center, University of California, Berkeley, California

Established in 1958 in collaboration with the Institute for International Studies, the International Data Library and Reference Service (21, 22) was initially designed as a campus facility to serve the needs of local scholars.

In 1961, a social science data archive was formally established including in its data base the many studies executed or acquired by the Survey Research Center, Berkeley, and scholars and other organizations on campus.

Until 1963, the archive had no specific substantive focus, and oriented its activities toward maintaining data and providing data services for Berkeley scholars. During 1963, Seymour M. Lipset, Director of the Institute of International Studies, and Charles Y. Glock, Director of the Berkeley Survey Research Center, planned a joint program emphasizing comparative studies, particularly in the developing countries. In the same year, the Berkeley Survey Research Center received a grant from the National Science Foundation to support an archive to capitalize in such a way that it can serve the data needs of scholars, both in universities and other organizations in the United States and abroad.

Consequently, the International Data Library and Reference Service is now a general purpose service archive emphasizing a rapidly growing subset of its total holdings: sample survey and poll data from developing countries, particularly those in Latin America and Asia.

Presently, the archive includes well over one hundred different studies from the developing countries, including about ten from Africa, fifteen from Latin America, and about twenty from Japan. Data have also been acquired from India, Pakistan, Turkey, Thailand, Malaysia, and the Philippines.

Until late in 1964, the archive focused its activities almost exclusively on data acquisition. This was necessary in order to survey and evaluate the problems and prospects for obtaining data from developing countries; for locating sources of data; for contacting and establishing relations with sources of data; and for making the legal and other arrangements necessary before data and supporting documentation could be transported to Berkeley for processing and permanent storage.

During the latter part of 1964, the facility was far enough along in data acquisition to devote increasing attention to problems of conversion of storage media, data formats, and supporting documentation into a form useable with the data processing facilities available to American scholars, and for widespread distribution to users around the world. Presently, over seventy studies have been processed for more universal and more powerful analyses.

The staff of the International Data Library and Reference Service includes specialists in data acquisition, data reformatting and conversion for modern analyses, translation, and administration. The staff relies on the Data Processing Services Facility of the Survey Research Center for data processing equipment (including an IBM 1620 with tape and disk input/output capabilities) and specialists in computer programming, data processing, and data storage and maintenance.

The Data Processing Services Facility expects to acquire an IBM 360, model 40, with disk and tape input/output equipment during the first quarter of 1967. The data processing demands of the International Data Library have played a significant role in the selection of the new computer equipment.

In addition to increasing emphasis on processing data for widespread use with modern data processing equipment, the Berkeley archive is planning extensions of the archive beyond survey data and data presently available. Specifically, the archive staff desires to eventually include ecological and demographic data in its holdings. A study is now under way which should indicate the possibilities for adding information about closed societies, such as Communist China, to the data base.

The staff and facilities of the International Data Service and Reference Library are supported by recovering the direct costs of services rendered from users, by a grant from the National Science Foundation, and by indirect support from the University of California.

A schedule of fees to users, and a list of studies in the archive can be obtained upon request to the Data Librarian, International Data Service and Reference Library.

The Inter-University Consortium for Political Research (ICPR), Institute for Social Research, The University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan

Formally organized in 1962, the Inter-University Consortium for Political Research (11, 20) is a partnership between the Survey Research Center of the Institute for Social Research and almost sixty universities and non-profit research organizations in Canada, Great Britain, Europe, and the United States. It facilitates political research through seminars and training programs held each summer at the University of Michigan, research conferences, a publication program, and by making available to members the specialists in sampling, coding, interviewing, data processing and data analysis of the Survey Research Center and the Institute for Social Research for consultation, data collection, and a variety of services. Member institutions pay $2,500 per year in order to make these services available to their faculties and students

The archival functions of the Consortium are developing in the form of an integrated collection of aggregative, survey, and other data needed for the study of political phenomena. The archive has thus far been restricted to data relevant to the study of political phenomena—however, it includes all social science information which political scientists, political sociologists, and historians deem relevant for the study of political matters. Consequently, the archive includes data that can be used by a variety of social scientists for analyses only indirectly related to problems of political research.

An initial emphasis on survey research in the United States resulted in the acquisition of all of the major political surveys of the past twenty-five years. These include Stouffer's study of *Communism, Conformity, and Civil Liberties*, the Almond-Verba five-nation collection which supported *The Civic Culture*, the Columbia Bureau of Applied Social Research surveys which produced the *People's Choice* and *Voting*, several studies from the National Opinion Research Center, and almost all of the political surveys conducted by the Political Behavior Program of the Survey Research Center, the University of Michigan.

This initial emphasis on major survey research in the United States is now being complemented by a developing collection, in substantial historical depth, of election statistics, census data, and legislative records, and by the acquisition of major foreign and cross-national sample surveys. Specifically, the Consortium has collected the basic data, and is now putting into machine-readable form, for both major and minor parties, election statistics, by county, for the offices of Governor, Senator, Congressman, and President from 1824 to the present; and United States Bureau of the Census information from 1820 to the present. It is presently collecting, and putting into computer-useable form, congressional roll call voting data from the Continental Congress to the present.

Members are now conducting feasibility and cost studies important to decisions about adding to the archive information about all persons who have served in the United States Congress, election statistics for political units below the county unit, and selected state referenda votes by county.

Data services include anything from the simple reproduction of card and tape files of complete studies, to the preparation of special analysis or work decks or tapes tailored to the analysis needs of particular researchers, and on to providing precentaged tables and multivariate analyses of data maintained by the archive. Presently, despite rapidly increasing use of the facility, services cost nothing to persons affiliated with member organizations: the Consortium intends to maintain this policy as long as financially possible.

The ICPR uses the data processing and computer facilities of both the University of Michigan Computing Center and the Institute for Social Research. The University Computing Center currently provides an IBM 7090 computer, and expects to put into operation an IBM 360, model 67, computer emphasizing time sharing and interactive computing during the last quarter of 1966. The Institute for Social Research maintains, on-premises, a tape-oriented IBM 1401 computer and the usual array of unit record equipment. Primarily because of the heavy data processing needs of the Consortium, the Institute intends to move to an IBM 360, model 40, computer configuration during the first quarter of 1967.

The organization of the Consortium includes official representatives from each member organization, a Council, an Executive Director, a supporting administrative staff, a teaching staff, and a Technical Services group. The Official Representative is responsible for communications between the executive staff and the individual user; meeting yearly, the body of Official Representatives establishes the general policies of the ICPR. The Council, consisting of a Chairman and four other members, is responsible for the details of policy, and acts on behalf of the Committee of Official Representatives between annual meetings of the latter. The Technical Services group is responsible for the processing of data into the archive, establishing standards for the preparation and coding of data, converting data and codebooks into computer useable formats, providing services to individuals affiliated with member organizations and institutions, and for computer programming and system development activities.

In the area of development activities, the Consortium is intensively experimenting with information retrieval systems, concepts, and procedures (5), and seeking support for a joint information retrieval system development effort with the International Data Service and Reference Library. Also, the ICPR staff is participating in the design and development of a data management, documentation, and analysis system entitled SPAN/360. SPAN/360, created by Dr. Vladimir Almendinger, System Development Corporation, Santa Monica, California, includes the majority of advanced capabilities needed by the ICPR archive. The project, now seeking support, is a joint effort between the System Development Corporation and the Institute for Social Research. Finally, supported by a grant from the National Science Foundation, the staff is conducting research and experiments to solve some of the many problems missing data pose for computer analysis.

The Consortium is financed by organizational membership fees ($2,500 per year), direct charges to non-member users, grants from the National Science Foundation, and direct and indirect support from the University of Michigan and the Institute for Social Research.

Additional information about organization and purposes, data holdings, and services are available upon request to the Executive Director.

The Louis Harris Political Data Center, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, North Carolina

Formally established in 1965, the Louis Harris Political Data Center is, at this writing, the newest general purpose service archive. The bulk of data in the repository will come from the survey work of Mr. Harris. Presently, a Technical Director has been appointed, and plans for the routine operation of the Center are being developed.

Further information about the Data Center is available upon request to Professor James Prothro, Department of Political Science, University of North Carolina.

Bureau of Labor Statistics, United States Department of Labor, Washington, D. C.

As do a number of government agencies, the Bureau maintains a large, machine-readable data base, consisting of numerous files of information in historical depth.

However, the Bureau has taken a unique path which makes much of its data computer retrievable and analyzable by a large, diverse base of users. Designed and programmed by the Data Systems Research and Development staff of the Bureau, and recently made operational, the Manpower Information System (18) is a user-oriented computer software system (for IBM 7070/74 equipment) that allows users to retrieve, process, and produce well-labeled analysis output by a simple and easy-to-learn control language which frees them from concern about the strictly technical operations of computers. Output includes tables, correlations, regression analysis, and other statistics.

The aggregated data from three major statistical programs of the Bureau have been reformatted and otherwise prepared for processing by the Manpower Information System:

1. National Industry Statistics compiled monthly from information supplied by 140,000 establishments, and including approximately 4,000 series. The bulk of the data cover the post-World War II period, but information goes back to 1909. A comprehensive description of this data appears in the monthly pamphlet, "Employment and Statistics," beginning on page 6-E.
2. State and Area Industry Statistics. These are compiled from the same 140,000 reports used in the national program and the same data definitions apply. About 17,000 series, the majority of which begin after World War II but some of which go back to 1939, are now stored in the Manpower Information System format.
3. Labor Force Statistics compiled from 35,000 monthly household interviews. Currently, summary data from 1962 to the present are in the system format, and data for the period 1948–1961 are being processed for inclusion. Characteristics measured are described in "Employment and Earnings," beginning on page 2-E.

Persons desiring special output which does not appear in Bureau publications will find the Manpower Information System has greatly reduced both technical problems of access to data now in the System, and the costs of services provided.

Additional information about the Manpower Information System, other Bureau data which may be included in the system, the costs of services to users, and statistical publications of the Bureau are available upon request to the Commissioner.

Bureau of the Census, United States Department of Commerce, Washington, D. C.

Because of the size of its data base and special needs to protect the confidentiality of its respondents, Census can make only a small portion of its data available to the social science community. The Bureau will prepare special tabulations, but the costs of processing multimillion record files is usually beyond even generous social science research budgets.

Recognizing that its data are needed by the social science research community, the Census has taken two significant steps to better meet demands. First, it is actively seeking statements of social science needs, in order that its data gathering and statistical publication program will be more sensitive to social science requirements. Second, it is preparing on magnetic tape samples of very large files, and aggregated data at the level of counties and cities and making these available for direct processing and analysis by social scientists.

Additional information about ways the Bureau is meeting social science data needs, about the content of its data base, and about machine-readable data sets purchasable by social scientists are available upon request to the Director.

Zentralarchiv für Empirische Sozialforschung, University of Cologne, Cologne, West Germany

Founded in 1960, the *Zentralarchiv* (24) has a general purpose collection of survey data, mainly from organizations in the Federal Republic of Germany. Presently, the data from over eighty different studies, primarily in the areas of consumer economics, political science, and sociology, have been processed into the archive. More than fifty commercial and academic research institutes are cooperating by supplying data, descriptive materials, and other information.

In addition to the data and supporting documentary materials, the archive preserves press releases and published and unpublished reports based on survey research. There is also a library specializing in the methodology of survey research.

Initially, the archive deliberately restricted its holdings in order to develop its instruments and procedures. The archive continues to focus attention on problems of information storage and retrieval, and, in collaboration with Dr. Philip J. Stone, Harvard University, has been developing and implementing an automated retrieval system based on the concepts, strategies, and operations of the General Inquirer System for automated content analysis (25).

The organization includes an Executive Director; a supporting administrative staff; and specialists in data processing and computer programming, statistics and mathematics, and survey research methodology and analysis. Financial support comes from the University of Cologne and the Volkswagen Foundation. Additional information about data holdings, services to users, and development activities are available upon request to the Executive Director, Professor Erwin K. Scheuch.

Steinmetz Stichting, University of Amsterdam

A long period of planning and coordinating activities among a group of Dutch social scientists culminated during 1964 in the formal organization of the *Steinmetz Stichting* (14), named in honor of the first sociologist in the Netherlands, Professor S. R. Steinmetz.

The planning period was accelerated during the early months of 1964, when the Social Science Council of the Royal Netherlands Academy of Sciences sponsored a conference of social scientists from universities, governmental agencies, and private organizations to evaluate progress and extend plans for the development of the archive.

The goals of the *Steinmetz Stichting* are to collect data, supporting documentation, and research reports on social research executed in the Netherlands; to process and organize the information so that it is readily accessible to scholars around the world; and to provide education programs and specialized assistance in the use of the data. The Amsterdam archive intends to acquire only those studies meeting minimal criteria of methodological soundness and reliability, and for which suppliers have placed no difficult restrictions regarding diffusion to responsible scholars.

Presently, the processing of data into the archive is moving slowly as storage, retrieval, and user servicing capabilities are being developed. Although the *Steinmetz Stichting* staff has access to a variety of computing equipment made available by the University of Amsterdam, much of this equipment is severely restricted in input/output facilities, and thus is inappropriate to the needs of an archive. Consequently, the archive is making arrangements to use other equipment available in the Netherlands. Also, University officials are aware of the need for specialized equipment for the Steinmetz Foundation, and steps are being taken so that the archive can have on-premises access to the kinds of computing equipment it needs.

Independent of planning activities of the Steinmetz Foundation, the persons establishing the archive early agreed there should be an international journal in which the results of studies by polling agencies and survey research organizations could be published in organized and comparative ways. The journal was conceived as a continuation, in periodical form, of the Cantril and Strunk volume, *Public Opinion, 1935–1946*. With encouragement from the World Association for Public Opinion Research, the journal *Polls* (8) is now being published as an integral and important activity of the *Steinmetz Stichting*.

The Amsterdam archive considers education a primary and continuing function and responsibility of data archives. An important part of the education program is a European Seminar on the use of social science data to be held during the summer of 1966. This will be the second of a series sponsored by the European community: the first was held at the University of Cologne during the summer of 1964, and used the staff and facilities of the *Zentralarchiv*.

Organizationally, the Steinmetz Foundation has a Board of Directors; a Management Committee; an Executive Director; a supporting administrative staff; and specialists in the preparation and publication of *Polls*, and in the acquisition, translation, processing, and servicing activities of the archive.

Major support for the *Steinmetz Stichting* is provided by the University of Amsterdam: the organization is housed, staffed, and provided necessary equipment by the University. Other sources of long term general support are being explored.

Data, documentation, and translation services are provided users at cost. A list of studies already processed into the archive and a schedule of fees are provided upon request to the Executive Director, Professor Marten Brouwer.

DATUM, 532 Bad Godesberg, Annaberger Strasse 148, West Germany

DATUM (12), founded in 1964, is a non-profit regional science information center, and will serve the research needs of agencies within all levels of government, and academic and non-profit research organizations and individual scholars in Germany and abroad. The acronym stands for "*Dokumentation und Ausbildungszentrum für Theorie und Methode der Regionalforschung*" (Documentation and Training Center for Theory and Methods of Regional Research).

DATUM has four purposes: 1) to collect, process, and store demographic and other data for political and ecological units, and survey and other information about individuals needed by researchers engaged in regional and urban studies; 2) to develop, or adapt for local use, systems for the storage, retrieval, and analysis of these data; 3) to devise high level training programs in data processing, research methods, and theory relevant to urban and regional research; and 4) to serve as a consulting agency and clearing house.

To fulfill the training functions DATUM desires to host scholars, from the United States and other countries abroad, who want to do research and who, at the same time, are willing to help train post-graduate regional scientists in Germany. The organization also plans to sponsor periodic seminars, research conferences, and special training courses. This professional program will give primary attention to the regional planning needs of public agencies. Regarding computer and other technical development, DATUM intends to follow a number of development activities closely, and desires to participate in exchanges of technical personnel among archival and other relevant groups engaged in computer development.

During the first stage of development, the archive of DATUM is concentrating on making available to its users different sources of labor market and mobility data, and urban renewal information: data for these content emphases will be from both census and survey sources. Looking to the future, the staff is studying the feasibility and cost of acquiring, and converting to a useable machine-readable form, election statistics and demographic data in considerable historical depth. Although the many survey and other studies executed by the *Institut für angewandte Sozialwissenschaft* for various city agencies within Germany have not been prepared for widespread distribution, these constitute a significant part of the data base.

Through its first two years, DATUM will utilize a library of IBM 1620 programs developed or acquired by the *Institut für ange-*

wandte Sozialwissenschaft. It will also use a nearby university-operated IBM 7090, and experiment with IBM 360 computer systems to which it has been promised access. The organization is working towards acquisition of a model 30 configuration of the IBM 360 for on-premises use beginning about January 1, 1968.

Organizationally, DATUM has a Council consisting of mayors of various German cities, social scientists from academic institutions both in Germany and abroad, and professional city planners and other regional specialists. The archive staff includes specialists in data processing, regional and urban science, and administration. DATUM is jointly sponsored by the *Stiftung Volkswagenwerk* (Volkswagen Foundation), regional planning agencies, and German municipalities.

Additional information about on-premises use of the DATUM archive and staff by visiting scholars, access to present data holdings, and plans for future data acquisition are obtainable upon request to the Executive Director.

Social and Economic Archive Committee, 12 Upper Belgrave Street, London, S.W. 1, England

The Social and Economic Archive Committee is developing an Archive Centre for social science research in Britain.

Although the ultimate location of the Centre is yet to be determined, the Committee has contracted the services of Political and Economic Planning (PEP) for the Archive Centre's first two years of work, which include the following:

1. Conducting a survey to determine what survey data are held and what data collections are planned by university departments and scholars, research institutes, and market research and other organizations. This survey is also to determine the conditions under which available data will be made accessible for secondary analysis.
2. Circulating the results of the survey.
3. Designing and developing information storage and retrieval systems for information gathered by the survey, and data acquired by the Archive Centre.
4. Determining policies for data acquisition and services.

Contributions from interested parties and a generous grant from the Social Research Council have provided the support required for the first year's operations. A Director, Mr. John Madge, Chief Consultant to PEP, has been appointed and will be assisted by a staff of three or four full-time specialists.

Additional information about the Archive Centre is available from the Director.

LOCAL SERVICE ARCHIVES

A number of archives have been established and developed to acquire, process, store, and maintain machine-readable data and supporting documentation for use by an on-campus group of scholars, a local community or metropolitan area, a regional group of organizations, or a state. These have been staffed, designed, and equipped to service a defined local clientele: however, some expect eventually to become general purpose service archives. Most are members of the Council of Social Science Data Archives, described later, and have agreed to rediffuse their data to other archives at cost.

Following are brief descriptions of several such local service archives. The list is not exhaustive, but the author has either received no information about other local archives or obtained requested information too late for inclusion in this article.

Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts

The Center for International Studies is developing an archive of data produced or acquired by its social science researchers. Data includes polls, surveys, and Bureau of the Census information. A heavy user of data from the Roper Center, the M.I.T. Center is a member of the International Survey Library Association.

During the past year, the staff has been reformatting and editing data and supporting documentation for concerted analyses. Copies of the reprocessed data, on tape and prepared for efficient computer processing, are to be made available to non-M.I.T. users through the Roper Center. The M.I.T. Center makes heavy use of the pioneering Project MAC (Multiple Access Computer) computation facilities, which provide many users simultaneous access to a large computer through remote typewriter consoles and other terminal devices. The programming staff of the Center is refining and adding to a library of programs, utilizing the MAC system, for analyzing survey data. Under a grant from the National Science Foundation, the Center is conducting research on the organization and processing of large files of social science data for analysis in a time-sharing computer environment.

Additional information can be acquired from Professor Ithiel de Sola Pool.

The Laboratory for Political Research, University of Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa

The Laboratory is acquiring and maintaining data for use by graduate students' and faculty of the University. Included are data from the Inter-University Consortium, the Roper Center, and the *Des Moines Register and Tribune* Iowa Poll (1948-1954). A limited array of in-house unit record equipment serves some of the needs of graduate students and faculty. In addition, the archive has use of the central computation facility of the University of Iowa.

Additional information about the Laboratory is available from Professor G. R. Boynton, Department of Political Science.

Laboratory for Social Relations, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts

Housed within the Laboratory for Social Relations, a general collection of social science data is under development for use in graduate student and faculty research. Data resources include materials from the Roper Public Opinion Research Center, the Inter-University Consortium, and the body of machine-readable content analysis materials developed by Dr. Philip J. Stone and his staff at Harvard. Data holdings are housed and maintained in the computation facility of the Laboratory. This facility operates, on-premises, basic unit record equipment, and a tape-oriented IBM 1401 computer. Data users also have ready access to the IBM 7094 operated by the Harvard Computation Center, and some of the computing equipment available at M.I.T. The Laboratory has a staff of research and technical assistants to facilitate the use of data, computer programs, and equipment; to develop and adapt additional computer programs; and to bring researcher, data and equipment together in the most useful manner.

Additional information is obtainable from Professor Robert F. Bales.

Political Science Research Library, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut

The Political Science Research Library is a collection of literature and machine-readable data with a staff to assist graduate students and faculty in political research and the use of computation facilities.

PSRL belongs to both the Inter-University Consortium for Political Research and the International Survey Library Association, and maintains a large proportion of the holdings of these two archives in duplicate form on its own premises. Its data base includes collections from other sources, including those acquired or produced by Yale scholars and research projects. All data produced by the Yale Political Data Program (13) are included in the repository. Data in the archive are available to other archives at cost.

The Research Library maintains, on-premises, a limited array of unit record equipment. Its primary data processing and computing resources are the staff and equipment of the Yale Computing Center, which maintains a variety of unit record equipment, and several small and large scale computers. Periodically, PSRL publishes, for Yale students and faculty, a newsletter listing recent data acquisitions and containing other information. A limited supply of these are available upon request.

Additional information is available from Professor Robert E. Lane, Department of Political Science.

Survey Research Laboratory, University of Illinois

In 1964, a data repository was organized as an integral unit within the newly established Survey Research Laboratory. The functions of the archive are 1) to acquire and maintain surveys and other kinds of data having research and teaching potential for the students and faculty of the University; 2) to collect data on the economic, social, and political characteristics of the state of Illinois and its subdivisions; 3) to serve as an information center to help students and faculty locate and obtain data collected and maintained by other organizations and archives; 4) to serve as a clearing house for relations between the various departments and research units of the University, and archive and data producing organizations outside the University; and 5) to maintain data produced and gathered by the Survey Research Laboratory.

The repository contains studies conducted within the state of Illinois by the Survey Research Laboratory, information from state agencies, and data from archives such as the Roper Center and the Inter-University Consortium. The staff has access to a considerable array of unit record equipment, an IBM 1620, and an IBM 7094. The University provides a Statistical Services Research Unit, which provides consultation on programming and data processing, and has written a library of standard data processing and analysis programs: the archive uses services and computer programs of this facility. The data repository staff has developed programs for converting multiple-punched data to a single-punch-per-column format, for recoding data, and for analysing the consistency and reliability of data sets.

Presently, University faculty and students, and other archives have access to data contained in the repository. Users and other archives are charged the costs of labor, equipment, and supplies for obtaining data.

Brochures describing the activities of the Survey Research Laboratory and the data repository and additional information are obtainable upon request to Professor Denis Sullivan.

UCLA Political Behavior Archive, the Department of Political Science, University of California, Los Angeles

Created in 1961, the UCLA Political Behavior Archive is a data bank including official government statistics, election returns, survey data, and biographical materials. Data are acquired from local scholars, survey organizations, government agencies, the Roper Public Opinion Research Center, and the Inter-University Consortium for Political Research.

The archive collects only those data sets for which there is intramural demand, and which are easily acquired. Because of the interests of several major users, the archive is developing extensive holdings on political recruitment and career patterns, on a worldwide basis; community studies; and on the Southern California region.

Heaviest users of the archive are the staff and students of the Political Science Department of UCLA. Other users include persons from other parts of the University, government agencies, and political party organizations.

From the beginning, the archive has been conceived as a three dimensional organization involving the user, computing equipment, and data. Thus, an important feature of the UCLA Archive is the development and acquisition of easy-to-learn programs for manipulating and analyzing information using the computing facilities of the Western Data Processing Center, located at UCLA. The Archive maintains a small complement of unit record equipment for preparing data for processing by computer.

To better exploit a large, integrated data base, particularly for concerted analyses utilizing multiple data sets, the Archive has contributed large amounts of computer time and staff assistance to Dr. Vladimir Almendinger, System Development Corporation, in nearby Santa Monica. Almendinger has developed a complex data management, documentation, and analysis system called SPAN (3). As indicated earlier, an effort is under way to adapt and extend the capabilities of SPAN for use on IBM 360 computers, an effort which benefits from the experience gained from operational use of SPAN for the 7090 by the UCLA Archive.

Additional information about the archive is available from Professor Dwaine Marvick.

ORGANIZATIONS AND ACTIVITIES COORDINATING INDIVIDUAL ARCHIVE EFFORTS

Even if the development of a single, centralized archive were ultimately desirable, a number of forces work against the immediate establishment of such a facility. These include, among others, diverse motivations to acquire and maintain different kinds of data of varying quality; insufficient development of computer resources for maintaining and processing large data bases and for information retrieval; political problems in the acquisition of data; the differing patterns of specialization required to acquire and maintain various classes of data; nationalism; and cost problems in diffusing data to geographically dispersed users.

Following is an account of efforts to establish networks of archives, and coordinate the activities of various data repositories (4, 10).

The Council of Social Science Data Archives, c/o the Bureau for Applied Social Research, Columbia University, New York City, New York

The Council of Social Science Data Archives (CSSDA) is a planning, policymaking, and information-disseminating group for coordinating and publicizing the activities of a confederation of social science data archives in the United States. Its most basic principles are that machine-readable data and supporting documentation useful to the social science community should be readily accessible, at minimum cost, to scholars, and be rediffusible to archives and individuals.

CSSDA began in the winter of 1962 as a "Committee of Eight," sponsored by the Inter-University Consortium for Political Research, to find ways and means to facilitate access to data and to encourage archive development. After a year of meetings and discussions, the "Committee of Eight" developed a plan of action and received support from the National Science Foundation.

Participating in the formative meetings were Professors S. M. Lipset and C. Y. Glock of the University of California at Berkeley, Karl W. Deutsch and Robert E. Lane of Yale, David

Easton of the University of Chicago, James S. Coleman of the University of California at Los Angeles, James W. Prothro of the University of North Carolina, Erwin K. Scheuch of the University of Cologne (then a visiting Professor at Harvard), and Philip E. Converse and Warren E. Miller of the University of Michigan.

With the help of the NSF support, the representation of the operating and potential archives was continually expanded and increasing information about data holdings, costs, procedures, operating policies, and goals was shared. A constitution was prepared, and a permanent operating staff discussed and defined.

The constitution was developed over three sessions of the policy group. The first of these was held at the University of Chicago in September, 1964; the second at Williams College in January, 1965; and the third at Columbia University in April, 1965. The first two sessions were plenary and included representatives from the three major archives in the United States and most of the local service archives described above. The third was limited to eight persons elected at the Williamstown meeting to rework the first draft constitution.

On September 10, 1965, approximately twenty-five representatives from social science data archives met in Washington, D. C. At this meeting, the constitution and by-laws were approved; an Executive Director, Dr. William Glaser from Columbia University, was appointed; proposals regarding the work of the Council for the next two years were presented and discussed; and an Executive Committee was elected, consisting of: Charles Y. Glock, Chairman, Survey Research Center, Berkeley; Allen H. Barton, Bureau of Applied Social Research, Columbia; Philip K. Hastings, Roper Public Opinion Research Center; Robert E. Lane, Political Science Research Library, Yale; Dwaine Marvick, UCLA Political Behavior Archive; Warren E. Miller, Inter-University Consortium for Political Research; Ithiel de Sola Pool, Center for International Studies, M.I.T.; and Peter H. Rossi, National Opinion Research Center, University of Chicago. The Executive Committee met at Columbia on December 18, 1965, to discuss proposals of the Executive Director for forthcoming activities of the Council, and to approve a grant request for funds to support these activities.

Under the auspices of the Council, two meetings of technical experts from the various archives and other relevant organizations have been held. The first, co-sponsored by the Center for International Studies, M.I.T., was held in Cambridge, Massachusetts, in December, 1964; the second was hosted by the Bureau of Applied Social Research, Columbia, in May, 1965. Among other results, these conferences have established technically feasible principles for information retrieval, computer programming and program sharing, data formatting and storage, data maintenance, and services to users and archives.

One specific result of these meetings was the establishment and approval of a standard format for keypunching machine-readable codebooks. Machine-readable codebooks are advantageous for preparing multilith and photo-offset masters. Such masters are needed to print data documentation in the large quantities required to serve users, to make more efficient and less costly the maintenance of up-to-date documentation, to provide part of the input and output requirements of archive information retrieval systems, to aid the documentation and identification of analysis output, and for data diffusion among archives. The format approved by the Technical Committee takes account of these potential uses for machine-readable codebooks. Presently, the Inter-University Consortium and the International Data Service and Reference Library are preparing codebooks according to the approved format, and have developed computer capabilities for realizing several of the potential uses. The Roper Center and *Zentralarchiv* are taking preliminary steps toward operationally adopting the conventions and capabilities.

Major participants in the technical conferences have been representatives from academic research organizations which suppply data to archives and are studying the implications of themselves becoming general purpose service archives. A significant outcome is that the Bureau of Applied Social Research at Columbia, the Institute for Social Research of the University of Michigan, the National Opinion Research Center at the University of Chicago, and the Survey Research Center of the University of California, Berkeley, are implementing developing standards, conventions, and operations for the initial phases of data preparation, insofar as possible with presently available computer capabilities.

The third Technical conference is to be held in Ann Arbor, Michigan, during 1966, if the necessary support can be obtained. The Planning Committee met in Los Angeles in October, 1965, and determined that the theme of the conference should be "The Concerted or Integrated Use of Large Social Science Data

Bases." Formal papers are to be invited on social science data bases generated by metropolitan planning groups, government agencies, academic research organizations, and social science data archives; system development efforts for computers to exploit such data bases; and information retrieval experiments, and design and development activities. The Technical Committee of the Council hopes that a published volume on data archives will result from this conference.

The Council publishes documents describing the work of its Technical Committee; a periodic "Archives Newsletter" containing information about policies of the Council, the activities of operating archives, announcements of and descriptive information about newly established archives, and other items of interest to archive users and research organizations. These documents and further information about the Council are available upon request to the Executive Director.

The Coordination of Archive Activities in Europe and the United Kingdom

UNESCO and the International Social Science Council have sponsored and encouraged a number of activities with the primary aim of making archived data more readily accessible to European scholars. A number of conferences have been held, two of which specifically dealt with social science data archives.

At the Second Conference on Data Archives, held in Paris in 1964, particular attention was given to the production of survey data in Europe and the United States; the selection, re-diffusion, and utilization of data; relations among data suppliers, archives, and users; procedures for data preparation, storage, processing, and retrieval; the role of archives in graduate education; and the establishment of networks of archives. Representatives from European archives drafted and agreed to a statement of principles regarding the establishment of a European Federation of Social Science Data Archives. From the papers presented at this conference a book entitled *Data Archives for the Social Sciences* is to be published early in 1966.

A "Working Party of Data Archives," sponsored by the World Association for Public Opinion Research, and organized by the International Social Science Council, was held in connection with the WAPOR conference in Dublin in 1965. To provide a means for closer co-operation among archives, the "Working Party" decided to undertake the execution of a plan for an inventory of the current holdings of archives. Subsequently, some financing for the inventory has been obtained, the co-operation of American archives solicited, and in most cases, assured, and the instruments for information gathering further developed. Present plans are initially to gather a specified set of information about sample surveys taken in European countries.

The "Working Party" paid special attention to protection of the interests of data suppliers in the development and operation of archives. A number of arrangements for implementing this goal were reviewed or proposed, and discussed.

Plans for the organization of a European Federation of Social Science Data Archives are presently being prepared. A conference of representatives of archives and other interested organizations is scheduled to take place in London, April 12 to 17, 1966.

Until recently, developments in Europe focused on data using the methodologies and techniques of survey research. Increasing attention is being given to the collection, conversion to machine readable form, and organization for widespread diffusion and use, of governmental and institutional statistics in historical depth. For example, the Michelsen Institute in Bergen and the Institute for Social Research in Oslo are cooperating in the development of an historical archive of ecological data on Norwegian politics. (23) The archive already contains, in machine-readable form, and for each commune, information from local and national elections; censuses; educational, agricultural, industrial, and fiscal statistics; church attendance figures and local party organizations. A similar development is under way in Finland. (2)

To explore problems and progress in the establishment of archives of ecological data, and the research potential, particularly for comparative analyses, of such data bases, an international symposium is to be held in Evian, France, September 12–16, 1966. This symposium, whose theme is "Quantitative Ecological Analysis in the Social Sciences," will include formal papers and informal exchanges of information emphasizing the development of ecological archives for exploitation by computers, and new techniques in the quantitative analysis of such data bases.

Further information about developments in Europe is available upon request to Professor Stein Rokkan, The Chr. Michelsen Institute, Bergen, Norway.

Efforts by the United States Federal Government to Provide Better Access to Data Collected or Generated by its Agencies

During recent years, several federal agencies have taken steps to make their data more accessible to non-governmental agencies, state and local governments, academic and nonprofit research organizations, and individual scholars. The efforts in this direction of two such agencies, the Bureaus of Census and Labor Statistics, were reported earlier.

Unfortunately, a number of governmental agencies have not yet established policies and procedures for the use of their data, and some have not yet taken steps adequate to insure that their data are preserved, in a usable machine-readable form for scholarly use. Moreover, there is an increasing need to combine the data produced by several agencies for certain kinds of analysis. Up to now there has been little effort to standardize data formats, coding procedures, and storage and maintenance methods to provide for such needs, even when the needs arise within the government itself.

Steps are now being taken to solve these problems. In response to the recommendations of what has become known as the "Ruggles Committee," the Bureau of the Budget has engaged the services of a consultant, Dr. Edgar Dunn of the Council on Resources for the Future, to prepare recommendations as to what the federal government should do. An *ad hoc* committee, consisting of representatives from the Bureaus of Statistical Standards, Labor Statistics, and Census, and the National Bureau of Standards has been appointed to advise Dr. Dunn.

The Committee, chaired by Professor Richard Ruggles of Yale University, was established as a Social Science Research Council Committee on the Preservation and Use of Economic Data. This Committee had developed out of concerns of the Executive Committee of the American Economic Association and the Social Science Research Council for the preservation of economic and other social science data for research. In 1965, it submitted a report of its findings and recommendations to the Social Science Research Council and to the Bureau of the Budget.

From 1962 to 1964, the Committee surveyed data resources of the government and studied the problems of providing access to individual data sets. Meetings were held with representatives of agencies in the Departments of Commerce, Labor, Treasury, Agriculture, Interior, and Health, Education, and Welfare; and with representatives from the National Archives, the National Science Foundation, and the Bureau of the Budget. The Committee concluded that to solve the many problems of data access and preservation, the federal government should establish a Federal Data Center with its own staff and computer facilities, and with authority to acquire governmentally produced data.

At this writing, the Budget Bureau *ad hoc* committee responsible for acting on the recommendations of the Ruggles Committee hopes to have funding for a Federal Data Center included in the budget for the fiscal year 1967. There are no documents describing the proposals of the committee; however, conversations with two members have indicated there is substantial consensus regarding the functions and responsibilities of the proposed Center. As of November, 1965, the Budget Bureau committee apparently felt that the Federal Data Center should basically be a centralized place where users could determine what data are available, where duplicate sets of data could be stored and maintained for future use, and data services (including computer analyses) could be provided users.

According to present thinking, the Federal Data Center will not attempt to house all data in one central location. It will instead, emphasize coordination, referral, and facilitation functions; it will promote standards for the collection, coding, formatting, and preservation of federally produced data; and it will support the development of staff and computer capabilities to serve users. Insofar as feasible, the Center will also develop an archive of data, organized and coded as an integrated data base for concerted analyses. The Federal Data Center will not limit itself to any content area or subset of government agencies; it will concern itself with data produced in machine-readable form by all agencies.

In addition, the Center might attempt to coordinate data collection efforts. It will make the needs of users known to data-producing agencies and help users to prepare new data files to take advantage of governmentally produced data.

A critical problem concerning public access to governmentally produced data stems from the imperative need to protect the confidentiality of respondents. Hundreds of thousands of individuals and businesses cooperate monthly to provide data important for routine business, and for forecasting and reporting purposes. The need to protect confidential information is one important reason for the difficulty of access to government data. Although this protection can be guaranteed if the agency can itself provide the needed analyses, this is not a practical solution because many agencies do not have the necessary analytical capabilities (their functions do not demand them), and because most are not staffed, budgeted, or organized to provide custom services for individual clients. The Federal Data Center would essentially bypass many of these problems by providing a centralized staff, organized and equipped to perform almost any kind of data analysis, including those where privately produced data must be merged with data produced by the government.

It is expected that significant information about plans for a Federal Data Center will become available early in 1966. If so, a substantial portion of the second issue of "Archives Newsletter," published by the Council of Social Science Data Archives, will be devoted to federal action regarding machine-readable data the United States Government produces.

Questions and comments regarding the establishment of a Federal Data Center should be addressed to the Director, Office of Statistical Standards, Bureau of the Budget.

* * *

While the development of satisfactory national policies for disseminating machine-readable data generated by the federal government is only in its initial phases, a coherent national posture embracing the many other private, academic and foreign data sources of interest to researchers is even less advanced. The Behavioral Sciences Division of the National Academy of Sciences has recently established a permanent Committee on Information in the Behavioral Sciences, under the chairmanship of Professor David Easton. The first mandate of this committee is to prepare a major report providing guidelines for policy development in the area of documentation and data resources. The report will deal with problems in the financing and maintenance of archives and other data resources that serve as "input" to the research process, as well as progress in information retrieval systems and the "output" flow of results or digested scientific information through the research community.

If further space were available, extended comments on some of these other aspects of information problems would be appropriate—particularly in the areas of information retrieval and data processing, management and analysis capabilities. Suffice it to say here that with a new generation of computer equipment providing heretofore impossible capabilities for social science research as well as data archives, considerable attention to research, experimentation, and development must be given over the coming years. The technical staffs of archives and other organizations are currently working on a number of user-oriented systems to maximally exploit the revolutionary potential of large, integrated collections of social science data. It is hoped that researchers and funding agencies will appreciate the massive development efforts required, and applaud the ultimate results.

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COMMUNICATIONS

A REPLY TO "SOME FURTHER COMMENTS ON THE END OF IDEOLOGY"

To the Editor:

I am pleased to have Professor Lipset confirm that the preference of the decline of ideology writers for the kind of consensual societies emerging in some parts of the West is itself ideological. But, if I may restate my intention, I mean 1) to demonstrate that the Italian case seems not to fit some of the generalizations of Professor Lipset and others regarding *ideology's* decline in Europe and 2) to suggest that beyond their obvious preferences for consensual societies, some of the decline of ideology writers seem to me to be offering as scientifically established truths generalizations that may themselves be ideologically based. It is in this last sense that I contend that we are far from resolving the Mannheim Paradox, no matter how much intellectual whistling in the dark we may now engage in.

Professor Lipset's appeal to the authority of scholars and journalists he cites is surely an insufficient response to the major thrust of my article. In the case of Raymond Aron, I would argue that his outpourings on the subject suggest that he is very *engagé* on this subject and that it is manifestly difficult to distinguish in some of his works what may be the dispassionate observations of the social scientist from the impassioned utterances of a brilliant polemicist. Otto Kirchheimer, at least, was quite explicit about the *kind* of ideology he believed to be in decline in countries like Germany and quite open in suggesting why he personally bemoaned the alleged transformations. As for Giovanni Sartori, I find it difficult to understand how Professor Lipset can use him in support of the point of view I am examining. Sartori finds the "end of ideology" literature unacceptable in part because (as I have noted) it seems excessively anti-historical, that is, extremely limited in space and time and in part because (again as I have noted) the "decline" writers seem to be referring only to a particular kind of ideology (i.e., Marxism). In this regard, Sartori says, " . . . Marxism is not necessarily the last of the ideologies, and we must not confuse the decline of a certain kind of ideology with the disappearance of ideology as such."[1] Sartori goes on to say that the idea that ideologies have run their course is self-delusion, that in discussing this alleged decline, we are inclined to confuse the genus and the species, and that not even the proposition that ideologies will wither away under the impact of industrialization is satisfactory as a long-range prediction.[2]

Why Professor Lipset and I seem to come away from our reading some of the same experts with basically different interpretations of what they are driving at may or may not be a question worth pursuing; the fact that there are these different interpretations, however, brings me back to the matter of definition and meaning. The matter is not greatly clarified by Professor Lipset's response to my article, for as I read his rejoinder, it seems to me to contain the following observations: 1) That there is something in existence we may appropriately identify as ideological behavior in a "pure sense," although I fail to detect in any of the writings I cite (with the possible but nevertheless still confusing exception of Mannheim) what this distinction would mean empirically, and whether it is "pure" as opposed to some other kind of ideology that is allegedly in decline; 2) That *Weltenschauungen*, or what Mannheim called "total ideologies," have declined, which suggests that "partial ideologies" have not; 3) That what has really declined is "sharp" or "intense" or "deep" or "bitter" ideological conflict which suggests that ideology that is not preceded by such adjectives is still very much with us. I believe that I acknowledge this last fact in my paper and try to emphasize the necessity of avoiding cosmic generalizations about what may be happening to ideology in the West and to focus greater attention on the rhetoric and symbology of ideological formulations.

It is only in this last context that one can hope to judge what it means when Professor

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[1] See his *Democratic Theory* (Detroit, 1962), p. 191.

[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 192–193. Even in those places where Sartori seems to support the idea that political extremism may wane in *some* societies that achieve industrial economic affluence, he cautions that this association may not be true of *all* such societies and that it may not long remain true even in some of the affluent democracies. He says, "If we labor under this delusion, I am afraid that a future historian will be able to refer to a *felix America*, or to a "happy Europe," in a highly ironic sense. *Ibid.*, p. 192.

Lipset finds the ideology of the Italian Communist party "more moderate" (which I concede, if he means by "more moderate" a basic change in symbology and not necessarily a "decline" of the party's ideology); or to judge what it means when I suggest that recent events in the Communist party may actually be a sign of "ideological vigor." Furthermore, since Professor Lipset has in fact joined issue with me on several details of Italian politics, I would ask, in turn, why he prefers to view the present Italian governmental coalition as a *decline* in Socialist ideology without considering whether it is not equally valid to interpret the coalition in terms of a marked *increase* in the ideological articulation and commitment of Christian Democracy.

I am convinced that the issue I am posing here will not be readily or convincingly resolved by asking merely which of the above "findings" is more "scientific" or what kinds of questions are or are not "researchable." To return to Sartori, this question can only be resolved if we turn our attention to some basic questions about the *sociology* of knowledge and of the *theory* of knowledge.[3] I hope my article suggests to some that several such questions are begged or obscured by the decline of ideology writers. I leave it to those who have read the relevant literature of the past decade to decide whether my interpretations of the impressions created by that literature and the problems I raise in my paper add up to only a straw man.

JOSEPH LAPALOMBARA

Yale University

TO THE EDITOR:

I was pleased to read Louis W. Koenig's review of John Feerick's *From Failing Hands* in your December, 1965, issue. I would like, however, to correct an erroneous impression left by Professor Koenig.

Professor Koenig suggests that the Bayh Amendment on presidential inability and succession departed from recommendations of the American Bar Association in providing for a body other than the Cabinet which, if created by the Congress, could determine—in conjunction with the Vice-President—that the President was unable to perform the powers and duties of his office.

The very constructive idea to provide Congress with the authority to create an alternate body was the American Bar Association's primary contribution to Senate Joint Resolution 139, which I had introduced some weeks before the American Bar Association considered the problem. These legal experts wisely suggested that the Constitution should remain as flexible as possible—that rather than freeze into the document the requirement that the Cabinet make this all-important decision, the Congress might at some future time find a more viable alternative.

Although Senator Albert Gore, a colleague for whom I have the greatest respect, contended that the language appeared to provide for the possibility of the two bodies (i.e., the Cabinet or "such other body as Congress may provide . . . ") to function simultaneously, the legislative history is painstakingly clear on that point. Because the courts rely most heavily on statements of a proposal's floor manager in determining legislative intent, I scrupulously went over that point time and again at hearings of my subcommittee, of the House committee, and in my floor statements. If the Congress were to provide for another body, that body would act *in lieu* of the Cabinet, but in conjunction with the Vice-President.

Senator Gore's point was debated at length on the floor of the Senate before the amendment received final action and was sent to the states. The Senate, in a vote of 68-to-5, agreed that the intent was clear and voted in favor of the proposal. Fifteen state legislatures have since ratified the 25th Amendment.

BIRCH BAYH

United States Senate

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[3] See his brilliant treatment of this in *ibid.*, pp. 455–460.

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BOOK REVIEWS

The Making of the President—1964. BY THEODORE H. WHITE. (New York: Atheneum Publishers, 1965. Pp. 404. $6.95.)

It is a pleasure to read a book filled with awe and admiration for the terrors and accomplishments of the political enterprise. Theodore White is evidently in love with politics. He writes with tenderness and compassion about the men who seek so valiantly to grapple with forces they can but dimly perceive. He sees good men (yes, Goldwater, too) doing their best for their country even as their good intentions lie splattered around the campaign trail, where unforeseen circumstances or ideological rigidity or personal failing have cruelly left them. White does an especially good job of re-creating the atmosphere as the outbreak of racial violence led to a mingling of despair for the present and a determination to bring hope to the future. But White is also the inside-dopester writ large. What secret revelations does he have to enlarge our understanding of political life at the levels of the high and mighty in which he moves?

Having grown tired of scholarship by telescope, students of Soviet affairs have been known to wish they could give up the slippery ways of Kremlinology and really find out what is going on by placing an agent in the highest reaches of officialdom. Let us view Theodore White as our man in America. If his inside stories cannot enrich our understanding of American politics, we may have to reconsider the value of inside information.

At once (pp. 6 and 7) we learn exactly where Nelson Rockefeller, Thomas Dewey, Barry Goldwater, William Scranton, Richard Nixon, Dwight Eisenhower, and U Thant were when they heard the news that John F. Kennedy had been assassinated. Is it significant that Rockefeller and Dewey were dining (conspiring?) together and heard the news from a Negro maid, while Nixon was (characteristically?) alone in a taxi cab, whereas Goldwater (more ominously?) was accompanying the coffin of his mother-in-law? We are back, it seems, to an American version of Kremlinology.

Soon (pp. 62 ff.) we are introduced to a struggle of "morbid intensity" between " 'the primitives' " and the " 'Eastern Establishment.' " Although "both names are corruptions of reality . . . they are convenient shorthand for describing a twenty year period . . . during which the Eastern Establishment dominated the national machinery of the Republican Party and its major governorships, while the primitives dominated its Congressional machinery and set its national lawmaking posture." From its capital, New York City, "the apparently dominant Eastern Establishment" could technically "be described as the executive center of the Western world," from which the war against cancer is carried out, the Persian economy reorganized, and the Franco-British cross-channel scheme revived.

In its political aspect, the Eastern Establishment is best seen as a "rather large village" whose members have been brought together "by an indefinable selection process." They are like other men, yet "set apart . . . by their enormous executive ability, superior responsibilities or great wealth." While the Eastern Establishment "—if there is one—" lives in several places, it generally dwells in the "Perfumed Stockade" on a portion of Manhattan's East Side (p. 63). Although their children go to the same exclusive schools and exchange visits, the Eastern Establishment "is by no means a closed community; . . . raw money cannot buy entrance. . . . Persons who make a mark in the world—be it in industry, politics, art, science, writing—gradually find acceptance in the Perfumed Stockade" (p. 64). Wall Street is part of the Establishment. But "Wall Street can no longer command. Yet it still leads. The Wall Street men do not meet collectively . . . any longer in a cozy group. . . . Yet they set the climate" (p. 66). While members of the Eastern Establishment share "a common code," they are not centralized. They are divided among the political parties "and the dominant Republicans are themselves split and torn by groups, factions and personal antipathies . . . " (p. 68). As for the candidates, Nelson Rockefeller was presumably in but "never a favorite of the Establishment" (p. 69), while William Scranton, "a modest millionaire," was not in "But his Establishment connections were superb" (p. 86) among the "men who move things in the East . . . " (p. 87). Since Rockefeller could not be dissuaded from running, divorcing and fathering, and the Establishment lacked the power in the Republican Party to help Scranton, Goldwater won the nomination. "It was as if the Goldwater people had rewired the switchboard of the Party," a person with knowledge of the Establishment operation told White, "and the numbers we had were all dead" (p. 158). Yet none of this seems to matter very much because "Power, in America, comes from voters—their . . . taste or conviction" (p. 128); "The President, alone among men, can set the climate of politics" (p. 243); and there "is an iron rule of politics: the higher the office, the more important the candidate is—and the less important the organization" (p. 319).

One could only sympathize with a Soviet analyst trying to make sense out of the Eastern Establishment and its role in American politics. As all expert observers of Presidentology are aware, however, the agent could report that it was by no means an accident that Attorney General Robert Kennedy accompanied the casket of the former Chief Executive while President Lyndon Johnson followed far in the rear. For the first time, we learn that "Johnson had felt that he must, in order to establish continuity, accompany the casket from the plane to the ground in the cargo lift with the family and the blood-stained widow, in the view of the nation. Robert Kennedy . . . had countermanded Johnson, the President. . . . The matter rankled on both sides" (p. 260). The fact that certain followers of former President Kennedy remain in Johnson's office must remain a puzzle to which further clues should diligently be sought.

Bits and pieces of information of political interest may be gleaned from reading *The Making of the President—1964*. Did Goldwater really believe in the myth of the silent Republican vote? White says he did. Did Nixon wait around to see if Rockefeller and Goldwater would eliminate each other? White says he did. Did the Goldwater leaders decide upon a strategy centering their hopes upon a strong southern base? They did, says White. We learn that President Johnson did order a poll taken to gauge the (negligible) effects of the Jenkins affair, and that the Goldwaterites made extensive use of polls, despite the bad news they invariably contained. Our skepticism of the value of news reports increases when we discover that reporters took it upon themselves to save Goldwater from his worst self by persistently questioning him until they came up with a quote that seemed safer to them than the one he originally gave them.

On the matter of greatest political interest—did men allied with Goldwater secure his nomination by somehow taking over the Republican party?—Theodore White offers tantalizing snippets. He tells how F. Clinton White, a former leader of the Young Republicans and a technician of party organization, held a secret gathering of twenty friends in 1961 and decided to form a committee "to seize the Republican Party for the conservative cause" (p. 92). But then we lose sight of Clinton White's efforts for the most part. We are told that his apparatus was somehow active in some state conventions, but the only hard information comes from Washington. In that state, conservatives elected delegates by the simple expedient of sending people down to become precinct captains where no one else would do the job; then they used their votes to control precinct caucuses, county conventions and eventually the state convention itself. Still we cannot tell how many delegates from how many states were thus placed to support Goldwater. The hypothesis that Goldwater was truly the personal preference of Republican activists is not pursued.

It should be evident that inside dope is no substitute for political analysis. While the inside story may suggest puzzles which need to be unraveled, it does not contain the indispensable analytic formula for giving meaning to what has been observed. Reading inside information can be most enjoyable. One could only wish that there were more of it in this book, for the author apparently never penetrated Lyndon Johnson's inner court.

Since Theodore White is likely to continue his enterprise in future Presidential elections, political scientists may wish to consider how his work might be most useful to them. As a propagandist for the worth and dignity of the political life, White has no peer. Long may he continue. As a reporter he is splendid when he settles upon subjects that are amenable to personal interviewing and observation. His description of Goldwater's convention organization is excellent, for example, while his account of the primaries is disappointing because he can add nothing to what has already appeared in the press. Next time around he might devote more space to the relationships between the candidates and the reporters who follow them around. It would be especially helpful to have more detailed chronologies of how the candidates and their staffs perceive and react to the events of the conventions and the campaigns as they occur. As a political analyst White leaves a great deal to be desired. No one is suggesting that Theodore White should write for political scientists. On the contrary, he should stick more closely to his great forte of reporting the thought and actions of the actors who participate in the most stirring drama of American political life.

Aaron B. Wildavsky
University of California at Berkeley

Elements of Judicial Strategy. By Walter F. Murphy. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964. Pp. xiii, 249. $7.50.)

What does a political scientist do when he addresses himself to "public law?" Twenty years ago, Earl Latham and others were viewed as fairly *avant-garde* for referring derisively to political science professors who "try to sound like lawyers in the classroom." At about the same time this reviewer found it necessary, in the introduction to an instructional text that consciously sought to depart from the traditional law school casebook pattern, to point out that political science analysis had goals in mind that differed sharply from the vocational aims of legal training.

Herman Pritchett had just published his book on the Roosevelt court. W. W. Willoughby's three volume opus was beginning to gather dust—but it was still on the shelf: today our graduate students are likely to look nonplussed if you ask them who Willoughby was. And, to be sure, the tradition he represented has been almost wholly displaced by, on the one hand, the quantitative orientation of Schubert, Ulmer, *et al.*, and, on the other hand, the kind of inquiry and analysis exemplified by Walter Murphy's work.

Murphy's key question in the book under review is essentially sociological in nature: it is an inquiry into role and role perception. What he purports to do in this book is "capability analysis." He sets out to demonstrate that Supreme Court justices not only have choices but that they are quite capable of making the most of them. The premise is that, whether he admits it or not, every justice is to some degree "policy-oriented."

How far can one take this kind of approach? How fruitful is it likely to be? There are two footnotes on page 201 of Murphy's book that seem to me to pose the issue contained in these two questions in stark relief. Murphy's text at this point asserts that capability analysis permits hypothesizing *now.* "Even where papers or interviews are not available," one reads here, "the results of traditional and behavioral research can be combined to provide fruitful —and testable—hypotheses about how justices will behave or have behaved, based on how they *can* act." (Italics of the original.) At this point Murphy drops a footnote speculating about a "very obvious" hypothesis one might formulate about Justice Brandeis. He notes that he found some support for this hypothesis in some letters from Justice Clarke to Woodrow Wilson and in "the general theme" of Alexander Bickel's book, *The Unpublished Opinions of Mr. Justice Brandeis.*

Then, after two more sentences in the text, another footnote—and this one is worth quoting in full: "I am making an assumption which may be unwarranted—that the publication of this kind of study will not cause future judges to destroy their papers." The earlier footnote had, quite understandably, closed with the observation that the hypothesis could be more fully tested, once all of the Brandeis papers are accessible.

Much of Murphy's illustrative material is drawn from the Taft-Hughes era. Taft and Stone have, of course, left us with treasure troves of paper to be mined. Their clerks and secretaries filed loyally—but without knowing to what ends the modern biographer might go. Murphy's question, his halfway fear that he might, by the very kind of analysis he propounds, close off the Pandora's box of judicial memorabilia, was, of course, already widely mooted following the publication of Mason's book on Stone. What Murphy does in his book is totally different from Mason's detailed biography—but it raises the same specter. Judges may not necessarily destroy their papers: it will suffice that they (or some of them) will be conscious of the fact that their papers will be read in the light of capability analysis. Are we not, in our eagerness to penetrate into the inner sanctum of judicial reasoning, creating the foundations for a false front, the presuppositions, as it were, for a judicial double bookkeeping system?

What has been said here is not a criticism of Murphy's book. Time and again throughout the book's 210 pages of text, Murphy demonstrates that he knows both the limits and the pitfalls of his method. I have elected to underline one of his own words of caution and to enlarge it into a major misgiving—or perhaps I should say, a feeling of uneasiness. Realist jurisprudence has enabled us to sweep aside the cobwebs of legal verbiage until now we may boldly hypothesize upon what judges hoped to accomplish but did not tell us about. Those who have studied decision-making in other settings, such as business organizations or municipal councils, tell us that one can postulate that the bargaining that is likely to be part of decision-making in a collegial body will, of necessity and by its very nature, seek to avoid the glare of publicity, be it current or future. Today, much is being said by justices in separate opinions of one kind or another—plainly one of the by-products of modern thinking about law and the Court. But—and here I find myself far less sanguine than Murphy—what are they confiding to their papers? I suspect that if I were on the Court today it would be part of my strategy to explain myself to future capability analysts in just the light in which I would like to be seen. Are we about to kill the goose that laid the golden egg?

But even if we are—and if Walter Murphy should turn out to have been a prime axe wielder—*Elements of Judicial Strategy* deserves careful reading and study. What do political scientists do when they study "public law"? Murphy provides one set of answers: they ask not only what decisions judges make but how and (importantly) *why* they make them. This capability to make decisions gives to each justice a strategic weapon which he may (Murphy would, I suspect, say "does") employ in furtherance of his personal policy objectives, and his techniques as he seeks to make the most of his potential power are proper objects for study.

Decisions, power, policy choices—this is indeed the language of political science. We have come a long ways since W. W. Willoughby—and Walter Murphy deserves much credit for drawing some very logical affirmative precepts out of the rejection of traditionalism that sounded so courageous two decades ago.

Francis H. Heller
University of Kansas

The Scientific Estate. By Don K. Price. (Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1965. Pp. xi, 323. $5.95.)

Nothing makes a man a philosopher more than experience in public administration followed by the contemplation of science and its social consequences. In public administration he sees that most of the social problems with which government must deal, from nuclear threat to safety for infants, are the results of the scientific revolution. In contemplation he sees that the revolution has quietly brought profound changes in the nature of American government.

Don K. Price has written a superb statement of contemporary political philosophy. He examines American government, as it is, and talks about the distribution of power. He borrows the term estates from history deliberately to make the point that large sections of society still share power. The estates today are the scientific, the professional, the administrative, and the political. They handle "four broad functions in government and public affairs," but they "are by no means sharply distinguished from one another." Rather the estates "fall along a gradation or spectrum within our political system. At one end of the spectrum, pure science is concerned with knowledge and truth; at the other end pure politics is concerned with power and action. But neither ever exists in its pure form. Every person, in his actual work, is concerned to some extent with all four functions."

Why does a man writing political philosophy in 1965 talk about the scientific estate instead of some other institution that might serve a discussion of the distribution of power?

Government has been engaged in scientific research and development to some extent since the birth of the nation. Franklin and Jefferson were the best examples, and almost the last, of scientists who were also politicians by open profession. Accelerated instead of gradual growth has been the rule in every aspect of science and its consequences. The acceleration since 1940 has produced changes so striking that anyone who considers them has to come to the conclusion that many of the old concepts of political economy have to be questioned. Science has become a power and a major function of government. The national government has become the foremost sponsor of basic research as well as a contractor for development. The scope of research and development has grown to more in money terms than the entire federal budget before Pearl Harbor. States, cities, private firms, universities, individuals need the security that comes with money for defense, atomic energy, space, education, and health. All these enterprises are massive in their effect on the economy. All are decided in whole or in part by the national government, with the benefits flowing to states and institutions and individuals.

If once an observer could talk about economic power coming mainly from the ownership of property, he can no longer do so. When the national government became the biggest buyer of technical goods and services, the line between public and private economic power became so blurred it lost meaning. So did any analysis of power that saw radical set against conservative solutions. Such a Newtonian idea as separation of powers and checks and balances lost its clarity. With the development of science and technology, so many complexities were introduced into public policy that no longer could one see solutions in opposing party doctrines. The bureaucracy, now mixed public and private, became at once stronger in influence and more unified in its purpose of the further use of science.

The new federalism of grants-in-aid extended to include beneficial contracts that are carried out in states, cities, and both public and private institutions. Professor Price is very perceptive in his analysis of what has happened to federalism. He sees, for example, that while economic and political power have been fused, the authority of the central government has been diffused. "This has destroyed the notion that the future growth in the functions and expenditures of government, which seems to be made inevitable by the increase in the technological complexity of our civilization, would necessarily take the form of a vast bureaucracy, organized on Max Weber's hierarchical principles, and using the processes of science as Julian Huxley predicted [in *Man in the Modern World*] to answer policy questions." When scientists are influential, they behave as scientists and not as "science fiction or Marxist theory would have them behave; they have introduced into stodgy and responsible channels of bureaucracy the amiable disorder of a university faculty meeting." The Insiders, those "who hold important positions of influence in government, and in the institutional structure by which government and science are now so closely connected," are likely to "accept the subordination of science to the value systems established by the nation's political tradition and interpreted by the authority of its government, and they can get along without much confidence that they are on the road to Utopia."

In other words, the scientific estate does not attempt to choose the purposes for which government's power is to be used. It serves rather to transmit its knowledge to the administrative, professional, and political estates all of which participate in the choice of purpose. In the blend the professions can mix purpose with knowledge most easily and are more involved than the sciences in the "competitive scramble of the administrative and political estates." Freedom, especially in the search for knowledge, is a prerequisite for the whole process. But freedom also requires that the institutions established for the discovery of truth be kept independent of those established for the use of political power, although independence should not mean isolation.

This book is filled with acute observation and some new, purely intellectual, insights that a reader will wish he had seen first. If books, rather than print-outs, are still read in future colleges, this one should stay on the list for political philosophy for a long time. It deals with fundamental questions of power and freedom and the uses of knowledge for human welfare.

James L. McCamy
University of Wisconsin

Children and Politics. By Fred I. Greenstein. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965. Pp. 199. $5.00.)

In an incipient field of scholarly endeavor, any news is likely to be good news. The frontiersman, however rough his manners and unfinished his products, will merit applause by virtue of his initiative in striking his plow on the new problem. Research into the processes of political socialization, for all its deep ancestral taproots in the first Grecian dialogues on the upbringing of citizens, has only begun to break through the lapidescent soil of political science. The early planters have barely arrived and their fruits are thus far green on the vine. The hard data in print by mid-1965 consisted essentially of some lefthanded putterings of psychologists and sociologists, two or three parcels of retrospective data turned up in studies of adult political attitudes, and a few uncultivated pilot study reports furrowing directly on the problem. It is therefore into a seller's market that Fred Greenstein has borne his New Haven harvest of evidence on the developing political orientations of children in grades four through eight.

The uniqueness of Greenstein's effort is that it is the first book-length empirical treatment of the political socialization of American elementary school children. The only other book making a major contribution in terms of the American political culture was Herbert Hyman's *Political Socialization.* In Hyman's 1959 inventory of findings, one finds only the most scattered references to the portion of the political life-cycle prior to adolescence. The assumption seemed rather to be that early adulthood—or to a certain extent, the high school years—was the time when political flowers bloom. This assumption was undoubtedly forced by the necessity of sustaining interest in the kinds of evidence it was then possible to garner. These extant data excluded pre-adolescence almost entirely. The work of Greenstein together with the parallel pilot studies of Easton and Hess have undermined this approach. It has been shown instead that childhood rivals and probably surpasses the later years in its importance for the political growth of the individual.

The grammar school child becomes therefore an important object of political analysis. If a considerable portion of the intergenerational transmission of the political culture occurs in this earlier period, it behooves us to look to the circumstances and content of the young child's progressive acquaintance with things political. It is Greenstein's merit that he has given us the first fairly full empirical discussion of this politically vital segment of the member's life-cycle.

His evidence consists essentially of the responses of 659 children to a 49 item questionnaire plus some 20 individual interviews and observation of his respondents in several informal group sessions. In addition, Greenstein has exercised his considerable bibliographic talents to extract from the literature on child development some interesting information concerning long-term trends in children's exemplars. Seen in relation to some projects in this area currently under way, involving several thousands of respondents and hundreds of questionnaire items, Greenstein's data are, comparatively speaking, quite modest in scope. Yet, even with these limited data, he is able to engender some valuable hypotheses and perspectives about the political socialization phenomenon. He has an especially good ear for the major theoretical strains present in the still limited literature; and he integrates these nicely into his own analyses.

What his findings are about is the content of early political socialization, its historical trends, and how this content varies for sex and social status groupings. He does not concern himself with every kind of content nor does he tackle very directly several other major dimensions of the overall problem. The main force of the volume is rather upon the course of development of the child's feelings and cognitions concerning political authorities and upon those aspects of the child's democratically participant roles having to do with the accumulation of political information and partisan identifications. In a field of disciplinary specialization where the most significant dimensions of the general problem are just beginning to be recognized, Greenstein's specific problem choices are of obvious strategic theoretical value.

They are a far cry, nonetheless, from the location of benchmarks in every part of the researchable landscape. To give a full account of these processes would include relating systematically the kinds of developments he finds—as, for example, the highly positive initial image the child has of political authorities—to the particular influences of various of the socializing agents—the family, school, mass media, etc. This kind of analysis is not possible for Greenstein nor, seemingly, for anyone else at the present moment. Nor is Greenstein in a position to relate his findings in any but the most speculative way to present or future states of the American political system. The many connecting links between his micro-level findings and a macro-level analysis of the change and stability of political aggregates still remain to be worked out and tested. Some other dimensions about which Greenstein can say little involve the cross-cultural, comparative applications of his findings and the part of the general problem which concerns the nature of learning process *per se*—especially the specific organization of rewards and sanctions according to which these orientations become incorporated into the new member's psychic map of the political world.

We cannot, in all fairness, expect a pioneering venture to attempt to deal with every one of these questions. The author has wisely limited his efforts to a manageable domain. In doing so, he has added visibly to our understanding and has whetted our appetites for whatever future digging in this fertile ground may unearth.

JACK DENNIS

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Politics in the Congo, Decolonization and Independence. BY CRAWFORD YOUNG. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965. Pp. xii, 659. $12.50.)

Crawford Young has written an analysis of the disintegration of the Beglian Congo and its genesis as an independent state that is likely to stand, regardless of the fate of the Congo, as a major contribution to African studies and to the exploration of political transformations.

Though one of America's best informed and most perceptive students of the Congo, Young emphasizes the limitations of his contribution. "It would be rash indeed to claim that [this] analysis of decolonization processes in the Congo . . . had laid bare the essential motor elements in the political system and to presume to predict their direction. . . . Although there is abundant raw data on Congolese peoples, relatively little is directed to the critical question of social change. In [my] opinion, there is no adequate theory of social change which can serve as a reliable framework for analysis. [Hence] at this stage, one may walk more swiftly through the thickets of Congolese politics if one first unbuckles cumbersome methodologies." He is right to complain of the lack of relevant theory and (in other passages) of the plethora of unhelpful methods and frameworks for analyzing incomplete political systems persisting in processes of profound but unmanaged revolution. In this respect, the Congo constitutes only the extreme case of a pervasive and probably growing political condition, and dramatizes our intellectual distance from such problems. We continue to perfect concepts of order for the understanding of change.

In this respect, however, Young also underestimates his own accomplishment. No reader of this book will any longer be able to think of the explosive transition of the Congo as "chaos." If Young does not systematically tell us why countries like the Congo are handicapped in organizing modern political systems, he succeeds splendidly in explaining the nature and motion of Congolese forces. The reason for this achievement is that Young has asked those questions that go to the core of a particular evolving polity, and then sought generalizations which would meet the case. As a result, he can explain at different levels of abstraction several dozen different forces and trends. Because his study constitutes neither case study nor validation for any single hypothesis, Young seems reluctant to grant the power of the method he employs: a plenitude of relevant data joined by induction or analogy to new or familiar generalizations. Until we possess better deductive theories or more meaningful statistical correlations, the path followed by Young remains one of the most solid avenues for bringing us closer to a network of hypotheses about political change.

The book begins by giving us a clear view of the Belgian colonial system—a regime whose high reputation, paternalistic insensitivity, and helpless disintegration stemmed from its resolute substitution of administration, economics, and religion for politics. Belgium had built a seamless web that resembled traditional societies. The state subsidized the church, the church preached obedience to the state, and the higher civil servants joined the corporate monopolies after early retirement from government. Popular response to the large toll in human lives and suffering was held in check by the isolation of Congolese local elites from each other, and the insulation of administration in the Congo from politics in Belgium. Welfare, as a privilege and not a right, was the reward of Africans whose collaboration conformed to the expected model of "arrested adolescence." Change of this closed system was not envisaged, and the procedures of change within it most impressively (or depressingly) ritualized.

Unlike true traditional empires, however, the Congo's interlocked Belgian elite granted the underlying population neither autonomy nor integration nor could it offer the comfort of fixed, ultimate answers. On the contrary, the Congolese administration's commitment to closure and permanence was followed by its own inescapably modern practice: It could not function without introducing new norms, new relationships, new demands, new mobility, new ideas. When the pressures for change finally stood in patent and riotous contradiction to the need for stability, this system showed no capacity for institutionalizing change. It fell apart. The Belgian government discovered the limitations of its international strength and domestic divisions; the Church reconsidered its long-range interests in an independent Africa; and the corporations began to rely on their own great influence.

The largest and most important contribution in Young's book comes from his giving meaning to the unintended results of the Congolese devolution. He discusses the roots of ethnicity—of tribal solidarity formed not by the perpetuation of accustomed structure but under the stress of modernization in the midst of organized strangers—and explains why ethnicity remains far stronger than Congolese nationalism. He shows why a revolution conducted by bureaucrats was arrested with the Africanization of government and now lacks motivation and capacity at the center to proceed to the conscious transformation of society. He analyzes why political parties, whether composed of supporters, critics or more recent rebels, have all crumbled and the gap between elite and masses widened.

Who governs? Much of the Congo has continued to function in autonomous local, provincial, administrative, economic, and military spheres. That is much if one had feared anarchy, perceived as the product of inadequate authority. But if the fundamental cause of anarchy in the Congo is inadequate change, no one yet governs.

MANFRED HALPERN

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Political Culture and Political Development. Studies in Political Development, 5. ED. BY LUCIAN W. PYE AND SIDNEY VERBA. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965. Pp. x, 574. $10.00.)

Well in evidence in Herodotus, Thucydides, or Ibn Khaldun, the idea that peoples have an aggregate political temperament or moral character appears in a modern version when Machiavelli explains in Chapter XLIII of *The Discourses* that prediction of human events is facilitated if one observes that "nations preserve for a long time the same character, ever exhibiting the same dispositions to avarice, or bad faith, or to some other special vice or virtue." Two streams of thought connect this ancient concern with the present. The notion of "atavism" was transformed into theories about genetically-based cultural characteristics and "group psychology" which led not only to the forging of new ideological weapons but also to an intuitive and literary school of national character represented by Salvador de Madariaga's scintillating essays on Englishmen, Frenchmen, and Spaniards, commissioned by the League of Nations after World War I, or the writings of André Siegfried. For all its charm and insights, this school clearly contributed more to an understanding of the attitudes of intellectuals of one nation to other nations than to a knowledge of the politics of the countries they observed; furthermore, it became increasingly suspect because of its inescapable link with racism. The second stream, represented by Tocqueville and Sir Ernest Barker, is based on the notion that the origins of political institutions and their subsequent fate have an effect on the formation of habits and beliefs in the political realm, forming what Barker called "the spiritual superstructure" of the nation. This approach has been institutionalized by the inclusion of introductory background chapters in standard textbooks on foreign governments.

The search for a respectable scientific approach to "national character" continues to reflect the concern expressed by John Stuart Mill in *A System of Logic* for a science of "ethology" which he believed was needed to provide an indispensable step between the study of the mind and the study of mankind in the mass. Because it has led to so many unsatisfactory results, some contemporary social scientists have been inclined to abandon it altogether. Those who study the politics of countries other than their own, however, have persisted because their conceptual approaches, which include usually in some form the notion of "national actors," lead them to investigate the relationship between the political systems of these actors and the societies in which they operate. This in turn requires a way of defining the relevant attributes of these societies as distinguished from the aggregate attributes of their individual members.

Hence, the search has remained a major theme in comparative politics. Its picaresque trail has been marked by more or less happy encounters with recent personality theories and different schools of cultural anthropology; on the methodological side, by liaisons with attitudinal research and the techniques of multivariate analysis. The most recent avatars of "national character" are the related concepts of "modal personality," explicated by Inkeles and Levinson, and of "political culture," in whose development Gabriel Almond has played a major role and whose guiding spirit is acknowledged by the editors of the volume under consideration and by most contributors.

The present book must therefore be evaluated as a courageous attempt to explore an extremely important but still inchoate field of political research which has hitherto trapped many distinguished thinkers. Since that is clearly its purpose, in keeping with the other published results of the lively activities of the Social Science Research Council's Committee on Comparative Politics, it is not surprising that the book does not provide a definitive statement of the concept "political culture" in relation to other aspects of political life, but rather a group of exemplary approaches to the problem for particular countries contributed by ten experienced area specialists sandwiched between a brief introduction to the subject by Lucian Pye and a lengthy essay intended as a guide for further thought and research by his co-editor, Sidney Verba. The essays on Great Britain, Italy, Germany, and Mexico make use in part of the materials gathered by Almond and Verba for *The Civic Culture* but are fully original contributions; the pieces on Turkey and Japan provide continuity with Volume 3 of the Committee's series; and the remainder deal with India, Ethiopia, Egypt, and Soviet Russia.

Surveying these contributions, one comes away with the impression that the domain of "political culture" is indeed extremely broad. Richard Rose, for example, views his assignment as a study of "the relationship of English society to British Government" and devotes much attention to social stratification and other structural aspects of society, while for Frederick Barghoorn, an examination of Soviet political culture requires first of all a study of the functions and structures of the CPSU, its interactions with groups in Soviet society, political socialization and recruitment. There are rather fundamental differences in the conceptualizations exemplified by the approaches of Sidney Verba, whose account of the remaking of political culture in post-war Germany deals almost exclusively with political attitudes at the aggregate mass level, and of Leonard Binder, who focuses on the contribution of Egyptian elites to that country's integrative revolution.

Political culture ultimately appears to include not only beliefs, cognitions, values, and symbols pertaining to politics, but also mechanisms for socialization and recruitment, political history, and political institutions. There seems to be agreement that it is an "aspect" of any and all of these, but perhaps less agreement on which of these aspects are most relevant. Two trends emerge: on the one hand, what might be called the "psychocultural" approach linked with the concept of modal personality and modal attitudes; on the other, what might be called a "structural" approach which is combined with a special concern with social stratification, recruitment, socialization, and the make-up of politically relevant elites. These correspond, of course, to more general, divergent, but not necessarily irreconcilable paths in contemporary political science. Since at this stage of the discipline's growth an abundance of conceptual entrepreneurs is preferable to the premature achievement of theoretical monopolies, the fact that both trends are represented by serious practitioners in this book is perhaps the volume's major quality.

Either of these approaches, and the combination of both that is found in some of the essays and in Verba's conclusions, constitutes a major improvement over the often delightful but usually unreliable approach to "national character" which prevailed in the days of political science *de salon*. But there are still some serious conceptual problems. A number of the contributors subscribe to the notion that "modernization" or "development" is somehow related to "pluralism," but then one man's "pluralism" is another man's "fragmentation," much as what one man views as a concern with privacy is seen by another as evidence of isolation or "anti-social attitudes." A more troubling note is that unexplainably, the only thing that seems to be systematically excluded from the domain of "political culture" is the explicit set of organized political concepts usually encompassed by the terms "political thought" and "political ideology." It would be very sad if in the course of avoiding the alleged "formalism" of their predecessors contemporary students of political culture threw the baby out with the bath.

Aristide R. Zolberg
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Education and Political Development, Studies in Political Development, 4. Ed. by James S. Coleman. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965. Pp. xii, 620. $10.00.)

Professor Coleman is one of the few truly creative contributors to political science. Had this book been confined to essays by him on education and political development in Africa, it would have been an outstanding effort. As it is, the multi-authored symposium with world-wide generalizations lacks balance and even quality at many points, despite the efforts of the Editor to lend continuity.

The Committee on Comparative Politics of the Social Science Research Council sponsored a seminar at Lake Arrowhead, California, in June 1962. The essays in the present volume were those presented at the conference, appropriately revised, and together constitute number four of the Committee's series of "Studies in Political Development."

In a straight forward and substantial introduction to the symposium, Professor Coleman sets forth definitions of political development and education and recites the history of neglect of politics by educationists and of education by political scientists. Defining education as the formal school and university system, the Editor identifies three processes of the political system "which have a fairly clear relationship to education . . . political socialization, political recruitment, and political integration" (pp. 17–18). His subsequent discussion of these three processes is one of the strongest sections of the book. It would have helped had more precise definitions of different kinds of political elites been set forth, since they are used by the several authors differently—and even by the same author (e.g., p. 229 where political elites, governing elites, and members of the higher bureaucracy are mentioned without clear indication of differences of function).

The rest of this symposium is organized into four parts, with two to seven essays grouped under each heading together with four additional introductions by the Editor. The contributions are very uneven and do not present similar research results from different countries. Happily, Professor Coleman's introduction to each of the sections frequently goes well beyond anything the individual essay authors touch upon. The difficulty is one typical of many written symposia based upon conferences: There is automatically pressure to have all the papers published, and any that are left out cause hurt feelings. The result is usually a potpourri of diverse views and research upon a topic rather loosely defined in practice. This is the central characteristic of the present volume.

However, one can use a different yardstick for symposia. It is sometimes useful to have diverse approaches to a broad topic. They add to the variety of insights that can be obtained. They counter any tendency to oversimplify an otherwise complicated picture. The way to a more systematic approach or approaches to the subject can be made clearer and thus valuable subsequent research can be stimulated. This the present volume also does.

Part I is devoted to patterns and problems of educational underdevelopment, a rather bulky title that covers a series of very uneven essays. Of the seven individual treatments, that by Joseph Fischer of the University of California easily stands out for its excellent examination of education and politics in Indonesia. He casts his reflective insight on educational change and how it is related to political mobilization, socialization, acculturation, and elites. Part I begins with two rather general chapters by Francis X. Sutton and Michel Debeauvais, the former emphasizing British Africa and the latter French Africa. Three African case studies are included, Leon Carl Brown's competent historical essay on Tunisia, Metcolm H. Kerr's chronological account of Egypt, and Ayo Ogunsheye's reflections on his own country, Nigeria. The section closes with Frank Bonilla's comments on the background of education and the background of politics in Brazil.

The most closely integrated and persuasive section is Part II, devoted to patterns of polity-directed educational development. While Coleman is not at his best in the introduction, he correctly judges that his contributors can carry the burden of the argument. The essay by Jeremy R. Azrael on the Soviet Union never loses its cogency and tight focus on political elites and political education. "The ultimate goal of the educational system," states Azrael, is "to render terror superfluous by establishing a *totalitarian* consensus in society and creating a 'new man' characterized by the sort of self-control and self-mobilization that would permit the establishment of a wholly 'consensual' or 'popular' totalitarianism (p. 267)." Herbert Passin devotes half his attention to a smooth-flowing account of the educational system of Japan, and then examines in clear-cut terms its social and political impact, emphasizing the period of the modernization of Japan. In his discussion of the Philippines, Carl H. Landé follows the lead of Professor Coleman as closely as any symposium member in examining political processes and education, namely, nation-building, political socialization, recruitment, political integration, and education and democracy.

Part III takes second place in quality. Its five essays and introduction are exceedingly unbalanced, but they illustrate some of the advantages of varied approaches to a subject. Anthony H. M. Kirk-Greene takes Northern Nigeria as his model. While his contribution says little about most of the central themes of the book, it is a fine piece on the problems an educational administrator encounters when posted in such an area. A second African case study, Dwaine Marvick's essay on university students from Sierra Leone and Nigeria at Fourah Bay College, is a good example of a limited empirical study with broad significance. The chapter by Edward A. Shils is in part a restatement of his views on India. He also includes some general reflections. Concluding on the theme that intellectuals in the newly independent nations are in danger of isolation, he recommends the fostering of opportunities for regional and continental contact, and adds, "The custodians of the intellectual communities of the new states must therefore bear constantly in mind that the precipitation of a new and indigenous intellectual center of gravity within their own countries requires simultaneously the cultivation of good relations with the intellectual community outside and with the authoritative, executive sectors of their own society." In chronological fashion, from traditional Chinese education to the party cadres in Communist China, John Wilson Lewis sets forth an excellent account of elite formation. Education of military leadership in the emergent states is the theme of a general account by William F. Gutteridge.

Unfortunately, the volume ends on a weak note. Part IV on educational planning and political development contains nothing that is new and very little that is specific. The essays by Bert F. Hoselitz on investment in education and by William J. Platt on conflicts in educational planning might usefully serve as an introduction to those who are new to the field, but they do not test new generalizations or present disciplined interpretations.

The contributions by the editor are of high quality. As he himself states, the developing countries of the world reveal enormous differences in education and politics (p. 356). Still, his examples are overwhelmingly from Africa (e.g., see the Introduction to Part I). And the generalizations that follow are not necessarily applicable to other regions. Thus his references to the social sciences (p. 534) and to expatriate scholars (p. 535) have more relevance to present-day Africa than to present-day Asia.

There are eight or ten strong essays in the volume, plus the contributions of the editor. Building the book on these would have been preferable. The Committee on Comparative Politics should consider being more selective and more restrictive as to focus next time around.

EDWARD W. WEIDNER
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The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi, Volumes I–XII (1884–1914). ED. BY INDIAN MINISTRY OF INFORMATION AND BROADCASTING. (Delhi, India: [Government] Publications Division, 1958–1964.)

The Government of India, in 1956, put its resources behind the task of collecting, annotating, and publishing in full the voluminous writings, utterances, and correspondence of their great leader, Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi. The documents are being arranged in chronological order, thus constituting a comprehensive record which permits us to view Gandhi's manner of dealing with issues, great and small, as they arose. As the late Prime Minister Nehru put it in a foreword,

> In a collection like this there is bound to be a mixture of what might be called the important and the unimportant or the casual. Yet, sometimes it is the casual word that throws more light on a person's thinking than a more studied writing or utterance. In any event, who are we to pick and choose? Let him speak for himself. To him life was an integrated whole, a closely woven garment of many colours. A word to a child, a touch of healing to a sufferer, was as important as a resolution of challenge to the British Empire (Vol. I, p. x).

Two editions are being prepared, one in English and one in Hindi. The task is increased by the fact that Gandhi expressed himself in three languages, Gujarati, English, and Hindi. Great care has been taken with the translations, and the scholarly apparatus is complete with index, chronologies, notes as to sources, persons, and places, and valuable appendices containing texts of relevant legislation and of speeches, letters, and reports written by others which elucidate the Gandhi documents. The Government's decision to undertake this task was applauded throughout India. The manner in which it is being carried out deserves the plaudits of the scholarly world.

Gandhi, as has been frequently pointed out, never formulated a philosophy or systematized his ideas. He focused on problem-solving, viewing his life as a continuous series of experiments using methods devised to accord with his fundamental values, truth and *ahimsa* (nonviolence extended to non-harmfulness to all forms of life). No problem was too large to be tackled, or too small to receive his attention.

Underlying these experiments was an urge to relieve suffering and a belief that human nature must ultimately respond to appeals to its nobler qualities. He was guided in his activities by the light, first, of a conscience honed to a sharp cutting edge through study (and acceptance) of the basic moral precepts of all major religions (not excluding atheism), and, second, of an intellect similarly sharpened by the study and practice of law. He attempted to be objective and engaged in introspection, but his self-awareness was distinctly pre-Freudian. Such a man, armed with the conviction that all problems could be made to yield to his methods, was indeed a formidable, if unfailingly courteous, adversary. The younger Gladstone has given this view of Gandhi as a negotiator:

> . . . It is no easy task for a European to conduct negotiations with Mr. Gandhi. The workings of his conscience are inscrutable to the occidental mind and produce complications in wholly unexpected places. His ethical and intellectual attitude, based as it appears to be on a curious compound of mysticism and astuteness, baffles the ordinary processes of thought. Nevertheless, a tolerably practical understanding has been reached (Vol. XII, p. 324, note 1).

Viscount Gladstone has here summed up what was to become a recurring theme in Gandhi's life. Colleagues as well as opponents frequently found themselves baffled by Gandhi, only to conclude that his campaigns ultimately had produced practical results.

Bafflement persists, and indeed appears to be a major impulse behind the present effort to seek out every scrap of Gandhiana. For it should be emphasized that the purpose here is not to preserve relics but to gain comprehension of a most complex figure whom India can neither forget nor follow.

When the record is complete, it is expected to run to fifty volumes. The first twelve, which have now reached these shores (three more have left the presses), form a natural unit, covering Gandhi's twenty-year period in South Africa. These were crucial years. Gandhi went to Durban as an inexperienced young man of 23. Under the goading of South Africa's racist policies, he suffered physical abuse, humiliation, and frustration, but in the process forged and refined a weapon he called satyagraha (adhering to truth). In his hands "passive resistance" became active, combining self-suffering (to prick the adversary's conscience) with reasoned statements (to win the adversary's mind). Above all, it was strictly truthful and quixotically chivalrous, disdaining to take advantage of the adversary's misfortunes. He won the respect of General Smuts, and was able to conclude an agreement for legislation lifting restrictions against Indians. He returned to India—which he considered a far more fertile field for experimentation—a powerful personality, confident in the possession of a "sovereign remedy" for India's ills.

Is this "sovereign remedy" applicable to the ills of the world today? Many questions arise in the mind, including such matters as whether the successes Gandhi achieved are to be explained in his terms. Can the role of the various ingredients in his method be separately assessed? Does astuteness in choice of issue outweigh purity of motives? Can an essential core be extracted from his techniques, or would the method fail if any ingredients are lacking? Clearly many movements which currently use his name are pervaded by a spirit diametrically opposed to his. How does this affect their prospects? Perhaps only further experimentation can provide adequate answers. But the issues which divide us warrant close study of the remarkable documents now being made available, if only to pinpoint areas worthy of investigation.

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BOOK NOTES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

POLITICAL THEORY, HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT, AND METHODOLOGY

Nicolai de Cusa, De Concordantia Catholica, EDITED BY GERHARD KALLEN. (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag. Book I, 1964. Pp. xxxix, 90. DM 50. Book II, 1965. Pp. 214. DM 60.)

The political writings of Nicholas of Cusa have received increasing attention in recent years, not only among German scholars where every aspect of his life and writings has received intensive study during the last thirty years, but in the English-speaking world as well. To some extent this is the result of the revival of conciliar themes in the discussions surrounding the Second Vatican Council, many of which Cusa anticipated by five centuries. More fundamentally it is due to a general advance in England and the United States in the past fifteen years in the study of canonist thought in relation to political theory.

The renewal of interest in Nicholas of Cusa has been made possible because it is only recently that we have a scholarly text of his monumental work of political theory, *De Concordantia Catholica* (1433). The volumes under review are a revised edition of the first two books of the *Concordantia,* originally published in 1939 and 1941 respectively. Due to wartime conditions the earlier edition was not widely distributed, and the publisher's stock of the first two books and the type which was set for the third book were destroyed in an air raid on Leipzig in the summer of 1943. Book III was finally published in 1959. All three books are edited by Gerhard Kallen, now professor emeritus of the University of Cologne, who was originally entrusted with this edition by the *Cusanus Kommission* of the Heidelberg Academy of Sciences in 1928. Now at the age of 82, he has completed what has become for him a life work.

A critical edition of the *Concordantia Catholica* is a life work because it is a veritable encyclopedia of references to medieval theology, philosophy, political thought, and even natural science. In the footnotes to this edition Kallen has checked every reference, given its citation in printed editions, and corrected it where (as frequently) Nicholas departs from the original text. He has also included all the relevant secondary literature and given frequent references, where appropriate, to Cusa's personal library, still largely intact at Bernkastel-Kues in the Moselle valley.

Kallen's most important labor was to compare all extant manuscripts and establish an authoritative text. This edition gives all variant readings in the apparatus, and Kallen has written an introduction (in Latin) which uses the manuscript history to throw new light on the composition and content of the *Concordantia.* From an outline in the introduction to the Basel manuscript he was able to reconstruct the contents of an earlier conciliar treatise which was more narrowly concerned with the structure of the church and the relations of pope and council than is the final *De Concordantia Catholica.* The first version corresponds to the first book and sections of the second book, but does not include the general discussions of natural law and consent in Book II, nor the treatise on the empire which comprises the third book. This would explain the ambiguity of the term, *ecclesia,* as it is used by Nicholas, since the first version was primarily concerned with the church as the priesthood while the final version defines it to include all Christians and describes the priesthood and the empire as the soul and the body, respectively, of the church. Kallen has also determined that the last chapter of Book II and the preface to Book III were written after the other parts of the work. This is important since these are the only sections which mention Marsilius and Aristotle and knowing when they were written helps to establish the influence of the two writers upon his theory (see this reviewer's article on the subject in the *Journal of the History of Ideas,* vol. XXIII, no. 3, 1962). From internal evidence Kallen also establishes the date and place of composition of the *Concordantia,* differing somewhat in this respect from the standard biography by Edmond Vansteenberghe.

Despite the fact that it contains a fuller set of references and makes use of more manuscripts, the revised edition of the first two books contains no greater number of pages than the books published during the war. This was done by juggling and compressing of footnotes, so that there would be no overlapping with Book III, the pagination of which was based on the earlier edition. The practice of enumeration of paragraphs was introduced in Book III and this has now been adopted for the new edition of the first two books, but there is bound to be some confusion since there is a slight difference in the location of pages throughout. A concordance of the references to the old Book II made in Book I appears at the end of the second book.

Kallen's footnotes make clear the dependence of Book I upon the writings of the church fathers, especially Augustine, Ambrose, and Cyprian. He does not elucidate the disputed question of the source of the influence of Dionysius the Areopagite which presents a problem, since although Book I is unmistakably dependent upon the Dionysian hierarchies, Nicholas denied in one of his later works that he had read him until some years after the composition of the *Concordantia*. Book II shows the influence of the canonists much more clearly. Where the legal quotations in Book I are principally from Gratian's *Decretum*, Book II makes considerable use of the canonist commentaries, especially Hostiensis and the Archdeacon (Guido de Baysio). Yet in the important discussion of consent based on natural equality as the foundation of all law and government (Book II, chapter xiv), Kallen's footnotes refer only to Aristotle's *Politics* and Aquinas' *Commentary on the Politics*. It seems to this reviewer much more likely that the theory is derived from a canonistic source, particularly since Cusa hardly ever mentions Aquinas and probably had not read Aristotle at this time. (The quotations from Aristotle in the preface to the third book were taken without attribution from Marsilius.) Francisco Zabarella, who was both a canonist and a conciliarist, is quoted earlier in another connection, and he may have influenced Nicholas in making consent a central element in his conciliar theory. Some reference might also have been made in the footnotes for this passage to the many versions of the idea of original natural equality which appear in the writings of the Roman and canon lawyers. Cusa's originality, of course, lay in linking consent to natural equality, which earlier writers had not done (and the author of the *Vindiciae*, John Locke, and Thomas Jefferson were later to do with greater effect).

This edition is an indispensable aid to the student of ancient and medieval political theory. For instructional purposes, we still need an English translation, since the excerpts provided in Coker's *Readings in Political Philosophy* are inadequate. (This reviewer is working on such a translation.) We are still some distance from the day when "the average professor will be able to dip into his well-underlined copy of Cusa's *De Concordantia Catholica* with the same facility with which earlier in the semester he had turned to the *Politics* of Aristotle" (Ewart Lewis, *Medieval Political Ideas*, I, vii), but Professor Kallen has brought it much closer with this valuable edition of one of the most important medieval political theorists.—PAUL E. SIGMUND, *Princeton University*.

Marxism: One Hundred Years in the Life of a Doctrine. BY BERTRAM D. WOLFE. (New York: The Dial Press, 1965. Pp. xxiii, 404. $6.95.)

Bertram D. Wolfe has gained, and deserved, high honours for his historical writing. His *Three Who Made Revolution*—a sort of combined biography of Lenin, Trotsky and Stalin—was at once scholarly and written with great verve and felicity. It was fascinating reading and remains, I think, his best work. His later writings were less substantial and were sometimes infected with the Cold War fever.

The volume under review is a biography of Marxist doctrines, and is almost bound to be less exciting than a biography of men. Yet students of the history of ideas, particularly of Marxist ideas, will find this book of absorbing interest. It has lavish documentation and quotation, a lively and felicitous style, and the author has a keen eye for the incongruous and conflicting elements built into the whole Marxist system. Occasionally he nods (e.g., Engels is put in Birmingham instead of Manchester on p. 254) but a few flaws do not seriously damage a book of very high quality.

If the book has a central theme, it is that Marxism " . . . is complex and varied, unified by a single person and a temperament rather than by any systematic logic or consistency." (P. xxii.) The "ambiguous legacy" of Marxism is tellingly displayed in many instances. Was Marx a nationalist? Yes—of sorts, and especially where German nationalism was involved. Was he not also an internationalist? Yes—now and then, and up to a point. Did he favour national wars? Yes—often. Did he not also favour the international class war? But of course—sometimes. These conflicting attitudes and their tortuous theoretical justifications were not confined to the writings of Marx and Engels, but showed up also in the First and Second Internationals, in Lenin and the whole Communist movement.

The author takes a number of key concepts, such as "revolution" and "dictatorship of the proletariat," and shows with devastating documentation their ambiguity, their varying interpretation, and their adaptation to party tactics. So too with the much-touted Marxist theory of human nature, with the vision of the final, classless society, and with the Marxist claim to be "scientific." The Marxist doctrines are an *ism*, a faith. But what is heresy and what orthodoxy in this foggy world where every object is shifting and dimly outlined?

In passing, the author notes that some Western scholars throw out all that the mature Marx lived for and wrote about, and go instead to Marx's rough notebooks of 1844 as to a fount of wisdom. I agree entirely with Mr. Wolfe that this search for profundity in the early Marx is misguided, even perverse. One hopes this fad of rescusitating the early Marx, and reading wise meanings into his confused notes, will soon pass.

There was a time, not so long ago, when there was little serious Marxist scholarship in the United States. That day has passed, and Mr. Wolfe's book is one of several good evidences for it. No doubt a lot of what Mr. Wolfe says has been said before, but never better, never so convincingly or with the same thoroughness. One hopes this book will soon appear in a paperback edition for widespread student use.—H. B. MAYO, *University of Western Ontario.*

The Great Evasion; An Essay on the Contemporary Relevance of Karl Marx and on the Wisdom of Admitting the Heretic into the Dialogue About America's Future. BY WILLIAM APPLEMAN WILLIAMS. (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1964. Pp. 189. $4.50.)

This book makes a penetrating survey of the economic and social conditions which exist in contemporary America. It is a scintillating review of our major weaknesses, and interestingly points up certain aspects of our problems as they appear in new relationships not usually considered. The book imparts an urgent desire to begin immediately our efforts at improvement, or, as the author sees it, transformation. To those interested in social outcomes and utopias, the book is well worth reading.

Overall, there appears to be an attempt in the book to reconcile Marxism with Christianity. This implied parallelism glorifies Marx more than it does Christ and His church. This effect is acheived in part by omitting those Marxian prinicples that are least acceptable in western society. The author ignores Marx's atheism but upholds some of his other teachings as akin to Christ's. He brushes aside Marx's hostility to the Christian Church and religion. He steps lightly over Marx's theory of economic determinism and, indeed, confutes it by assuming that man's social condition stems largely from his ideas and their deliberate and conscious application to his social situation, rather than being an inexorable consequence of the economic system under which he lives.

The same treatment is accorded Marx's doctrine of class warfare; with good reason, no doubt, since its acceptance would shatter any possibility of an "integrated community" in present western society. Williams evades Marx's doctrines of the revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat. Only peaceful change, engineered by a "national class" or group of leaders is conceivable. He redefines the concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat as not only the exploited worker, but the culturally deprived. This definition seems totally at odds with that of Marx because it cuts across class lines. In the United States, this definition would include large numbers of every class (income group) and in so doing would destroy the Marxian system. Hence, William ignores the so-called "scientific socialism" of Marx completely.

The catalyzing agent for change gets its dynamic character, Williams contends, from the exploitation, deprivation, and alienation of the low income groups. The author asserts that capitalism in America, while seeming to be bettering conditions is, in reality, making them worse. Abroad, American colonialism and imperialism are causing impoverishment, revolution and war. Capitalism is too "possessive" and egoistic to evade the exploitation of the common man wherever it (capitalism) is practiced.

There is no escape from a gradual disintegration and eventual death of viable society unless we reunite the selfish and egoistic part of man, now absorbed in the capitalistic system, and his social self. This act of union can eventuate only through participation in the "great community," which approximates to some form of socialism. Just what the form must be is not made clear, but it must include certain principles: (1) the development of "integrated personalities," akin to the ancient Greeks; (2) a democratic society in which all must participate; (3) government by politically intelligent and just leaders; (4) "cybernetic production" where machines will replace the labor of men; (5) a humane and loving spirit in men who will be imbued with the desire to respect others and cooperate with them; (6) freedom of the individual through participation in the group; and (7) extensive education for leisure-time pursuits.

In some ways the book itself may be a great evasion: (1) of Marxian principles; (2) of capitalist achievements towards the ideal community; (3) of a more clear-cut and specific statement of the nature of the ideal community; and (4) of the real meaning of freedom. Because, if freedom is not to be attained by coercion, it will almost certainly find its fulfillment in ways of life, different in many respects than that envisaged in this book. —FLOYD A. CAVE, *San Francisco State College.*

Statesmanship and Party Government—A Study of Burke and Bolingbroke. BY HARVEY C. MANSFIELD, JR. (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1965. Pp. xii, 281. $7.50.)

One of the most striking features of contemporary politics is the fact that political parties, formerly deplored as factions, are now almost universally accepted as a necessary and valuable basis for political action. Many explanations, economic, political or what have you, have been put forward in an attempt to account for this development. Without wholly rejecting these explanations, Mansfield believes that the reason for the emergence, and for the character, of modern parties is to be found, in part at least, in the field of political theory. In 18th-century England, long before the actual emergence of party government in the modern sense, a radically new view of the role of parties had already been developed in the writings of Burke and Bolingbroke. To demonstrate the novelty of this view, and to show its relevance as a factor in subsequent political developments, is the purpose of this book.

Although Burke and Bolingbroke were different in many ways, they also had much in common. Both were followers of the "modern" school of natural rights, philosophically rooted in a strictly individualistic hedonism. Both welcomed the contemporary decline of religious dogmatism and the relatively tolerant act of settlement which, by removing religion from the field of political controversy, had eliminated the need for the "great" political parties of the 17th century, parties irreconcilably devoted to the task of destroying one another. Both were agreed that the disappearance of "great" parties made it necessary and desirable to develop parties of a wholly different kind. Where they diverged was in their conception of the nature and of the proper function of these new parties.

Bolingbroke, though the first to argue openly for the formation of a political party, regarded partisanship not as a permanent necessity, but as a temporary expedient. An optimistic rationalist of the most extreme sort, he believed that most people, as a matter of enlightened self-interest, could readily reach agreement on all important matters. The only real problem of politics is to insure that public offices are staffed by the ablest men, the men most competent to implement the obvious public purposes desired by all reasonable men. If a party of patriots was needed at the moment, it was simply because a greedy faction of Whig magnates had managed, in the wake of the Glorious Revolution, to acquire an undeserved monopoly of political office. The purpose of a patriot party, under the authority of a patriot king, would be to break this monopoly and establish a regime in which public responsibilities were assigned, objectively and without any sort of favoritism, to the best available men. Once this had been done, the new system would be so clearly in the interests of all that all would gladly support it. In a nation now made up almost wholly of patriots, there would be no further need for partisanship.

Burke's view of parties was developed in direct opposition of all this. A rationalist of less sanguine temper than Bolingbroke, he believed in the necessity for traditional institutions as a check on the greed and ignorance of men. Politically he favored a balanced constitution in which men of substance, themselves deeply rooted in family traditions of their own, would be able to control the otherwise inevitable excesses of an unbridled administration. Seeing in the activities of George III and his King's Men a covert attempt to apply the principles of Bolingbroke, he tried to encourage the gentlemen of England to develop their existing party loyalties into permanent institutions, institutions strong enough to resist the blandishments of royal patronage and thus to restore the threatened balance of the British constitution. To have done this openly, in a time when the royal favor was still a matter of vital importance, would have been dangerously imprudent. His message was therefore delivered in a series of writings in which his real position was never clearly stated. Masking his purposes under a veil of brilliantly artful rhetoric, he tried to nudge his fellow gentlemen, more often by hint and implication than by direct statement, to accept party institutions as a permanent and necessary feature of the British system of government.

Mansfield is clearly a very capable scholar. His book is full of challenging and rewarding insights, and will be read with pleasure and profit by all students of 18th-century thought. But it will be hard for many, as it is for the present reviewer, to follow him to his final conclusions. For Mansfield believes that the characteristic shape of modern political parties, with their frequent confrontation of sanguinely innovative progressives and tradition-minded conservatives, is in some sense an outcome of the 18th-century debate. The conditions of modern democratic politics are too radically different from those of that earlier day to make this wholly credible. And it is hard to believe that a Burke as arcane and secretive as the one here presented could ever have had the kind of influence on public events that Mansfield would ascribe him.—Frederick M. Watkins, *Yale University*.

Metodologia delle scienze sociali. By Giulio Bolacchi (Rome: Edizioni Ricerche, 1963. Pp. 241. L.3,000.)

"Methodology" is a term which can have a variety of different meanings for political scientists, as Driscoll and Hyneman have pointed out in their bibliographic article in this Review in March, 1955. Many of us tend to view methodology in terms of general approaches to the study of political science, or in terms of types of procedures for collecting and interpreting data. But in a broader sense, methodology can involve attempts to relate the natural sciences to the social sciences, to consider questions of epistemology and scientific method, and to develop forms of scientific discourse suitable, at a maximum level of abstraction, for both the natural and the social sciences. This book is concerned with methodological problems that transcend the boundaries of a single discipline.

Bolacchi devotes the first half of his book primarily to definitions, semantic relationships, and linguistic structures. In his approach to the behavioral sciences, he draws a number of semantic concepts and terms from the works of Charles Morris and Rudolph Carnap, particularly Morris's "disposition to respond" which he regards as a more precise characterization of the commonly-used term "interest." He is also concerned with distinguishing between theoretical language and observation language, and with discussing the problem of the empirical verifiability of abstract linguistic structures, which can only be justified on the basis of their usefulness for the purposes they are intended to serve—clarification and interpretation.

These essentially introductory chapters are followed by chapters dealing with the concept of "structure," with the relationship between the natural sciences and the behavioral sciences, and with the basic predicates of the social sciences. In this section, which constitutes the main body of his work, we find the author analyzing the ideas of Rudolph Carnap, Hans Reichenbach, Bertrand Russell, Talcott Parsons, Ludwig von Bertalanffy, J. B. Clark, and Ralf Dahrendorf, among others. The discussion ranges from linguistics to physics, from mathematics to economics, from biology to sociology. But Bolacchi's purpose is not merely to survey the various approaches to scientific method: were this the case, his bibliography would have to be regarded as being highly selective, to say the least. Rather, he is attempting to develop his own methodological approach and is using the works of the aforementioned authors as a means of constructing his theory and refining his concepts. Thus, for example, he discusses critically Reichenbach's concepts of "order of time" and "direction of time," and then goes on to suggest that "open ordered series" should be the standard concept for examining causal relationships in scientific discourse. In the course of his analysis, certain basic predicates ("open ordered series," "system," "structure," and "irreversibility") emerge as common to both the natural and the behavioral sciences. At a lower level of abstraction, the social sciences are characterized by certain basic predicates of their own ("interest or disposition to respond," "dispositional field"), which are not applicable to the natural sciences. And at a still lower level of abstraction, each of the social sciences has its own fundamental predicates: marginal utility in the case of economics, interrelation of interests in the case of sociology.

Bolacchi's work appears to be a provocative and worthwhile contribution to the general problem of scientific method in the social sciences. His conceptual scheme is based on a very rigorous logical foundation. And his ability to analyze and synthesize the theories of a considerable number of non-Italian scholars in a variety of disciplines should make this book particularly useful for Italian students. One might, to be sure, raise the question as to whether or not it was really necessary to devote two entire chapters to a detailed appraisal of Carnap's linguistic theories when a more concise treatment might have better clarified the relevance of these theories to the concepts developed later on in the book; but this is a minor point.

A more serious complaint is based on the author's failure to mention political science at all. There is a passing reference to "juridical science," which "analyzes social structures in terms of the specific contents of institutional power . . . "; but one is left with the impression that "juridical science" is simply a branch of sociology. This attitude on the author's part is understandable if we consider the present embryonic condition of political science in Italy, where only a handful of universities have political science departments; but it certainly represents a serious lacuna in a work that deals with the methodology of the social sciences. In fact, this point (combined with the explicit exclusion of history from the author's discussion) raises a further question: is the author talking about *social* sciences, or *behavioral* sciences, or does he regard the two terms as synonymous?—RAPHAEL ZARISKI, *University of Nebraska.*

The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups. BY MANEUR OLSON, JR. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965. Pp. 175. $4.50.)

Professor Olson applies some of the analytical procedures used in economic studies to discover the rewards that are available to the members of groups or organizations. (The two are synonymous, i.e. no group is without its organization.) The technique permits him to find that differential rewards to individual members characterize groups of different sizes; in general, smaller sized groups have as members those who are more directly rewarded by activities of their organizations and larger, i.e. "latent" groupings, have greater difficulties in showing adequate rewards and consequently in maintaining their organizations. In such organizations the "rational individual" calculates that he will gain only minor rewards or endure only minor losses from non-membership. Therefore it is rational not to pay the cost of membership when the rewards are distributed to all automatically or alternatively the costs to the individual exceed the rewards. Olson uses the analogy of the perfectly competitive market of neo-classical economics to "explain" the situation. He concludes that "*only a separate and 'selective' incentive* (*six*) will stimulate a rational individual in a latent group to act in a group oriented way." Such groups may also become effective by "force," that is through compulsion to participate, e.g. union shops or public authority to require uniform action.

In three successive chapters the author examines the literature on labor unions and economic freedom, orthodox theories of state and class, and orthodox theories of pressure groups. In view of his structures in the first two chapters it will not be a surprise that he concludes that "The 'group theory' that dominates the discussions of pressure groups is inadequate for large economic groups, at least, and there is accordingly a need for a new theory."

The last chapter is devoted to this theory, and the major premise is that the large economic groups that engage in lobbying activities have that activity as a result of another and more important purpose. It is the other purposes that "explain" the existence of organizations and provide the rewards justifying rational individuals in their membership. Lobbying is a by-product.

The study is ingenious if not ingenuous. Professor Olson has provided a useful analysis of the differences between sizes of groups and their potential consequences for a rational individual, a task that has long been needed. The outcome is suggestive. He has not done an empirical study, but he cites a number of relevant studies that exist. Primarily he is using logical techniques to draw conclusions from premises. At times he writes as if the logical outcomes were empirically based; at other times it is not clear what is intended. There is an ambiguity in his notion of 'force' that is not clarified. He is correct that compulsion is frequently used to aid a group or organization, but it is not clear what is the source of the compulsion. He concedes that private, i.e. non-governmental, groups can compel, but he does not "explain" how it is that governmental agencies can sometimes compel and at other times are unsuccessful in assisting a group to accomplish a public goal that is provided in a statute and its related administrative agencies. Anyone developing a group theory as he purports to do should "explain" how compulsion by government can fail, e.g. in the South today. Governmental activity is activity by individuals and it may fail or succeed in proportion as it "represents" an underlying base. Olson's rational individuals are abstractions and at best provide a basis for forecasting. Governmental agencies may act on behalf of a latent population without an intervening organization, e.g. migrant workers. He relies heavily in his political analysis on Schattschneider who seems to say that political parties are not groups. Surely that is an anomaly in a system with more than one party.—CHARLES B. HAGAN, *University of Illinois*.

Politics: A Study of Control Behavior. BY NEIL A. McDONALD. (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1965. Pp. ix, 264. $7.50.)

This book is an essay in political theory directed toward the explanation of a particular aspect of political behavior. Professor McDonald seeks to explain or understand the conditions under which men obey. He is not especially concerned with those situations in which men obey other men because they are given no alternative, rather he is interested in those kinds of behaviors which, as he says, "tend to be wide spread and regular and which require sacrifices, outputs, and restraints, but in which there is no obvious return or satisfaction" (p. 6). He begins his inquiry by using the example of tax paying, which he regards as "strange behavior" (p. 9). Such behavior is strange to Professor McDonald because he can find no immediate gratification which accrues to those who pay taxes. He therefore concludes that men are, by nature, somehow concerned with what he refers to as the "more remote environment." Professor McDonald argues that the remote environment (which is only vaguely perceived by man) presents the need to stabilize and control it. He feels that there is a basic human need to control this more remote environment, and that tax paying can be understood as a means to that end. Accordingly, politics can be defined as the pattern of acts which can be most readily understood as efforts to control the more remote environment.

It can easily be seen that this definition of politics requires a further explanation of the key terms, remote environment and control. Time and time again Professor McDonald returns to these terms. For example, on page 22 he says, "The distinctiveness of that which is usually called political or politics is its involvement with deliberate control over intervening remoteness." By remoteness Professor McDonald means the lack of direct implications in the interaction between two units. The argument is that the more remote a particular quality is, the more "political" become the efforts to control. This concern with remoteness leads Professor McDonald to direct his attention away from the superordinate-subordinate relationships which so frequently characterize political research. Instead, he seems to return to a discussion of that abstract and difficult concept known as "the polity." Men do not seek to control men, they seek to control the polity.

What does it mean to say that men want to control something? Does it mean that they want to exercise power? McDonald feels that this is not the case. He feels that the concept of control can be distinguished from the concept of power as it is traditionally used in political science. He argues that power is an inadequate concept because it cannot be directly observed, and hence, has little theoretical usefulness. He further believes that the concept of power is suggestive of a tangible "something" rather than a reciprocal relationship. Given these difficulties with the concept, McDonald does not find it difficult to understand why the concept of power has been of "so little value in directing research" (p. 25). Professor McDonald feels that the use of control as a central concept avoids these errors because it is dynamic, concerning itself with acts rather than possessions or things.

Having distinguished control from power, Professor McDonald devotes the rest of the book to an explanation of methods of control, instruments of control, and response to control. Just as he finds power an inadequate concept because of its lack of dynamism, he believes that words like "authority" are not satisfactory because they do not emphasize reciprocation. Power and authority are static, but control and persuasion (the word he substitutes for authority) are not.

In general, this essay in political theory is well thought out and well written. The discussion of the instruments and methods of control seem to flow logically from the theoretical introduction to the book. If one were to find fault with the book, it would be primarily with what the reviewer believes to be an inadequate understanding by McDonald of some of the concepts he rejects. For instance, I do not believe that political scientists today use the concept of power to describe a "thing" which somebody possesses. A concept of power as a relationship between superordinate and subordinate units was adopted in so basic a text as V. O. Key, Jr.'s *Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups*. In a similar vein, one does not find authority used by political scientists to describe a static situation. Herbert Simon's *Administrative Behavior*, for example, certainly does not use authority to describe a "static quality of patterns in human relations" (p. 111). Fortunately, the merit of the book does not hinge on the ability of the author to reject old concepts and substitute new ones for them. Even if one does not agree that control is somehow different from power, one can still profit from reading the book.—HARMON ZEIGLER, *University of Oregon.*

Main Currents in Sociological Thought, Volume I. BY RAYMOND ARON. (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1965. Pp. 272.)

In this volume of his intellectual history of sociology, Professor Aron deals with those who are for him the founders of modern sociology: Montesquieu, Comte, Marx, and Tocqueville. Doubtless, claims could be made for other beginnings, both earlier and later. Such claims will not be considered here, for I believe that the present state of sociological theory precludes any definitive choice of beginnings. Indeed, the author's choices seem to rest more on a desire for symmetry in argument, than on any attempt to definitively identify beginnings. The relevant points of evaluation are, therefore, the treatment which Professor Aron affords each of these theoreticians and the validity and impact of his central line of argument.

While Professor Aron does draw the attention of the reader to the environment in which each writer lived, the main thrust of his effort is, in each case, to elucidate the theories of the writer under consideration. To this task he brings an incisiveness in interpretation and a clarity of expression which renders otherwise cumbersome collections of ideas as lucid conceptual schemes. Most particularly is this true in the cases of Montesquieu and Marx. For those who would have in the compass of a few pages the essence of the ideas of these men, especially as they relate to political sociology, Professor Aron's book strikes the mark.

There are, however, other criteria against which one could judge the author's treatment of these theorists. Specifically, one could ask whether Professor Aron's book would help the serious researcher in his pursuit of viable, testable theory. I am not sure that such a criterion is relevant. As I understand it, the book is based upon the author's lectures to French undergraduates. Conceivably, such an audience might lack the basic grounding in the philosophy of science requisite to appreciation of analysis concerned with the viability and testability of theory. Nonetheless, two factors impel me to apply this criterion. First, the book has been introduced into the American market, where social science undergraduates are apt to have some methodological sophistication. Second, Professor Aron himself clearly understands the importance to scientific theory of statements in refutable form, and the empirical durability of these statements is not altogether irrelevant for him.

The guidance afforded the seeker of testable, viable theory by Professor Aron's treatment of these four bodies of ideas is quite uneven. He pieces together the ideas of Montesquieu with the care and pleasure with which an antique car enthusiast might restore a 1914 Stutz Bearcat. Moreover, one receives the distinct impression that in this essay the empirical validity of Montesquieu's theory is as little relevant to the author's purposes as the efficiency of the Bearcat's engine is to the purposes of the antique car buff. Indeed, in one of the few passages in which any note is taken of the possible invalidity of some of Montesquieu's ideas (specifically, those pertaining to the effects of physical environment on political mores), Professor Aron argues that his concern is with Montesquieu's method rather than with the validity of any specific hypothesis. I defer for the moment comment upon the substance of this concern. What I question here is the service rendered to serious researchers by the presentation of obviously invalid hypothesis, e.g., Montesquieu's ideas on the relationship between country size (or, more kindly, facility of communication) and form of government. Even where an idea has a claim to presentation on the basis of its central position in the lore of the discipline, current thinking and evidence on the subject ought to be brought to the student's attention. Montesquieu's notions about the separation of powers and personal liberty are presented as though they had never been questioned. Yet I suggest, e.g., that Dahl's analysis of the dilemmas entailed in constructing organizational safeguards against tyranny (*A Preface to Democratic Theory*, chapter four) is substantially relevant and profoundly antithetic.

If Professor Aron has presented an overly seductive view of the ideas of Montesquieu, the error is not repeated in his analysis of Comte. Explicitly or implicitly, the author challenges Comte at every point. The assumptions, understanding of science, evaluation of evidence, and self-perception which comprise Comtian theory, are all called into question. Even where the author is in sympathy with Comte, as in the case of the latter's religious formulations, this critical facility is not lost.

A similar and much more extended treatment is afforded Marx. The main stream of his writings on political economy is set forth lucidly and is subjected to a very enlightening scrutiny. Regretably, no mention is made of the scientific uselessness of Marx's definition of value. However, the use of definitions which appear to have been wrought to save the theory from the evidence confronting it, the ubiquity of the dialectic, and the basic failure of the prognostications are all skillfully brought to the attention of the reader.

In his presentation of Tocqueville, Professor Aron reverts once again to the enthusiastic, but quite uncritical approach earlier displayed in his treatment of Montesquieu. If anything, his enthusiasm is even greater, as Tocqueville's formulations appear to the author to have saved some of Montesquieu's hypotheses. For example, the use of federalism to make possible the combination of the "advantages of both great and small states" is advanced as a fact rather than a questionable hypothesis. The evidence certainly has been ignored here. While the preservation of the diversity of customs made the American colonial alliance possible and may be regarded as a virtue on the basis of survival, such an alliance may serve the maintenance of tyranny as easily as that of liberty—as was in fact the case for all those whose skin was black.

If one pauses to recall the audience for which this book was probably intended, the fluctuations in critical commentary, the level of sophistication of the methodological discussion, and the main burden of that discussion become quite comprehensible. Professor Aron appears to be exhorting French undergraduates to an appreciation of inductive inference based upon empirical evidence, in which the analyst, while subscribing to a set of normative positions, strives to keep these positions from obscuring the evidence or prejudicing his logic. For this purpose, Montesquieu and Tocqueville are clearly heroes, as against Comte and Marx. For the suggested audience, this may be a useful and admirable purpose. However, at this point in the development of political sociology in the United States, I believe that the appreciation for this approach is already quite high. If anything we are in need of exhortations toward the appreciation of non-polemical, testable, deductive theory—for exercises in which Professor Aron is wary even of Tocqueville.—ARTHUR S. GOLDBERG, *University of Rochester*.

Democratic Theory. BY GIOVANNI SARTORI. (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1962. Pp. xvi, 479.)

If Robert A. Dahl's well-known book of 1956, *A Preface to Democratic Theory*, is properly titled, as I think it is, then Giovanni Sartori's *Democratic Theory* is equally well titled. Sartori, Professor of Political Science at the University of Florence, in translating and revising his *Democrazia e definizioni* for English and American readers has presented a full-dress treatment of the theory of democracy.

Sartori by no means limits himself to the British and American experience with democracy, although his treatment of this experience is illuminating and insightful. He deals skillfully with continental democracy, both successful and unsuccessful, as well. In this connection his distinction between what he calls "empirical democracies" and "rational democracies," while not altogether new, is clearly and sharply drawn. Neither does he force himself to choose between descriptive and prescriptive theories of democracy. Sartori discusses both with intelligence and understanding and, perhaps most importantly, casts a good deal of light on the complex relationship between the two. The Greeks, the British, the French, the Americans, Locke, Rousseau, Madison, Tocqueville, liberalism and conservatism, liberty and equality all play their part in this volume. In short, Sartori takes on the whole subject of democratic theory.

What is perhaps most striking about the book is that, given its scope and its subject, it nowhere degenerates into a shallow description of well-worn ideas. Note, for example, Sartori's comments on Professor Dahl's rejection of the ruling elite model:

> . . . I will admit for the sake of argument—as Dahl suggests—that the elite model is an operational model, and therefore made to be tested empirically. Nonetheless, just because we are not able to trace the thread of political decision-making to a particular group of people, is not a sufficient reason for excluding the possibility of their existence. Leadership may be a fundamental aspect of the political process even if the process is too complex and often too elusive to allow us to designate the wire-pullers and the people who have the last say. In other words, if the limitations of empirical research lead us to state, "We have not found anything," we cannot derive from that statement the conclusion that the problem we wish to investigate does not exist . . . the validity of the model does not depend entirely on whether or not the power holders happen to be identifiable within a democratic system. I mean that we cannot legitimately conclude that the model is useless unless we can show that it does not apply to *any* system. And this has not been shown. In fact, it is my opinion that Nazism, communism, and fascism, for example, have been characterized precisely by the identifiability of their respective ruling classes. On the other hand, I am well convinced of the thesis that the attempt to pin down physically the power elites and the leading minorities operating within a democratic system is a hopeless and elusive undertaking. However, I would in this respect reverse Dahl's argument, by saying that this very fact provides an excellent test for democracy, and that this difference confirms the usefulness of the [ruling elite] approach since it permits us to define democracy *a contrario* as the political system where power is scattered to such an extent that the decision-making process can hardly be personalized (p. 114).

This passage (any number of others would have made the point equally well) illustrates very nicely the content, style, and relevance of the book. Whether or not one agrees with the argument here made, it is clear that Sartori has the feel of contemporary political science, knows the virtues and limitations of empiricism, and writes with a clarity of mind and of language that is uncommon. Particular stress should be laid upon the quality of the writing. As noted earlier, the book is a translation from the Italian by the author himself. American political science would be considerably improved if all of us could handle English with the vitality, clarity, and precision of Sartori.

In sum, *Democratic Theory* is a very good book, in my judgment one of the best produced by contemporary political science. While it is, of course, a work in political theory, it is by no means of significance only to teachers of political theory. It can and should be read by all with an interest in understanding politics. *Democratic Theory* is a compliment to the whole enterprise of studying politics.—THOMAS LANDON THORSON, *University of Wisconsin.*

The Problem of Democracy. BY HERBERT TINGSTEN. (Totowa, New Jersey: The Bedminster Press, 1965. Pp. 210. $5.00.)

This book, written by a Swedish social scientist, purports to deal with the problem of democracy, considered against the background of its ideological and sociological development. It is not presented as a new edition in translation of an earlier work; but the focus of discussion is largely that of the mid nineteen-thirties.

The first three chapters deal with the development of democratic theory and institutions. What is usually called the pre-democratic constitutional state, Tingsten prefers to call the "privilege state" (p. 14). This concentrates the distinction between constitutionalism and democracy upon class interest, a major theme in the book. At the same time, it lessens the significance of those aspects of constitutionalism—the rule of law, representative institutions, restraints upon governmental agents, for example—which, as the author occasionally acknowledges, were closely related to the development of democracy. He reports that "roughly 35–40 percent of the world's population lives under working democratic constitutions" (p. 45), including in addition to the United States, non-Communist Europe, and Japan, "many" South American states and new states in Asia and Africa. Despite the lack of political experience and of general literacy, democratic constitutions in the new states "have functioned without too much friction . . . " (p. 45). He does not specify how much would be "too much." At the end of the book, he notes, however, that questions quite different from those he has discussed are encountered "in those countries which are called undeveloped," and that in those countries "democracy appears to be more precarious than in the West" (pp. 192–93). But unfortunately he does not explore the nature of the differences or their relative significance.

In the early section especially, there is a continuous attempt to make complex matters clear "at the risk of oversimplification." This means too often at the cost of precision. Thus: "Rousseau presupposes that the majority is always correct in its judgement" (p. 52); he justified democracy as majority rule (p. 55). "The majority of the people in the ancient world" of classical democracy (Athens, Rome) were slaves (p. 18). Calhoun proposed action by concurrent majorities "*instead of* the 'numerical majority' " (p. 135, italics added). Behind a statement by MacIver on democratic consenses can be seen "a theory of roughly the same sort as Calhoun's doctrine of 'the concurrent majority' " (p. 158).

Unlike conservatism, liberalism, or socialism, "democracy" denotes simply "a form of governance" (p. 49)—one marked by universal suffrage, majority rule, and political liberties, including freedom of debate, association, assembly, press (p. 92). "Theories of democracy justify nothing but democracy" (p. 50). If the author means, as he appears to mean, that the objectives that democratic devices are expected to serve are not relevant to its justification, then the nineteenth and twentieth century authorities he cites deny his claim. He names no democratic theorist who attempted to justify democracy except in terms of its assumed objectives. In fact, Tingsten himself declares in the last sentence of his book: "It cannot be fully justified except as an attempt to liberate and to develop the human personality" (p. 204).

In the major section of the book much familiar material is reviewed, such as conceptions of representation, opinion and propaganda, politics and administration, community of values, cohesiveness in parties, the role of women in politics, money in elections, etc. The evidence here comes largely from "the period between the world wars." Wallas and Lippman, Merriam, Pollock, and Gosnell are cited at the appropriate points. But there is no reference to Heard or V. O. Key, nor does that standard reference, *The American Voter*, get into the bibliography. We read of the role of the Center Parties in pre-war Germany and Austria, but find little mention of the C.D.U. We learn of the behavior of women voters in Baden in 1932, but not of the behavior of French voters in the years since 1958. We read of the theory of Guild Socialists, but meet no analysis of the role of the Communists in post-war Italy. This curious neglect of recent evidence appears strongly in a chapter on "Democracy and Socialism" in which pure bourgeois liberalism opposes full-blown socialism and in which Laski, Cole, Hobson, and Tawney oppose Hayek, while Schumpeter remains almost hidden in the wings and Blum and Crossland do not appear. This section leaves the reader wondering whether there was, in fact, an American New Deal or a fairly important period of Labour Party activity in 1945–50, or a final abandonment of doctrinaire socialism by the S.P.D.

A translation of the second two-thirds of the book would have been useful and instructive in the late nineteen-thirties. It would be useful for the nineteen-sixties, were it not that so many of the arguments have by now been presented more thoroughly elsewhere and that much recent evidence on theoretical problems has been ignored by the author. In effect, he acknowledges this in a short concluding chapter which might well be the introduction to another volume.—JOHN D. LEWIS, *Oberlin College*.

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Harvard University

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3. State University of New York at Buffalo
4. Wayne State University
5. University of Adelaide
6. University of California at Santa Barbara
7. University of Colorado
8. University of Michigan
9. McGill University (Canada)
10. York University (Canada)
11. Stanford University
13. San Diego State College
14. University of Nijmegen (Holland)
15. Bar-Ilan University (Israel)
17. Yale University
18. Goucher College
19. Educational Testing Service, Princeton, New Jersey
20. College of Osteopathic Medicine and Surgery, Des Moines, Iowa
21. Claremont Graduate School
22. University of Wisconsin
23. Northwestern University
24. University of North Dakota
25. Miami University
26. University of Massachusetts
27. Bell Telephone Laboratories, Inc., Murray Hill, New Jersey
28. University of Pennsylvania
29. Kansas State University
30. Tufts University
31. Boston University
32. University of Illinois
33. University of California, Berkeley
34. Nanyang University, Singapore
35. San Jose State College
36. Rice University
37. University of Delaware
38. University of Miami
39. University of Cincinnati
40. Harvard University
41. Cornell University
42. University of Kentucky
43. University of Stockholm
44. University of Georgia
45. Joint Center for Urban Studies, Cambridge, Massachusetts
46. San Francisco State College
48. Duke University
49. Washington University

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

The Southerner and World Affairs. BY ALFRED O. HERO, JR. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1965. Pp. xiii, 676. $12.00.)

Alfred O. Hero set out in this book to explain the attitudes of American Southerners on world affairs since early New Deal times (1936). To do this effectively he indicates by contrast the evolution of non-Southern thinking about international problems. Since Hero used the major collections of survey research data as the core of empirical evidence for his findings, the result of this aspect of his study is an exploration in depth going far beyond what the title suggests. But qualitatively the really masterly parts of his analysis are scattered through the book in the form of occasional paragraphs sketching the individual style of politics and life in various distinctive sub-areas of the South.

Hero was born a Southerner. He grew up in New Orleans and in a nearby rural parish. A graduate of West Point, he also took degrees in psychology and political science in the South. By background he was well prepared to understand the area he has chosen to analyze. During his research for this book he interviewed approximately eleven hundred Southerners for periods ranging from twenty minutes to several hours, often more than once. The questionnaire he used is included in an appendix. The enormous range of other materials he consulted is indicated in a highly useful annotated bibliography of thirty-two pages embracing works for all of the social and behavioral sciences. The book is amply documented and the materials and findings so arranged that they can be easily verified and used for further studies.

The book is not always an easy one to read, although Hero's style is uncomplicated. Not only is it a long book, but the method he chose for reporting survey results makes it longer than strictly necessary. He sometimes avoids tables when tables would be much more compact. His frequent resort to whole runs of paragraphs and pages listing poll results in sequence has its awkward features. The reader must then attempt the physically difficult task of trying to see the data on two or three pages simultaneously. There are two other minor drawbacks to the book. Hero's touch for certain parts of the South is less sure. Florida is the most obvious illustration, the treatment on it being both too scanty in sources and far from definitive. In Hero's defense it should be added that Florida politics are extremely difficult to categorize. V. O. Key was not too successful there either. The other drawback, more serious, is Hero's tendency to let his chapters and parts conclude without always adequate analytical summaries. These are relatively minor flaws in an otherwise excellent and masterly treatment.

Hero divides his book into three parts. Part I, on "Comparative Regional Trends in International Thought, 1936–62," is a study in 243 pages of evolving opinion. Part II, on "The Diverse South," is an equally long section which is a fascinating socio-political probe of the South in depth. Part III, the shortest section, is concerned with how to increase a cosmopolitan appreciation of international problems in the South. The overall theme is stated at the outset: That "Southerners as a group, like other Americans, became gradually more sophisticated about world affairs" during 1936–62, but that the Southern approach was less analytical, critical and dispassionate, and the Southern sophisticated group remained smaller percentagewise than the other regions. To state the theme so baldly does insufficient justice to the many dozens of sub-analyses: Congressional votes, Negro voter attitudes, rural white views, the interconnections between racial desegration and attitudes on world affairs, etc. It is a rich treasury of materials, well used.—FREDERICK H. HARTMANN, *University of Florida.*

A Peril and a Hope: The Scientists' Movement in America 1945–47. By ALICE KIMBALL SMITH. (The University of Chicago Press, 1965. Pp. xiv, 591. $10.00.)

The New Priesthood: The Scientific Elite and the Uses of Power. By RALPH E. LAPP. (Harper and Row, 1965. Pp. 228. $4.95.)

In one sense these books complement each other; in another, more important sense they present a striking contrast. Dr. Smith describes the entry into politics, in the years immediately after World War II, of many of the scientists who had worked in the Manhattan Project. She celebrates their lobbying activities as a noble crusade that deserves to be remembered with admiration. Dr. Lapp, who was one of the physicists drawn into the crusade and who has since become a prominent publicist on issues of science and public affairs, takes the story up to the present. But he is full of dire warnings and lamentation. What began as an idealistic campaign, he seems to believe, has degenerated into a crass and soulless lust after power and pelf. What Mrs. Smith describes as in origin a messianic mission—a "movement"—Dr. Lapp sees, in its present state, as a "new priesthood" posing a grave threat to democracy.

In this contrast of views there is a theme all too familiar to students of religious history. But does it really suit the experience of scientists in American politics? Fortunately for her work, Dr. Smith did not succumb to what must have been a great temptation to envelop the movement in a myth of original innocence. Even such ranking apostles as Szilard and Oppenheimer come in for some criticism; Vannevar Bush and A. H. Compton are defended against those who suspected them of playing the role of Judas; if General Groves remains cast as the Pilate of New Mexico, at least he is forgiven his ignorance.

Far from inflating their accomplishments or covering up their mistakes, Mrs. Smith has sought to correct the scientists' own illusions about their days of glory. It is remarkable that although she tells her story largely from the perspectives of

Argonne, Los Alamos, Oak Ridge, and a rented Washington office (in "a good location but a mediocre building"), it does not differ in essential points from the account provided by Hewlett and Anderson in the first volume of the official history of the Atomic Energy Commission (*The New World*, 1939/46). She is aware, moreover, that the activities of the Federation of American Scientists upon which she concentrates were not the only ones with political significance for science. She refers only briefly to the campaign for a National Science Foundation because, as she points out, this was then a matter of more concern to scientists in government than to scientists in the "movement," who were chiefly agitated about the danger of atomic holocaust.

Dr. Smith concludes with praise for the scientists' accomplishments but she does not exaggerate them. Nor does she indulge in any wistful longing after paradise lost in considering what has happened since the early days. She notes that in educating laymen to the danger of the new weapon, in promoting civilian control of atomic energy, and in initiating steps toward international control of nuclear weapons, the three thousand scientists in the crusade managed to exert an influence far out of proportion to their number. But she also admits that science and government would probably have been drawn together by sheer mutual need even if the scientists had not embarked on their pilgrimage to Washington. If the movement has declined in intensity, she believes, it is because circumstances have changed. If the scientific community no longer seems to speak with one voice, it is because the constituency has been enlarged and because the issues are more diverse. Most scientists are not interested in being active in politics; those who are find that "a more congenial means of doing so has opened up." If the rank and file of the movement is today without an abundance of able spokesmen, it is not because a new generation of leaders has failed to arise but rather because the government is only too anxious to enlist the services of eminent scientists who can move easily from the laboratory to the committee room. The cause, in other words, has not failed; it has only moved indoors.

Dr. Lapp is unable to contemplate what has come of the movement with such equanimity. In sketchier, bolder strokes than Mrs. Smith employs, he outlines the rise of the scientists to power as a relentless progress toward corruption on all sides. The fact that universities have come to receive a "flood" of federal funds for science means to him that they are becoming the preserve of a new breed of academic "operators," that even in the university "big science" displaces presumably purer work by solitary modern imitators of Roger Bacon. At first the scientists sought to challenge the military but finally they have merged with their competitors to form one new and formidable "cult of power."

The result is dangerous not only to science but also to society, because it means that "cardinal decisions," in C. P. Snow's term, are now being made by the few rather than by the many who must live by them. "If these few are the best qualified," Dr. Lapp declares, "then, according to an updating of Plato's original definition, our democracy would become a timocracy." Dr. Lapp never bothers to explain to his readers what a timocracy is, let alone an updated one; nor, strangely, does he ever again refer to this term after he injects it into the discussion at the outset of the book. Presumably, what he means is that the scientists (guardians) become creatures of personal ambition rather than lovers of wisdom and ally themselves with the military (Plato's auxiliaries or soldiers).

If Dr. Lapp had taken the trouble to try to prove this case he might have written a powerful jeremiad. Instead he tends to rely on metaphor and illustration where careful analysis and convincing evidence are sorely needed. He pays no attention to the efforts of those who administer the federal grant system to encourage quality and balance in university science programs. He alludes to reports of possible conflict of interest involving scientific advisers but he scarcely demonstrates that this is actually a serious problem. Although in one place he pleads for more money for basic research, in another he affects astonishment that high energy physicists should ask for expensive equipment which may yield no information useful to society. He criticizes universities for merely serving as brokers between government agencies and their own laboratories instead of trying to evaluate and influence the types of research undertaken on their campuses. He fails to explain, however, just why he thinks scientists should appreciate such intellectual interference on the part of the lay deacons.

In at least one important instance Dr. Lapp's own incidental argument only serves to indicate the weakness of his overall case. He points out that whereas a poll of scientists showed that a majority was opposed to the current level of support for the space program, most of those called to testify on the subject in Congress had a vested interest in maintaining the program in high gear. Does he seriously believe that if a more representative group of witnesses had appeared, Congress would have decided to cut the appropriations drastically? The fact that scientific opinion has had so little influence in decisions concerning the space program indicates how mistaken is Dr. Lapp's major thesis. Clearly, just because scientists have become important to the implementation of broad national policy they have not necessarily acquired political authority. For better or worse the democratic system continues to function even where science is concerned.

Dr. Lapp's suggested remedies are no less flawed than his criticisms. He would consolidate all agencies supporting basic science in one department and all oversight functions in one Congressional committee. He does not say how this proposal would overcome the objection that in many cases basic research, applied research, and development are best kept together. Worse, he himself points out early in his book that one of the strengths of the present system is that it frees scientists from total dependence upon one group of potentially high-handed bureaucrats; yet he ends by proposing precisely such a possibility.

There is a lesson to be learned from the shortcomings of Dr. Lapp's book. In an age that has been well characterized by Don K. Price as that of the "scientific establishment" rather than of established religion, dissenters are as necessary as ever. Dr. Lapp rightly singles out one of them, Philip Abelson, for particular praise. But those who seek to play the prophet, rather than merely the dissenter, cannot safely assume that history repeats itself, or, that if it does, the traces will be obvious on the surface. The reasons of history—to update Hegel—are more cunning than that.—Sanford A. Lakoff, *State University of New York at Stony Brook.*

Constitutionalism in America: Origin and Evolution of Its Fundamental Ideas. By Arthur E. Sutherland. (New York: Blaisdell Publishing Company, 1965. Pp. xviii, 619. $9.50.)

This is essentially a book of essays dealing with a series of topics that have excited the author's interest over a period of years. There are chapters —really papers arranged in chronological order— on the Petition of Right of 1628, Constitutional Theory in the Thirteen Colonies, Church and State Before 1800, and briefer treatments of such matters as the National Bank issue and the Civil Rights Act of 1866. Out of 550 pages of text, the first 452 take us up to the year 1870.

The essays are uniformly intelligent and informative, with occasional flashes of insight that are truly penetrating. The long state-by-state analysis of the early political role of the church in this country is first-rate. Arthur E. Sutherland has written a book to be dipped into from time to time when one's own imagination is at a low ebb. It is not designed to be read all the way through at a single sitting, and it is certainly not conceived for text use.

The underlying assumption of continuity between English and American constitutional law is perforce overstated, if only because the bulk of the book is seen through the perspective of the Supreme Court itself. Thus the discussion of "majoritarianism" in our generation is illustrated with Court opinions on recent reapportionment, civil rights and civil liberties issues. But the decisions written by the Justices provide an urbane, even English, view of the political reality that impels a case into the courts. The "facts" as stated in the opening paragraphs of an opinion, and these are on what Professor Sutherland chiefly relies, are a partial image of the surging totality out where the majority lives. "Majoritarianism" in contemporary America also includes such mundane but widespread phenomena as local referenda on school bonds, public housing, fluoridation, and the popular election of demi-demagogues at all levels of government. If there are no seminal cases on these matters, it does not mean that they are not contributory to our constitutional atmosphere.

The book, then, has a certain antediluvian charm. I do not mean this in a disparaging sense at all. It is in the tradition of the legal writing of both England and New England; it follows the style of Sir Frederick Pollock and Roscoe Pound, and matches the learning and wisdom of those commentators. Professor Sutherland, for example, refers not at all to the recent monographic documentation of the historical stages and transitions he depicts in legal terms. There is little allusion to political coalitions or to voting behavior, to the changing character of economic elites or to the shifting social attitudes of groups within the population. The constitutionalism he describes has more to do with the decisions of nine men than with the political society that must live with such a system. But all this said, I would not have it any other way. Each scholar should conduct his research and writing in a manner that comes naturally to him. For Professor Sutherland to attempt to impose some highly up-to-date framework on his reflections would be far worse than having none at all.

It remains to say that this is a very "Harvard" book. It is written by a professor of the Harvard Law School, as part of a series edited by a member of the Harvard department of government, and published by a subsidiary of a house long based in Boston. The extensive bibliography shows an affinity for Harvard authors: Pound, McIlwain, Chafee, and Frankfurter, for example, have more than their proportionate share of citations. Articles appearing in the *Harvard Law Review*, by my rough count, outnumber those from all other legal journals taken together. Even books produced by the Harvard University Press seem slightly over-represented. I mention this with all good humor and certainly no rancor. After all if one has to select a single university as a vantage point from which to ponder the Constitution, then Professor Sutherland—who decamped Ithaca for Cambridge many a year ago—has probably made the best possible choice.—ANDREW HACKER, *Cornell University.*

How They Became President: Thirty-Five Ways to the White House. BY REXFORD G. TUGWELL. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1964. Pp. 587. $8.95.)

The tremendous responsibilities of the chief executives of major powers have focused increased attention on the processes by which individuals achieve those positions. In most modern democracies other than the United States little ambiguity exists regarding the route to the top. In those countries an aspirant for the position of chief executive must first become the leader of a party and if his party gains control of the government, he then becomes the chief executive. The pattern in American politics is more chaotic and less predictable. Recognized party leaders are not uncommonly passed over as others with considerably less experience or status in the party are nominated and elected. In this volume Rexford G. Tugwell—who has had a distinguished career as a college professor, writer, New Deal Brain-truster, and governor of Puerto Rico—analyzed the processes by which the elected presidents have been elevated to that position.

The book is divided into two sections. The first, called "The Thirty-Five Ways," consists of thirty-five chapters, one devoted to each of the elected presidents. In this section the author analyzes the interplay of social and political forces, the strategies, and the planning by which these men have been selected by their fellow citizens to lead the nation. In addition to outlining the salient facts of the presidents' careers, he discusses their family backgrounds, education, previous positions, and the political leaders who assisted in their nomination and election. A weakness in these chapters is the paucity of information regarding the strength, abilities, and role of the defeated opponents of each successful presidential candidate. From these chapters one learns why a "dark horse" may be picked over proven party leaders, under what conditions military heroes have been chosen, why governors have been selected more often than senators, and what the prospects are for cabinet officers and vice-presidents who aspire to the presidency. The study discloses that, contrary to popular belief, only rarely has the office sought the man and the great majority of chief executives worked, planned, and "schemed" for several years prior to achieving the highest office in the nation. The information in these chapters can hardly fail to impress the reader with the variety of backgrounds of the men who became president, the uniqueness of each individual's path to the White House, and the element of fortune or chance in the success of each.

Realizing that campaign managers, biographers, and the exalted office itself have tended to create for most presidents an image at variance with the fact, Tugwell announces that his purpose is "to penetrate the myth and to discover the reality." The result is an appraisal of the various presidents which most readers will believe is too critical. In "penetrating the myths" Tugwell apparently has come to the conclusion that he has discovered that a number of presidents have failed to meet the desired requirements of knowledge, experience, and personal qualifications. One gathers that of those who have held the office since the turn of the century, only Franklin Roosevelt—whom Tugwell has both personal and professional reasons for holding in high esteem—and possibly John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson have met the approval of the author. While most readers might understand the low regard he has for Harding, few students of the American presidency will fully accept his characterizations of the others. Note, for instance, his statements that Wilson in the 1912 campaign "never really knew what he was talking about" (p. 354), that Taft was "one of the worst failures in office" (p. 326), and that Eisenhower was "obviously unfitted" (p. 440). Of Truman's first term he wrote: "He had acted in character as a county politician. The able executives who had surrounded Roosevelt had been dismissed and their places had been filled with nonentities, sometimes of fantastic inappropriateness" (p. 435). It is regrettable that the author does not temper such appraisals by recognizing the achievements of these men while serving as President, for the reader who does not have other information would be left with an erroneous impression that American presidents as a group have been lacking in ability.

Possibly the study would have been more valuable and less controversial had the author organized the material by different political eras or periods rather than by separate presidential administrations. Because of the number of presidents, the organization of the book permits little more than a superficial treatment of each, encourages over-generalization, and has produced few new political insights. By grouping the chief executives by historical periods greater emphasis might have been given to the importance of long-term historical trends; the dominance of one party in national politics during given political eras; and to changes in the nominating process, the functioning of political parties, and the role of the mass communication media in political campaigns. While reference is made to most of these factors, much of the relevance is lost by the separate treatment of the election of each president.

In the second—and less valuable—section, entitled, "Choosing the Best of the Ways," the author, in twenty-one short essays ranging from two to six pages, draws on material in the earlier chapters to make a variety of observations related to presidential elections. Considering the generally critical descriptions of the presidents, one might have expected in this section recommendations for improving the selection process. Unfortunately none of significance are presented.

The book will be useful to those who wish in one volume an account of the careers of the presidents. However, the volume fails to make the contribution one would expect from a scholar of Tugwell's stature. It is recommended primarily for the general reader or for potential presidential aspirants who, if lacking the qualifications, might find encouragement in the volume, for the author notes that this has not always been a serious impediment to those who have sought the presidency.—Henry A. Turner, *University of California, Santa Barbara.*

The Metropolis, Its People, Politics and Economic Life By John C. Bollens and Henry J. Schmandt. (New York: Harper & Row, 1965. Pp. xv, 608. $8.95.)

Political scientists whose subject of study is metropolitan government and politics, have been forced to take account of research and guiding theories of the other social sciences, perhaps to a greater degree than in any other part of the discipline aside from the study of developing nations. But at the same time, as Lawrence Herson noted in "The Lost World of Municipal Government," students of urban governments have often allowed themselves to remain prisoners of a reformist ideology long after it was abandoned by other political scientists.

The Metropolis is an effort to write a comprehensive text designed specifically for a course in metropolitan government and politics. A relevant question then, is, which path does it take? Is it a study of the political metropolis that builds on the research findings of economists, sociologists, and those political scientists whose primary focus is community decision making or is it a rehash of recommendations on area-wide integration of competing local governments? The answer is, as it probably must be at this point, that the book is both; but, as its subtitle suggests, it gives a greater emphasis to a social-science approach.

The chapters on metropolitan models, social anatomy, economy, politics and power, and civic participation make a first rate introduction for the beginning student and a really exciting review of social science research on the metropolis relevant for political scientists. This is text book writing above standard. And I would add, it appears that both authors contributed to these chapters. The one weakness, I felt, was the last half of the chapter on metropolitan society, where racial and ethnic patterns are treated in the statistical and compilative manner of the *Municipal Year Book* rather than in the more challenging way found in a later chapter on social and economic maladies.

But other parts of the book are in an older, reformist tradition. Despite clearcut statements at a number of points that metropolitan integration is perhaps irrelevant to solution of some metropolitan problems, an underlying bias on its behalf, as if it were a cure-all, persists. Prescriptive phrases and words suggestive of old reformist cliches should have been pruned out more completely in a few sections. The tone I am referring to is identified by the authors in their chapter on civic reformers as the result of treating metropolitan governments as if they were modern business corporations. I would add that it is an ideology that views all problems and tries to measure all policy by a financial profit motive yardstick ignoring psychological satisfactions, and this is perhaps why its principal concern is with traffic counts or gallons of sewage disposal, rather than causes of crime and race riots or even the social results of mass public transportation policy. But even where this viewpoint enters the text most strongly, as in the three chapters on metropolitan integration plans (e.g. city-county consolidation from the pre-1900 era in New Orleans and Boston down to Nashville-Davidson), there are many citations to literature that won't especially appeal to a professional League of Woman Voter.

But on balance, it seems to me that the scale is tipped decisively from reformist viewpoints toward the analytic approach of modern social science. The authors suggest at many points, though they do not state it explicitly, that their guiding model of metropolitan politics is one of subcommunities of individuals, living distinctive life styles because of such factors as occupation, ethnic background, and family composition. Out of this experience, they seem to me to imply, evolve distinctive ideologies, resulting in political preferences and demands on government. This approach means, I believe, a clear step forward for the study of metropolitan politics at the undergraduate level for in most technical respects this book will make a good text. It covers relevant literature fairly and thoroughly, it is full of interesting insights and facts that will lead the brighter student to fruitful hypotheses, it concludes with a carefully compiled and useful bibliographic essay. Its lack in this respect are those of style. Only occasionally does the writing sing. More often it moves along in leisurely fashion, but never is it unreadable. The authors also, unfortunately in my opinion, omit chapter summaries. Instead, they present shortened thinkpieces of a few paragraphs on the subject matter just covered. On the other hand, they spruce up the pages with many headings and subheadings that will act very well as signposts for the student and will emphasize for him the underlying organization. The book also contains a variety of well-chosen maps, charts and tables.

I have reviewed the book as the undergraduate text I assume it was intended to be. But I should in fairness add that it can also be read with pleasure and profit by the advanced student if he is selective concerning chapters.—Charles Press, *Michigan State University*.

SELECTED ARTICLES AND DOCUMENTS ON
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

Franklin L. Burdette
University of Maryland

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COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT AND CROSS-NATIONAL RESEARCH

The British Commonwealth of Nations in a Changing World: Law, Politics and Prospects. By Zelman Cowen. (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1965. Pp. vii, 118. $3.50.)

This modest volume consists of the three Julius Rosenthal lectures which were prepared during the aftermath of the debate over Britain's admission to the Common Market and were delivered at Northwestern University during the early summer of 1964. When the lectures were written, the multiracial, multilingual, and multicultural Commonwealth consisted of 18 members. In October, 1965, when this review was written, the number had increased to 22, with the union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar offset by the separation of Singapore from Malaysia, and with the addition of Gambia, Malta, Malawi, and Zambia. Among these, the percentage of members with republican status has been increasing.

The author, the Dean of the Faculty of Law at the University of Melbourne, has understandably paid special attention to legal and constitutional precedent in his discussion of the emergence of the Commonwealth and its redefinition and adjustment. However, his final and special concern has been to appraise the strength of the remaining ties between the member states within the Commonwealth. In his view, legal links, a common view on foreign policy, economic ties (important though they be), broad similarities in governmental institutions, and shared traditions, values, and ideals no longer provide an effective cement. The significance of these factors are appraised in the light of Britain's failure to consult over Suez, the conflicts in member state interests exhibited during the debates over Britain's entry into the Common Market, the events leading up to the withdrawal of South Africa, and the continued internal difficulties between members which have been continuously high-lighted by the India-Pakistan dispute. In short, since the "cloth of Commonwealth" lacks distinctiveness and coherence and is "pretty threadbare," Cowen agrees basically with J. D. B. Miller's characterization of the Commonwealth as a "concert of convenience" (pp. 101, 108).

These published lectures offer ample evidence of the author's scholarship, careful reflection, capacity to marshal pertinent facts, and happy choice of phrase. Nevertheless, we believe that a reappraisal of certain of the Commonwealth ties analyzed by the author might yield a bit more of a deposit than he recognizes. The papers prepared for a conference at Como in the late summer of 1964, a conference in which Professor Cowen participated, have been published in December, 1965, under the title of *A Decade of the Commonwealth, 1955–1964*. Several of these papers will indicate the continuing importance of the spirit and substance of the common law embodied in case law, the bonds provided by numerous nongovernmental associations, the university ties, the growth during the past five years in Commonwealth defence cooperation with Britain at the center (sharply in contrast to the generally-accepted view), and even the meaningfulness of Commonwealth group membership in international migration. The final role of the Commonwealth Secretariat, created in accordance with the communique of 1964, cannot be judged at this early date, but it does represent a unique institutional experiment which could mark one small step in the transformation of the Commonwealth into a different type of international association. We are not denying that the ties which unite Commonwealth countries have been continuously weakened through centripetal pressures since World War II or that Commonwealth relations have been largely assimilated into the main streams of international politics. We are only suggesting that the Commonwealth ties have not disintegrated to quite the degree suggested by Cowen and that the centrifugal forces in the Commonwealth have left slightly more residue than is implied in "concert of convenience."—Taylor Cole, *Duke University*.

The Vertical Mosaic: An Analysis of Social Class and Power in Canada. By John Porter. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965. Pp. xxi, 626. $15.00.)

Canada's class system and power structure have been sorely neglected by social scientists mainly concerned with probing the anatomy of formal political institutions. Public administration and constitutional law, federal-provincial relations and public finance, parliamentary procedure and municipal government, have all been analyzed and debated by a host of able scholars. But to the degree that intellectual resources have been diverted into a search for the form and procedures of governance, the reality of power and its allocation among groups of men has escaped analysis. In the absence of critical thought on the larger social structures and problems shaping the lives of Canadians, there has grown up a number of loosely formulated notions about the nature of Canadian society; impressions which have flourished in the mild, innocuous climate of Canadian social thought. Conventional wisdom defines Canadian society as democratic and egalitarian, with power, income, and prestige dispersed among a predominantly middle class and ethnically heterogeneous populace.

Professor John Porter's *The Vertical Mosaic* boldly challenges this view. His study, an admirable antidote to the formalistic obsessions of Canadian academicians, probes behind the mask of formal institutions to the sources of power inherent in the structure of society. The result is an important and original work, packed with factual detail and striking formulations, which effectively destroys some of the pet notions of political mythologists.

The first half of *The Vertical Mosaic* describes the positions and relations of class and ethnic groups in Canadian society. Professor Porter carefully documents his analysis of the pervasiveness of structural inequality with a mass of data on class differences in income, health, and educational opportunity, and the notion of a generalized middle class is shown to have little basis in reality. His analysis of the powerful barriers to equality of educational opportunity is particularly informative. Equally forceful is his treatment of the romantic concept of the colourful Canadian ethnic mosaic. Porter acknowledges the primacy of ethnic as opposed to class or national loyalties among wide sections of the Canadian populace, but he rejects the happy portrait of a horizontal mosaic of diverse groups relatively equal in status and power. As the title informs us, the Canadian mosaic is vertically arranged with the Anglo-Saxon charter group, highly represented at the upper levels of the social pyramid, enjoying a preferred status.

The second half of *The Vertical Mosaic* focuses on the structure and composition of the Canadian elite. According to Porter, three conditions need to be satisfied before there can exist a fully developed democracy. Firstly, the various social forces must be given freedom to organize and represent the interests of their constituents in the elite. Secondly, the various social types and forces must gain access to and be well represented within the elite. Thirdly, the sectors of the elite must maintain separate and independent existences and effectively countervail each other's power. Only the first condition is adequately fulfilled in Canada. There is variability in the degree of representation of social types in different sections of the elite, but the lower status ethnic groups and lower classes suffer from a low overall representation. What is more important, those sections of the elite in which the lower groups are better represented, such as labour, don't serve as effective countervailing forces. Porter's argument suggests that the economic elite, the business leaders, are the most powerful and highly organized sector of the elite and that, for a variety of reasons, the power of the business barons has not been effectively curtailed by the other sectors. The trade union movement in Canada has been relatively weak and poorly organized. The political elite, drawn largely from the upper strata, have been flaccid and timid. The prevalence of sectional as opposed to class politics has guaranteed the hegemony of negative, non-ideological administrative politicians concerned with national unity and compromise rather than with leadership and direction. As an institutional order, the political system has failed to mould and direct society and by default has served to maintain the hegemony of the economic elite. Porter is equally critical of the role of the academic elite and mass media as limiting forces. The mass media are largely controlled by a few publishers intimately associated with the economic elite. The leading academics have been recruited mainly from the upper strata and hardly comprise a critical intelligentsia.

While the economic elite is the *predominant* group within the ruling class it does not easily control the other sectors. Porter's approach is not hindered by what Robert Lane describes as the cabalist mentality which equates high power with total power and conspiracy. Porter allows the bureaucratic, the labour, political, and intellectual elites a measure of independence and countervailing power, but he does this without summoning the pluralist utopia of equal power and balance. Techniques and instances of coalitions between the economic and political elites are cited, but the political system is not seen as a simple captive of the economic barons.

Being a Canadian, Professor Porter is not given to the florid phraseology of the moral crusader, nor does he write with the massive indignation of his American equivalent, C. W. Mills. His prose is straightforward, clear, and somewhat restrained, but his work is happily free of the feigned objectivity so frequently found in contemporary social science tracts. *The Vertical Mosaic* is informed by a point of view and the Canadian system is measured by the standards of justice, equality and efficiency. It is found wanting on all counts. Professor Portor does not, it is true, adopt a transcendent critical position and argue for equality of condition or equality of political participation. He does, however, perceive the necessity of equality of opportunity (which perhaps implies equality of condition) and representation of *all* social forces in the ruling elite.

The Vertical Mosaic is a milestone in Canadian intellectual history. Both academics and the general reading public have waited a long time for this study to appear. They have not been disappointed. In both richness of detail and rigour of analysis, it has few rivals.—MARTIN ROBIN, *Queen's University*.

Mr. Prime Minister 1867–1964. By BRUCE HUTCHINSON. (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1965. Pp. xl, 394. $7.50.)

Approximately one hundred years of Canadian history is here portrayed through the life and times of her fourteen prime ministers. The author is a distinguished and popularly respected Canadian jounalist whose previous books on aspects of politics and the national spirit have enjoyed a wide audience. This has led the author to a self-appointed role of the interpreter of Canada in which he displays his abundant capacities which combine a sophisticated attitude toward economic theories, considerable factual knowledge of Canadian history gained through wide reading and personal association, a skill in presentation and some astuteness in assessment of men and events. However, his strengths are also his weaknesses for yielding to the urgings of a facile pen his shortcomings are those of a popular writer.

Serious students can find much reward in his appraisals but they should never accept all his statements for fact or his interpretations as necessarily sound. Like all mortals, Mr. Hutchinson has his biases and his judgment becomes clouded. In some details he has neglected that care which an historian would employ. Although from time to time quotations are used, there is never a citation as to source nor is authority given for support to dogmatic assertions. On constitutional issues he reveals a surprising lack of real understanding concerning the original confederation plan while the law and practice of the 1926 controversy is similarly confusing. In character analysis while he is oftentimes perceptive, one nonetheless tires of an exaggerated stress and overplaying of the weaknesses of some of the principal actors. Similarly some rewriting of his colorful passages might have overcome his tendency to overdo. It might have weeded out his repetitious passages—repetitious not only of the picture but even the phrase.

This book will of course be best appreciated by the Canadian, for whom the events and personalities have real meaning. Clearly the reading public for which he writes is Canadian. The American reader will be puzzled by the inclusion of so many names of unfamiliar personalities whose roles were subsidiary while the machinations that are the life blood of Canadian politics will make little sense to the outlander. Currently when so much attention is being focused on bi-culturalism in Canada, one might have hoped that the author could have shed clearer light on its historical phases but even here the writer's thread is faulty. Yet readers, whether informed or those with only a passing interest in Canada, will find here some useful starting points for their assessment of Canadian political issues through all the years of its national life but much of its enigma persists. In the words of an earlier book title by this author it remains the story of "the unknown country."—Lionel H. Laing, *The University of Michigan.*

Kurt Schumacher: A Study in Personality and Political Behavior. By Lewis J. Edinger. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1965. Pp. 390. $8.95.)

This originally conceived and well-wrought study of one of post-war Europe's most enigmatic political leaders will appeal to audiences as diverse and over-lapping as the roles in terms of which his career is analyzed. Students and sympathizers of the S.P.D. still pondering why that party fell so far short of its goals in post-war Germany will find it indispensable. Bold researchers exploring the poorly-lit alleys between "democratic" and "authoritarian" party precincts will also find great reward in this culmination of Professor Edinger's prolonged researches into problems of post-totalitarian politics. Its broadest appeal may, however, be to those looking for an example of "new-modeled" political biography consonant with the present systems orientation in political science. By combining a rich variety of techniques—personality analysis, "impact" analysis to weigh the leader's relations with his party colleagues, role analysis to analyze his interaction with important "counter-players"—the author develops a conceptual framework which permits him to relate his subject's personality system to the complex political system within which he operated.

Schumacher had a disproportionately large number of enemies among the Allied and German decision-makers who mattered, and this gave his biographer a most important cue. For at the outset Adenauer and he seemed to have fairly equal handicaps. Both matched strong will-power with parochial careers, had been shaped by their Weimar experiences and spent the 1933–1945 period in relative isolation. The question was which would prove more adaptable in the overlapping roles thrust upon the Occupation period leader—the 70-year-old ex-administrator who had to mold a new party, or the 50-year-old double amputee concentration camp veteran at the head of a revived party organization? In Edinger's analysis, Schumacher's youth and other pre-1945 experiences are seen as the most important determinant factor. These helped to shape a powerful tribune who developed a strange monologue with the German masses, but who could develop no empathy for the motivations of his counter-players. "He wanted to be a Hercules who brought extraordinary powers to the task of cleaning out the Augean stables. But pressing personality needs made him a Tantulus instead," and thus a foil for his more rationally calculating rival.

No other published study approaches Edinger's in the richness of detail with which the relationships among the Socialist leaders are analyzed. Using intensive interview data to build on his knowledge of exile politics as well as such tangibles as Schumacher's appointment calendar, Edinger is able to lift the curtain through which the Socialist "in-group" screened its internal struggles much more successfully than did the C.D.U. Particularly helpful in explaining the extraordinary degree to which Schumacher was able to impose his will on his colleagues, who testify that "he made every major decision affecting the national policy of the party between 1946 and 1952," is the depiction of his superior moral position as a *concentrationnaire* over those who had "laid low" or gone into exile. It is a great merit of Edinger's analysis that his portrayal of the struggle among the post-1945 counter-players relates to continuities of German leadership patterns from (Erik Eriksen's) Luther to Lassalle to Wels to Hitler. But he does not quite spell out what the effective choices for the party might have been in 1945. Hence his censure of Schumacher for keeping the S.P.D. "essentially the same organization it had been . . . a party of traditionalist, elderly workers . . . who remained faithful to their entrenched functionaries," seems a bit gratuitous. It is also somewhat inconsistent with the evaluation of

"Mainly Functional" which Edinger assigns to Schumacher's role performance as monocratic party chairman.

It will certainly be very hard for the surviving admirers of Schumacher, who shortly before his death defined the "democratic way of life" as a "willingness to work for causes that goes beyond the pursuit of mere personal advantages and interests" to accept Edinger's major hypothesis, that

> Schumacher's political behavior in postwar Germany may be explained primarily as that of a man compulsively striving to relieve intense personality tensions by means of adaptive mechanisms that had proven effective in the past for maintaining the equilibrium of the personality system. (p. 297)

Edinger admits that his resort to personality theory is imprudent, that the scarcity of data on Schumacher's early life forced him to go further in inferential analysis than he would have liked. Certainly the lay reader can raise the objection that the emphasis on the man being driven by the youth, and the party driven by the leader's personality problems introduce a highly deterministic bias. But the crucial question is whether those sharing the central concerns of political scientists are helped or hindered because Edinger added personality analysis to his battery of tools. Writing as someone who has puzzled over the reactions to Schumacher as they were documented in the records of his major German (CDU/CSU) opponents, this reviewer believes that Edinger's analysis contributes tremendously toward coping with many questions that had long gone begging for answers.—ARNOLD J. HEIDENHEIMER, *University of Florida.*

Der schwedische Justitieombudsman. BY WALTER HALLER. (Zurich: Polygraphischer Verlag, 1964. Pp. xx, 320. Approx. $6.00.)

The Ombudsman: Citizen's Defender. ED. BY DONALD C. ROWAT. (University of Toronto Press, 1965. Pp. 348. $8.25.)

"[O]ne may venture to predict that the Ombudsman institution or its equivalent will become a standard part of the machinery of government throughout the democratic world," we are told by Professor Donald C. Rowat of Carleton University, Ottawa. Indeed, the recent rate of adoption has been rapid, spreading from Sweden, where the office originated in 1809, to Finland (1919), Denmark (1954), Norway (1962), and New Zealand (1962). There are separate Ombudsmen for Military Affairs in Norway (since 1952) and West Germany (1956), as in Sweden since 1915.

The Labour Government in Great Britain has espoused an Ombudsman, and the office has also been considered in other West European countries, as well as in Australia and Canada. In 1965, Ombudsman bills were introduced in California, Connecticut, Illinois and New York, and a Director of Citizen Redress was proposed in the New York City Council.

An Ombudsman is a commissioner appointed by Parliament to investigate individual complaints of bureaucratic abuse. In Swedish, the word, which has been received into English, means simply "agent" or "representative." *Riksdagens Justitieombudsman,* abbreviated as "J.O.," is Parliament's Agent for Justice.

Faced with an extensive but scattered literature, Professor Rowat has performed a commendable service by bringing together 28 articles, all but a half-dozen of which were prepared especially for *The Ombudsman: Citizen's Defender.* Most of the reprinted articles are found in the first and largest section of the book, entitled "Existing Ombudsman Systems." This section does not add a great deal to what had already been written elsewhere, but it is convenient to have descriptions of all extant Ombudsmen in a single volume, as well as of the Finnish and Swedish Chancellors of Justice.

In general, Norwegian Ombudsmen have not been afforded the scholarly attention which has been paid the Swedish and Danish officers, and the pieces offered in the Rowat book do not remedy this shortcoming. The article on the Norwegian Ombudsman for Military Affairs is the first description of that office published in English. It is good as far as it goes, but the eight pages allotted were not sufficient for a definitive exposition.

The article on the Norwegian Ombudsman for Civil Affairs treats with the legislative history of the enabling act—a translation of which is appended—and not with actual operation. The same is true of the chapter on New Zealand's Parliamentary Commissioner. Both offices are of recent origin. As for New Zealand, subsequent analysis has appeared, including two items cited in Professor Rowat's bibliography. The only thing in English more up-to-date on Norway is a translation of a lecture delivered by the Norwegian Ombudsman, Mr. Andreas Schei, in which he describes the first year of operation of his office. (Translation was arranged by the Institute of Governmental Studies, University of California, Berkeley 94720. While the supply lasts, mimeographed copies will be sent upon request.)

For the most part, the Scandinavian Ombudsman offices are noncontroversial. It is quite appropriate, then, that the authors are past or present Chancellors, Ombudsmen and civil servants. In the case of the West German Ombudsman for Military Affairs, however, the furore which has several times surrounded that office is barely mentioned by Egon Lohse of the Ministry of Justice. This controversy has since been related in English in a biting article by H. P. Secher, "Controlling the New German Military Elite: The Political Role of the Parliamentary Defense Commissioner in the Federal Republic," 109 *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society* (No. 2, April 1965), pp. 63–84. In contrast with the Scandinavian counterpart, Secher concludes that "[t]he commissioner's office, which could have served the military leadership as a genuine aid in the shaping and maintenance of troop morale, has come to be regarded by an increasingly role-conscious professionalized military and ministerial elite at best as a nuisance, and at worst a perpetual reminder of their supposed inability to keep their houses in order."

Under the rubric "Related Institutions," the Second Section of Professor Rowat's book presents two fine articles, one on "The Inspector General in the U. S. Army," and another on "The Presidential Complaints and Action Committee in the Philippines." The third and last article in this Section, on the European Commission of Human Rights, is only remotely related to the Ombudsman, as it concerns criminal law rather than administrative law. Still, it is brief and interesting, and no harm is done. One wonders, though, why other more pertinent institutions were not included, such as the East European Procurator and the French *Conseil d'Etat*, which are mentioned in passing, or the Indian Vigilance Committees, the Israeli State Comptroller, the Japanese Administrative Management Agency, and the Nepalese Complaint Book.

Section Three treats with "Proposed Schemes." With Henry J. Llambias, the Editor has himself written the chapter on Canadian endeavors, giving emphasis to developments in Ottawa and Toronto. Representative Henry S. Reuss, with co-authorship of Everard Munsey, describes his proposal for an Administrative Counsel of the Congress, under which complaints would be relayed to Counsel by Congressmen. A similar limitation has been suggested for Canadian and British Ombudsmen, partly as a concession to greatness of population, partly to legislators who do not want to lose contact with constituents. In a compact piece on "Ombudsmen for State Governments," Ralph Nader describes the Connecticut measure which was considered in 1963. (The Canadian Bill, the Reuss Bill, and the Connecticut Bill are reproduced in an Appendix.) Finally, the abortive proposals for a Philadelphia Ombudsman are described by Henry J. Abraham.

There is considerable overlap between Section Three, just described, and Section Four, on "Applicability Elsewhere." In fact, the Connecticut and Philadelphia pieces are included in Section Four, even though they treat with actual legislative proposals, while Section Three contains chapters on The Netherlands and Ireland, where the main impetus has been extra-governmental. The reason for this apparent confusion is that Section Three is meant to be factual and descriptive, while Section Four offers "sets of contending essays which present some of the arguments for and against transplanting the institution."

The articles of Section Three are also argumentative, however, and as a result we are given the conflicting counsel of no fewer than 17 authors. Leaving the description of actual proposals to appropriate authors, it would have been better to limit debate to a handful of contenders, and to have expanded the five-page Conclusion. As it is, more questions are raised than answered. Fortunately, this is an incentive to further inquiry. All in all, Professor Rowat has provided a timely and provocative book, deserving of wide circulation.

The approach of Walter Haller is strikingly different. His is the work of a sole author, in contrast with Rowat's 29. As the title *Der schwedische Justitieombudsman* suggests, the emphasis is on a single office, while the Rowat book takes on a score. Further comparison of the books is pointless, as they were meant to serve markedly different purposes: Haller's book is a doctoral dissertation, submitted at the University of Zurich. The author devotes fully 200 pages to the Swedish Ombudsman, 70 of which present surrounding institutions and history while the remaining 130 contain a well-documented analysis of the office.

Nonetheless, in introduction and conclusion, Dr. Haller covers much of the ground surveyed by Dr. Rowat. The other Ombudsmen are described, together with a few uncompleted proposals, including one put forward in Switzerland. In addition, the author points out precursors in Greece, Rome, China, Aragon and Venice. He calls attention to the Censors of New Jersey and Pennsylvania set up in the late Seventeenth Century, and to the Councils of Censors in New York, Pennsylvania and Vermont founded at the time of the Declaration of Independence. He cites Art. 47 of the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776, which established a Council of Censors "to enquire whether the constitution has been preserved inviolate in every part and whether the legislative and executive branches of government have performed their duty as guardians of the people, or assumed to themselves, or exercised other or greater powers than they are entitled to by the constitution."

Thus we are returned to the Founding Fathers. —Stanley V. Anderson, *University of California, Santa Barbara.*

Lithuania Under the Soviets: Portrait of a Nation 1940–65. Ed. by V. Stanley Vardys. (New

York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965. Pp. ix, 299. $7.00.)

The Soviet succeeded merely in swallowing Lithuania, not digesting the Lithuanian people. This is the assessment of V. Stanley Vardys and a group of Lithuanian émigré scholars responsible for this important work on the political and social portrait of a land and people which has received little attention in the post-Stalin era of Western acquiescence to the Central-Eastern European status quo.

The ultimate goal of Soviet policy is Russification or, better, the creation of the "new Communist man." Among the countervailing forces two are most consequential, Lithuanian nationalism and Roman Catholicism. Nationalism at present is in a "cautiously calculated" stage; it is broadly based and is respected by the Soviet overlord for its potential as an irritant. It even penetrates the Lithuanian Communist Party.

In analyzing the Communist Party of Lithuania (CPL) Thomas Remeikis records that until the death of Stalin and the fall of Beria, top men like Suslov and Shcherbakov served as rigorous proconsuls on behalf of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks). There have been changes in the post-Stalin era. CPL membership is still only 65 per cent ethnic Lithuanian, according to calculations based on available data. But a significant portion of these (estimated as 40 per cent of the total CPL) belongs to the "new class." These, mostly educated technicians, "did not have to be anti-Lithuanian." They, together with the intelligentsia, show "much enthusiasm and concern for Lithuanian cultural heritage" (pp. 120–121).

Vardys reports other "remnants of bourgeois ideology." The "psychology of private ownership is very much alive," noted with apprehension the First Secretary of the CPL, Antanas Sniečkus, an old revolutionary of the Kremlin of Lithuanian birth, in 1962. Collectivized agriculture is no more successful than elsewhere, it is the regime's "Achilles heel" (p. 247).

Religion, another "remnant," has been closely associated with nationalism in Lithuania, and inroads have been made by the Soviets to undermine this alliance. The Catholic Church is the largest, attracting the most of the Soviet's attention. The sole non-Lithuanian contributor to the volume, Vittorio Vignieri, details the case of Roman Catholicism, for the illustration of religious policy. He records the "intensive propaganda, terror and persecution, carried out by the whole apparatus of Party and state." The results, attributed to "informed sources," indicate limited gains, for "almost 100 per cent of the children are baptized . . . 80 per cent of all funerals are religious . . . and 60 per cent of all marriages are performed in churches . . . " (p. 234).

Economic policy is an important vehicle on the road to Russification, or to the creation of the new Communist man who will regard his native land "a lovely dear corner in a large apartment." Pranas Zundė records "Moscow's determination to industrialize Lithuania at a rate of speed out of all proportion to Lithuanian labor resources" (p. 169). Accelerated development of heavy industry demands importation of labor from other republics. If beyond economics, the aim is to reduce Lithuanians to a minority in their own country, more is needed. This may come about by integrating Lithuania into a Baltic federation, including Kaliningrad, or some other larger unit, to correspond to the "new stage of economic development." This would radically change the demographic balance in favor of the Russians (p. 259).

An account on Sovietized Education by Vytautas Vaitiekunas, and one on the policy toward literature and the arts, by Jonas Grinius, complete the analysis of the period of 1940–1965. Introductory chapters by Simas Sužiedėlis, V. Stanley Vardys, and Zenonas Ivinskis present a brief historical outline of medieval and modern times, a profile of independent Lithuania between the Great Wars, the Soviet occupation, 1939–40, and the resistance against Soviet and Nazi occupants during World War II.—TIBOR PAYZS, *University of Detroit*.

Revolution and Defeat: The Story of the Greek Communist Party. BY D. GEORGE KOUSOULAS. (London: Oxford University Press, 1965. Pp. xiv, 306. $7.00.)

Revolution and Defeat is over-all, an excellent history of the Greek Communist Party. It provides an interesting and authoritative picture of a Communist Party in the Balkans in the period between the wars and during World War II and right after. In terms of the naïveté and incompetence manifested by the Greek Communists, they were not unsimilar to their comrades elsewhere in Eastern Europe. The ups and downs of the Greek Party are of especial interest, of course, because it was in Greece that the Communists came so close to power without achieving it and because their near-success and ultimate failure were so much a part of the beginnings of the Cold War. It is in connection with this last-mentioned aspect—in some ways the most important—that the reviewer must note his disappointment with Professor Kousoulas' account.

The book is detailed and objective, relying heavily on original sources—some of them here available for the first time, at least in English. What stands out most clearly in the inter-war period is that the Greek Communist Party was always an abject instrument of Moscow. This is hardly surprising news, and it may be that Professor Kousoulas sometimes belabors the obvious. At the same time, perhaps more emphasis could have been given to two concomitant factors which the author well describes but is constrained in analyzing. One is that the confusion in Moscow between the Comintern stress on revolutionary activity and the stress first of Lenin and then of Stalin on avoiding revolutionary activity was so great as to contribute to the Party's ineptitude. The second is that to the extent that the Greek Party did in fact engage in "left wing" revolutionary activity, it was in conflict with Soviet policy. It is true that the Greek Party was not concerned with the welfare of Greece as such any more than the Kremlin was. The interesting point is that on important occasions the policies the Kremlin wanted the Greek Party to espouse were by no means out of harmony with policies supported by a substantial part of the Greek people, who clearly were, as Professor Kousoulas says over and over again, never very sympathetic to Communism.

In this connection, Professor Kousoulas feels that the choice for Greece in the inter-war period was between dictatorship and Communism. It is true that democracy in the Western sense was never more than a facade, and if the Communists had taken over it would not have been correct to say they "destroyed" it—any more than the Communists "destroyed" democracy in, say, Bulgaria. After all, one cannot destroy what does not exist. Yet this analysis risks some pitfalls. Whether the actual alternative—the Metaxis dictatorship—was as preferable to most Greeks as the author indicates may be questioned by some. He does not endorse the Metaxis regime. But, having taken the position that anything was preferable to Communism, he comes close to it. On the other hand, since—as he correctly points out—the Party was confused and badly led and never had much popular support, it is not clear why Communism was really a meaningful alternative at all.

Professor Kousoulas' account of the Greek resistance and of how the Communists came to lead it is first rate. He even almost succeeds in clarifying the confusing welter of alphabetic groups involved—ELAS, EAM, LOK, KKE, DSM and others. The most significant aspect of the Greek Civil War, however, concerns not so much its internal components as its relationship to outside forces, especially the Soviet Union. It has become an article of faith for many writers on Communism to say that the Greek Civil War reflected an attempt on the part of the USSR (or of "international Communism") to take over the country. This, indeed, was the reasoning on which the Truman Doctrine was based. That the Communist-led efforts failed is, to this very day, cited in defense of the utility, if not the necessity, of American military intervention not only in Greece in 1947 but elsewhere now. Yet the facts of the matter are infinitely more complicated. If these facts—in as far as they are known—do not actually show that the Soviet Union always opposed the position of the Greek Communist Party in the Civil War, and the war itself, they do clearly demonstrate that Moscow had nothing to do with starting the conflict, did not aid the Greek Communists in any material way and finally pulled the rug out from under them completely. All this is involved with Churchill's and Stalin's "divisions of influence" in Eastern Europe, with Stalin's super-cautious view that Communist revolutions could not then succeed without the Soviet Army and with Moscow's quarrel with Tito, already well under way behind the scenes in 1947.

Professor Kousoulas does discuss these matters, but both his analysis and his conclusions are less clear here than in other regards. The result is to lend more comfort than is warranted to the picture of the Greek revolution as an aspect of Soviet aggression. The author appears, for example, to believe that Stalin's disapproval of the Greek Civil War did not come before early 1948 and that it was never communicated to either Markos or Zachariades, the Greek Communist chieftains.

If the Soviet Union took any interest in the Greek conflict at all, it was not until toward the end of 1945, after the United States and Great Britain challenged Moscow's policies in Bulgaria. Yet the Yugoslavs, who were the main supporters of the Greek Communists, were disturbed at the Soviet lack of enthusiasm in December, 1945. It is likely that, with the Cold War burgeoning in 1946, Moscow's interest in the Greek conflict then increased—although not to the point of material assistance. But before the end of 1947, Soviet concern with Tito overshadowed all else. This is not to say that American military intervention did not intensify Stalin's desire to avoid involvement in Greece. But there is no reason to assume that it was not, all along, his assessment of the over-all tactical situation, bolstered by increasing suspicions of Tito, that was governing. As far as the confusing positions taken by Greek Communist leaders are concerned, this reflected primarily the inability of all of them to grasp that Communist successes in Greece had a decidedly low priority in Stalin's eyes.

It is not clear whether Professor Kousoulas thinks the Communist-led revolutionary forces would have been victorious if the Americans had not intervened. But to the extent that foreign actions were important in administering the coup de grace to the revolution—and they were very important—Stalin's excommunication of Yugoslavia, followed as it was by an economic blockade that made further aid to the Greek revolutionary forces out of the question, may have been as significant as General van Fleet's military efforts.

It is only fair to add that the book's primary concern is, of course, with the internal Greek situation, and its treatment of this is outstanding.—Fred Warner Neal, *Claremont Graduate School.*

Minobe Tatsukichi: Interpreter of Constitutionalism in Japan. By Frank O. Miller. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1965. Pp. xi, 392. $7.50.)

Professor Miller should be congratulated on the publication of this detailed and well-documented study of the constitutional ideas of Minobe Tatsukichi (1873–1948), professor of administrative and constitutional laws at Tokyo Imperial University until 1934 and a member of the House of Peers since 1932 until his resignation in 1935 as a result of the so-called "emperor-organ theory affair." There have been very few studies of its kind both in Japan and the United States; its nearest Japanese counterpart is only to be found in Ienaga Saburo's *Minobe Tatsukichi no Shisoshiteki Kenkyu* published in 1964.

In examining Minobe's liberal constitutional ideas, Professor Miller tried his best in relating them to the critical political events in the 1930's, and his judgments upon these events are, on the whole, balanced and wholesome. With regard to the celebrated Minobe Affair of 1935, for example, the author had this to say: "The attack on Minobe and the organ theory marked the outset of the closing action in the campaign to eradicate the remnants of the anti-militaristic, parliamentary position. It had also a forward-reaching meaning, for it was the opening phase of the movement to 'clarify national polity,' in the process of which, over the next two years, there was to be a grand purge of academic and bureaucratic ranks. It paved the way for the successful promotion of an intensely nationalistic, authoritarian, and totalitarian view of the Japanese state and society. The organ-theory issue made the middle class for the first time in a meaningful degree responsive to the call of Japanese fascism." (P. 197.) Although I have some misgivings about the author's interchangeable use of such terms as "authoritarian, totalitarian and fascism" (Was there ever a genuine totalitarianism or fascism in Japan?), I quite agree with the author's evaluation of this affair.

Dr. Minobe held that constitutional parliamentary democracy was entirely possible even under the Meiji constitution, but such a constitutional position was rather "unorthodox" in the prewar period. If interpreted literally, the Meiji constitution was heavily weighted toward authoritarianism. It is, however, largely through such a "political" interpretation of the Meiji constitution that Minobe made the greatest contribution to the cause of liberal democracy of prewar Japan. His unorthodox constitutional position was especially important since he was able to exercise a great influence upon the future high-ranking bureaucrats of Japan as a professor of the Law Department of Tokyo Imperial University.

Although Professor Miller highly evaluates Minobe as one of the foremost proponents of parliamentary democracy in prewar and postwar Japan, he is also frank about Minobe's limitations. According to the author, "The measure of Minobe's importance was not in his breadth of vision or depth of insight in the realms of political science and jurisprudence. The external circumstances of his career may make a modest claim on the attention of students of modern intellectual and social history, but it is only within the narrower framework of the political evolution of modern Japan that his constitutional theory has importance. . . . After all, his mission was not to explore or to create, but to translate, to interpret, to instruct the minds of bureaucrats, judges, pedagogues, and politicians in what he understood to be the necessary and salutary consequences of the establishment of constitutional government of Japan." (Pp. 190–191.) Minobe is also criticized for his lack of real sympathy for popular interests (p. 193). It is interesting to note that Ienaga, in his above-mentioned work, does not emphasize Minobe's lack of professional originality, but rather directs his criticism at Minobe's ideological and political "limitations" such as the support of the Meiji constitution and the Imperial system, too much confidence in the state, the distrust of mass action, and the approval of imperialism. Ienaga seems to say that Minobe should have been a socialist like himself. As for me, I am much interested in Minobe's distrust of direct mass action. The contemporary significance of such an attitude common with Yoshino Sakuzo would have been very profitably explored.

A few other comments. First, in dealing with the postwar constitutional politics of Japan, the author should have refrained from too simple a dichotomy of the revisionist and anti-revisionist forces, for various opinion surveys suggest that the majority of Japanese approve of the Self-Defense Forces in spite of their support of the "peace" constitution. Second, the classification of the liberal constitutional school into the school of conceptual interpretation and the school of teleological interpretation (p. 285) seems to introduce more confusion than order by bracketing together such scholars as Oishi Yoshio and Tabata Shinobu. Third, I noticed a few errors in Japanese pronunciation: tenzen no jiyu (p. 143), Takikawa Yukitatsu (p. 158), Minoda Kyoki (p. 202), Suzuki Kentaro (p. 235) and Kansai Gakuin (p. 249) should have read tennen, T. Yukitoki, M. Muneki, S. Kantaro and Kansei Gakuin, respectively. Of course, these minor defects could hardly vitiate the excellent quality of the book.—HAJIME WATANABE, *Ritsumeikan University.*

Influentials in Two Border Cities: A Study in Community Decision Making. BY WILLIAM V. D'ANTONIO AND WILLIAM H. FORM. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1965. Pp. xii, 273. $7.95.)

This is another contribution to the community power structure discussions, and a noteworthy one because it contrasts a United States and a Mexican city. This international comparative dimension proves to be a valuable aid in furthering our understanding of influence and authority in the local political community.

El Paso, Texas and C. Juarez, Mexico are the locations of the study. The analysis of the respective structures of power involves assessing the contributions of the distinct national political cultures. But as the cities are adjacent across an international boundary, their politics also have reciprocal effects upon one another. However, it is not in the analysis of these reciprocal effects, but in the treatment of the two national cultures as variables, that the contribution is made. In order to indicate the nature of this contribution, some review of the research procedure is in order.

The research involved two separate visitations to the communities, first in 1955 and then three years later in 1958. One surmises that during the first visit a full blown Hunter methodology was employed and the efforts were largely devoted to identifying reputational elites. The second visit replicated the reputational procedures but also included a number of decisional studies to test the reputational findings.

The structure of authority and influence differed in the two cities in a number of respects. While business success in both cities was an important resource for increasing influence for those who desired it, the same cannot be said for political success; that is, attainment of formal political office yielded varying amounts of political influence. In the Mexican city, the power of the office gave its incumbent influence, but in the United States city, influence was more often derived from sources independent of the office held. The Mexican party (Partido Revolucionario Institucional) furnished its office holder power, but in El Paso there was no similar formal structuring of influence.

A second major difference lay in the greater integration among the business and political leaders in El Paso than was the case in C. Juarez. In one of the more striking sets of findings the images of American and Mexican businessmen and politicians are recorded about business and politics. While American businessmen and politicians have similar assessments about American business and political institutions, this is not the case among Mexicans. There political conflict between the two groups was anchored by the difference between self perception and the perceptions each group had of the other. Differences in integration were also indicated by individual characteristics and organizational membership patterns of the sets of political and business influentials in the two cities.

D'Antonio and Form pose the usual questions which endeavor to place their case cities somewhere along the elitist-pluralist continuum. In neither city do they find monolithic elitist power structures. In evaluating their findings, however, they place greater stress on the way opportunity for political involvement is structured, than on the degree of inclusiveness in the political process. They argue that the crucial difference, not merely between El Paso and C. Jaurez, but between more and less democratic local political systems generally, is not simply a function of how many different groups are involved in the decision process. Rather it lies in the nature of the institutions which comprise the decision process. In this latter respect they found their two case cities were remiss in quite different ways.

In El Paso there was no real structuring of the community's political life. The business-professional group was the best organized and enjoyed general political success. The only other group which attempted political action was the Spanish surname community. The latter successfully challenged the business leaders in a mayorality election, but the result apparently was simply the placing of Spanish surname individuals in offices who then continued to carry out traditional policies. The problem of the political structure generally was its confused and episodic nature.

The problem in C. Juarez was the rigidity of the political structure. The PRI dominated political life. A successful opposition to the party seemingly could not be sustained. Thus, interest groups did not make demands, instead, interested individuals sought individual favors or relief through access to the party. This *mordida* system served to undercut the development of a more constructive political process.

While D'Antonio and Form do not say it, their concluding chapter in many respects is an expression of yearning for a local two party system. But there are some, including those who doubt Dahl's conclusions about New Haven, who wonder if it would really make any difference. However, it is the very improbability of any formal restructuring of local political institutions, which makes the study of community power structures, such as this one, such an important undertaking.—OLIVER P. WILLIAMS, *University of Pennsylvania.*

Labor and Politics in Peru: The System of Political Bargaining. BY JAMES L. PAYNE. (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1965. Pp. 292. $6.75.)

In a recent essay evaluating the state of political science research on Latin America, Merle Kling has observed that it "often appears to drift in an isolated channel of its own, with its sponsors perched along the banks of the more swiftly moving waters of the discipline." Many Latin Americanists, including this reviewer, would unhappily feel compelled to agree. Thus it becomes a pleasure to report that Mr. Payne's book stands forth as a clear exception. Indeed, on several different levels he has made an important contribution to the literature.

To begin with, he has realistically selected one important segment of political activity in a given country and has provided a careful and systematic analysis. Peru itself has rarely been the subject of serious study, and the nature of labor has not previously been investigated in detail. Focusing on what is termed a period of "free government" rather than one of an authoritarian regime, he limits himself to an examination in depth of Peruvian labor during the 1956–62 administration of Manuel Prado. Noting that the only other such period in recent history was the brief three-year government of José Luis Bustamante y Rivera, he proceeds by defining the "system of political bargaining" which helps to delineate the position and role of labor in the Peruvian political process.

Specifying that he is making no distinction between labor politics and labor relations, he sets forth a careful account that includes illustrative case studies drawn from representative trade unions and national federations. Particular attention is devoted to agricultural workers, government bureaucrats, and public school teachers in the course of projecting future patterns in the evolution of labor relations. Empirical techniques are employed in the study of internal features of the labor movement, including chapters dealing with organic structure, national centers, union finances, and the characteristics and attitudes of leadership. Within this context he examines the utility of political bargaining for organized labor, describing the patterns which have emerged in recent years. The result is perhaps the most insightful and suggestive study of labor relations yet to be published in the Latin American field.

At the outset the author discusses the significance of violence within the broader framework of Peruvian politics. He characterizes it not as a manifestation of Latin character, but rather as a political weapon used rationally by objective and calculating politicians. Mass violence means demonstrations, riots, and various forms of strikes, all of them having a particular political purpose. The intensity of conflict is governed by the continuing clash between the president and opposition forces, with the violence of political bargaining the fundamental method of Peruvian labor. Such bargaining follows a pattern in which a highly centralized government, confronted by conflict intensity and an unreliable military, is compelled to enter directly into the settlement of labor-management disputes. With Congress unable to deal effectively with general labor matters, the executive must in the interests of its own survival enter into the negotiations.

The primary weapon of labor, therefore, is "its ability to threaten an insecure executive with extinction." Issues are necessarily resolved on political rather than economic grounds. Continuing industrial strife in Peru is projected as a further institutionalization of the existing system of political bargaining. Three critical variables are posited as fundamental to such a development: cohesion and centralization of worker organizations, the degree of organizational specialization, and the condition of channels of communication between labor, management, and government. In a schematic presentation he identifies the basic decision-making mechanisms of political bargaining within a constitutional democratic framework, again concluding that the experience of the 1956–62 period is indicative of future trends.

Mr. Payne argues in his concluding remarks that an understanding of Peruvian labor is most fruitfully based on his model of civilian violence, political bargaining, and the threat of military intervention. Very briefly but provocatively he asks if the traditional literature on Latin American political violence has accurately reflected the nature of the phenomenon. While carefully and explicitly stating that his study has constructed a model for the analysis of a particular set of interrelated problems in one specific country, he raises the possibility that his approach may well have broad heuristic implications for the study of Latin American politics. In sum, Payne offers a thoughtful consideration of Peruvian labor and politics which at the same time is a discerning piece of political science scholarship.—JOHN D. MARTZ, *University of North Carolina.*

Castroism: Theory and Practice. By THEODORE DRAPER. (New York: F. A. Praeger, 1965. Pp. xiii, 253. $5.95.)

This, Theodore Draper's second book-length compilation of ideas on the Cuban Revolution, is, as usual, lucidly written and carefully documented. It is essentially a restatement of the evaluation of the Cuban Revolution as found in his earlier *Castro's Revolution: Myths and Realities* (New York, 1962). In addition to bringing his comments up to date, Draper purports here to treat the Cuban Revolution in its ideological dimension—Castroism as a variant of Communism—rather than its social or organizational aspects. Indeed, the first of the three essays which comprise the bulk of the book is called "What Is Castroism?"

Draper's method of defining what Castroism "is" is the exegesis of the written texts—published speeches, articles, interviews—of the principles in the Cuban drama. Few other techniques are available to the responsible American scholar who is unable to study the Cuban phenomenon in its own locale. But the pitfalls of this technique are many and profound. It is tempting to deduce from the written or spoken word not only what the speaker says, but also what he thinks or, even, what he "really" feels (e.g., on pages 75 and 89). Referring to Castro's apparently contradictory statements on Marxism-Leninism Draper states (p. 18) that it is necessary to view them "in their contexts and in relation to each other to get a reasonable facsimile of the truth." The perspective from which Draper wants to discover this "truth" is that of Marxist ideology. Since Fidel Castro is a declared Communist, and his country is now a member of the international "socialist bloc," his kind of Communism must be defined in terms of the cosmic genus.

But the trouble is that it is quite possible that Castro*ism* does not exist. In fact, Draper says outright on p. 53 that "there is no such thing as Castroism per se." Draper emphasizes often in the first chapter that Castro has changed his line and justified past inconsistencies for strategic and tactical reasons; he finds it "peculiar" that Castro came to power with one ideology and has held it with another (p. 49). Although "Castroism" can be assumed to have a "true face" (p. 41) it is defined historically (pp. 48–49) as "a leader in search of a movement, a movement in search of power, and power in search of an ideology"; for Draper, Castro's attempts to develop an ideology—or slogan—of his own has been "characteristically unoriginal and pathetically short-lived." (P. 40.)

The problem is that "Castroism" is not a coherent set of ideas. To approach Castroite politics from the vantage point of ideology as if this were an independent variable is to take Castro on his own terms. Projecting his "ism" on to the world scene and treating Castroism as a member, albeit an adopted one, of the Communist world family (p. 221) and Cuba as an "integral part of the Communist world" (p. 232) permits Draper to call all the shots. The improvising Cuban ideologues are no match for the careful non-committed exegete.

But if one must refer to Castroism in the abstract would it not be more useful to see it as a political phenomenon in relation to the political and social reality of Cuba rather than an ideological variant of a world-wide secular religion? Indeed, the best parts of Draper's book are those —notably the last part of Chapter 2 on the "Déclassé Revolution"—where he discusses the nature of the internal tensions of a Cuban society not terribly underdeveloped by Latin American standards and which resulted in a kind of non-class movement against Batista. But Draper cuts short his historical "class" analysis of the Castro Revolution with Batista's collapse. From then on he takes Castro at his word, and since this "word" is utterly contradictory and opportunistic it is easy to see the regime as being brittle, vulnerable, and permeated by a volatile sense of permanent crisis.

Questions about the adequacy of this perspective are posed implicitly in an "appendix" which Draper adds to his three essays in the form of a critique of "Senator Fulbright and U. S. Policy." Draper explains that the appendix touches "on vital issues indirectly relevant to the main body of the work" (p. xiii). Actually, it is centrally germane to the rest of the work. In the body of the book there has been little systematic attention given to the object and content of "anti-Imperialism" as an ingredient in the amalgam of Castroism. Castro's policies have obviously been much more than automatic responses to North American hostility; but the United States is equally obviously something more than a passive observer. Draper's policy-oriented appendix is an honest reminder of the moral and political complexity of a phenomenon which cannot be taken simply on its own terms as a self-contained variant of the Communist family.—ROBERT W. ANDERSON, *University of Puerto Rico.*

The Cuban Revolution and Latin America. By BORIS GOLDENBERG. (New York and Washington: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1965. Pp. 376. $8.00.)

Still another view of the Cuban revolution and its impact on the western hemisphere is provided by Boris Goldenberg's *The Cuban Revolution and Latin America.* Now a free-lance writer living in England, the author has been both a socialist and a communist, and frankly admits Marxist biases, but claims now to be essentially anti-Marxist, while at the same time disclaiming any right to be considered a Latin American "expert." The book reflects insights gained during nineteen years in Cuba, mostly in the pre-Castro era. Mr. Goldenberg left Cuba in 1960.

Despite the disclaimer of expertize about Latin America, a substantial portion of the book concerns itself with fairly detailed and rather incisive reviews of, first, the reason for and general nature of Latin American problems, and, second, the background and development of the Cuban revolution of Fidel Castro.

An interesting aspect of the first review is the author's attempt to draw distinctions between "underdevelopment," "misdevelopment," and "imperialism," pointing out that Latin American problems are more the result of misdevelopment than either underdevelopment or imperialism. Imperialism in this discussion is defined as the regulation of an economy so as to concentrate on a single product, while misdevelopment is defined as a failure on the part of the vested interests, i.e. the ruling class, to provide for the rational development of the economy.

The review of the Cuban background for the Castro revolution is couched in terms of the unsuccessful risings, unsuccessful independence, the unsuccessful republic, unsuccessful democracy, and, finally, unsuccessful dictatorship, all of these comprising the failure of Cuban leadership, both domestic and alien, to establish a viable system. The role of the Platt Amendment is well described, though one can hardly agree with Mr. Goldenberg when he alleges that the "Cubans were *encouraged* [emphasis added] to incorporate" these provisions into their constitution, because, of course, they had no choice. On the other hand, one can heartily agree that the Platt Amendment "was both the birth certificate and the gravestone of Cuban independence." (p. 102)

However, the heart and soul of this stimulating, highly informative, and, in some respects, troubling book is to be found in the author's discussion of the Cuban revolution itself and what it has meant to the Cuban people and the western hemisphere. The conflicts and contradictions, the errors of judgment, the whole gamut of experimentation, and the marked change in the warp and woof of Cuban society that occurred during the first five years of the new era are carefully described, analyzed, and evaluated.

By and large this volume will prove of great use to future students of these problems because of the insights it provides, yet one must approach the discussion with some caution. For example, at one point the author makes quite a point of the fact that in the early phases of the revolt there was a lack of the terrorism that often characterizes such movements. Well may we ask: "What of the senseless, arbitrary, firing-squad executions that so inflamed public opinion in the United States?" Does Mr. Goldenberg not consider these terroristic, or was he not aware of them since he was still at that time in Cuba? Actually this terrorism is referred to a few pages later, and the question is put " . . . but was not this terror less cruel than that of preceding revolutions?" (p. 311)

In weighing the impact of the Cuban revolution on the rest of Latin America, the author, while alleging that the Cuban revolution must spread to other hemisphere nations or die on the vine, readily admits that Castroism has not become a dominant force in the hemisphere. He also points out that both the Alliance for Progress and Communism have failed to bring about changes, the one by evolution the other by revolution. In other words, neither reform nor revolution has brought the answer to Latin America's problems. Yet the volume ends on a note of hope when the author calls attention to various factors which may enable "Latin America . . . to avoid the Charybdis of critical underdevelopment as well as the Scylla of chaotic rebellion or totalitarianism." (P. 360.) In conclusion one is tempted to speculate as to what additions or modifications might have been made in this book if it had been written after the disappearance of Guevara from the Cuban scene and the opening of the doors to almost unrestricted flight from Cuba.—LOUIS G. KAHLE, *University of Missouri*.

SELECTED ARTICLES AND DOCUMENTS ON

COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT AND CROSS-NATIONAL RESEARCH

RICHARD L. MERRITT
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INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, LAW AND ORGANIZATION

The United States and the Arab World. By William R. Polk. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965. Pp. xvi, 320. $5.95.)

This book, written for the American Foreign Policy Library, is designed to appeal to the general reader in order to form and guide an enlightened public opinion on an important area of the world. Though it is not meant to be a scholarly monograph, it is the product of a careful researcher, an accomplished writer and a specialist who is confident of his field.

Unfortunately, the book suffers from two limitations. One is the fact that, despite the comprehensive title, it does not cover the whole Arab world. Thus, Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia are left out since they had already been dealt with in a companion volume by Charles F. Gallagher entitled *The United States and North Africa: Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia.* Under this arrangement, apart from the disadvantage, especially to Arab nationalists, of not treating the Arab world as a unit, Libya seems to have been somehow left out of the Arab picture completely.

The other limitation is rightly recorded by the author in the preface. It is the fact that Mr. Polk had been since 1961 a member of the Policy Planning Council of the State Department, actually involved in formulating United States policy toward the Middle East. In addition to broadening his knowledge, the new job had certainly altered the author's perspective and imposed some restraint on his pen—perhaps far more than he realized (p. ix).

The book is divided into six parts, only the last of which deals with the United States and the Arab world. There is little doubt that the most incisive and worthwhile portions of the book are those which do *not* deal with American involvement in the Arab world. For the author displayed there a great talent for being a "dispassionate foreigner," as he called himself (p. 103), thus producing a sagacious and perceptive analysis of Arab history and society. In this respect, Mr. Polk consistently and brilliantly related historical-geographic-societal factors to shed light upon present-day actions and reactions of the Arab leaders and people. "For the imperative of preserving or achieving dignity, the fear of reproach as being unworthy or impotent people, and finally, the importance of the form of action and the word of communication as equal to or surpassing that of the content, greatly influences Arab political behavior. To outsiders who would understand, whether condoning or opposing, this is the beginning of knowledge." (P. 35.)

When dealing with United States relations in the Arab world, the author does not display this "understanding" all the time. It is true that he criticizes the Eisenhower Doctrine for its "shortfalls" and "dangers," particularly to United States interests. But he has no patience with the Arabs when they fail to show gratitude for United States "impartiality" for voting to censure Israel in the Security Council in 1955 and for its efforts to find an "impartial" solution to the Palestine problem. Perhaps it is sufficient to say that what the State Department and its Policy Planning Council consider to be impartial actions are not viewed in the same light by the Arab world.

When stating United States policies in the Arab world, the author uses simplistic arguments and thinking. Does Mr. Polk really believe that the *basic* Arab objective is economic improvement? Does it truly supersede the political objectives (Palestine, unity, etc.)? Can the Arabs, or any nationalistic people, pursue economic aims unencumbered by the memories of colonial rule and the political-nationalistic search for dignity, identity, "true independence" and "sovereignty"? Or does Mr. Polk assume that such actions are signs of lack of political sophistication from which the Arab states are blossoming forth? One certainly gets that impression. Yet does not the author expect too much from these newly-mature countries when he suggests that "even saving 1 percent of the 10 percent or more gross national product now diverted to armaments would significantly assist national development"? (P. 294.) Has the world, especially the developing world, not suggested this to the "mature" nations, particularly the United States and the Soviet Union? And to what avail?

Despite the last chapter, Mr. Polk's book is well worth reading. In particular, the chapters dealing with nationalism, Palestine, the accelerating social revolution, and the Arabs' quest for identity and dignity are extremely well-written and most incisive. An annotated list of suggested readings at the end is useful.—Michael W. Suleiman, *Kansas State University.*

African Battleline. American Policy Choices in Southern Africa. By Waldemar A. Nielsen. (New York: Harper & Row for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1965. Pp. x, 155. $3.50.)

The President of the African-American Institute, Waldemar A. Nielsen, has made an outstanding contribution to the Council on Foreign Relations' series of Policy Books. By focussing closely on United States' responsibilities and interests in African affairs, Nielsen has achieved a quality of relevance that adds logical coherence to his presentation. Selection of the southern "white dominance" area of sub-Saharan Africa as a potential battleline dramatizes the essential nature of American involvement. Background assessments of the current situation are presented with terse lucidity and scrupulous balance.

A reader is enabled to engage in the discussion on United States' policy commitments with few reservations as regards the sufficiency of factual materials provided. Though maintaining a consistently "reasonable" and unsensational tone, Nielsen emphasizes the precarious condition of American interests in a succinct phrase. "In a curious fashion southern Africa may represent the kind of international problem in which the potential dangers to American interests are far greater than the acceptably available powers of the United States to deal with them." His conclusion follows that the United States "must join its influence to that of other powers sharing its general objectives."

It is on this key issue that more radical and comprehensive policies than those outlined by Nielsen merit discussion if the impression of inadequacy and passive helplessness is to be removed from the African policy of the United States. No single Western power, by and through its own efforts, is capable, under present conditions, of safeguarding its future interests in sub-Saharan Africa. This applies especially to the United States because of its lack of the infrastructure of commercial and administrative "know-how" acquired by major European countries during the colonial period. Consequently, until something approximating a Concert of major Western powers comes into being for co-operative action in sub-Saharan Africa, crisis diplomacy will take its normally disastrous course. Nielsen's frame of reference precludes sufficient emphasis on the significant place of France, Belgium and even West Germany as factors in any final determination of African relations with the West. France, in particular, is "on the ground" in sub-Saharan Africa to a far greater extent than the United States or even present day Britain. Perhaps too much reliance is placed on the parallel interests of the British and United States governments. While this is true of the highest levels it is less accurate on operative levels of commercial and cultural rivalry. Resentment by British business and "old Africa hands" of American intrusion should not be underestimated in its effect on practical operation of policies. Only a continuing sense of urgent danger to national interests, vigorously proclaimed on the highest levels, will ensure meaningful co-operation.

South Africa, Southwest Africa and the former High Commission territories of Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland provide the central material for Nielsen's discussion. A painful moral problem is raised through the involvement of private American finance and business in the support of the South African economy and by implication the "apartheid" culture. Nielsen's treatment of this touchy subject is fair and reasonable. He places final responsibility where it belongs, on the political branch of government and its equivocal attitude towards American business enterprise in foreign countries where the regime presents danger to national interests of the United States. There is slight evidence that private business, if given firm governmental direction, as in the case of Cuba and other danger spots, will require undue coercion to respond. A verdict of guilty through indifference deserves to be placed against at least second level government policy makers.

Nielsen does not discuss some of the wider implications of United States involvement in South Africa that are likely to have repercussions on the critical situation in Asia. Our growing reliance on Australia, with its imperfectedly concealed "White Australian" policy and equivocal support of South Africa in the United Nations, may be tied to our failure to achieve effective condemnation of "white supremacy" in southern Africa.

By his lucidly presented outline of a possible United States policy position in the southern portion of sub-Saharan Africa, Nielsen has provided reliable material for the promotion of vigorous debate in responsible business and governmental circles.—THOMAS R. ADAM, *New York University*.

The Evolution of Personnel Systems for U. S. Foreign Affairs. BY ARTHUR G. JONES. (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1965. Pp. viii, 136.)

The Development of Careers in the Foreign Service. BY JOHN E. HARR. (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1965. Pp. xvi, 104.)

Overseas Representation and Services for Federal Domestic Agencies. BY ROBERT E. ELDER. (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1965. Pp. xiv, 106.)

The American Foreign Service which came into being with the enactment of the Rogers Act in 1924 was the result of a reorganization of American representation abroad. The Act combined the Consular Corps and the Diplomatic Corps, which until that time had been separate personnel systems. The expectation was that this legislation would create a single personnel system for State Department personnel serving overseas, thus providing the United States a professional diplomatic corps for the first time in its history.

This expectation was only partially fulfilled, and the reorganization bequeathed to the Foreign Service a number of problems which continued to plague it. The principal difficulty has been that the merger of the Consular Corps and the Diplomatic Corps into a single personnel system did not alter the fact that the members of these personnel systems were performing functions which were essentially dissimilar. Consequently, since the Rogers Act, there has been either an open or tacit recognition that the functions represented by the Diplomatic Corps have been the more sought after and the more highly rewarded. This is not an arbitrary distinction since diplomatic functions have traditionally included the conduct of negotiations between nations, and the drafting of political and economic reports on the basis of which policy is made. Consular functions on the other hand have included the important but more prosaic functions of protecting American citizens abroad, issuing visas, routine commercial reporting, and administration of passport laws and regulations.

Immediately subsequent to the Rogers Act the distinction between these functions was recognized by maintaining separate promotion and assignment lists which assured the assignment of diplomatic functions to the personnel from the former Diplomatic Corps. As the infusion of new officers recruited under the examination established by the Rogers Act and as the result of the reforms contained in the Moses-Linthicum Act of 1931, a more subtle distinction, but just as clearly related to the dissimilarity of functions noted above, between substantive and non-substantive positions was made. The substantive positions were the staff-aide posts, and the political and economic reporting positions. The non-substantive positions were those which the consular corps had performed. This distinction became even more basic than another which has received more publicity: the distinction between the specialist and generalist. Those who rose to the top were generally those who were identified with substantive positions and who were considered generalists.

Two other problems which were not solved by the Rogers Act complete the matrix of problems that have been at the heart of the dispute over the nature and structure of the Foreign Service. First the question of relating the Foreign Service to the personnel representing Federal agencies other than the Department of State abroad, and secondly the problem of unifying the Foreign Service with the State Department's domestic service.

Every reorganization of the Foreign Service has had to wrestle with these problems. The latest attempt was that undertaken by the Herter Committee which offered a comprehensive plan for creating a Foreign Service which would meet the expanding needs of the United States. The three volumes being reviewed are reports prepared by members of the professional staff of the Committee. In the first of these, Arthur G. Jones has provided a competent summary of the development of the Foreign Service from the founding of the nation until the present period. All of the basic information is provided but the serious student of the origins and evolution of professional diplomacy in the United States will find it less perceptive than Warran Ilchman's fine history: *Professional Diplomacy in the United States 1779–1939;* but Jones does include the period after 1939 and therefore his monograph is of considerable use to the student of the administration of foreign affairs.

John Harr has outlined the problems of career development in the Foreign Service with some care, and makes clear the central problem that more officers want positions in political reporting and program direction than there are available positions. The problem is precisely the continued persistence of the functional distinction between substantive and non-substantive functions which none of the reorganizations have successfully integrated into a single personnel system. As Harr reports: "The evidence supports the strong impression one gains in interviewing FSO's: the political, program direction, and economic fields are regarded as the 'mainstream' of the Foreign Service, as the really important 'substantive' fields and as the fields in which one must perform well to have any expectation of attaining the highest grades."

Elder turns his attention to the representation abroad of Federal agencies whose domestic responsibilities involve overseas programs. He is precise in his identification of the dual nature of the problem involved: (1) the problem of creating a meaningful place for service overseas in a personnel system oriented to careers in the domestic service; (2) the relationship of the overseas corps of these domestic agencies to the Foreign Service. Although Elder, just as the other authors, does not offer solutions, his sympathies are with the extension of the present State-Commerce agreement on commercial officers to other agencies. Under this arrangement Foreign Service Officers are assigned to commercial attaché positions by a joint assignment panel, commercial reporting is recognized as a specialization in the Foreign Service, and Commerce has the principal voice in setting the reporting schedule.

Taken alone these reports are workman-like reviews of selected aspects of the Foreign Service. Their full worth is apparent only when they are considered in conjunction with the other reports in the series—three additional reports will be published—and with the full report of the Herter committee. Taken together, then, they represent the most detailed description of the historical development of the Forieign Service and its current problems now available.—MARTIN B. HICKMAN, *University of Southern California.*

Foreign Aid and Foreign Policy. BY HERBERT FEIS (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1964. Pp. vii, 246. $5.00.)

The great strength of such books as *The China Tangle* and *Churchill-Roosevelt-Stalin* was that they allowed those of us quite outside these great events an exceptional picture of how and why men acted in them as government. *Foreign Aid and Foreign Policy* is a quite different book; an essay of advocacy by one outside, rather than a careful history by one with access to the inside. It is a good book; indeed, if one has not the discipline to mine George Liska's pioneering and brilliant *The New Statescraft* of some years back, this book by Feis is the best available.

Feis favors concerted American effort to promote economic development. Unlike most of his fellow advocates, however, he suffers from no impulse to dismiss all other foreign policy concerns as wrong-headed, aberrations or illegitimate. He sees real dilemmas, and treats the hard choices they pose with sympathy and a wealth of illustration that opens the mind to the problem. This is the strength of the book.

The flaw is an odd one for a book by Herbert Feis and, unfortunately, needs emphasis. While he provides an excellent short sketch of things resembling foreign aid in the half century prior to World War II, the bulk of American experience with aid to underdeveloped countries during the period 1950 to 1960 is almost ignored. Feis deals extensively with the period 1961 to 1964, and does so in a way that permits the uninitiated to mistake what was said during the Kennedy Administration for what was done during the decade prior.

"Our ruling intention has been to provide means only for programs and projects that would contribute to the permanent improvement of the condition of the people assisted" (p. 116). This probably has been true from late 1962 to the present, but from the Korean War until 1962 it surely was more a stated intention than one that ruled or governed decisions to provide aid, including "aid for economic development," or decisions about the magnitude and kind of aid to particular countries. History has its uses, and the reader needs to be given stronger clues that foreign aid grew and became established during the 1950's above all as a response to real and seeming, but ever proliferating, Cold War crises. For one example, Feis does not mention the celebrated Richards mission in 1957 to find Middle Eastern countries who would accept the Eisenhower Doctrine and some of the $200 million in aid attached. One needs to know how the United States got into substantial economic aid for Lebanon in order to judge the termination of this aid in 1962–1963.

Those who know something of the history of aid will find this a small problem, for they will know what Feis is arguing against as well as what he is arguing for. But this is the sort of book that is most useful for the relatively uninitiated and, unfortunately, it will both open the mind and mislead.—ANDREW F. WESTWOOD, *The Brookings Institution.*

UN: The First Twenty Years. BY CLARK M. EICHELBERGER. (New York: Harper and Row, 1965. Pp. vii, 176. $3.50.)

Clark M. Eichelberger has been associated with American policy toward the United Nations for more than twenty years. In 1942 and 1943 as a member of a committee of five private citizens under the chairmanship of Sumner Welles, he helped prepare the first United States draft of the United Nations Charter. More recently he has served as National Director of the American Association for the United Nations. With this background, we might expect Mr. Eichelberger to combine a history of the UN's progress (and shortcomings) with an appeal for practical devotion to the purposes and principles of the Charter.

The best parts of the book are historical. The reader perceives himself in the midst of a scientific and technological revolution, many of whose potentials have not been fully realized. He can feel the major changes in the UN's political structure brought about by the breakdown and partial resurgence of Great Power unity, and the doubling of the Assembly's membership. More particularly, we are given a lively but sometimes facile review of peace-keeping achievements, disarmament negotiations, the financial crisis, and socioeconomic and human rights programs directly or indirectly under UN auspices.

Several other points are well taken. Aristide Briand's strong support for collective security through the League of Nations is effectively contrasted with current French reluctance to support UN peacekeeping programs. The critique of America's positive and negative policies toward the UN is balanced, incisive and informative. In Chapters 8 and 9, recognition that various means of strengthening the UN are largely dependent on members' attitudes is gratifyingly realistic in a book sprinkled with moral exhortations.

For this reader, the worst parts of the book are attributable to the strains of combining analysis with advocacy. This is not a book written for academic scholars. The deficiencies are perhaps clear even when we are forced to omit mitigating contextual remarks:

> [. . . The decisive factor for world peace has been the United Nations. . . . One phrase . . . may best describe [its influences on the side of peace]—'moral unity'. . . . Nations may ignore it [the UN] for a moment, but usually return to it as the only means to meet world problems. . . . The ever-present danger is that the member nations may fragmentize their concerns by alliances and bilateral action, that they may lose the vision of world society (pp. 5–7).
>
> The principles of collective security are sound. The world cannot have peace without such a system (p. 27).

Contrast these views with some of the more recent scholarly literature on international organization. Deutsch has talked about mutual responsiveness and predictability in pluralistic security communities; Haas has studied convergent interests and the indirect contributions to integration of specific functional tasks; Etzioni and others have argued for regional building blocks before attempting world unity; Claude has challenged the principles of collective security, while calling for international pluralism and responsive diplomacy. Eichelberger cites none of these scholars. Even among men of good will, barriers to communication may be enormous.

This book will sustain some and stimulate others working to strengthen the United Nations. Ironically, it may even encourage some of its readers to investigate more scholarly books about the United Nations.—HAYWARD R. ALKER, JR., *Yale University*.

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NEWS AND NOTES

RESEARCH INFORMATION

Mr. William M. Franklin, Director, Historical Office, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State, has called to the Association's attention the fact that the American Embassy at Bonn reports that the Foreign Office of the German Federal Republic has been experiencing difficulty in handling the increasing number of foreign scholars who have come to Bonn to use the archives of the Foreign Office. Some of these scholars have arrived in Bonn to do research without any prior notification whatever. He asks that the researchers who want to consult the records of the Foreign Office at Bonn should so indicate by letter at least four months in advance of arrival. The letter may be addressed to the

Leiter des Politischen Archive,
Auswärtiges amt, Bonn

or to

The Cultural Attaché
American Embassy, Bonn

PROFESSIONAL CONFERENCES

The annual meeting of the New York State Political Science Association will be held March 25–26, 1966, at Albany, New York. Officers of the Association elected for the year 1965–66 are: James A. Riedel, president (State University of New York); Maynard Smith, vice-president (Hobart College); John Gunnell, secretary-treasurer (State University of New York); Jewel Bellush (Hunter College), Robert Elder (Colgate University) and Donald McWherter (State University of New York), members of the executive council.

At its annual meeting in March, 1965, the Pacific Northwest Political Science Association elected the following officers: president, George Wolfe, College of Idaho; vice-president, Edwin Stillings, Willamette University; Donald Farmer, Pacific Lutheran University and John Kessel, University of Washington, members of the executive council. George A. Condon, Washington State University, was named secretary-treasurer, succeeding Donald G. Balmer, Lewis and Clark College, who had held the post for nine years. The University of Victoria at Victoria, British Columbia, was host to the conference.

OTHER ACTIVITIES

A Political Science Section of the Law and Society Association was organized in Washington on September 10, 1965. The purpose of the Law and Society Association is to encourage interdisciplinary contacts and work among political scientists, sociologists, psychologists, and lawyers who are interested in research into legal processes. The LSA will publish a new journal and sponsor panels at national and regional meetings of the member disciplines. At the Washington meeting, the following were elected to an organizing committee of the Political Science Section:

David Danelski, Yale University, Eastern Representative; Herbert Jacob, University of Wisconsin, Madison, National Board Member; Martin Shapiro, University of California, Irvine, Western Representative; Joseph Tanenhaus, University of Iowa, Midwestern Representative; Kenneth N. Vines, Tulane University, Southern Representative.

For the nineteenth consecutive year, the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan will hold a Summer Institute in Survey Research Techniques. The Institute is designed to meet some of the educational and training needs of men and women engaged in business and governmental research and other statistical work, and graduate students and university instructors interested in quantitative research in the social sciences. The 1966 Institute will be presented in two four-week sessions, the first from June 27 to July 21 and the second from July 25 to August 18. These two sessions may be taken independently or successively. For further information write: Survey Research Center, The University of Michigan, P.O. 1248, Ann Arbor, Michigan.

The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace has granted the sum of $30,000 to the International Studies Association to support the organization's development over the next two years. The International Studies Association was founded in 1959 as a professional association of scholars, teachers and practitioners interested in world affairs. Through regular national and regional meetings, through its journal *Background*, and through other activities, it seeks to assist in the orderly growth of knowledge and in the cooperation of the many fields of scholarship which contribute to an understanding of the organized relations, official and unofficial among nations.

A six-week seminar in comparative public administration was held at the University of California at Berkeley. The sessions, under the direction of Dwight Waldo, were devoted to a consideration of "Administration and Development: The Temporal Dimension." The seminar received support from the Comparative Administration Group of the ASPA.

A Center for Comparative Political Analysis has been formed in connection with the department of political science at the University of Minnesota. John E. Turner and Robert T. Holt are director and assistant director respectively. The Center will undertake appropriate research projects and will publish the results. It is at present a sub-contractor for part of a study of A.I.D.-supported overseas projects of American Universities. It is considering the establishment of a data archive of materials on comparative politics.

The department of government at Indiana University, in cooperation with Purdue and the U. S. Civil Service Commission, sponsored the University-Federal Agency Conference on Science, Technology and Public Policy in November. The conference discussion focused on continuing career development in fields related to science and technology.

The Michigan Center for Education in Politics is now permanently headquartered at Western Michigan University under the directorship of Robert W. Kaufman.

The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill has established the Louis Harris Political Data Center. The Center will serve as the official repository of the survey data collected by Louis Harris and Associates. The data will be open to the academic community. James W. Prothro has been appointed director, William Keech, associate director and Alden Lind, technical director.

Lincoln University has established an Institute of African Government. Harold F. Alderfer is director of the institute and John Marcum, co-director.

Thomas Greene, Bucknell University; Carroll Hurd, University of Utah; Fred Krinsky, University of Southern California; Samuel Krislov, University of Minnesota; Benjamin Nimer, The George Washington University; Leo Pfeffer, Long Island University; Robert Puckett; University of Virginia; Pierre Secher, Western Reserve University; Richard Sterling, Dartmouth College; and Ralph Straetz, New York University, were among fifteen American social scientists who participated as members of a Social Science Institute at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem from July 7 to August 3. The Institute was sponsored by the American Association for Middle East Studies, with the assistance of the Bureau of Cultural and Educational Affairs of the Department of State. The participants carried on independent research, in addition to meeting in discussions about Israeli society and foreign relations with various members of the Kaplan School of Social Science and government officials and visiting various places in the country.

The East African Studies Center at Syracuse University recently played host to two Tanzanian labor leaders: Mr. David B. S. Zimbihile, Director of International Affairs, National Union of Tanzanian Workers (NUTA); and Mr. Emulongose B. S. Mohamed, Assistant General Secretary, National Union of Tanzanian Workers. Their visit to the United States was sponsored by the Bureau of International Labor Affairs of the Department of Labor.

Virginia Polytechnic Institute will be host to a third conference on "Mathematical Applications in Political Science." The conference is scheduled for June 19 to July 9, 1966. It is designed to serve political science faculties active in teaching and research. Stipends up to $300 plus travel allowances of 4 cents a mile will be available for thirty participants. Applications will be accepted through May 1. Inquiries should be directed to: Joseph L. Bernd, Director, Conference on Mathematical Applications in Political Science, Department of Political Science, Virginia Polytechnic Institute, Blacksburg, Virginia 24061.

Henry J. Abraham, University of Pennsylvania, conducted a ten-day seminar in American government and politics for 45 high school teachers from Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden in Mora, Sweden in August, 1965.

Samir N. Anabtawi, Vanderbilt University, is serving as visiting research associate, Center of International Studies, Princeton University.

David Apter, University of California at Berkeley, is on leave of absence for the 1965–66 academic year and is conducting research in Latin America.

Morley Ayearst, New York University, visited Egypt and Lebanon in February as a member of an academic team from various universities in the state of New York to investigate possibilities of a Middle East Studies Center in Cairo.

Charles Backstrom is on leave of absence from the University of Minnesota. He is the recipient of a Congressional Fellowship awarded by the American Council for Education in Politics.

Stephen K. Bailey, Syracuse University, is on research leave of absence until September, 1966, conducting a study under the auspices of a Carnegie Corporation grant. While in Washington he will be a Brookings Institution Fellow.

Willard F. Barber has returned to the University of Maryland after spending a year at the Ohio State University as a guest Mershon professor.

Charles Barrell, Bowling Green State University, recently elected city councilman, has been granted research leave for 1966.

Thomas J. Bellows is a lecturer at Nanyang University, Singapore, during the current academic year.

Robert Berdahl has resumed his duties at San Francisco State College after having served as co-commissioner with Sir James Duff of Durham University in a study of university government in Canada.

Thomas C. Blaisdell, Jr., emeritus professor, University of California at Berkeley, has been recalled to teaching for 1965–66.

Arthur W. Bromage, University of Michigan, received a citation from Wesleyan University for outstanding achievement as a teacher and a scholar.

Rufus Browing, University of Wisconsin, has been on leave at the University of California Berkeley, on an NSF grant. He is also a visiting professor in the business administration department there.

Robert Casier has returned from his sabbatical leave to his position as department chairman at Santa Barbara City College after being awarded the doctorate in political science by the University of California at Santa Barbara.

Donald Castleberry, San Francisco State College, is spending the 1965–66 year in Sweden as a resident director of the California State International program there.

Dorothy I. Cline, University of New Mexico, was appointed by the governor of the state to be director of the State Government Intern Program, a summer training program for students of New Mexico Universities.

Jules Cohn was named chairman of the Internship Program of the Metropolitan New York Center for education in Politics in June, 1965.

John Deiner, Rutgers University, is conducting research in Buenos Aires under a grant from the Foreign Area Fellowship Program.

Robert B. Dishman, University of New Hampshire, has been awarded a Fulbright lectureship at the University of West Indies, Trinidad, for 1965–66.

Salo Engel has returned to his duties at the University of Tennessee after two years of research at the Harvard Law School. The research was financed by a Ford Law Faculty Fellowship and a Rockefeller grant.

John T. Everett, Jr., Texas Christian University, participated in an institute on Nuclear Science and World Politics held at Oak Ridge under the sponsorship of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Carnegie Foundation.

Gisbert H. Flanz, New York University, is on sabbatical leave during the spring term, 1966. He is engaged in research in Korea.

George Frederickson and Robert Zimring, University of Maryland, have been awarded a research grant from the International City Managers' Association.

R. Gene Geisler has returned to San Francisco State College from Kampala, Uganda, where he was a member of the University of Chicago's project at Makerere University.

Henry Goodnow, University of Colorado, is spending the academic year at the University of California at Berkeley. He is associated with the Institute of Governmental studies at the University.

James Gregg is on leave from his position at Chico State College and is serving in the office of Governor Edmond G. Brown of California under an NCEP grant.

Barbara B. Green, Wellesley College, has been selected by a committee of senior honor students as the first recipient of the Morris L. Ernst award for skill in stimulating the intellectual pursuits of her students.

Ernst B. Haas is serving as acting associate director of the Institute of International Studies, University of California at Berkeley, 1965–66.

Richard Harris has returned from the University of Ibadan, Nigeria, to take up his duties at the University of California at Berkeley.

Murray C. Havens, University of Texas, has been award a Fulbright lectureship at the University of Sidney, Australia.

Arnold J. Heidenheimer is on leave from the University of Florida on an NSF grant for 1965–66.

James Herndon has been appointed honors coordinator at the University of North Dakota.

Ralph K. Huitt, University of Wisconsin, has been named Assistant Secretary in charge of congressional liaison for the Department of Health, Education and Welfare.

Chalmers A. Johnson, University of California at Berkeley, has received a SSRC grant and is conducting research in the Far East.

Gladys Kammmerer is on leave from the University of Florida on an SSRC grant.

Kemal Karpat, New York University, is organizing an international conference on social foundations of democracy in the Middle East. The conference is expected to attract scholars from the U. S., Europe and all the Middle Eastern countries and will meet in Beirut or Istanbul in the spring of 1966.

Leo Kerschner, California State College at Fullerton, has been appointed senior associate at Hollander Associates in Fullerton.

Young W. Kihl, Juniata College, has received an SSRC grant and is on leave during the spring term 1966.

George Klein, Western Michigan University, directed a 1965 summer study tour of Yugoslavia of twenty students from WMU.

C. I. Eugene Kim, Western Michigan University of conducting research in Korea under a grant from the American Philosophical Society.

Arpad von Lazar, Vanderbilt University, will spend the 1966 year on a research leave in Chile, Argentina and Brazil under an SSRC grant.

Chong-Sik Lee, University of Pennsylvania, is on research leave during 1965–66.

Rene Lemarchand, University of Florida, has been appointed director of the University's new African Area Studies program.

Albert Lepawsky, University of California at Berkeley, was on sabbatical leave during the fall term, 1965–66.

Leslie Lipson, University of California at Berkeley, was on leave of absence during 1964–65 and served as director of studies, Atlantic Institute, Paris. He was assisted in Berkeley by Hugh McD. Clokie, associate research political scientist.

John W. Macy, chairman of the U. S. Civil Service Commission, presented a certificate to University of Indiana Chancellor Herman B Wells signifying the appreciation of the Commission for "fifty years of valuable and significant contributions to the study of government and public administration in the United States."

David Mars, University of Southern California, has returned to his position after two years in Brazil where he worked under a USAID/USC technical assistance contract. While in Brazil he was attached to the Brazilian school of Public Administration of the Getulio Varagas Foundation.

O. Ruth McQuown is on leave from the University of Florida on an SSRC grant.

Fred R. von der Mehden, University of Wisconsin, is on leave of absence in Bangkok, evaluating A.I.D. programs in southeast Asia for the Department of State.

Norman Meller was elected vice president of the WSPA, 1965–66, at its 17th annual meeting held at Victoria, B.C.

Douglas Mendel, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, has been appointed secretary-treasurer of the Midwest Conference of Political Scientists for the period January–September, 1966.

Theodore Mitau, Macalester College, has been appointed to a three-year term as book review editor of the *Midwest Journal of Political Science*.

Clement Moore, University of California at Berkeley, was on leave for the 1965 fall term and conducted research in Morocco.

Hans J. Morgenthau, University of Chicago, has an appointment as senior fellow of the Council on Foreign Relations for 1966.

William L. Morrow is on leave from DePauw University during 1965–66. He has a Congressional Internship.

Frederick C. Mosher, University of California at Berkeley, will be on sabbatical leave during the spring term, 1966.

PHILIP E. MOSELY, Columbia University, has been appointed to the Board of Associates of the University of Pennsylvania's Foreign Policy Research Institute and to the editorial board of *Orbis*, the scholarly journal published by the Institute.

PETER H. ODEGARD completed a fall term Fulbright assignment in Germany and will resume teaching duties at the University of California at Berkeley in the spring term.

MICHAEL O'LEARY, Syracuse University, testified in June before the Monroney-Madden Joint Committee on the Organization of the Congress. The testimony included data from a recently completed study on the Congress.

DENNIS J. PALUMBO, Fels Institute of Local and State Government, University of Pennsylvania, has received a two-year grant from the U. S. Public Health Service. OLIVER P. WILLIAMS, also of the University of Pennsylvania, will be associated with the project.

BHAGWATI P. K. PODDAR, Illinois State University, has been awarded a research grant by the Relm Foundation for study in India.

JAMES K. POLLOCK, University of Michigan, has been selected as a trustee of the new Citizens Conference on State Legislatures which has recently received grants from the Carnegie and Ford Foundations. He has also been appointed by Governor Romney to a study commission on legislative compensation. He was elected chairman of the commission.

DENNIS M. RAY will be on leave of absence from his duties at the University of Wyoming during the spring term of 1966.

ELLSWORTH L. RAYMOND directed the first student tour of Russia during the summer of 1965 sponsored by New York University.

JOHN C. RESENBRINK has returned to Bowdoin College after three years with the Agency for International Development in Kenya and Tanganyika.

RALPH RETZLAFF, University of California at Berkeley, has returned to teaching after a year in India where he taught at Gokhale Institute of Politics and Economics, Maharashtra, Poona.

FAUNEIL J. RINN, San Jose State College, is a guest scholar at the Center for Advanced Study of the Brookings Institution during 1965–66.

CHARLES B. ROBSON has returned to his position as Kenan professor at the University of North Carolina after spending a semester at the University of Cologne in Germany.

ALVIN Z. RUBINSTEIN, University of Pennsylvania, has been awarded a Guggenheim fellowship to undertake a program of research in Yugoslav and Eastern Europe.

ROBERT SCALAPINO, University of California at Berkeley, is on sabbatical leave during 1965–66. He was a member of the University of Mexico faculty during the 1965 summer term.

PAUL SEABURY, University of California at Berkeley, is spending a sabbatical leave in England and Europe.

CURRIN V. SHIELDS, University of Arizona, attended a conference held in Washington, November 16 and 17, to establish criteria for Health, Education and Welfare grants to colleges and universities. He also participated in the White House Conference on International Cooperation held November 28–December 1.

FRANK J. SORAUF, has resumed his duties in the University of Minnesota after a year as visiting professor in the Bologna Center of the Johns Hopkins University.

RICHARD N. SWIFT, New York University, represented the University at the meetings of the U. S. National Commission for UNESCO in Kansas City, in November.

JOHN T. THOMPSON, University of Wyoming, was on leave of absence during the fall semester 1965–66.

THOMAS LANDON THORSON, University of Wisconsin, is teaching at the University of the Philippines, Quezon City, for the current year, under a Rockefeller Foundation grant.

WOODWORTH G. THROMBLEY, University of Indiana, left in December to become head of a mission to establish a National Institute of Development Administration in Thailand. He represents the Midwest Universities Consortium on International Activities.

HARVEY WALKER, Ohio State University, participated in the White House Conference on International Cooperation held in Washington in November.

LOUIS WASSERMAN, San Francisco State College, has returned to his post from a year in Sweden where he was resident director of the California State International program. He also lectured in Uppsala and Stockholm universities.

J. K. Zawodny, University of Pennsylvania, spent the 1964–65 year doing research in Europe. He delivered lectures at the London School of Slavonic Studies, Radio Free Europe, Munich, and attended a conference at the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London.

STAFF CHANGES

New Appointments

Don T. Allensworth, assistant professor, University of Pennsylvania; research assistant, Fels Institute of Local and State Government, University of Pennsylvania.

Ernest Benjamin, assistant professor, Wayne State University.

Herbert M. Berk, lecturer, University of Pennsylvania.

Franklyn Bonn, assistant professor, Chatham College.

Philip W. Buck, professor, Pennsylvania State University; formerly of Stanford University.

William R. Campbell, University of Rhode Island.

Winberg Chai, assistant professor, University of Redlands

In Teak Chung, instructor, Vanderbilt University, 1965–66.

Arthur C. Churchill, assistant professor, Defiance College, Ohio.

James D. Cochrane, assistant professor, Western Michigan University.

William J. Conyngham, assistant professor, Catholic University.

Walter M. Cunningham, lecturer, California State College, Fullerton.

Ernest De Prospo, Jr., instructor, Pennsylvania State University, 1965–66.

John C. Donovan, De Alva Stanwood professor, Bowdoin College; formerly Manpower Administrator, Department of Labor.

Lawrence Durisch, professor, University of Tennessee.

William D. Eaton, instructor, University of California at Berkeley, 1965–66.

Thomas E. Eichhorst, instructor, University of Missouri at St. Louis.

Eugene Eidenberg, assistant professor, University of Minnesota.

Harold T. Ellis, assistant professor, San Jose State College.

Paul Stephen Ello, assistant professor, Georgetown University.

Minerva M. Etzioni, lecturer, San Jose State College.

Raymond J. Fening, instructor, Miami University (Ohio).

Irving D. Fisher, lecturer, Bowdoin College: formerly of Brooklyn College.

Michael J. Francis, assistant professor, California State College at Fullerton; formerly of Texas A and M.

Marcus F. Franda, assistant professor, Colgate University.

Richard M. Fulton, instructor, Knox College.

John A. Gardiner, assistant professor, University of Wisconsin.

Kenneth Gervais, assistant professor, Portland State College.

Marianne Githens, lecturer, Catholic University.

Marshall Goldstein, associate professor, University of Hawaii.

Michael Gordon, acting assistant professor, University of California, Santa Barbara.

Charles R. Green, associate professor, Macalester College; formerly of Oregon State University.

Jyotirindra Das Gupta, acting assistant professor, University of California, Berkeley.

Joseph Haberer, instructor, University of California, Berkeley, 1965–66.

Stuart C. Hall, lecturer, San Jose State College.

Louis Harris, lecturer, University of North Carolina.

Richard Harris, acting assistant professor, University of California, Santa Barbara.

Ruth R. Hawkins, assistant professor, Fordham University.

Jonathan P. Hawley, assistant professor, University of Tulsa.

Thomas A. Henderson, assistant professor, University of Florida.

Carl Hetrick, acting assistant professor, University of California, Santa Barbara.

Douglas I. Hodgkin, instructor, Bowdoin College, 1965–66.

S. Kenneth Howard, assistant professor, University of North Carolina.

Charles F. Hughes, assistant professor, University of Rhode Island.

Harold R. Isaacs, professor, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

J. Terry Iversen, instructor, University of Wyoming.

Raghavan Iyer, lecturer, University of California at Santa Barbara; formerly of Oxford University.

Kamel Abu Jaber, assistant professor, University of Tennessee.

William H. Jackson, Jr., lecturer, Catholic University.

William J. Keefe, Given professor, Chatham College.

Gerald E. Kerns, assistant professor, Wayne State University; formerly of Indiana University.

Marshall Knappen, professor, Western Michigan University; formerly of the University of Delaware.

Marian E. Krogman, instructor, University of Missouri.

David L. Larson, associate professor, University of New Hampshire; formerly of Tufts University.

Todd R. La Porte, assistant professor, University of California at Berkeley.

Keith R. Legg, instructor, University of California, Berkeley, 1965–66.

Mary K. Lepper, assistant professor, California State College, Fullerton.

Daniel S. Lev, assistant professor, University of California, Berkeley.

Paul H. Lewis, assistant professor, Louisiana State University.

Mrs. Paul H. Lewis, special lecturer, Louisiana State University.

Alden Lind, assistant professor, University of North Carolina.

J. Anthony Long, instructor, University of Wyoming.

Theodore J. Lowi, associate professor, University of Chicago; formerly of Cornell University.

David McGregor, instructor, Fordham University.

Dean Mann, associate professor, University of California at Santa Barbara; formerly with the Ford Foundation in Caracas, Venezuela.

Lois Ann Martin, instructor, DePauw University, 1965–66.

William Marty, assistant professor, Memphis State University.

Robert B. Moody, assistant professor, Portland State College; formerly of American University, Cairo, Egypt.

Thomas P. Morrison, lecturer, University of California, Berkeley, 1965–66.

Robert J. Mowitz, professor, Pennsylvania State University.

Robert O. Myhr, assistant professor, University of Washington.

A. F. Kier Nash, acting assistant professor, University of California, Santa Barbara.

Robert E. Newton, assistant professor, Catholic University, 1965–66.

Jose Nun, lecturer, University of California at Berkeley, 1965–66.

Daniel O'Neil, assistant professor, University of Tennessee.

James S. Pacy, assistant professor, Westminster College, formerly of American University.

Thomas L. Page, assistant professor, University of Florida.

Chi Young Pak, assistant professor, University of Wyoming.

William J. Parente, instructor, Antioch College.

Neale J. Pearson, assistant professor, Miami University (Ohio).

John A. Rehfuss, assistant professor, San Jose State College.

James M. Rhodes, instructor, Marquette University.

Richard J. Richardson, assistant professor, Western Michigan University.

Ira S. Rohter, assistant professor, University of Wisconsin at Milwaukee.

Harold S. Rosen, lecturer, San Jose State College.

Lloyd A. Rowe, assistant professor, University of Pennsylvania; research assistant, Fels Institute of Local and State Government, University of Pennsylvania.

Ram. M. Roy, assistant professor, Memphis State University.

Myron Rush, professor, Cornell University; formerly with the RAND Corporation.

Lyman T. Sargent, assistant professor, University of Missouri.

Robert F. Sasseen, lecturer, San Jose State College.

Joel Schwartz, assistant professor, University of North Carolina.

T. MacNider Simpson III, assistant professor, University of Tennessee.

Allan P. Sindler, professor, Cornell University; formerly of Duke University.

L. P. Singh, assistant professor, Pennsylvania State University, 1965–66.

David Smeltzer, assistant professor, Portland State College.

Richard Solomon, assistant professor, University of Michigan.

Robert Steers, assistant professor, Memphis State University.

Arthur B. Stein, University of Rhode Island.

Hugh W. Stephens, assistant professor, University of Houston; formerly of Texas Technological College.

Leonard A. Stitelman, assistant professor, Wayne State University.

Edwin B. Strong, Jr., assistant professor, University of Tulsa.

David L. Sudhalter, associate professor. Massachusetts State College; formerly of Calvin Coolidge College.

Dae-Sook Suh, assistant professor, University of Houston; formerly of Columbia University.

Michael Suleiman, assistant professor, Kansas State University.

Richard A. Sundeen, Jr., Stillman College.

Louis M. Terrill, instructor, San Jose State College.

Wesley B. Truitt, instructor, DePauw University.

Jack E. Vincent, assistant professor, Florida Atlantic University; formerly of Central Michigan University.

Vernon C. Warren, assistant professor, Eastern Kentucky State College.

David Wax, Stillman College.

W. Hardy Wickwar, professor, University of South Carolina; formerly Chief of World Food Program, United Nations Secretariat.

Edward J. Williams, instructor, Marquette University.

Roy E. Young, assistant professor, San Jose State College.

Visiting Appointments 1965–66

James E. Anderson, Wake Forest College: visiting associate professor, University of Houston, spring term, 1966.

Hannah Arendt, University of Chicago: visiting professor, Cornell University, fall term, 1965.

Frank Bestor, visiting instructor, University of Idaho.

Harold W. Chase, University of Minnesota: visiting professor, Army War College.

Rafiqul Choudhury, University of Hawaii.

Milton Greenberg, Western Michigan University: visiting professor, University of Wisconsin, summer term, 1965.

Marko L. Haggard, Portland State College: visiting lecturer, Peace Corps Training Center, Arecibo, Puerto Rico, fall term, 1965.

Paul Y. Hammond, RAND Corporation: visiting professor, University of Texas, spring term, 1966.

John Hanessian, University of Hawaii, summer and fall terms, 1965.

Wolfram F. Hanreider, Princeton University: visiting assistant professor, University of California at Berkeley, spring term, 1966.

Anne Renouf Headley, visiting instructor, University of North Carolina, fall term, 1965.

Helen Hill Ingram, visiting assistant professor, University of New Mexico.

Ralph Lerner, University of Chicago: visiting associate professor, Cornell University.

David Lowenthal, Wheaton College: visiting professor, Wellesley College.

Alpheus T. Mason, Princeton University: visiting professor, University of California at Santa Barbara, summer term, 1965.

Floyd W. Matson, University of Hawaii.

Martin Merson, visiting assistant professor, Washington and Lee University.

C. Herman Pritchett, University of Chicago: visiting professor, University of California at Santa Barbara, spring term, 1965.

Peter Ranis, visiting assistant professor and coordinator of Area Studies of the Permanent Peace Corps Training Center, University of New Mexico.

Albert Rosenthal, University of Denver: visiting professor, the Public Administration Center, University of Minnesota.

Frederick L. Schuman, visiting professor, Portland State College, summer term, 1965.

John Shingler, visiting lecturer, University of Wisconsin.

Lloyd M. Short, University of Minnesota: visiting professor, Lincoln University.

Surindar Suri, visiting associate professor, University of Florida.

James R. Watson, visiting professor, Rutgers University.

Harmon Ziegler, University of Oregon: visiting associate professor, University of Washington, spring term, 1966.

OTHER APPOINTMENTS

Harold F. Alderfer, director of the Institute of African Government, Lincoln University.

Vernon Aspaturian, director of the Soviet and Slavic Language Area Center, Pennsylvania State University.

Maxine P. Bennett, acting chairman, division of Social Sciences, Stillman College.

Robert Berdahl, chairman, San Francisco State College, 1965–66.

William Boyer, chairman, Kansas State University; formerly of Pittsburgh University.

D. Mackenzie Brown, dean, Prescott College, Prescott, Arizona; formerly of the University of California at Santa Barbara.

William Buchanan, head of the department and professor, Washington and Lee University.

Karl H. Cerny, chairman, Georgetown University.

Morton H. Cowden, director of International Studies, Briar Cliff College.

David R. Derge, associate dean of the Graduate School, University of Indiana.

Paul C. Dunham, research associate, University of New Hampshire.

Thomas R. Dye, acting head of the department, University of Georgia.

Leon D. Epstein, University of Wisconsin, Dean of the College of Letters and Science.

Harry J. Friedman, chairman, University of Hawaii.

Kenneth R. Gervais, associate director of the Center for Urban Studies, Portland State College.

Milton Greenberg, chairman, Western Michigan University.

Charles V. Hamilton, chairman and associate professor, Lincoln University; formerly of Rutgers-Newark.

Howard D. Hamilton, acting chairman, Bowling Green State University.

John J. Hooker, acting head of the department, Catholic University.

Charles F. Hughes, assistant director of the

Bureau of Government Research, University of Rhode Island.

Frank M. Lewis, chairman and professor, University of Toledo: formerly of the University of South Dakota.

Arthur C. Marlow, chairman, Marquette University.

John Brown Mason, reappointed chairman, California State College at Fullerton.

M. Nelson McGeary, dean of the Graduate School, Pennsylvania State University.

William R. Monat, acting head of the department, Pennsylvania State University, 1965–66.

Robert J. Mowitz, director of the Institute of Public Administration, Pennsylvania State University.

Robert C. Nairn, president, Prescott College, Prescott, Arizona; formerly of the University of California at Santa Barbara.

Frederic D. Odgen, dean, School of Arts and Sciences, Eastern Kentucky State College.

Kenneth Ostrander, Bureau of Public Administration, University of Tennessee.

Dwynal B. Pettingill, chairman, Eastern Kentucky State College; formerly of William and Mary.

John Petty, Bureau of Public Administration, University of Tennessee.

Claude S. Phillips, director of the Institute of International and Area Studies, Western Michigan University.

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George H. Watson, dean of students, Roosevelt University.

Frederic Wurzburg, chairman, University of New Hampshire.

Promotions (with new rank)

Herbert S. Albinski, Pennsylvania State University: associate professor.

Gordon E. Baker, University of California at Santa Barbara: professor.

John T. Ballard, San Jose State College: professor.

Martin Birnbach, San Jose State College: associate professor.

Alan S. Engel, Miami University (Ohio): associate professor.

Dan N. Jacobs, Miami University (Ohio): professor.

Norman Jacobson, University of California at Berkeley: professor.

Chalmers A. Johnson, University of California at Berkeley: associate professor.

Se Jin Kim, Eastern Kentucky State College: assistant professor.

George Klein, Western Michigan University: associate professor.

Richard Kraemer, University of Texas: assistant professor.

Chong-Sik Lee, University of Pennsylvania: associate professor.

Victor T. Le Vine, Washington University: professor.

Ralph E. Mitchell, Miami University (Ohio): assistant professor.

William R. Monat, Pennsylvania State University: professor.

William L. Morrow, DePauw University: associate professor.

Theodore M. Norton, San Jose State College: associate professor.

Roy Olton, Western Michigan University: professor.

Robert H. Salisbury, Washington University: professor.

David Stern, Colgate University: assistant professor.

Henry J. Teune, University of Pennsylvania: associate professor.

Fred H. Willhoite, Louisiana State University: associate professor.

Frederic Wurzburg, University of New Hampshire: associate professor.

Resignations and Retirements

Ernest E. Rossi has resigned his assistant professorship at Catholic University.

Robert Scalapino has resigned as chairman of the department at the University of California at Berkeley.

Lloyd M. Short has retired from the University of Minnesota faculty after a thirty-year period of service there. During his tenure he developed the Public Administration Center at the University and served as chairman of the department from 1951–1961. He is currently president of the American Society of Public Administration.

William V. Weber has resigned his chairmanship at Western Michigan University to resume full time teaching duties.

IN MEMORIAM

The loss to the political science profession through the death, from cancer, of DON R. LARSON can only partially be measured by recounting his past activities. Born June 20, 1914, his academic background included a B.A. from Augustana and a M.A. and Ph.D. from the University of Texas.

His excellence as a teacher was first demonstrated as a teaching fellow at the University of Texas. He continued to stimulate and inspire in progressively more responsible positions at Baylor, Texas Tech, and the University of Miami where he served as Professor and Chairman of the Political Science Department from 1947 to 1956.

His talents, however, were not limited to the teaching profession. He served on the staff of the Public Administration Service, 1956–1958, and as Consultant on Urban County Problems for Fairfax County, Virginia, 1958–1960. In 1960 he became Associate Director for the Municipal Manpower Commission and served in that position until joining the University of Southern California's public administration group in Pakistan in 1962 where he was appointed the first Chairman of the newly created Department of Public Administration, University of the Punjab, Lahore, Pakistan. As his colleagues in Pakistan, we observed that this position required vigor and patience, diplomatic skill and hard work, and a practical orientation of an academically-trained mind. Today, this department is functioning as one of his outstanding legacies. He was distinguished in manner and bearing yet possessed an expansive warmth and charm that immediately put people, of any culture, at ease.

Returning from Pakistan in September, 1964, he joined the staff of the National Municipal League as Director of Field Activities, in which capacity he continued to carry on despite the steady progress of the disease. And when finally he was bedridden and in great pain, he co-authored with his brother, Arthur Larson, *Vietnam and Beyond: A New American Foreign Policy and Program*—proposing the kind of constructive alternatives in Southeast Asia which President Johnson repeatedly has asked from the academic profession.

Here, then, was a political scientist of unusual spirit and dedication, whose death September 17, 1965 proves a great loss to his many associates and friends.—JAMES S. ROBERTS AND WILLIAM W. BOYER.

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The American Political Science Association again has received from The Asia Foundation a grant for encouraging closer relations between Asian and American political scientists. The funds will be used in three ways:

1) To enable Asian political scientists to become members of The American Political Science Association for a one-year period at greatly reduced rates. Membership includes subscription to *The American Political Science Review.* To be eligible, applicants must reside in one of the Asian countries listed below.

2) To enable libraries, university departments, and research institutes in Asia, who have heretofore been unable to do so, to subscribe to *The American Political Science Review* at greatly reduced rates.

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(Applicants must be at least at the graduate student level and may come from any of the following Asian countries: Afghanistan, Burma, Ceylon, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Laos, Malaysia, Nepal, Pakistan, the Philippines, the Ruyukyus, the Republic of China (Taiwan), Thailand, and Vietnam. Applicants who have not previously received grants will be given first consideration. Application forms may be obtained from The American Political Science Association, 1726 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W., Washington, D. C. 20036.)

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

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

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

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

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
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
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

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